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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

THE

ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE
THE

ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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THE present edition of the Ethics was planned on a more ambitious scale twelve years ago, and most of it was written before 1890. At that time I was unaware that Mr Bywater was so soon to give us a revised text, and that Mr Stewart was about to publish his "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics." When these facts came to my knowledge, I laid my own work aside, as I could not suppose it would any longer be required. But, when the publishers informed me that they intended to bring out an edition of a less elaborate kind, and asked me to undertake it, I felt that it might be worth while to bring the work I had already done into more moderate compass, especially as I was conscious that my method of interpretation was a somewhat novel one, and might possess a certain interest for students of Aristotle. I had come to the conclusion that most of the difficulties that have been raised about the Ethics were due to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages had long been admitted, commentators had never thoroughly recognised that the treatise was dialectical throughout. They had tried to find in it the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the foundations of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character, taken as they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another from

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popular Platonism, they have been ready to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency, or to doubt the authenticity of the treatise in its present form. There are indications in the writings of Diels and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff referred to in the Introduction that a different view is gaining ground in Germany, and this edition is a humble contribution to its advancement.

From the nature of the case, the text I have given is a somewhat eclectic affair, and is not intended as a contribution to Aristotelian criticism. It would doubtless have been more convenient for the student if I had simply reprinted Professor Bywater's text as it stands, but such a proceeding would hardly have been justifiable. I have therefore taken as a basis my own revision of Bekker's text, made with the help of Susemihl's edition ten years ago. As was to be expected, it presents some points of resemblance to Professor Bywater's text, though I have been less decided in preferring K\textsuperscript{b} to L\textsuperscript{b} where these mss. differ. I had published a few of my notes on the text in the Classical Review before the publication of Professor Bywater's edition, and had hit upon some of the corrections he has introduced, a fact which he has most generously acknowledged. It is, however, in matters of punctuation that I owe most to Professor Bywater. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the improved punctuation he has given us is as good as an exegetical commentary based as it is on an unrivalled knowledge of Aristotle's use of language. It will be understood that I have not hesitated to adopt many of Mr Bywater's readings, including a considerable number that he has not received into the text himself. The text of the Eudemian extracts which, for reasons given in the Introduction, I have printed at the bottom of the page, is mainly Susemihl's. I regret that have not been able to make more use of the notes whic Dr Henry Jackson is now contributing to the Journal of Philology, though I have been able to incorporate a few of
his suggestions, and especially the admirable conjecture by
which he has restored to us a new fragment of Eunikos
(p. 375).

It is inevitable that, in a commentary like the present,
most of the illustrations should be old, though I think I may
claim to have added some new ones. I have, of course, made
constant use of Bonitz's Index, and that indeed is the source
of the greater part of my quotations. My own contribution
to the illustration of the Ethics lies chiefly in the direction
of tracing the originals of many passages in Plato and
Isokrates. This was closely connected with my general
method of interpretation, and I may fairly claim that some
of the material has been collected for the first time; but no
one can be more conscious than I am how much still remains
to be done in this field.

I owe much to conversations with my friends, especially
Mr J. A. Smith and Mr Joachim, on difficult points, and
it has not always been easy for me to distinguish what
is mine and what is theirs. Dr Latta gave me the quotation
from Leibniz which illustrates 1166 a, 20–22. The Index
is mainly the work of Miss E. M. Samson.

J. B.
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INTRODUCTION

I.

§ 1. AMONG the writings that have come down to us as Aristotle's, there are three that bear the title "Ethics." This makes it necessary to state at the outset the critical assumptions on which the present essay in interpretation is based, and which, so far as it is successful, it tends to confirm. Every interpretation implies some critical hypothesis, and our acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis must in turn depend mainly on its adequacy as a basis for interpretation.

§ 2. We may fairly take it for granted that the so-called Magna Moralia is a Peripatetic hand-book written after Aristotle's time; for all competent judges are now agreed upon this. Still, as it shows no trace of Stoic influence or of opposition to Stoic views, it cannot well be later than the third century B.C., and is therefore evidence of the school tradition at a time when there was still a school with a living tradition. The other two treatises present a more difficult problem. They both profess to be Aristotle's; but the first of them is called after Nikomachos, his natural son, the other after one of his most illustrious scholars, Eudemos of Rhodes. It is true that these titles first occur in a quotation from the Platonist Atticus, who lived in the time of the Antonines, but they are certainly much older. Cicero knew the Nikomachean Ethics by its present title; for he is inclined to think Nikomachos was actually its author. Aspasios, the earliest of the Aristotelian commentators, has already to face the question whether the discussion of Pleasure in Book VII is the work of Aristotle or Eudemos. We may be sure, then, that these titles go back to Alexandrian times at least, and that they were found in the edition of Andronikos; but there
is no authoritative tradition as to their meaning. We can hardly accept the statement that the present work is that of Nikomachos; for, according to the biographical tradition, which is founded on contemporary documents, he died while still a lad\(^1\). He would be too young, then, to write the Ethics, though he may have been old enough to edit his father's lectures under the guidance of Theophrastos. On the other hand, we cannot adopt the view of the later Greek commentators that the treatises were dedicated to Nikomachos and Eudemos respectively. This would imply that Aristotle himself prepared his lectures for publication, which is contrary to everything that can reasonably be inferred from the books themselves and others like them. Following the analogy of the Theophrastean and Eudemian Physics and Metaphysics, most modern scholars agree in regarding the Nikomachean Ethics as substantially the work of Aristotle himself, and in assigning the Eudemian to Eudemos; but the meaning of this conclusion differs widely according as the critic holds that the three central books are rightly placed in the one treatise or in the other. For the most serious difficulty is just this, that, according to our tradition, Books V—VII of the Nikomachean Ethics are identical with Books IV—VI of the Eudemian.


\(^2\) Cicero de Finibus, v, 5, 13. Quare teneamus Aristotelis et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dubitatur illi quidem esse Aristotelis, sed non video quare non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Aspasius, p. 151, 21 (Heylbut) εκεί ἐν γε τοῖς Νικομάχειοις, ένα θεία διελέγονται καὶ περὶ ἕδων ἡ ἀριστοτέλης σοφίς εἰρήκε τινάτιν αὐτήν μη ταῦτα εἶναι τῇ εὐδομονίᾳ ἀλλ’ παρακολουθεῖν ἀνέπερ τοῖς ἄκμαις τὴν ἀραμ." σημειον δὲ τοῦ μη εἶναι τοὐτ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ’ Ἔνδομον τοῦ ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ λέγει περὶ ἐδώς ὡς οὐκέτι περὶ αὕτης διελεγμένως ἀλλ’ εἶναι Εὐδομον ταῦτα ἄνων εἶναι Ἀριστοτέλους, εὐδομον εἰρήκε. For the other references, see Zeller, vol. i, p. 97, n. 1.

\(^3\) He died in battle as a μειράξειν according to the biographers. Cf. the will of Theophrastos in D. L. v, 51. We must remember that the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastos were preserved in the school as charters of foundation. A Greek philosophical school was a corporation like a college, and had to keep its titles.

§ 3. From the nature of the case, most arguments on this subject are apt to involve a petitio principii. If we suppose
that these three books are in any sense the work of Aristotle, or even a fair reproduction of his thought, it becomes very hard to maintain that there is such a thing as a distinctively "Eudemian" doctrine; for the undoubtedly Eudemian books only differ from their Nikomachean counterparts in matters of detail and emphasis. On the other hand, if we hold that the three books are the original and independent work of Eudemos, we have to admit that we know nothing of Aristotle's views on some of the most important subjects, and that we have therefore no means of telling whether Eudemos gives us a faithful account of them or not. Of course it would be a different matter if, as some critics hold, any real inconsistency could be detected between the teaching of the doubtful books and the remainder of either treatise. I have tried to interpret them on the assumption that there is none, with what success the commentary must show. It would also alter the case if it could be shown that the central books contain expressions and thoughts not to be found in the undoubtedly Nikomachean books but easily paralleled from the undoubtedly Eudemian. But this argument loses all force when it is shown that these suspicious phrases and ideas can be matched from other works of which the Aristotelian origin has never been called in question, and that some of them even go back to Plato. This I believe I have shown in all important cases.

The assumption made in this edition, then, is that the disputed books are really Aristotle's, an assumption which may be provisionally commended by two general considerations. The interpretation of Book V is notoriously difficult owing to the use made in it of mathematical formulas which are not always clear, and which seem to give the writer almost as much trouble as they have given to his editors. Now Mathematics was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemos was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century. We can understand that Aristotle felt bound by the Platonic tradition to treat
INTRODUCTION.

Justice mathematically, but we can hardly understand Eudemos of Rhodes discussing so simple a matter as proportion in a way which, whatever we may think of it, has certainly produced an astonishing divergence in the interpretations of the most competent editors. The other point is this. The difficulties of Books VI and VII arise, as we shall see, from the presence in them of a dialectical element and a neglect of formal symmetry far more characteristic of the master than the scholar. If we look at the way in which Eudemos has reproduced the substance of Books VIII—IX, we shall find it very hard to believe that he would not have given us a more neatly formulated account of the "intellectual virtues," and a less puzzling discussion of the relations between thought and feeling. There is a higher art in Aristotle’s apparent confusion, and the spirit of the Platonic dialogue with its tentative arguments and provisional conclusions still lives in his dialectic procedure. He is seeking the truth along with his hearers and not expounding a ready-made system. We do not expect this from Eudemos, whose chief interest would lie in giving a faithful reproduction of his master’s thought, and who would not feel in the same way the need of leading his audience step by step from the Academic standpoint to his own; but we do expect a more dogmatic and perspicuous exposition.

§ 4. Now, if this is the true account of the relation of Eudemios to Aristotle, it follows at once that we have in the Eudemian Ethics the most authoritative commentary on the Nikomachean. I have assumed that Eudemos gives us the thought of Aristotle, as he understood it, as faithfully as he can, though it is plain enough that he has added a good deal from other Aristotelian sources in order to bring out more clearly what he took to be the meaning, and even that he has here and there given a turn of his own to what Aristotle had said. The burden of proof certainly lies with those who maintain anything else; for it is clear that this is what Theophrastos and Eudemos did in the case of the Physics and the Metaphysics. They followed the main lines, passing
lightly over those parts where Aristotle was full and clear, but formulating more precisely and discussing more minutely those subjects he had left with a less finished treatment. This statement, which is made on good authority of Theophrastos, is true also of the Eudemian Physics, as we can see from the numerous quotations in Simplicius. The Ethics of Theophrastos is unfortunately lost; but the few fragments we possess confirm the general impression so far as they go. It is significant that one of these fragments is distinctly an amplification of a sentence in one of the disputed books.

In view of all this, I have thought it right to print the relevant passages of Eudemos under the text to which they refer, and I have always hesitated to adopt an interpretation different from his. We must remember that he was in all probability there when the lectures were given, and that he would talk over all the difficulties with the master. We really cannot expect to know what Aristotle meant much better than he did, and we should always make the most of first-hand evidence. The superficial paraphrases of Byzantine commentators are quoted to-day as if those Gracchi had any authority in the matter; but the Eudemian Ethics, which takes us back to the Peripatos itself, has been too much neglected.

1 Boethius Hermen. ii, 12, 9 In omnibus de quibus ipse disputat post magistrum leviter ea tangit quae ab Aristotele dicta antea cognovit, alias vero diligentius res non ab Aristotele tractatas consequitur. Priscianus Lydus, 33, 6 (Bywater) ἐκθέμος τὸ Ἀριστοτέλειον...ἐπισκέφθην τὰ ἐρημευκα καὶ ἐπανεργή τινα.

2 Simplicius has preserved a significant fragment of a correspondence between Eudemos and Theophrastos with regard to the text of the Physics (Zeller, vol. i, p. 136). Further, Simplicius, who had the Eudemian Physics before him, says in one place (p. 411, 37 Diels) μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Ἐδήσιος ὁ γραμματέας τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων. There can indeed be no doubt that he reproduced the teaching of Aristotle's Physics much more faithfully than Theophrastos. It is surely arbitrary to assume that he did anything else than this in the case of the Ethics, though no doubt his strong theological interest has coloured his account of the "Contemplative Life."

3 On the Ethics of Theophrastos, see G. Heybut in the Archiv, vol. i, p. 194 sqq. and the notes on 1100 b, 29. 1113 a, 19. 1144 b, 33. 1145 a, 6. 1153 b, 19. 1154 b, 13.

4 Cf. 1154 b, 13 (from the "Eudemian" discussion of pleasure) ἐξελάμβανε δὲ Ἴδου ὁ λόγος ἢ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιχώσα with Theophrastos quoted by Aspasios, p. 156, 17 (Heybut) ἐξελάμβανε Ἴδου ὁ λόγος ἢ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. . . .καὶ τῇ τιχώσα, τούτων κ.τ.λ. . . .
II.

§ 5. All this is of course inconsistent with the widely-spread view that the Aristotelian corpus has come down to us in a more or less unauthentic form. Some recent scholars have gone great lengths in the assumption of "dislocations" and "duplicate passages," so far indeed that if they were right we could hardly say we possessed the works of Aristotle at all in any natural sense of the words. In its crudest form, this theory has been used to justify wholesale transpositions of sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to any place where, in the editor's opinion, they would be more appropriate. But it is very hard to see how the process of shuffling which this implies could actually have occurred. Even the story of the cellar at Skepsis does not suggest that the works of Aristotle were picked up in little bits like an Egyptian papyrus at the present day and pieced together as well as might be. And the external evidence that the works of Aristotle were known substantially in their present form from the time of Theophrastos to that of Andronikos is overwhelming. The rise of Stoicism would be inconceivable unless we might assume that the more important works of Aristotle were easily accessible. In this extreme form, then, the theory may be dismissed. But, in the form given to it by Professor Cook Wilson after Torstrik, the theory of "duplicate passages" requires more serious consideration. According to this, the Aristotelian matter with which the early editors had to deal was regarded as sacred, and their chief aim was to prevent the loss of any of it. So several different versions of the same discussion were combined into a single treatise just as a "harmony of the gospels" might be. The possibility of this is undeniable and the facts upon which the theory is based are certain. It is the case that, in certain parts of the work, Aristotle appears to discuss the same subject several times over, and that these discussions are frequently inconsistent and apparently quite independent of each other. But I have tried to show that this fact admits of another explanation. The
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Ethics is, and from the nature of the case must be, a dialectical and not a demonstrative work, and it is, as we shall see, entirely in accordance with Aristotle's own view of the method which is appropriate in such a case to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophical validity of those solutions. If it can be shown that these apparent duplicates are really successive applications of the different dialectical τόποι appropriate to the subject, the critical problem does not arise. Aristotle is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives any more than Plato is committed to the successive definitions of knowledge given in the Theaetetus. Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to base the exposition of Politics on his metaphysical system.

1 I do not mean to deny that there are traces of editing, and clumsy editing too, in the Ethics. In particular, many of the summaries and transitions break the argument in a way that can hardly be attributed to Aristotle himself, and which we do not observe in his more finished works. But this does not detract seriously from the integrity of the text. We may ascribe these connecting tags to Nikomachos if we please.

2 It is really impossible to resist the arguments adduced by Zeller (Aristotle, Chapter III.) in favour of the view that the works of Aristotle as we have them were known and used all through the period from his death down to the recension of Andronikos. The statement that the successors of Theophrastos were ignorant of the physical and metaphysical treatises is simply untrue, as is proved by the whole history of philosophy in the third century B.C.


§ 6. The plausibility of all these theories is enhanced by certain undeniable peculiarities of style, and these must be explained at once if we are to judge the work fairly. It is clear to begin with that we have not before us a book intended for publication in the ordinary sense of the word. Primarily it is the manuscript of a course of lectures intended for the lecturer's own use, and also doubtless for consultation by members of the school. In any case the writings of Theophrastos and Eudemos had, so far as we can see, exactly the same character, and no account of that character
which applies only to the Aristotelian corpus can be accepted. What we have to explain is not the form in which Aristotle's works have come down to us, but the nature of the Peripatetic ἀκρίβειας. "Now," as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff puts it, "there has been no lack of people who have tried to force upon Aristotle the pedantry of a well-paragraphed lecture notebook that sends the audience to sleep. We must allow, indeed, that as an oral teacher he had the vice of recapitulations and of declarations that now one subject has been exhausted and it is the turn of the next. But that is just the public speaker's vice, and if we take the akroamatic writings as spoken discourses, they lose much of what certainly annoys the reader. It is clear, however, that Aristotle was eloquent only with the pen, or he would not have written out all the indifferent stuff as well." The point of view here indicated appears to me the right one, and we may be glad that Aristotle found it necessary to write down what he was going to say word for word, and that his pupils, as was natural, caught the trick from him.

1 Aristoteles und Athen, vol. i, p. 66, n. 37.

§ 7. But there is a further peculiarity in the style of such works as the Ethics which is of great importance for their right understanding, and which has been most distinctly brought out by Diels. He has called attention to the curious fact that "we read on through long tracts of his ordinary dry prose, and are suddenly surprised by a charming oasis. It is observable too that in those more literary and popular passages we usually find a Platonic element, a reference to Platonic 'divisions' and Platonic dialogues. In this respect the Ethics holds a middle place between the purely scientific writings and the wholly popular such as the Rhetoric." How natural this is we shall see when we come to consider Aristotle's method in the Ethics; here it will be sufficient to quote the explanation given by Diels himself. He says:—

"I can think of no other ground for this alternation, to speak for the present only of the Nikomachean Ethics, than
a paedagogic one. Aristotle saw before him at the lecture on Ethics of which this treatise is the reflexion, hearers of riper years (1095 a, 1), whose minute familiarity with the Platonic dialogues he could count upon unconditionally, just as the audience at his course on Rhetoric must have had a number of model speeches, especially those of Isokrates, in their heads. So he gave them first the skeleton of his doctrine, and then tried to clothe it with flesh and blood by explanations in a more popular style and by instructive digressions, to bring it nearer to the understanding of his scholars by attaching it to what was familiar and exoteric. This certainly introduces some unevenness into the terminology and treatment, which has often had a confusing effect and has led some to assume a discrepancy of doctrine where there is really nothing but an accommodation of the expression to his Platonically schooled public."

Diels goes on to show the truth of this by a most skilful analysis of the opening of Book I, of which I have made free use in my notes. If I have succeeded in showing that the rest of the Ethics lends itself just as easily to the same treatment, the substantial unity and integrity of the work will become much more credible.

1 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i, pp. 494 sqq.

III.

§ 8. Besides the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, there are several ancient commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics. Only two of these are of real value, the commentary of Aspasios (2nd century A.D.) and the relevant parts of the Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις of Alexander of Aphrodisias. These two works contain genuine Peripatetic tradition and are often of service in interpreting the treatise. They also throw very considerable light upon the text by preserving readings older than those of our MSS. The commentaries of Michael (11th century A.D.) and Eustratios (12th century A.D.) with the 14th century Paraphrase now attributed to Heliodoros of
Prusa are of the usual Byzantine type and add little or nothing to our knowledge.\footnote{The commentaries on the Ethics have been edited by Heylbut for the Royal Prussian Academy (Berlin, 1889). For Alexander’s Ἀνάλειψις καὶ Λέοντα see the edition of Ivo Bruns in the Supplementum Aristotelicum vol. ii.}

§ 9. The modern commentaries on the Ethics of earlier date than the present century may be divided into two classes, those that throw light upon the argument and those that illustrate the language. Of the former class, the most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, while the edition of Zell is a most useful summary of the latter. Michelet’s edition (Berlin 1829) contains many good things, though his method of interpretation is somewhat arbitrary. Sir Alexander Grant’s commentary was the first attempt to explain Aristotle’s real meaning in accordance with the methods of historical criticism. However much we may differ from it in detail, it is a work of permanent value. Rasmauer’s edition is difficult to work with and hardly marks an advance. Professor Stewart’s “Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics” is a work of great learning and provides a store of matter from which all subsequent writers on the subject will continue to draw. Dr Henry Jackson has given us an edition of Book V, and there is an admirable little edition of Book X by Monsieur G. Rodier (Paris, Delagrave, 1897). Fritzsch’s editions of the Eudemian Ethics and of Books VIII and IX of the Nikoma-
chean Ethics contain much interesting matter, and the tracts of Rassow and Susemihl may always be consulted with profit.

IV.

§ 10. With the Ethics we enter upon that part of Aristotle’s system which has to do with Man, “the philosophy of things human,” as he once calls it\footnote{In the popular phraseology of his time. From the nature of the case, the philosophy of Man as studied by men must be a practical and not a theoretical science; for that is the true division of the sciences and is rightly put in the forefront by Eudemos. It is true, as Zeller has pointed out, that this particular}
classification is nowhere expressly made by Aristotle himself, but that is only because it was a Platonic "division" and might therefore be assumed. It is the only one recognised by the early Peripatetics and it is certainly implied by very many passages in Aristotle. Thought has only two forms; it is always either (1) theoretical or (2) practical and productive, and the difference between these is that the former has to do with things which are either immovable or have their source of motion in themselves, while the latter deals with such things as require an external cause to set them in motion, things which have their efficient or motive cause in something else, that is to say in human will or skill. We must not be misled by the minor distinction between practical and productive. Now and then it becomes desirable for dialectical purposes to mark the difference between those sciences which have some action as their end and those which produce some external product, and then the latter are more properly called arts than sciences. But this distinction is referred by Aristotle himself to "extraneous discussions," and he seldom or never makes serious use of it. As a general rule the terms "practical science," "productive science" and "art" are used quite indiscriminately.

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1 ii 181 b, 15.  
2 EE. ii 114 a, 10 quoted on p. 7.  
3 Eng. Trans. vol. i, p. 181 sqq.  
4 Cf. Polit. 258 e Τάδη γίνεσαι αμφιτάσια ἐπιστήμης διαίρεται, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προειρηκὼν, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικὴν.  
5 We find θεωρητικὸς οὐσία opposed to πρακτικὸς (De An. 407 a, 25. 415 a, 11. 432 b, 27. 435 a, 15), and so Met. 1036 a, 25 πάσα διάδοσις ἡ (1) πρακτικὴ ἡ ποιητική ἡ (2) θεωρητική. Cf. also Met. 1035 b, 18 ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ η ὄφωσις ἐπιστήμης παραδείγματι οὕτως ἐγείρθη τοῦ ὅτου (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔστω οὕτως ἐν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς καθολικῆς καὶ στάσεως καὶ ποιήσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), ὅπως ὅτι ὅσον πρακτικόν ἔστω οὕτως ποιητική, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιεῖται ἡ ἀρχή ἡ ροώσι ἡ τέχνη ἡ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράσατον τὴν πραθεισαίον.  
6 Cf. ii 140 a, 3. It is characteristic that the appearance of a threefold division is commonest in the Topics. Cf. 145 a, 15 θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται (ἡ ἐπιστήμη); 157 a, 16 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μὲν θεωρητικαὶ αἱ δὲ πρακτικαὶ αἱ δὲ ποιητικαί. But the true doctrine is given in EN ii 39 b, 1 αὕτη γὰρ (σε. ἡ ἀπεκά τοῦ δίδονα) καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρκει.

§ 11. A practical science or art, then, such as that of the statesman is essentially a source of change in something else,
the efficient cause of motion in something which has no motive cause in itself. Some things are wholly immovable, and these are the objects of First Philosophy and Mathematics; other things, though moveable, have their source of motion and rest in themselves. A tree grows of itself, a house is brought into being by the art of the housebuilder. Those things which have their motive cause in themselves are the sphere of Nature; Art or Practical Science has to do with things which have to be moved from outside. It is true, as we shall see, that in some cases the same result may be produced by Nature and by Art. Health, for instance, may be the result of the natural growth of the body, or it may be artificially produced by the doctor. There are other things, again, that can only be produced by art and do not come into existence by nature at all. Any classification based solely on the nature of the objects would, therefore, be endlessly complicated. We must hold fast to the simple distinction based on the fundamental difference between theoretical and practical or productive intelligence.

1 Plato had referred the science of the king or statesman to the cognitive class (Polit. 259 c); Aristotle, on the contrary, never tires of insisting on its practical character. This is a fundamental distinction, and is well brought out by Eudemus. Cf. EE. 1216 b, 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος γεν' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γνωστέον τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐπεζήτησε τί ἦσθ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐκαστὸ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐθύγραμμ' ἐπιστήμα γὰρ γεν' εἶναι πάθος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀρχέ' ἀμα συμβαίνει εἰδέναι τ' ἐν τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ εἶναι δίκαιοι. ἀμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθηκείς τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ αἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἄλλων αἰκοδόμων καὶ γεωμέτρων. διότερ ἐξήρε τί ἦσθ' ἀρετή ἄλλ' ὡς πάντως γίνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖν. τούτῳ δὲ ἐκι μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρημάτων (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐτέρῳ ἐστὶ τὰς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλῆρ' τὸ γνωρίζει καὶ θεωρεῖ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις' οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κατὰ συμβαθέοις οὐθὲν καλὸς τρόπον τῶν ἀναγκασών εἶναι χρήσιμον αὐτὰς ἡμῖν) τῶν δὲ πνευματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐτέρῳ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, ὡς ὑπόλεια μὲν λατρείας, εὐνομία δὲ ἢ τι τοιοῦτ' ἐτέρῳ τῆς πολιτείας. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἐκαστὸ τῶν καλῶν' οὐ μὴν ἄλλα γα' περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμιώτατον τί ἦσθ' ἄλλα τὸ γνωστέον ἐκ τῶν ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδείπτ' βούλεισθ' τί ἦσθ' ἀνδρεία ἄλλ' εἶναι ἄδερφοι, οὐδὲ τί ἦσθ' δικαιοσύνη ἄλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιεῖσιν μάλλον τι γνωστέον τί ἦσθ' τὸ εὐ ἔχειν.

2 Met. 1036 a, 13 ὧ μὲν γὰρ φυσικῆ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἄλλ' οὖν ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἦνα περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἐστιν, ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ δ' ἐστιν πρότερο καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.... ὡστε τρεῖς ἔν τινες φιλοσοφίας θεωρητικαὶ, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογική.
INTRODUCTION.

§ 12. Each of these kinds of science has its own good or end, something that makes it worth knowing; but this will be different in each case. The end of theoretical science cannot be to make any change in its object; for that object is either incapable of change altogether or at least of all change from an external source. In theoretical science we are, therefore, simply in the position of spectators, and this is the original signification of the word \textit{theoria}. The end or good of such science lies in conformity to reality, and this conformity is truth. When we have reached this, we have reached the completion (τέλος) of the science, and there is nothing beyond it for us to attain\(^1\).

If, however, the object of a science is something which has not its source of motion in itself, our relation to it at once becomes different. If the efficient cause is in ourselves, it becomes possible for us to realise the object of our science, and this realisation becomes the "end" or completion of the science. The object of it is no longer "what is" (τὸ ὅν), but the \textit{γένεσις} of "what is to be" (τὸ ἐσώμενον); we are no longer spectators but actors\(^2\). Popular language already uses the word \textit{δύναμις} for such a science\(^3\), and this is quite correct; for the definition of \textit{δύναμις} is just ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ\(^4\).

\(^1\) Met. 993 b, τὸ \textit{θεωρητικὴ} μὲν γὰρ τέλος Ἀλήθεια, πρακτικὴ δὲ ἔργον. ib. 1051 b, 3 Ἀλήθεια μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρήματος οἶνομεν διηρήθαι καὶ τὸ συγκεκριμένον συγκεκριθῇ, ἐφισταται δὲ ὁ ἔναντις ἐχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα. 
\(^2\) An. Post. 100 a, 9 ἢ ἂν μὲν περὶ γένεσις, τέχνης, ἢν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὅν, ἐπιστήμης. 
\(^3\) An. Post. 640 a, 3 ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὅν, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσώμενον. 
\(^4\) Plato, Polit. 304 d. ἢ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δύναμις. Isokr. Panath. § 30 τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφοράντων. So Ar. Met. 1046 b, 2 διὸ πόσω μιᾷ τέχνῃ καὶ μιᾷ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμῃ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ὁ ἀρχὴ γὰρ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ. 
\(^5\) Met. 1030 a, 4 ἢ ὅποτε ὁ κύριος ὅροι τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἢ εἰς ἀρχὴ μετα-

βολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ. De Caec. 301 b, 18 φόβος μὲν ὅτι ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐσάμελος κυρίου ἡ ἁρχὴ, δύναμις ὧν ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ. The addition ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ is intended to provide for such cases as the physician healing himself.
§ 13. We see that there are many practical and productive sciences or arts, just as there are many things that are good for Man; but we see also that the ends of some of those arts are subordinate to those of others. Plato had already divided arts into those that "make" and those that "use," those that make the tools and those that make the thing itself. The art of weaving uses the art of shuttle-making, and therefore the shuttle-maker must take his instructions as to the proper form of shuttles from the weaver, just as the weaver in turn takes his instructions as to cloth from the tailor. In the same way, to take an illustration which was in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the first chapter of the "Ethics," the maker of bridles must take his instructions from the horseman who uses them. This relation of the higher to the lower arts is otherwise expressed by saying that the former are "architectonic" with regard to the lower, a term also of Platonic origin.

Now, for reasons which will be explained presently, there must be some one good which is in a pre-eminent sense the Good for Man, and to which all other goods are subservient, and it is the art of producing this we are to study now. Clearly, if we wish to know what this art is, we must ask what is the art that "uses" all the other arts, the most "architectonic" of the practical sciences, the science that has the plan of human life as the master-builder has the plan of the house. This point too has been settled by Plato; for he has shown that the two sciences which are most apt to claim the chief place, namely Rhetoric and Strategy, are both subordinate to Politics. This, then, is the art or science we must study if we wish to produce the Good for Man.

1 Plato, Krat. 390 c (of the κερας) την οὖν ὁ γυναῖκας εἰς τὸ πρωτόκεφαλος ἐδὼ ἐν ὑπομονῇ ἔδω κατὰ άδυναν, ὁ ποιητής, ὁ τέκτων, ὁ χαλκωτής, ὁ υφαντής. The χρησιμοτήτης τέχνης is made ἐπιστατεῖν τῇ ποιολογ. In Polit. 281 d the distinction is expressed as one between αύτο καὶ συναίνει τέχναι. We read there δια μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργοθέναι δραμα παρασκευάζουσιν, ταῦτα μὲν συναίνει, τὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα ἀπεργαζόμενας αὐτίς. The
example of χαλκοποιη in EN. 1094 a, 11 is a clear allusion to Rep. 601 e (where a third art, the imitative, is added) ζωγράφως, φαμέν, हैसα τε γράφει καὶ χαλκῶς; Ναλ. Ἰδος ἥτις καὶ σκουτήσως καὶ χαλκὸς; Πάνω γε. "Ἄρ' οὖν ἔσωλε ὁ σύ δὲ τὰς χρῖςς των χαλκῶν οἱ γράφεις; ή νῦν' ὁ ποιήσας, δ' τε χαλκῶς καὶ ο σκουτῇς, ἄλλο τρόπον ἐστάτατο χρῆμα, μῶνον ὁ ἔπικος; Ἀθροιστάτα. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ περὶ τάτα τῶν φήμων ἤχει; Πώς; Περὶ ἱστον τάτας τῶν τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησμόνης, ποιήσας, μιμορομένης; Ναλ.

2 The term ἀρχετέκτονες is derived from Plato Polit. 259 e καὶ γὰρ ἀρχε-
τέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτῶν ἐργάτης ἄλλα ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. He furnishes γνώσει and
not χειροποιία. On the other hand he is not merely κριτικός but ἐπιτηδευτικός. So
in Ar. Phys. 194 a, 36 we have δὸν δὴ αἰ ἄρχουσιν τὶς ὕλη καὶ αἱ γεωργίων
τέχνας, ὡς χρωμάτικα καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχετέκτονη.

3 The problem of Plato’s “Statesman” is to distinguish by the use of dialectics
the true King or Statesman from the countless claimants of the title. After the
kingly art has been distinguished from the other arts of tending live animals in
herds, we have still to distinguish it from the other arts within the state, both
those which produce the things themselves (αι αὑτας) and those which produce
the tools for making them (αι συναρτασις). After enumerating seven classes of arts
which produce inanimate possessions, we come to the animate. We pass in
review slaves, hirelings, heralds, secretaries and priests, till at last we have left
only τὰ τίμων καὶ εὐγενεία, namely στρατηγία, δικαστικὴ and the highest kind
of ἱπποτες (Polit. 302 e, cf. EN. 1094 b, 3).

Now, if we take any art, we find that there is a higher art which prescribes
whether we are to learn it or not (Polit. 304 b, cf. EN. 1094 b, 1), and the other
arts must yield precedence to this. So Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, must yield
precedence to the art which decides whether persuasion or force is to be used,
and Strategy, the art of war, must yield to the art which determines whether we
are to be at war or at peace. That Aristotle had all this in mind when he wrote
the first chapter of the Ethics is plain, not only from its general tenour, but from
coincidences of language such as πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πράξις (1094 a, 12 n.), the use of
θόμη (§ 12, n. 3), the phrase αἰ τιμησάται τῶν δυνάμεων and the like. The
argument was familiar in the Platonic school and is found also in the Euthydemos
(289—291).

4 The interpretation of the first chapter of the Ethics here implied is, so far as
I know, a new one. It is generally supposed that the passage deals with ends
general and not simply with the distinction between the ends of theoretical and
practical science and the proof that the end of the most architeconic of the
practical sciences will be the good for Man. The external evidence for the
interpretation I have adopted consists of (1) the obvious fact that Aristotle is
simply reproducing the familiar argument of Plato given above, n. 3, (2) the brief
synthetic summary of the argument in the Politics, 1282 b, 14, quoted on p. 7,
(3) the tradition of the school as represented by MM. 1182 a, 32 sqq., quoted
on p. 6.

§ 14. A modern writer who wished to draw a distinction
between Ethics and Politics would probably rest his case on
the view that the good of the individual is something different
Such an idea, however, is wholly foreign to Aristotle's way of thinking. No one knew better than he did that a happiness which is not the happiness of individual souls is nothing at all. The state as such has no good that can be secured at the expense of the individuals who compose it. What Aristotle did hold was that, if we wish to find the Good for Man, we must seek it in a community of some sort; for man is by nature a being who finds his good only in a community, and can only find it completely in the most "full-grown" or complete community, that is, in the city-state. Lesser communities like the family and the village are enough for the needs of bare life; but Man’s nature requires more than this for its full development, and it is the state alone that can secure for him the good life.\(^1\)

On the other hand, it is true that the organisation of the state involves a restriction of happiness in the fullest sense to certain of its members. The state exists for the sake of the comparatively few rare souls that are able to lead the highest life, and it is undeniable that the rest are to some extent sacrificed to these. But in reply to this Aristotle would say that in a well-ordered state all the citizens have such happiness as they are capable of, and we cannot ask for more. Even slavery, which Aristotle regarded as necessary and natural, he at least attempted to justify on the ground that it is best for the slave himself to be the "living tool" which enables his master to lead the good life. Were it not that some men are "slaves by nature," slavery would be unjustifiable altogether.\(^2\)

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1 Pol. 1252 b, 28 (after a description of the oikia and the kópmi) ἡ δ’ ἐκ πλευρὰς κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἡ δὴ πόλις ἐκουσα πέρας τῆς αὐθαρείας ὡς ἐποίησεν, γινομένη μὲν ἄλλων τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, ὡσα δὲ τοῦ εὐ κακὸν. ἦν πᾶσα πόλις φόβῳ αὐτῶν, εἰ περὶ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι: τέλος γὰρ αὐτὴ ἄκριται, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἀπὸν γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ γενέσεως τελεσθείης, ταῦταν φαίνει τὴν φύσιν ἐνίατον, ὅσπερ ἀνθρώπων ίσον οἰκίας (cf. below § 27).

2 Aristotle therefore condemns the indiscriminate treatment of prisoners of war as slaves (Pol. 1255 a, 24); τὴν τε γὰρ ἄρχην ἑνδέχεται μὴ διεκάλκαν ἐνὶ τῶν τυφλῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄξιων δουλεύσαντος οὐδείς ὅποι ἐνὶ δοῦλων ἐνὶ τῇ ἑνὶ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, συμβαίνει σῶς ὁ ἀγεννησίης ἐνὶ δοῦλων δοῦλος ἐνὶ καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆται λοιπόν. δίσπερ ἄκριπόν καὶ βούλαται λέγειν δοῦλον, ὅλα τὰ σεμβανόμενα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνδιάθεσιν ἐνὶ τῷ φύσει δοῦλον.
§ 17. There is another mistaken view of the identification of Ethics and Politics which we have to guard against. We feel that somehow the ideal of a community is not always the same as that of the individuals who compose it. It may occasionally be higher, as most Greeks would have said was the case at Sparta; usually it is a good deal lower. Now Aristotle was keenly alive to this fact and the problems to which it gives rise. To the Greeks such questions were apt to present themselves in a personal form—a peculiarity which saved them from much confused thinking—and Aristotle therefore asks himself "Is the good man the same as the good citizen?" The answer which he gives to this is quite clear. The good man and the good citizen are not the same except in the case of the man who is leading the highest life in the ideal state. Here we certainly have no lowering of the moral ideal to suit the middling practice of the ordinary state; for we may make our ideal state as ideal as we please. The only thing we must insist on is that, except in a community of some kind, man can never be complete, can never be all that he has it in him to be.


§ 18. Aristotle, then, was quite aware of the fact that the ideal was nowhere realised, and he knew that, as things were, there was a discrepancy between individual and social morality. But he did not separate Ethics and Politics because he did not despair yet of the Greek city-state. No one who reads these lectures can doubt that they were delivered as a serious contribution to the realisation of the ideal state as Aristotle conceived it. There is a hopeful tone in all he says which shows he really thought the thing could be done if only people would go about it in the right way. He is no idle speculator, but a man in all earnestness making practical proposals which he has hopes of getting adopted. We feel the contrast between this and the far less sanguine view that was natural to Plato's deeper nature. The fact is that Aristotle, with all his intellectual greatness, was a child to his
master in the understanding of human life. On the other hand, it may be noted that his strong sense of reality prevented him from ignoring altogether, as Plato was sometimes apt to do, the relative worth of the various imperfect ideals realised by the Hellenic states as he found them, and this enabled him to become the founder of Politics in the modern sense of the word.

§ 19. It is only another consequence of the personal way in which such problems presented themselves to the Greek mind that the question of how to save the city-state took the shape "How can we best train a lawgiver?" The whole course of Greek history illustrates the importance of personality. The laws of most states had been framed by legislators whose names were known, and where none was known a mythical one was soon invented. This was the only form in which a Greek could imagine a reformation, and we need not wonder if Aristotle thought he might be able to train a new Solon. The discovery of the long-lost "Constitution of the Athenians" has proved that the historical works of Aristotle were composed with the same idea. They were no mere collections of facts on which a generalisation of purely scientific importance might be based, but also political pamphlets intended to commend certain definite views to practical statesmen. As it has been well put by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Aristotle wished to train a generation that should be enabled, by insight into the nature and end of the state and into the forms it assumes, to have a practical effect in the right sense among the thousandfold different conditions which the Hellenic states presented....To this task he addressed his efforts, and he thought not a little of his performance!"

The strange thing is, as has often been pointed out, that Aristotle, himself a man without a city and closely connected with the Macedonian court, should never have suspected that the days of the city-state were numbered, and that the Diadochoi were creating a new political unity, the Empire, which was not indeed to reach its full development on Greek
soil, but was to act as the most powerful of the influences that led an Italian city-state to become the capital of the world.

1 Aristoteles und Athen, vol. i, p. 361.

VI.

§ 20. The question of method is always vital to Aristotle, and he seems to have found his hearers very deficient in a due sense of its importance. He complains in one place that people dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to, and mean by intelligible no more than familiar. It is just the same as with the ancient laws, which are often childish, but have been sanctified by long custom. Thus it is that some will not listen to a lecture unless it is put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty. There is something about it, in philosophy as well as in business, that repels them. What is wanted to remedy all this is Culture. We cannot be always looking for the method of knowledge and for knowledge itself at the same time. Neither is easy to find. It is clearly necessary, then, that we should have some preliminary training in these matters, so that we may know where we are entitled to demand mathematical precision and where anything of the sort would be entirely out of place.

1 Met. 995 a, 3 al d’ ἀκροάσεις κατὰ τὰ ἑθη συμβάλλοντο· ὡς γὰρ εἰσόδουμεν ὑπὸς ἀξιόματα λέγοντα, καὶ τὰ παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὄμοι φαίνεται ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἀνωθέντων ἀναφοράς καὶ ἑρμικτής. τὸ γὰρ σύνθετες γνωριμίας, ἥλεν δ’ ἴσχυς ἔχει τὸ σύνθετα ἔχει τὸν ὑπόθεσιν, ἐν ὑπὸ τὸ μεθυόδο καὶ παιδαρίωδο μεθεσμένος λογίας τού νοοθέακων περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος. οἱ μὲν οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγω τε, οὐκ ἀποθέσται τῶν λεγόντων, οἱ δ’ ἐὰν μὴ παραβιασματικῶς, οἱ δ’ ἀκρίτηρα ἀξιόματα ἐπάγω τιθήναι. καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοῖς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβές ἕ σει τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι συνελεῖν ἤ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν. ἔχει γὰρ τί τὸ ἀκριβές τουστάχτων, ἡσυχαστέρα ποιὸς τῶν αὐθεντικῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελθέντων εἶναι ταῖς δοκεῖ. διὸ δὲ πεπαιδευτέοι τὸς ἔκτων ἀποδεκτόν, ὁς ἄτοποι ἢ μᾶργων ἐπιστήμης καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης· δεῖ τῷ ἀδικίας ἀδικίας λαβεῖν τὴν δ’ ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἔν ἄπασιν ἀπαιτήσεως, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι διόν.
§ 21. We see that Aristotle calls this preliminary training παιδεία. This word in the fourth century B.C. was very commonly contrasted with τέχνη, to express the idea of culture as opposed to professional knowledge or skill. It was the proudest boast of Isokrates that he, alone among the teachers of his time, kept this end steadily in view; for to him it seemed that Plato and Aristotle taught a mere specialism, and that of no very exalted kind. In the Protagoras of Plato the young Hippokrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman. It is clear, however, that Aristotle means something far more definite than this. With him the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much precision is fairly to be expected in any inquiry (EN, 1094 b, 23), and in the Metaphysics we are told that it shows want of culture not to know what can be demonstrated and what can not.

The clearest account of the matter, however, is to be found in a remarkable passage at the beginning of the treatise on the Parts of Animals. There we read that there are two ways of possessing any science whether it be humble or exalted, one of which may be called knowledge of the subject and the other a sort of culture. It shows culture to be able to form a right judgment instinctively as to where the speaker’s exposition of a subject is methodically correct and where it is amiss. This is general culture, the power of judging all scientific method correctly. But there is another kind of culture which has to do with some definite part of knowledge only. In Natural History as in other branches of study there is a culture of this kind which enables us to approve or condemn the form of the exposition quite apart from the question of the truth or falsehood of the matter.

We have to do, then, with two distinct kinds of culture, general and special, and we must ask what precisely each of these is. Now, there is a passage in the Metaphysics where want of culture is identified with ignorance of "Analytics."
This seems to be the key. Giphiusius said long ago "Vocat ille παιδείαν habitum quendam recte iudicandi de rebus omnibus quod docet doctrina Analytica; contra δπαιδευσια contrarius ab illo habitus dicitur, hoc est ignoratio doctrinae Analyticæ." This is quite correct; for "general culture" is evidently what we call Aristotelian Logic, a knowledge of which is, therefore, essential to a right understanding of the Ethics.

But, in addition to this, Aristotle demands a special kind of culture from the student of Politics, just as he demanded a special culture from the student of Natural History. In the Politics we are told that, just as a doctor must render his account to doctors, so must all others be judged by their peers. But by a doctor we mean not only the practitioner, but also the architectonic doctor, and thirdly the man of culture; for, we are told, there are people of that class in nearly all the arts. We must allow the right of judgment to men of culture as fully as to men of knowledge.

The kind of culture referred to here is clearly not Aristotelian Logic. The "architectonic" doctor is the great physiologist or pathologist, to whom the practitioner is related as the builder is to the architect, and the man of culture must be the man who has an intelligent, but non-professional, knowledge of medicine, enough, let us say, to know a quack when he sees one. Just so in Politics. The architectonic politician is, as we have seen already, the lawgiver, the "practical politician" corresponds to the medical practitioner, and the man of culture to the citizen who, without necessarily taking an active part in political life, can form an intelligent judgment on political questions, and who knows what sort of treatment is applicable to so complex a thing as human society. Just as the man of medical culture will see at once through the quack's nostrum, even though he may be unable to justify his rejection of it on scientific grounds, so the man of whom we are speaking will at once distrust any talk upon such subjects which seems to suggest that good citizens can be made by theoretical instruction in the duties of citizenship, and any attempt to regulate the
state on the basis of rigid and abstract formulas like the axioms of the mathematician.

1 Met. 1005 a 6 διέως δὴ καὶ τούτο (the principle of contradiction) ἀπακεδακίσει τινές δι᾽ ἀπακεδακίας· ἓν γὰρ ἀπακεδακία τὸ μὴ γεγονόσκειν τῖναν δεῖ \[ζορτιν\] ἀπόδηξεν καὶ τίνος οὐ δεῖ.

2 Part. An. 693 a, 1 Περὶ πάσης θεώρησας τοῦ καὶ μέθοδον, ὡμοίως ταπεινότερα τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόπου τῆς ἔξωθεν εἶναι, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ἐκεῖνα παθεῖν τινά. Πεπαθεμένου γὰρ οὕτω κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίνει εὔσων τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδιδόσαν ὁ λέγων. Τούτων γὰρ δὴ τίνα καὶ τὸν ὅλον πεπαθεμένον ἀλήθειν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαθεμένου τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. Πληροὶ τούτων μὲν περὶ πάντων ἃς εἰκόνιν κριτεὶς τινα καθίσμως εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅστα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν φύσεων ἀφορμεμένα· ὅτι γὰρ ἄν τι ἐτερος τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων τὸ εἰρημένη διακειμένον περὶ μάρων. Οὕτω δὲ ἤλθαν διὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεων ἀτομοῖ δεῖ τὶς ἔπερον ὅροι τούτων, πρὸς οὗ ἀναφέρων ἀποδιδόσαν τὸν τρόπον τῶν ἑαυτομόλων, χωρίς τοῦ πῶς \[ζορτιν\] τῇ τάξει, εἴτε \[ζορτιν\] \[εἴτε \[ζορτιν\] ἀλλοιοι.

3 Met. 1005 b 3 δι᾽ ἀπακεδακίας τῶν ἀναλογικῶν τοῦτο ὅροισιν.

4 Pol. 138 a, 1 ᾧσπερ οὐν λατρεύον δεῖ διδάσκειν τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν λατρείας, ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίως. Λατρεύον δὲ τα ἀθανάτους καὶ τὸ ἀρχιτεκτονικόν καὶ τρόπο οὐ πεπαθεμένοι περὶ τῆς τέχνης· ἓν γὰρ τινας τούτους καὶ περὶ πάντως ὡς εἰκόνιν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδιδόμεν̣ ἔρ ς τὸ κρίνειν ὅσον ἤσθον τῶς πεπαθεμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδώλιοις.

VII.

§ 22. The first lesson we have to learn from our man of culture is that every science must have a starting-point (ἀρχή). Geometry, for instance, starts from certain definitions and axioms which define the nature of space, and we must have a similar starting-point for Politics.

From what has been said as to the nature of practical science, however, it follows that the starting-point of Politics will be a definition, not of something that is, but of something that is to be. It will not resemble the definitions from which deductive geometry starts, but rather the enunciation of a problem in geometrical construction, what in the older Greek geometry was called a ὑπόθεσις. Now the method by which we solve a problem of this kind is analysis, that is to say, we assume that the construction is made, and then ask what are the conditions of its being made until we come to something that is in our power, just as in a theoretical analysis we go on until we come to something we know to be true.
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives us an example of a theoretical analysis. Figures are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the proof would be plain; as it is, we must make a construction which is always in the long run some form of division. For instance, why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? It is because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be plain at first sight. Again, why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? It is because, if you have three lines, the two segments of the base and the perpendicular raised on the centre, and if you know the previous proposition, the thing is clear at first sight.

The theoretical sciences cannot prove their starting-points or first principles. In the long run these must simply be perceived, and it is equally true that the practical sciences cannot deliberate about the end which forms their starting-point. The reason is that analysis, whether it takes the form of demonstration or deliberation, has to do only with the series of middle terms which appear in the theoretical sciences as causes, in the practical sciences as means. For instance, if we have to “demonstrate” an eclipse of the moon, we do so by finding the middle term ἀντίφροξ ἡμί, and when we have found this, we know the cause of the eclipse.

In the same way, if we have to deliberate about health, we do so by seeking for middle terms or “means” till we come to one that it is in our power to produce. And, on this side too, we are dependent on a simple “perception” or “intuition.” If we are analysing a rectilinear figure, we simply “perceive” that triangles are the ultimate figures into which we can analyse it, a perception which is really identical with that of the axiom that two straight lines cannot inclose a space. So too in practice. An act is always a particular act, and no particular can ever be reached by a process of reasoning. We simply “see” that this particular act which is within our power is a case of the general rule which we have found by deliberation. The whole process of analytic deliberation has
to do only with the middle terms which are intermediate between the definition of the end to be attained and the particular act, which is also an object of simple intuition. We start from an “immediate proposition” (ἀμέσως πρότασις), that is, a proposition which does not admit of any middle term between its subject and its predicate, and we end with a particular act, which in turn cannot be connected with the rule under which it falls by a middle term. At each end of the scale we are dependent on immediate perception.

1 The precise signification of ὑπόθεσις is δ ὑποτεθεὶς τις, that which one sets before oneself as a thing to be done or proved; for the meaning of ὑποτεθειμα is not very different from that of προτεθημα. The ὑπόθεσις is properly the Q.E.D. or Q.E.V. of a geometrical problem. It is a conclusion assumed for purposes of analysis to be true, or an end assumed for purposes of deliberation to be realised. The method and terminology are alike Platonic, though in the Sixth Book of the Republic Plato insists that knowledge in the highest sense cannot be of this character, but must deduce everything from the Form of the Good. The analytic method proceeds ἔξ ὑποθέσεων ὅλως ἐκ’ ἀρχῆς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τελευταῖον (510 b); the true method would not regard these ὑπόθεσεις as ἀρχαί. It is evidence of the Academic origin of the theory that we have in [Plato] Def. 415 b ὑπόθεσεις ἀρχὴ ὀνομασθαι. See Jowett and Campbell’s Republic, vol. ii, pp. 333 sqq.

Met. 1051 a, 21 eιρύσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖσ’ διαφοροῦσ’ γὰρ εἰργασμοῖς. εἰ δ’ η’ διαγράμμα, φανερὰ δὲ η’ νῦν δ’ ἐναρξῖα δυνάμει. διὰ τ’ ὁδὸν ὁδὸν τὸ τρίγωνον; δι’ αὐτὴς περὶ μιὰν στεγνὴν γωνίαν ἢς ἡ παρὰ ὁδὸν ὁδόν. εἰ δ’ η’ παρὰ η’ ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἠδὲ δὲ η’ τῷ εἰσόδῳ δῆλον. διὰ τ’ ἡ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὁδὸν καθόλου; διὰ τ’ ἡ παρὰ τῆς βασίν δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπιστάθεια ὁδόν, ἠδὲ δῆλον τῷ ἐκέντρῳ εἰσόδῳ.

2 An. Post. 93 a, 30 ἐκλείπει ἐφ’ οὗ τὸ A, σελήνη ἐφ’ οὗ Γ, ἀντίφρασις ἐφ’ οὗ B. ib. 85 b, 23 ἀποδείξεις μὲν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς διεκτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τ’ ὁδόν τι Μet. 1041 a, 10 ἔχεται δὲ τὸ διὰ τ’ ἐξίλειον διὰ τ’ ἔκλειψις ὁδόν. An. Post. (loc. cit.) ἦκα δὲ ἐπιταθεῖαι αἰτίας οὔτως τῆς αἰτίας, αἰτίας δὲ τιταραῖς...πάσαι αἰτίας διὰ τοῦ μέσου διελθέται. See EE. 1227 b, 28 sqq. quoted on pp. 323 sqq. Cf. Met. 1052 b, 15 τῶν δὲ γενετέων καὶ κατοικήσων η’ μὲν κόσμος καλεῖται (the deliberative analysis), ἢ δὲ τοιχίας, η’ μὲν ἀπὸ τ’ ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἰσόδου (the ὑπόθεσις consisting of a formal cause or definition) κόσμος, η’ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς τοιχίας (the ἐχθρόνων ἐν τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ) κόσμος. λέγω δ’ οὖν εἰς ἐνεργεῖα, δὲν ἐλευθεροῦσα, τι ὁμοιοῦσα, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τῇ σχηματισμῷ τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν εἰς τῇ σχῆμα...παραλληλοπ. δ’ ἐγὼ τῷ περὶ τῶν

3 Cf. EN. 1143 a, 28 n. This passage, which has caused some difficulty, is well elucidated by Görland, Aristoteles und die Mathematik, pp. 79 sqq. The mathematical ἐχθρόνων, into which all rectilinear figures could be resolved, was the triangle. Cf. Met. 1054 a, 3 καὶ τ’ ἐχθρόνων ἐνφύσασμα (τα δ’ ὄντα τ’), ἐχθρόνων τῷ ἐχθρόνων, τῷ τοῦ τρίγωνον. De An. 414 b, 21 ὁδὸν ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρά τῷ τρίγωνον ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ ἐφιμεθ’...παραλληλοπ. δ’ ἐχεῖ τῷ περὶ τῶν
§ 23. How, then, do we know these "first principles," these ultimate definitions from which every science must start? The answer given by Aristotle in the Ethics (1098 b, 3) is that some are apprehended by means of induction (ἐπαγωγή), some by perception (αἰσθήσει), and some by "habituation" (ἐθισμῷ τινί). It is by perception or intuition that the first principles of mathematics, for instance, are apprehended. The definition of a triangle is reached simply by looking at a triangle. No one can prove to us that a figure with three angles will also have three sides; we must simply see that for ourselves. If we cannot imagine a triangle, no one can help us to do so. When, however, we have once got the definition, we can go on to demonstrate mediate propositions about triangles to any extent by finding middle terms which lead to new conclusions. This process is analysis; but without the definition of the triangle as a starting-point we should have nothing to analyse.

In most cases, however, the subject is more complex, and a single act of intuition does not suffice to make the definition clear to us. In such cases we must be made to see the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognise it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose. It is this process which Aristotle calls ἐπαγωγή, a word which literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law. It is not a method of proof; for the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of proof in the proper sense of the word. It is simply a way of making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way. If we have not the "sense" to see the truth of an immediate proposition.
for ourselves, no number of instances will make us sure of it, and this is what Aristotle means when he says *νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*, and identifies *νοῦς* with *αἰσθησίς*, which is the most general term for immediate perception whether sensuous or intellectual.

But there are still more complicated cases, and these include, for reasons we shall see presently, the greater part of human affairs, which require something more than this inductive process, the chief sphere of which is the study of nature. The operations of nature are always in the same direction, whereas human action is always the result of a capacity of opposites, and therefore implies a choice between alternatives. Now, if we are to see for ourselves the first principle of which all human action ought to be the application, we must be habituated in such a way as always to choose the right alternative of the two which are possible in every act. If we were habituated in such a way as always to choose the wrong alternative, we should arrive at some sort of a first principle too, but it would be a false one; while if we were to choose now the one and now the other, our "moral sense" would be blunted and confused. And this explains why we must attend to the unproved statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people (1143b, 11). Their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright. But we must remember also that it is the "eye" and not the experience that really secures the truth of these statements. The first principles of the science of human conduct are as incapable of demonstration as those of any other science. They too must in the long run be "perceived" immediately, and if we cannot see them for ourselves, no one can make us see them.

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1 This is the *ενετιμομενη αισθησις* of Speusippus, ἡ μεταλαμβάνωσα τῆς κατὰ τῶν λέγων ἀληθειας (Sext. Math. vii, 145). Cf. EN. 1043 a, 27, where it is contrasted with ἡ τῶν ἰδίων αισθησις and compared with the perception of the "common sensibles," i.e. those *αἰσθητά* which are not the object of any special sense.
VIII.

§ 24. Assuming, then, that the necessary habituation has been secured, how are we to get at the starting-point of our science in a form that admits of deliberative analysis? In other words, how are we to find the definition of the Good for Man? The answer is that we must adopt the method of Dialectic. The word διαλεκτική properly means nothing more than the art of dialogue or discussion—it signifies the theoretical formulation of the practice of Sokrates. Little as we know with certainty of the teaching of the historical Sokrates, we do know very accurately the method which he adopted. It was to make people see the truth by talking to them, to elicit by means of question and answer that knowledge which they possessed without being clearly conscious of it, the truth which was in them already in the sense that they could be made to see it as soon as it was put before them in a clear and distinct way. Plato developed this method and, by the help of the theory of Reminiscence, made Dialectic the science of the Forms or "Ideas." In his hands it became the only instrument of all philosophical thinking, the ideal of a completed science. To this Aristotle could not agree. A dialectic proof was to him no proof at all; for it had no middle term. It could not be the right instrument for arriving at mediate propositions; for we can only be said to know these in the true sense of the word when we know them as the conclusions of a syllogism. This was Aristotle’s own contribution to Logic, and he is never weary of showing us that the syllogism is the only adequate form for the mediate truths of science. But it remains as true for him as it was for Plato that the dialectic method is the only way of arriving at immediate propositions, propositions which can have no middle term between their subject and their predicate, and we have seen that it is from such propositions that all science must start.

1 The fault of the dialectic method as employed by Plato is just that it represents mediate truth in a form which is only right for immediate. Cf. An. Pr.
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§ 25. Dialectic is the subject of that part of the Organon called the Topics, and it is there that we shall find the theoretical justification of the method employed in the Ethics. The object of the science, we are told, is to enable us to draw conclusions from received beliefs on any subject that may be proposed. The dialectic syllogism differs from the demonstrative syllogism in having for its premisses, not scientific truths but received beliefs. These beliefs are those either of the majority or of the wise. It is useful to cultivate this science, first as an intellectual exercise, secondly as a preparation for discussions with those who do not accept our premisses, and it has a place even in sciences that admit of philosophic treatment. If we are able to raise all the difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily distinguish truth from error. But above all it is of use for the discovery of the first principles or starting-points of the different sciences, since it is impossible for any science to give an account of its own starting-point. That can only be discussed in the light of received beliefs on the subject. This, then, is the proper function of dialectic, which is a method of examination and affords a path to the first principles of all the sciences.¹

We begin, then, by “taking” (λαμβάνειν)² premisses from the beliefs of the many and the wise to serve as premisses (ἐνδοξοι προτάσεις)³. But our attitude towards these beliefs is by no means uncritical. We start from them, indeed, but we at once go on to raise all the difficulties which they suggest. As a general rule, we find that they are contradictory, and when we find such a contradiction between received beliefs, we have what is called an ἀπορία (literally “no thoroughfare”). Our thought is, as it were, fettered and we are obliged to look for some means of freeing it from its
chains. The technical name for a pair of contradictory ἐνδοξα is πρόβλημα and the solution of it is called the λύσις.

Our belief in the possibility of solving the contradictions between ἐνδοξα depends upon the conviction that neither the mass of men from ancient times down to the present nor the great thinkers of mankind are likely to be altogether wrong. We usually find that if we develope their beliefs by criticism, if we make them "take a step further" (μεταβαίνειν), they come into agreement readily enough. "It is of advantage," we read in the Metaphysics, "to advance step by step to what is more known," that is, more known "by nature." "It is thus that all learning takes place, by an advance from what is less known by nature to what is more so. This is our real task, to turn what is more known to us into what is more known by nature, just as in action it is to turn what is good for us into what is good universally. What is first known to a given person is often very feebly known; but for all that it is from things known to oneself, however inadequately, that we must try to apprehend universal knowledge, shifting our ground and advancing step by step, as has been said, through these very things."

The task of the dialectician, then, is to draw on the opposing parties to a consciousness of their real meaning, and thus to make them see their fundamental agreement. It is to lead them on, to use a phrase which has strangely been called "Eudemian," but which is really Platonian, from what is "true but not clear" to what is "true and clear." This he does by assailing these beliefs (ἐπιχειρεῖν) from a number of positions or points of vantage (τόποι), which are applicable to every kind of subject, the positions of "the more and less," "the essential and the accidental," and so forth, which the skilled dialectician is always ready to occupy. They are in fact a number of ways in which the beliefs under discussion can be qualified so that the contradiction, which only arises from their being stated without qualification, will disappear.

It is sometimes said that the method just described amounts to taking our first principles on trust; but this criticism leaves out of account the other side of the doctrine,
namely that the ἀρχή is really apprehended immediately. To this extent we must always remember that Aristotle is a convinced “intuitionalist” in the true sense of that much abused word. Just as we must simply see by “looking at it” that a figure with three sides will have three angles, so in the long run we must simply “see” the truth of our definition of the Good for Man. But that is no reason for refusing the help of any method that will put us in a position to see more easily what is too complex a thing to be grasped at once like the axioms of geometry. Our belief in the truth of this definition rests on no other ground than our conviction of these axioms, and if any one chooses to deny it, we can have nothing further to say to him. We cannot prove it to him; he can only be converted, as Eudemus says, by the experience of advancing years or by being put under restraint. (EE. 1214 b, 28 sqq.)

1 Top. 101 a, 25 ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰσεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμή ἡ πραγματεία. ἢτι δ' ἢ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γνωμασίαι, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεῦθες, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφαὶ ἐπιστήμασι. ὃτι μὲν ὅδ' πρὸς γνωμασίαν ἠχήσαι, εἰς αὐτῶν καταφέρει ἢ; μεθοδὸν γὰρ ἔχουσα τὸν πρὸς τοὺς προσευκτικοὺς ἐπισείρεις διαφαίνεται. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεῦθες, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν καταργούμενον δόβας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ἀποδείκνυε πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβίβαστες (cf. π. 6) ὃτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνονταὶ λέγειν ζων. πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφαὶ ἐπιστήμασι, ὃτι διευθέρια ἐπὶ καταφέρεις δόβας ἐν ἐκάστοις καταφέρεια τάλθεσθε τε καὶ τὸ πρῶτον. ἢτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τὸν πρὸς ἐκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχήν, εἰς μὴν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προσευκτικάν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀποστείγον ἐποίησαν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἢτοι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀπότατοι εἰς, διὰ δὲ τῶν πρὸς ἐκαταρακτών ἐνδοξάσθη ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνελθεῖν, τούτῳ δ' εἰπον ὡς μᾶλλον οἰκεῖος τῇ διαλεκτήτη ἢ; ἐπειδή τούτη γὰρ ὅσα πρὸς τὰς ἀναφορὰς τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχαὶ δόθην ἤρει.

2 The use of λαμβάνω as a technical term of dialectics is Platonic, and is derived from the current phrase λαγὸν ἡ λαμβάνειν παρὰ τους. So we have λαμβάνειν προτάσει παρὰ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων (Top. 154 a, 25), λαβένιν ὑποθέσεις (An. Pr. 24 a, 24), λαβένιν ἀρχαί (Top. 153 a, 9). Cf. also λήψις τοῦ φανομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου (An. Pr. 24 b, 11), λήψις τῶν δρων (ib. 61 a, 28). The ἐρωτήματα αὐτάται παρὰ τοῦ ἐρωτημάτου, the ἀποκρόμμενος ἀποθεωθῶν τῷ ἐρωτήθη, and the ἐρωτήματα in turn λαμβάνει, δέχεται, ἀποδέχεται.

3 Cf. EN. 1098 b, 27. Top. 100 b, 27 ἐνδοξα ἢ τὰ δοκεῖται τἀσιν ἢ τῶν πλείστας ἢ τοῦ σοφίου, καὶ τῶν ἢ πάνω ἢ τῶν πλείστας ἢ τῶν μᾶλλον γνώριμος καὶ ἐνδόξος. The mark of an ἐνδόξος προτάσει is the verb δοκεῖ, “is believed,” “is thought,” which must always be carefully distinguished from φαίνεται, “seems,” “appears.” Cf. Bonitz Ind. 703 a, 27 “imā δοκεῖ, δοκοῦται usurpatur de is opinionibus quae commun hoc hominem sensu comprensuri, τὰ δοκεῖται (syn. ἀν ἐνδοξα, τὰ φαίνομαι).”
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For ἰδιότης cf. EN. 1146 a, 22 sqq. and the notes. A πρόβλημα (προβάλλω) only differs from a πράτον (πράτειν) in form (τῷ τρόπῳ), cf. Top. 101 b, 29. The best commentary on the term λόγος is δέθαι ἡ διάλογος (EN. loc. cit.).

This conviction of Aristotle’s is most strongly expressed in such passages as EN. 1153 b, 32 where all creatures are said to have θέων tv in them. This comes from Plato, Laws 950 b θείον δὲ τι καὶ εὐστοχον ἔσται καὶ τοῖς ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ.

Met. 1029 b, 3 πρὸ ἔργων γὰρ τὸ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμότερον. ἢ γὰρ μάθησις οὖσα γίγνεται πάση διὰ τῶν ἕντων γνωριμίων φόρτες εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον, καὶ τούτο ἐργὸν εἰς τὸν ἐκπόνησιν τὸ νοστῆν ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστην ἐκάστην ἀγαθόν τὸ διὸ ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστρο ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὑτῷ γνωριμοτέρων τὰ τῇ φοβεῖ γνώριμα αὑτῷ γνώριμα, τὰ δ’ ἑκάστοις γνώριμοι καί πρῶτα πολλαῖς ἤρμα ἕτοι γνώριμα, καί μικρὸν ἢ οἴδατε ἥξει τοῦ ὅτος. ἢ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φακόν μὲν γνωστών, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ διὸ γνωστά γνώσθην πειράτευν, μεταβαίνουσιν ὡσπερ ἐρρητεί διὰ τούτων αὐτών. For μεταβάλλειν, μεταβαίνειν cf. EN. 1097 a, 24 n., EE. 1216 b, 30 (quoted ad loc.), Top. 101 a, 34 (quoted in n. 1).

For ἀληθεῖς μὲν οἴδατε δὲ σαφές cf. EN. 1138 b, 26 n. The formula is technical in Plato’s dialectical dialogues. Cf. e.g. Polit. 275 a τὸ μὲν λεχθὲν ἄληθεν, ὁδόπλεον... σαφές ἐρρηθή, 281 c ἢ λέγομεν μὲν ἄν τι ἄληθες, ὁδόπλεον σαφές γε;

§ 26. Once we have got our definition, however, the procedure becomes quite different. Our analysis of it, though it is deliberative and not demonstrative, will proceed through middle terms and can only be expressed adequately in the form of a series of practical syllogisms. But here again the “man of culture” has an important warning for us. There cannot be more in the conclusion than there is in the premises. We can make deductions from the axioms with absolute precision, because these axioms are eternal and necessary and even the mediate truths which we derive from them are quite free from matter. But the premises of practical science are not of this kind. They are statements, not of immutable truth, but simply of what holds good “for the most part,” and our conclusions will therefore have the character of a total lack of culture to ask for mathematical accuracy in the discussion of human affairs. That is only to be looked for in sciences which deal with simple and primary truths.

It formed no part of Aristotle’s programme to justify this distinction in a course on practical science, but it is really based on metaphysical grounds. We must carefully distinguish two classes of facts which may be the objects of science. First we have those that are of necessity and always,
such as the truths of mathematics. Then there are the things that happen “for the most part” or as a general rule. Thirdly, as this implies exceptions to the rule, there are those things that follow no rule, and are said to happen by “chance.” These cannot be the objects of science.

In the Topics, the fact that reason rules over temper and desire is given as an instance of a thing that is true for the most part, and in the Prior Analytics, the fact that men grow gray. The first is an ἡβική πρότασις; the second a φυσική πρότασις. Most investigations, we are told, have to do with facts of this kind, and this is especially true of the practical sciences. Rhetoric, for instance, deals with actions (τὰ πρακτά), and these all have this character. None of them are necessary, and “things which happen for the most part and admit of being otherwise must be inferred from premisses of a like nature.” This is just the other side of the proposition with which we started above. Again we are told in another passage of the Prior Analytics that “problems as to what is for the most part must be answered from premisses that are true for the most part. The conclusion of each is similar to its starting-point.”

From all this it follows that the starting-point of Politics cannot be anything more than a general truth; we cannot hope to find a universal and necessary axiom such as those from which the geometer starts. And it will be absolutely impossible to lay down universal rules of action. Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule. As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted.

1 The words which express the presence or absence of this precision are all metaphors taken from the arts, and this is the primary application of the adjective ἀκριβῆς, though we can only guess what a κρῖθος was. The opposite of ἀκριβῶς is τόπως, a word which expresses the outline of a solid as ὑπογραφή or περιγραφή expresses the outline of a plane. As Muretus says, “quod in picturis ὑπογραφή, in statuariorum similiunque artificalium operibus τόπος.” The adverb παχύς is used of the thick, rough lines of a sketch in contrast with the fine outline of the τελεία ἀπεργασία. Cf. Plato, Politi. 394 e, 395 a, where τῶν οὐδενὶ παχύτερον is opposed to ἀκριβῶς and the verb λεπτομερέω.
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2 The conditions of ἀκριβεία are thus given in An. Post. 87 a, 31 ἀκριβεστέρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη καὶ προτέρα (1) τῇ ὡς καὶ τοῦ διδασκαλίας καὶ (2) τοῦ μὲν διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ διδασκαλίας.

3 Met. 1056 a, 4 ἐπιστήμη γὰρ πάντα τοῦ ἄλλω τῶν ἰδιώτων ἐστίν. ib. 1026 b, 3 πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβολήν λεκτον ὡς ὀνομάζεται εὐεργετέον περὶ αὐτό τοῦ θεοῦ.

4 Top. 129 a, 10 οὕτως ἐπειδὴ τὸ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ὠτὸ πλείονα, καθάπερ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἴδιον ἐπειδὴ ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν τὸ μὲν προστάτευτον τὸ δὲ ὑπερτέειον, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τάσσεται προστάτευτον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ ἔπειτα τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, οὕτως τὸ ἔπειτα, ο呼ばれることはありません。
§ 27. We have assumed that man has an “end,” and it is desirable to say something at this stage about the conception of the Final Cause which is the ruling conception of our study. It is in accordance with the whole character of this treatise that Aristotle does not include in it any account of his teleological views, but it is necessary for us to refer to them briefly in order that their true bearing may be understood.

The existence of an “end,” or more exactly a “completion” (τέλος), is due to the fact that nature and man have not only a source of motion in themselves, but also a source of rest. No animal or plant grows indefinitely; there is a point at which each is “complete” or full-grown. Still more will it be the case that for the human soul there is a point at which it has nothing further to attain, and this will be the perfection or completion or “end” of man.

To Aristotle’s mind the existence of such a point is proved by the fact that otherwise we should be face to face with that most irrational of things an infinite progression. It is one of his fundamental doctrines that the infinite exists potentially but not actually. We can always get a finite as large as we please, and that gives rise in our minds to the fiction of an actual infinite; but this is quite inconsistent with the idea of the “complete” (τέλειον), which is defined as that outside of which there is nothing (οὐ μηδὲν ἕξω), that which requires nothing more to make its form complete. The actual infinite if it existed would destroy the possibility of human action by destroying the Good or Final Cause.

“We cannot desire to walk for the sake of health and to be healthy for the sake of happiness, and that again for the sake
of something else and so on ad infinitum......Those who set up an infinite do not see that they are destroying the Good. Surely no one would ever set about doing anything if he were never to reach any final result. There would be no sense in such action; for all men of sense act for the sake of something, and that something is a limit; for the end is a limit." In other words, we should never desire anything at all, unless there were something which we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. However long the chain may be, it must have its last link firmly attached somewhere.

1 The Greek word τέλος has quite different associations from the English "end." We may see from its use in common speech (τέλος ήδην, λαβὲίς, έπειθέναι) that it implies the idea of completion. We must always think of it as the teloëswis of an έδος.


3 Cf. 1094 a, 20 πρὸ πάντων γὰρ οὕτω γ’ εἰς ἄπειρον, a phrase which is regularly opposed to ἴσαται, στήρισαι. This is derived from the "quasi-impersonal" use described in Riddell's Digest § 97. Cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 28 b ὀδόν δεκαύῃ μή ἐν τῷ στῆ, "there is no fear of my being the last." So An. Post. 82 b, 11 ὅσον ἐτέλεσ εἶμι τὸ ἄνω ἴσαται ὁδοῖς, καὶ ἡ ἐτέλεσι τὸ κάτω στήρισαι. An. Pr. 43 a, 36 δι’ ἐς καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω tortoemýrion ἴσαται πορε, πᾶλιν ἄρχει. An. Post. 72 b, 11 εἰ τὸ ἴσαται καὶ εἰς τὸν ἁρχῆς. Gen. Corp. 332 b, 12 δεῖ μὲν γὰρ στήρισαι καὶ μή εἰς ἄπειρον τότο λέγω. Met. 1000 b, 18 καὶ εἰ ἴσαται καὶ εἰς βαθύνει εἰς ἄπειρον.

4 Met. 1021 b, 21 ἐκατὸν γὰρ τότε τέλειω καὶ οὕτω τάσα τότε τέλεια, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἄρτημι μυθὲν ἔλλειψιν μήρως τοῖς κατὰ φόροι μεγέθοις. 1055 a, 11 ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ γέ μέγαστον ἐν ἑκατόν γένεις τέλειοι: μέγατον τὸ γὰρ ὀυκ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἄρρητη, καὶ τέλειοι οὐ μὴ ἔστων ἐξω λαβένει τις δυνάτος. Phys. 207 a, 9 ἄπειρον μὲν οὐκ ἔστων οὐκατὰ ποσῶν λαμβάνοντος αἰεὶ τι λαβών ἔστων ἐξω· οὐκ ἂν μὴν ἔστων τοῦτο ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὄλον...τέλειον δ’ οὐδὲν μή ἔχων τέλος. For a fuller account of teloëswis, see Introductory Note to Book II, p. 70, n. 10.

5 Met. 994 a, 1 ἀλλὰ μὴ τί γ’ ἐστὶν ἁρχή τις καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρον τὰ αἰεί τῶν ἄτων...δὴ, τί σοι τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν τ’ ἴσαται, βάθων μὲν ὡσεὶς ἄκοκλως, ταῖθρος δ’ εἰσαίμων, τῆς δ’ εἰσαίμων ἄλλω τ’ ἵσαται, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλο ἄλλον ἄλλον εἶναι. 1b. 994 b, 9 ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ δὴ ὡς ἄλλο ἄλλον ένεκα δὲ τάλα ἐκείνων ’’όστ’ εἰ μὴν έσται τοιοῦτον τι έσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον’ εἰ δὲ μηδέν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ’ οἰ τὸ ἄπειρον παύοντες λαμβάνοντος ἐξαιρόμενε τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φόσιν, κατόπι τότε τὸν ἐγχειρησίας οὕτω πράττει μὴ μειώσεις ἄλλοι πέρας ἔχειν. οὐδ’ ἂν οὐ ρωσ οὐ τῶν τοιοῦτον’ ἔνεκα γὰρ τούτο αἰεὶ πράττει δ’ γε ρωτάν έχων: τότε δ’ ἔστι πέρας’ τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἔστιν.
§ 28. There is nothing, however, in the conception of the Final Cause to justify us in saying that there is only one end of all existence, a universal good to which all others lead up. On the contrary, we seem rather to see that there are very many different forms, each of which has its own completion, a stage at which it is full-grown. A plant is complete when it flowers, an animal when it has reached the full stature of its kind, and we do not see that in this they are contributing to the completion of any universal form. There appear to be as many final causes as there are forms capable of completion, and if this is so, we can hardly agree with Plato who held that the Good for Man could not be studied apart from the good for all creatures and of the world as a whole. It follows at once from Aristotle's teleology that the good of each form must be studied by itself.

It must, however, be admitted that this is not exactly the ground on which Plato's universal good is rejected in the Ethics. We have instead a number of subtle arguments based on the doctrine of the "Categories" and a few remarks which look like appeals to the prejudices of "common sense." The latter we can understand at once; for it is in accordance with the method of the Ethics to go for premisses to the beliefs of the many. But what are we to make of the arguments drawn from the priority of one category to the others and the impossibility of anything being a common predicate in all the figures of predication? Are we to say that Aristotle for once has violated the rules of his own method and argued directly from his own scientific premisses, and then not even from those that really determined his views?

To understand this point, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what these "categories" are, a subject upon which much new light has recently been thrown. There are various names for the categories, but the most correct and technical is σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, "figures of predication." The most obvious way of interpreting this term is to look at it in
the light of the analogous phrase σχήματα τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ or
"figures of inference." Now what the figures of the syllogism
really give us is the different relations in which two terms
can stand to a third or "middle" term, and it would therefore
seem natural that the figures of predication should give us
the various relations that can exist between a subject and a
predicate. The analogy is not quite perfect, however; for we
should rather expect in that case to find the categories or
"predicaments" identical with the "predicables," namely genus,
species, property and accident, whereas they are really such
things as quality, quantity and relation. This little dis-
crepancy, we may note at once, is suggestive of a non-
Aristotelian origin for the doctrine.

The whole theory, as Apelt has shown, is intended to
solve the difficulties about predication which had caused
so much trouble to "the more recent of the ancients," as
Aristotle calls them. They were disturbed by the thought
that a thing might turn out to be both a one and a many,
and resorted to various devices to avoid this. Some, like
Lykophron, abolished the "is" (the copula), some altered the
form of speech and said ἄνθρωπος λευκός, to avoid
having to admit the proposition ἄνθρωπος ἐστι λευκός, which
seems to violate the principle of contradiction. Man is man
and white is white, and we must not say that man is white.
Now all these difficulties arise from a confusion between what
we may call the substantial, the qualitative, the quantitative
judgment and the rest. When we say that Koriskos is
musical, we are not making the same kind of judgment as we
make when we say that Koriskos is in the Lykeion or that
Koriskos is sitting. We can quite well ask what Koriskos is,
what he is like, how tall he is, and what he is doing, without
implying that he "is" anything else than Koriskos. In this
sense, then, Koriskos is a "one and a many," and the
difficulties about predication disappear as soon as we re-
recognise that it has many forms.

All these difficulties, however, were very ancient history
indeed by Aristotle's time, and we can hardly suppose that
he invented a theory of categories in order to meet them,
especially as that theory is something of an excrescence alongside of his own characteristic theory of the predicables. Not only so, but by the time Plato wrote the Philebus, this particular spectre had been finally laid to rest. This is what Plato himself said about it:—

So.—To say that the many is one and the one many sounds a strange statement, and it is easy to raise objections against anyone who lays down either of these propositions.

Protarchos.—Do you mean when anyone says that I Protarchos, who am one by nature, am again quite a number of “me’s” and opposite to one another, and puts me down as tall and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

So.—What you mention, Protarchos, are only the vulgar marvels of the one and the many, and practically everyone is agreed now-a-days that it is better not to meddle with them. They are childish and easy and stand in the way of all reasonable argument.

Now, if once we realise the full meaning of this, we shall have no hesitation in admitting with Rose and Gercke that the table of the categories is not Aristotle’s at all, but simply part of his heritage from the Academy, and we shall have no difficulty in accepting the positive statement that Xenokrates reduced the categories to two only, Substance and Relation. If that is so, we shall see that, in accordance with his method, Aristotle was bound to argue against the Platonic view from some position admitted by the Academy, and that it is this which has prevented him from doing what would doubtless have been more interesting to us, namely, from contrasting his own view of teleology with that of Plato.

Now that we can look at them in this light, the arguments themselves are not nearly so captious and unreal as they might appear at first sight. Aristotle is pointing out a real inconsistency in the Academic position, namely that the theory of the “one and many” is quite inconsistent with the doctrine of “forms,” at least in its original shape.

All these arguments depend upon the fundamental position that the categories cannot be reduced either to one another or to any common genus. It may be possible with Xenokrates to reduce all but Substance to the single category of Relation, it may be possible to class them all as accidents of
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substance; but there is no common measure of a substance and of a relation or accident. Now the Platonic forms are substances, if they are anything, and cannot have any application beyond the first of the categories. A thing which could be predicated in all the categories can for that very reason have no substantial existence; it can form no true genus. But the Form of the Good professes to be just such a common predicate; we say that a thing is good in any category we please, and therefore good is no true universal. In particular it is impossible that the same universal should be predicated of two things, one of which is posterior to the other; for species are never prior or posterior to one another. Now all the other categories are clearly posterior to substance and they cannot thereby be coordinate species of the same genus. This is an argumentum ad hominem, certainly, but it goes to the root of the difference between Plato and Aristotle.

1 O. Apelt, Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, pp. 101 sqq.
2 Phys. 185 b, 29 ἐθερμωθοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὑστεροὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅτι μὴ ἂν γένηται αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἐστὶν ἀφέλιον, ἢσπερ Δικάρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετέρρυθον, ὅτι ὁ ἀληθῶς τὸ λεικόν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ λελεκτωκέται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μὴ ποτὲ τὸ ἐστὶ προσάσποντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶν τὸ ἐν, ὡς μοιχῶν λεγομένον τοῦ ἐνδιὰ ο实实在 τοῦ δοτοῦ. The phrase μοιχῶν λεγόμενον (opp. πολλαχῶν λεγόμενον) is exactly equivalent to ἐν μὴ κατηγορία κατηγοροῦμεν. The doctrine in question was maintained by Antisthenes and the schools of Megara and Eretria.
3 Phileb. 14 c ΣΙ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ εἰναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ χαμαστὰ λεγθέναι καὶ μῆδαν ἀμφισβητήσει τῷ τοιῶν ὅποτεροι λειψόσημοι. ΠΡΩ. "Δρ' οὖν λέγεις ὅτι τὰ ἐνῷ φή Πρώταρχος ἕνα γεγονότα φόβοι πολλοὶ εἰσί ταῦτα ἐμὲ καὶ ἑκατοντάς ἀλλήλους, μεγάς καὶ συμβροχ θεόσμοίον καὶ μακρὸν καὶ κοίνῳ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄλλα μιρά; ΣΙ. Σὺ μὲν, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ἐρήμητα τὰ δεδομενα μὸνας των χαμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκέκρισθήναι δὲ ὅτι εἰπείς ὅτι πάντων ἡδὲ δὲν τῶν τινῶν ἀπεστήμη, παυδαρωθῶ καὶ μῆδα καὶ σφόδρα τῶν λόγων ἐμὺ δὲν ὑπολαμβανόμενα γίγνεσθαι. Plato first published the solution of the problem in Soph. 251 ι. sqq., where see Apel's note. The "category" of προτὶ τι gets rid of this particular difficulty.
5 Simplicius in Cat., Schol. Br. 47 b, 26 οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ζευκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόκλου πᾶντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρῶτο τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσι.
6 Phys. 200 b, 34 καὶ οὖν δ' ἐστι τοῖς ὁδήγοις ὅτι λαβεῖν, ὡς φαμέν, δ' οὕτω τῶν τῶν ἀλλων κατηγορημάτων ὁδήγει. Μετ. 1024 b, 10 ἔτερα δὲ τῷ γένει λέγεσθαι...καὶ ὅτα καθ' ἔτερον σχήμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὅποτοι λέγεσθαι.
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τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί, τὰ δ’ ὡς διεξάγεται πρῶτερον οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὐκ’ εἰς ἄλλα ὁμό’ εἰς ἐν τί. ἰδ. 1070 κ. 33 ἀποφέρει γὰρ ἐν τις πρῶτον ἔτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαι καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὀνείων καὶ τῶν πρὸς τί καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην δι’ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἄλλ’ ἄποικον εἰ ταῦτα πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦστα τὰ πρὸς τί καὶ ἡ ὀδοία. τί οὖν ταῦτ’ ἦσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ὀδοὶαν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως ἦστι κοινῶς, πρῶτερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχείων ἄλλα μὴν οὐδ’ ἡ ὀδοία στοιχείων τῶν πρὸς τί, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς ὀδοῖας.
BOOK I.

HAPPINESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. To find the definition which is to be the starting-point of our science we must discuss the beliefs of the many and the opinions of the wise (Introd. § 25). Now all are agreed that the Good for Man is Happiness, but there is a great divergence between the many and the wise as to what happiness really means. We must therefore discuss their views, whether these are merely implied in the lives they lead, or formulated as theories of the good. This discussion will show us what sides of the truth each has laid hold of, and the definition of happiness will then emerge.

We need not hesitate to translate the word ἑυδαιμονία by the English "happiness," but we must be careful not to ascribe to Aristotle any theory of "Eudaemonism." If we do, we make the mistake of supposing him to be setting up Happiness as the end of life in opposition to some other theory of that end. Now his whole point is that there is no other. Plato and his followers are quite at one with Sardanapallos as to this, and the only question is what we are to understand by it. In popular Greek ἑυδαιμονία meant having a good δαίμων, and δαίμων means fortune or luck. Generally speaking, then, it meant an abundance of worldly goods, and this sense is given in Aristotle's Rhetoric along with others which seem to come from the Academy.

For the Greek philosophers had long been trying to deepen μάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεις φυλακτικῆς καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων. These definitions bear the stamp of the Academy. The first is a definition

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the significance of the old term. Herakleitos had said "Man’s character is his δαίμων," and Demokritos declared that "Happiness lieth not in flocks and herds: the soul is the dwelling-place of the δαίμων." This was of course the view of Plato too, and the final step in the ennoblement of the word was taken by Xenokrates. To him the soul itself was a δαίμων, and the term ἐθναμονία thus acquired a new shade of meaning.

§ 2. If we look at the lives men lead, we see that they may be reduced to three. First there is the life of pleasure or enjoyment, then there is the life of action, which aims at honour or fame, and there is the life of the spectator, the artistic, scientific or religious life. The first two are easily disposed of, and so is the view which the seeker of honour may readily be made to adopt, that goodness is the real object of his life. A man may be good and never do anything with his goodness; he might as well be asleep or be a vegetable. We are getting nearer the truth, but we have not reached it yet. We are not now in a position to discuss the life of artistic and scientific contemplation, the life of the onlooker, and besides it can hardly be called a popular one; but we shall have to show later on that its aim is not mere amusement. All these views of life, then, are partial; but our definition must do justice to them all. Popular opinion cannot be altogether wide of the mark.

§ 3. Turning next to the opinions of the wise, we are met at once by the Platonic theory of the Good. This we are forced to reject, because it is based upon the impossible idea of a universal good. (Introd. § 28.) But, when we pass on from this, we find that Plato has expressed several views about Happiness which lend themselves to the purposes of our dialectic. For instance, in the Philebos, he has made it quite clear that Happiness must be complete, self-sufficient and more worth having than anything else. It must be something which is desired for itself

by τόδε μετὰ ταύτης (cf. Ι.146 a, 27 n.). The second is to be explained from [Plato] Def. 413 b αὐτάρκεια τεθνείτιτς κτήσεως ἀγαθῶν (cf. Plato, Philebos 20 c sqq. and the definitions of Speusippus and Xenokrates in note 3). The third is possibly that of Eudoxos, while the fourth alludes to the εὐπερητικὴ δόμαι of Xenokrates (see note 3).
and never as a means to something else. We cannot ask the question why we desire to be happy, and if that is so, Happiness cannot be identified with any partial form of life, but only with the good life as a whole.

But what is the good life? Here again the views of Plato help us. In the Republic he has shown that the good life and consequently the happiness of anything is identical with the good performance of its own proper task or function. Accordingly if we wish to find in what a good human life consists we must ask what is the proper function of man. Now man is an animal, a living creature, so his function will be life. But life merely as such cannot be his proper function; for a plant lives as well as a man. Nor can it be merely sentient and appetitive life; for every animal shares in that. The only kind of life which is peculiar to man is the life of rational activity, that is the life which knows the ground (λόγος) of its activities and can give an account of them (λόγοι ξένοι).

The Good for Man, then, is to perform this function well, but what do we mean by “well”? We can only mean that the function is performed in such a manner as to exhibit the form of goodness proper to it. To be happy we must, then, be in such a condition that we can perform our proper function well.

§ 4. So far, we are in substantial agreement with the Academy. Speusippos defined Happiness as “the complete or perfect condition of beings in a natural state,” and Xenocrates says it is the “possession of our proper goodness along with the power that ministers to it.” These definitions are, however, inadequate. If we ask Speusippos whether the good life is best defined as a

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* The Academic definition of εὐ-
  δαιμονία as an εἶτι first appears in
  Plato Phileb. 11 A ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἐξ ἡμῶν
  ὕπαχθεν καὶ διάδωσιν ἀποφαίνει τῷ
  ἐπιχειρήσει τῇ διάμερει ἀνθρώπων
  πάση τῆς ἔιν ἐνδαιμονοι παράκαιν. The
  definitions of Speusippos and Xenoc-
  krates are preserved by Clement of
  Alexandria, Strom. ii, 11 p. 500
  (Potter) Ὑποδεικνύει τῇ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
  φρονίς ἐξ ἐναί εὐλαβεῖ ὡς νῦν κατὰ
  φύσιν ἧμων, ἥν ἐξ ἐγαθωδίν ἡ ἡ
  κατασκεύας ἀντανάκες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
  ἄρεξ ἑξίων, ἐστὶς ἐξ ἔχοντές τις ἄρεξ
  ὑπὸ τῆς ὄχθητιας. ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄρεται
  τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἄπειραν καλεῖ. ib. 12
  Σεβαικράτης...τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀποθέωσιν
  ἀκροβατοὺς τῷ ὕπαιθρῳ ἠθέτηκε καὶ τῷ ὑποτρε-
  πικῇ ἀκτῇ δινάμεως. εἶναι ως μὲν ὡς σο-
  τικὴν ἐν ἀλλήλῳ τοῖς ἄρετας, ὡς τοῖς ἄρετας, ὡς ἐν ἡ
  μέρος τὰς κάλλα πράξεις καὶ τὰς συνο-
  διαίας ἔχειν τέκνα καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ λαμπρὰς
  καὶ σχέσεις, ως τοῖς ἵναι ἀναι (surely
  ως τοῖς ἰδίω ἰδίων τοῖς Zeller) τὰ
  σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. We cannot
  understand the dialectic by which
  Aristotley reaches his own definition
  without keeping all this clearly before
  us.
condition or as the activity arising from that condition, he must allow that a life is strictly speaking an activity rather than the condition which gives rise to it. And, if we ask Xenocrates whether he means by Happiness the mere “possession” of goodness or rather its exercise and use, he must certainly admit that he really means the latter.

§ 5. After this discussion, the following definition will appear self-evident. In the first place, Happiness is “an activity of the soul,” that is, as we have seen, of that part of the soul which “knows what it is doing” (λόγον ἔχει). But not every such activity is related to the function of man, but only good activities. For the purpose of our analysis it will be clearer to express this formally as the differentia, and say “an activity according to goodness.” And, if there are more forms of goodness than one, we must say “according to the best and most complete form of goodness.” We must add further, since an activity is always something complete, that it must be “in a complete life,” meaning by that a life which has developed to its full stature, which has reached the form appointed for it by nature. The body is complete when it has reached the limit which nature fixes for the growth of its species, and the rational soul too is full-grown at a certain stage of its development. But we must not imagine that when it has reached this completion, its life comes to an end; that was the mistake made by Solon, who confused the “end” of life in the sense of its full development with the “end” of life in the sense of death. It would be truer to say that life is only beginning when the “end” in the former sense is reached; for now it is a complete or full-grown activity, or, to put the thing in a way which Aristotle is fond of in other connexions, though he does not refer to it here, we are dealing with an activity and therefore we can use the present and the perfect tenses at the same time of the same thing. Seeing is such an activity, and we can say “he sees” and “he has seen” and they may both be true. In like manner, Aristotle might have said, we can say of the man who is active according to goodness both εἰ ἐνσώματι and εἰ βδομαι, for the goodness of his life is fully present in every moment of it. And, in spite of Solon, we may say also εἰ βραχαία, for such activities have an element of permanence in

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4 On this way of expressing the complete presence in any given moment of an ἐνέργεια, cf. 1174 a, 13 sqq. and the notes.
them, and are not wholly at the mercy of fortune. But we must not push this to an extreme; for an old age like that of Priam or King Lear is possible in a world not wholly independent of chance. The world is such that "on the whole" Happiness once achieved is permanent; but there are exceptions to this just as there are monstruosities and portents in nature.

§ 6. We see, then, that we must allow to a certain extent for chance, and this is precisely what we should expect from the account given above⁵ of the subject-matter of Politics. But that is no reason for identifying happiness with good luck or embodying "external goods" in our definition of it as Xenokrates does. It is, of course, quite clear that Happiness, like everything else in this world, is dependent on certain material conditions, but that is no reason for including those conditions in its definition. It is true that a tragedy, however fine it may be, cannot be produced at all without a chorus and costumes and scenery; but these things are no part of the tragedy itself; they are the province of the choregos and not of the poet. We must admit, then, that Happiness is dependent on something which is not in our power at all, while on the other hand we must refuse to admit that these external conditions are any part of the happiness itself. In this respect the relation of Happiness to external goods is quite different from its relation to pleasure. Pleasure is not something external, but something in the soul itself, and therefore belongs to Happiness not accidentally but essentially. This indeed is the justification of the one-sided popular view that happiness is pleasure, just as the view of men of action that it is honour is fully satisfied by the doctrine that it is an activity according to goodness. For honour implies goodness in the honoured, or the belief in it by those who honour, and is only a secondary end.

We see, then, that the definition we have given meets all the requirements we can fairly make of it, and it can have no other proof than this.

⁵ Introd. § 26.
πράξεων ούσιν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ύγεία, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοίων, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, ὀικονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσα 4 ὀνείρων ἰδανίων ἤτοι καθήκοντος—καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἰππικὴν χαλινοποιοικὴ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἰππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὐτή δὲ καὶ πάσα πολεμική πράξεως ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικῆς, κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλα ὡς ἑτέρας—ἐν ἀπάσιμας δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέχνη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱ ἐρευνώτερα τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτόν τοῦτον γὰρ χάριν κάκεινα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ’ οὖν ἡ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτὰς 5 εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἡ παρὰ ταύτας ἀλλ’ τις, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθειστῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

II. ἐδ’ ὑπ’ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν δεὶ αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι’ ἑτέρου 10 ἀιροῦμεθα—πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ’ εἰς ἀπειρὸν, ὡςτ’ εἶναι

ἐνεα παντηγίας: Σο πᾶσα πολεμική πράξεως is from Polit. 304 ε στρατηγική καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πολεμική πράξεως. Eudemos (loc. cit.) adds that the purely theoretical problems arising from practical science are to be treated also so far as they are relevant. This is Aristotle’s practice too.

§ 4. ὅσα δὲ κτλ. This sentence is an anacolouthon; for δεὶ δὲ is resumed after an intricate parenthesis by ὅτι ἄπαντα δὲ as if ὅτι δεὶ had preceded. This form of anacolouthon is very characteristic of the akratic style. In the parenthesis itself, as Professor Bywater points out (Contr. p. 29), κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον introduces the apodosis to καθάπερ κτλ. We might substitute ἑκατέρο... οὕτω to bring out the sense.

τῶν τοιούτων, ὅπως πρακτικῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν.

δύναμιν, practically equivalent to τέχνην in πρακτικὴν ἐπιστήμην as in Plato, Polit. loc. cit. Cf. Introd. § 12.

ἄλλα...ἐτέρας. The pronouns are alternated for variety. Cf. 1158 a, 28. 1166 b, 7.

τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν Introd. § 13. The term is assumed to be familiar from Plato.

§ 5. διαφέρει δ’ αὖθις κτλ. In the case of the sciences just mentioned (ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθειστῶν ἐπιστημῶν) the end is some ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. But the principle just stated will apply also in cases where the end is the ἐνέργεια itself. So, at the beginning of the Metaphysics it is shown that σοφία is ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ with regard to all sciences, and its end is simply an ἐνέργεια. In the Ethics, too, we shall find that the end of σοφία is ‘better’ than that of any practical science.

II. § 1. τῶν πρακτῶν. By τῶν πρακτῶν Aristotle means the objects of πράξεως, the things we do, just as by τὰ ἀληθή he means the things we perceive by the senses. For another sense of πρακτῶν, cf. below 1096 b, 24.

πράξεις, impersonal. ‘There will be a process ad infinitum.’ Cf. 1097 b, 13. The phrases εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἔναν, προέλθαν, περιενέσχασεν, βασιλέας are opposed to γοργάνων, στήνωσε. Cf. 1143 a, 29n. For the argument, cf. Introd. § 27.
κενήν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν.—δῆλον ὡς τούτ’ ἄν εἰς τάγα-1θοι καὶ τὸ ἀριστον. ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τῶν βλεν ἣ γνώσεως αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ροπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοτῶν ἑχουσεις μᾶλλον ἐν τυχχάνοιμεν τοῦ διώντος; εἰ δ’ οὖν, πειρατέοι τῶποι γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ’ ἐστι καὶ τώος 25 δραπετομομ ἡ δυνάμεως. δοξεῖε δ’ ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης 5 και μᾶλλον ἀρχέτεχνουκής. τοιαύτη δ’ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται:

1094 a, 22. EE. 1214 b, 6 ἀπαντὰ τὸν δυνάμεον ἵθην κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προοιμίσθαι δέθαι τω ἱκετοῦ τοῦ καλῶς ἵθην,...πρὸς δὲ ἀπο-βλέπῃς ποιήσεται πάντας τὰς πράξεις, ὡς τὸ γε μὴ συνεταίριον τοῦ βλεν πρὸς τί τέλος ἀφροσύνης παλλῆς σημείων ἔστω.

κενήν, 'ineffectual,' like the λέγε κενή of Thuc. ii, 49. So often κεναλ εὔχαλ, κεναλ αἰθίδες and the adverbial διὰ κενῆς.

ματαίαν, 'in vain.' A thing is μάται, fricstra, which does not attain its proper end. So μάται γαρ ὑπόθημα...οὐ μὴ ἔστω ὑπόθεσις: ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φωτεῖν οὖσιν μάται ποιοῦσι (De Caelo 271 a, 32). We use the word μάται when a thing which has a final cause does not attain it. Phys. 197 b, 23 σημείων δὲ τὸ 'μάταιν,' ὡς λέγεται δὴν μὴ γένεται τὸ ἔνεκα ἄλλον ἐκεῖνο εὖ ἔνεκα...ὡς τούτο ἐν τὸ 'μάταιν,' τὸ πεφυκόν ἄλλον ἔνεκα, δὴν μὴ περιαγθὲ ἐκεῖνο εὖ ἔνεκα ἐπιφυκέον.

τάγαθον καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, 'the good and indeed the best.'

§ 2. ἄρ’ οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is one of Aristotle's literary passages and is reminiscent of Plato and Isocrates. Cf. Introd. § 7. Such passages are often used by the conversational ἄρ’, e.g., cf. 1163 a, 16. 1166 b, 3. 1171 b, 29. The subjects discussed in this section are; as Diels says, such as we should treat in a preface; but with Aristotle they "form a resting-point after the first fatiguing ascent."

καλὰπερ τοξόται κ.τ.λ. This simile is found both in Plato and Isocrates. Cf. Rep. 519 c σκοτῶν ἐν τῷ βίβο οὐκ ἔχουσιον ἔνα οὐ στοιχαζόμενον διὰ ἀπαντα πράττειν αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ πράττουν ἵθην τε καὶ δημοσίως. Ep. ad Jasonis liberos § 10 τῶν μὲν τῶν τρόπου τρισχέςτε καὶ φιλοσοφοῦστε, ἵστερ σκοτεινος κειμένος στοιχαζόμεθα τῇ ἑσυχῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτείλουσθε τοῦ συμφώνους. It recurs several times in the Ethics. Cf. 1067 a, 3. 1109 b, 26. 1138 b, 22 n.

τοῦ δίκτον, 'the right thing,' what is wanted in given circumstances, not 'our duty' which would rather be τοῦ προοιμίσθαι. So when Demosthenes urged the Athenians τοῦ δίκτον τοις he did not mean they were to 'do their duty,' but that they were to take the steps required by the situation.

§ 3. τῶπον γε περιλαβεῖν. A Platonic phrase, cf. Rep. 414 a ὡς ἐν τῶπῳ τῇ δι’ ἀκραβίας καθήμενος, 559 a ἐν τῶπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτά, Laws 718 e ἐν τῶν τίθέντων αὐτῷ ἐν τῶ καταστήσει, καθώς ἐκέειν αὐτά ἐν τῶ τόπῳ. For the terminology of this passage cf. Introd. § 26 with the notes.

§ 4. δοξεῖς δ’ ἂν, 'it will be admitted,' the usual phrase in a dialectical λήψις. By κυριωτάτης Ar. means 'most authoritative' as the context shows. Cf. also Pol. 1282 b, 14 quoted on p. 7.


§ 6. τίνας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Politics is most "authoritative," for it regulates what sciences, theoretical or practical, are to exist in the state, what each class of citizens (ἐκάστους) are to learn and up to what point (or up to what age). Ar. is referring to such regulations as those laid down by Plato, Rep. 539 d, sqq. Diels notes χρεών as a literary touch.

§ 7. χρωμάτως κ.τ.λ. This is from Plato, Polit. 302 e, sqq. Cf. Introd. § 13.

§ 8. εἰ γὰρ καί κ.τ.λ. This is not an apology for "confusing ethics and politics," but rather for appearing to separate them (Introd. § 14). The science of the Good is the same whether for one, few, or many, but it is called Politics a petiario. To secure the good of one is "better than no-

thing" (ἀγαπητόν), but it is not the full realisation of the end of our science.

§ 9. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος κ.τ.λ. 'This' (viz. to secure and preserve the good for man) 'is what our branch of science aims at.' Here we have a clear reference back to the beginning, Πᾶσα τῆχη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος...ἀγαθοῦ τῶν ἑθελοντων δοκεῖ, and a confirmation of the view that that passage refers to the ends of sciences alone, and not to ends in general.

ἐφέτησαι...οὕσα. As Zell points out, the meaning really is "Now the science which aims at this is Politics," The Greek idiom allows of the leading idea being expressed by the participle (so regularly with τινῶν etc.).

πολιτικὴ τυς. The τυς is added merely because popular usage confined the word to 'practical politics' and ignored the 'architectonic' art of the lawgiver (cf. 1145 b, 28). We must not translate 'a species of Politics'; for it is the whole of Politics,
III. Δέγκουτο δ' ἂν ἵκανος, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφθείη τὸ γὰρ ἄκριβές οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰν ἀπασί τοῖς 2 λόγοις ἐπίζηττην, ὀσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργοῦμενοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ δὲ ἢ πολιτικὴ σκοπεύεται, 15 πολλάν ἐχεῖ διαφοράν καὶ πλάνην, ὡστε δοκεῖν νῦν μοῦν μόνον 3 εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή, τοιαύτην δὲ τιμαὶ πλάνην ἐχεῖ καὶ τάγαθα διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι γὰρ τινὲς 4 ἀπάλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἐτεροὶ δὲ δι' ἄνδρειαν, ἀγαπητῶν

III. § 1. Δέγκουτο δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.

"This discussion of scientific accuracy distinguishes itself from the gray uniformity of Aristotle's style by its choice phrases and words (πολλάν ἐχεῖ διαφοράν καὶ πλάνην, σαφῶς, χρεών, πέπαινον") Diels in Archiv 1, 495-

κατά τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην, 'so far as the subject-matter allows.' Pol. 1.156 a, 8 λέγει δὲ τὸν ὑποκειμένον ἐξ ό,τι τι ἀποτελείται ἔργων, διὸν οὐκ οὖν μὲν ἢ ἢ, ἀνδριαιτητόντως δὲ χαλκὸν. Met. 1019 a, 3 λέγει δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑλὴν, ὑδατέον τὸν χαλκὸν, τῶν δὲ μορφῶν τὸ σχήμα τῆς ἱδέας, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν, τῶν ἀνδριατα, τὸ εὐάρστον. This is not only an Aristotelian technicality, but a Platonic image and therefore in place here. Cf. Philo, 62, ἡ φήμη διὰ τὸ καταφθάνειν μὲν ἑκάστα φυσικῶς τὸ καὶ πάσα ἡ ἀνάλυσις παρατίθεται πάσας κ.τ.λ. Tim. 60 a ἡ δ' οὖν τῷ τῶν ἡμών καὶ ἀνάλυσις ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἔκ τῶν ὁπλατον λόγων δει συνιστάται (where note the shifting of the metaphor). Aristotle substitutes ὑποκείμενον for the Platonic particularētai (cf. also 1104 a, 39 n.) because ὑλή ἐπικείμενη στοὶ εἴδει is a more important aspect of the thing to him than ὑλή παρακείμενη τῷ δημιουργῷ. The metaphor is kept up by ὀσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργοῦμενοι πᾶσα. We do not expect the same finish in wood as in marble. It is worth noting that there is no properly attested instance in earlier literature of ὑλή meaning any other material than wood. That quoted in Liddell and Scott from Sophokles is illusory. The word ὕλη there belongs to Plutarch.

§ 2. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not mean to say that τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια are in themselves liable to variation and fluctuation,—that point is discussed below 1134 b, 18 sq.—but that they give rise to variation and fluctuation in men's judgments. For the meaning of ἔξω, cf. ἀφυβίσθησαν ἐξων, ἀποκλέων ἔξως and the like.

ὅστις δοκεῖν 'that they are believed' by some of the sophists. For the history of the contrast between νόμος and φύσις, see my article in the International Journal of Ethics for April, 1897.

§ 3. καὶ τάγαθα, i.e. the recognised good things of life, described later on (1129 b, 3) as τὰ ἀπλῶς μὲν ἄγαθα, τινὶ δ' οὖν δεῖ. For a characteristic Greek list cf. Plato, Rep. 491 c κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἴχνη σώματος καὶ ἀναγέννησιν ἐρωμένη ἐν τόις. See also Meor 87 εὐζέβεια, φιλοσοφία, καὶ ἴχνη καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δ' ἂν, ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τούτω ἐφθάσαμεν.

διὰ πλοῦτον...δι' ἄνδρειαν. For the first Diels compares Xen. Kyth. 4, 6, 44 πολλά τῶν πολεμικῶν πλούσιον καταρτήσαμεν διὰ τούτον ἀπώλεσαν. Difficulties have been felt about the inclusion of ἄνδρεια among goods that may be bad. But the point is what the popular view is, and certainly it
20 οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπτερ τάληθες ένδεικνυόμεθα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὁς ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦλ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαύτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδείκνυσθαι χρείας ἐκάστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοσούτον τάκριβες 25 ἐπίσητειν καὶ έκαστον γένους, ἐφ' ὅσον ἦ τοῦ πράγματος

1094 b, 22. ΕΕ. 1216 b, 35 διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον, οἳ τε φιλοσόφοις λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφοις. διότε καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἳ χρὴ νομίζαν περίεργον εἶναι τὴν τοιούτην θεώρησιν δὲ ἦσαν οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερὸν, ἄλλα καὶ τὸ διὰ τὴν φιλοσοφοῦν γὰρ τὸ τοιούτον περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον. δεῦται μέντοι τούτο τοllerες εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἳ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφον εἶναι τὸ μηθὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἄλλα μετὰ λόγουν, παλλάκισι λαμβάνοντο λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τούτῳ δὲ ποιοῦν ὅτε μὲν δὲν ἀγνοοῦν, ὅτε δὲ δὴ ἀλαιονείαν, ὥσιν ἄλλησεν συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμείρον καὶ δυναμένον πράττειν ὑπὸ τοὺτὸν τῶν μητή ἐχόντων μῆτη δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς ἤ πρακτικῆς.

admits this. Diels points out that the reference is to Plato's Meno 87 e sqq. After enumerating the arguments, he says (88 a) ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα φαμέν ἐντεινει καὶ βλάστασιν...οὐσί ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἐστι φόρονις ἢ ἀνδρεία, δι' ἄλλων θάρσος τι κ. τ.λ.

§ 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων.

For the phrase cf. 1095 a, 3· 1143 b, 10. According to the doctrine of the Analytics there are three things in every proof: (1) περὶ δ ἀδεικνυτι, (2) ἀδεικνυτι, (3) ἢ δν ἀδεικνυτι (An. Post. 75 a, 39 sqq.). The περὶ δ (1) is the ὑποκειμένων γένους or the ὑποκειμένη ὥρα, that about which something is proved. In the present case this is τα πρακτά or τα καλά καὶ τα ἄδεια. The ἢ δν (3) are the ἀδειματικē, the principles from which we argue. In the present case, as neither (1) nor (3) is universal or necessary, it follows that (2) δ ἀδεικνυτι, i.e. the conclusion, τὸ συμπέρασμα, cannot be so either. Ττ. 'on such a subject and with such premises.'

περὶ τῶν ὁς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. Phys. 106 b, 10 ὁ ὠρέμων ὁ δὲ ὠρατοῦς γενομένα τὰ ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν δὲν οὔτερον τούτων αἵτω ἡ τόχη λέγεται οὕτω τὸ ἀπό τόχης. If chance were the cause, there could be no science of them; ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ τῶν αἵτω ἄστος ἦ ὥσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (Met. 1065 a, 4). Nature and Man are the two causes which act ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ and stand between Necessity and Chance. Cf. Introd. § 26.

τιμῶν, οὐ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. The conclusion (συμπέρασμα) must have the same character as the premises (τὰ ἢ δν δὲ λόγος).

ἀποδείχθηκαί. Correlative to ἀποδείχθηκαί. We pass from the lecturer to the student.

πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. On Aristotle's conception of παιδεία, see Introd. § 21.

καὶ ἐκαστὸν γένους. The clear distinction of γένος is the mark of παιδεία.
φύσεις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικόν τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδεχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικον ἀποδειξεῖς ἀπαιτεῖν. ἐκαστὸς δὲ κρίνει καλὸς ἡ γνώσεις, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθός κριτής. καθ’ ἐκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, 1095 ἀπλῶς δ’ ὁ περὶ πάντων πεπαιδευμένος.

Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἐστιν οἰκεῖον ἀκροατής ὁ νέος: ἀπείρου γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οι λόγοι δ’ ἐκ 6 τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐτί δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικόν ἰὼν ματαιός ἀκούεσθαι καὶ ἀναφελέω, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν 5 7 οὐ γνώσεις ἀλλὰ πράξεις. διαφέρει δ’ ὑδάτι νέος τῆς Ηλικιαν ή τὸ ἡθος νεαρός: οὐ γὰρ παρά τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἐκλειψίς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ἔτη καὶ διάκειται ἐκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνονήτου ἡ γνώσις γίνεται καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατεῖαν: τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγου τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιομένους καὶ πράττουσιν 10 πάσχοντες δὲ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπαιδευθήναι: ἀπαιδευθεὶς γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ ἐκαστον πράγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ’ οἰκείους λόγους τού πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.

παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. This is taken from Plato, Thesit. τόσο σ’ ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀπάγην οὐδ’ ἤρθεν αὐτόν λέγεις, ἄλλα τῷ εἰκόνι χρῆσθαι, ὅπειρον θεόδιδος ἢ ἄλλα τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρόμων γεωμετρῶν, ἄξιος οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ μονῆς δι’ ἐκεῖν, σκοπεῖ αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ θεόδιδον τις ἀποδείξει τιθάμενος λογικόν τε καὶ εἰλέει περὶ τολμητῶν λογικών λόγων. On the other hand we have no right to ask more than τὸ πίθανον from the rhetorician. Rhet. 1355 b, 10 sqq. (ἡτορική ἤργων) τὸ ἱθῶν τὸ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανά μετὰ ἐκαστόν, ἀπόδειξις. The ἀνθώψημα στὸ rhe- torical stylistism from εἰκόνα εἰ σημεῖα is sometimes called ἡ τοτική ἀπόδειξις (Rhet. 1355 a, 6), but that is only καθ’ ἀναλογίαν, 'by analogy.'

§ 5. καθ’ ἐκαστὸν μὲν ἄρα κ.τ.λ. The qualification καθ’ ἐκαστὸν does double duty. Fully expressed the meaning is καθ’ ἐκαστὸν κρίνει καλὸς ὁ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν πεπαιδευμένος. For the brachylogy cf. Kühner § 597 f, and for the distinction between general and special παιδεία, Introd. § 21.

ἀπλῶς. The word ἀπλῶς, simplific-er, means without any πράθεσιν or qualification. The πράθεσις which is dropped here is καθ’ ἐκαστόν. For the τοῦτος of πράθεσιν and ἀφαίρεσιν, cf. 1160 a 28 n. It is a favourite form of ἀναιγήγη.

Διὸ κ.τ.λ. This is because he has not the special παιδεία required as a preliminary training. The logical παιδεία is more within his reach.

ἐκ τούτων...περὶ τούτων. Cf. 1094 b, 20 n.

§ 6. τὸ πίθος, sc. τῆς πολιτικῆς, which is a practical science. Cf. 1103 b, 27.

§ 7. καθαύτης ἀκρατής. As we shall see in Book VII, the ἀκρατία is the morally weak man who εἶδον δὲ τοὺς γραμματέας δὲ πᾶν.

κατὰ λόγον, 'by rule,' 'uniformly,' 'consistently.' In 1169 a, 5 τὸ κατὰ
Πολυφιλής ἄν εἰς τὸ περὶ τοῦτων εἶδέναι, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἄκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφρομενισθὼ ταῦτα.

IV. Δέλωμεν δ’ ἀναλβάντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ 15 προαίρεσις ἁγαθοῦ τινος ὑπερέχει, τί ἐστιν οὐ λέγομεν τήν πολιτικήν ἐφίσεθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἁγαθῶν. ἀνόματι μὲν οὖν ἱκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται τῆν γάρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαριστείς

1095 a, 14. ΕΕ. 1217 a, 18 πεπρομαισμαζόμενοι δὲ τοῖς, λέγομεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων, ὥσπερ εἰρήκαμ, οὐ σαφῆς λεγομένων, ἔχομεν ἑτέρω τῷ σαφώς <προοίμενοι> εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἀριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἁγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἀνθρώπων δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ’ ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτίων ἄλλον τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, οὐδὲν θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ζῴων, ὅταν χεῖρα τήν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστιν, ὡδὲν κοινωνεῖ ταῦτα τῆς προστηριασάς· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν εὐθαλεῖον ὅσος ὠδε ὠδε ὠδε ἴχθυς ὥσ’ ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδέν, δ’ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θεοῦ τινός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῃ τινα τῶν ἁγαθῶν μετεχεῖ τὸν μὲν βελτίων ἕν’ τὸ δὲ χείρον αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ ὅτι τούτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὄντερον ἐπικεκτεῖν’ νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἁγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων πράκτων τὰ δ’ ὑπ’ πρακτά. τούτῳ δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἐνα τῶν ἁγαθῶν οὐδέν μετέχει κατάφθιος, ὡστ’ οὐδὲ τῶν ἁγαθῶν (π’ πράξεως)· καὶ ταῦτ’ ἑσός ἀριστὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν. ἐνα δὲ πρακτὰ μὲν, ἀλλὰ πρακτὰ κρείττους ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διότι λέγεται τὸ πράκτον (καὶ γὰρ ὄν ἐνεκα πράσσων καὶ α’ τοῦτον ἐνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, ὁδὲ καὶ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ τὸν πληθὺν τίμεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πρατόμενα χάριν, τὰ δ’ ἴχθυνα καὶ τὰ χρησιμοτικά), ἐθέλω δὲ ότι καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράκτων ἀριστον θετεῖν.

λόγον ἐν is opposed to τὸ κατὰ τάδος. Cf. Plato, Laws 689 d ἀ...κατὰ λόγον ζῶν. Tim. 89 d ἦ τι...μάλατ’ ἐν κατὰ λόγον ζῷα. What is meant is that the appetitions must be consistently directed so that they may be counted on; they must not be para- logos or such as to defy calculation. The phrase does not mean "according to reason," cf. 1100 a, 13 τον. IV. § 1. Δέλωμεν δ’ ἀναλαβόντες κ.τ.λ. This shows clearly how we are to understand 1094 a, τον. As we saw, πολιτευς is both a γνώσις and a προαιρεσις.

§ 2. τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν κ.τ.λ. See Introductory Note. We now find a nominal agreement but a very real disagreement between the beliefs of the many and those of the wise. This ἀφοία must be solved by the dialectic method. The fact that
λέγουσιν, τὸ δ’ εἰς ξην καὶ τὸ εἰς πράττειν ταύτων ύπολοιμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν περὶ δὲ τὴς εὐθυμίας τι σο σοφὸς 3 ἀποδεδάσασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οὐν ἡδονή ή πλοῦτον ἦ τιμήν, άλλοι δ’ ἄλλο—τολλάκις δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἔανερ: νοοίσασας μὲν γὰρ ἀγίεσαν, πεσοῦμεν δὲ πλοῦτων—συνειδότες δ’ έαυτοῖς ἀγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ 25 ύπέρ αυτῶν λέγουσιν θαυμάζοντες. ένοι δ’ φόντο παρὰ τὰ

a, 22—26. EE. 1214 b, 7 έδειξαι τινα στοπον του καλῶς ξην, ήτοι τιμήν ή δόξαν ή πλοῦτον ή παιδείαν.

a, 26. EE. 1217 b, 2 φασι γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἄγαθον, αὐτὸ δ’ εἶναι τὸ ἄγαθον οὐ ύπάρχει τὸ τε πρῶτον εἶναι τῶν ἄγαθων καὶ τὸ αἰτίω τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἄγαθος εἶναι. ταύτα δ’ ύπάρκει ἀμφότερα τῇ ίδιᾳ τοῦ ἄγαθος. λέγω δὲ ἀμφότερα τὸ τε πρῶτον τῶν ἄγαθων καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτίων ἄγαθος τῇ παρουσίᾳ

‘most people’ regard εὐθυμίαν as the Good for man raises a presumption that it is the ἄρχι we are seeking for.

Introd. § 25.

οὶ χαρισταὶ. This is the urbane equivalent of οἱ σοφοὶ, the name which is given to them below. The reference is mainly to the Platonists, who had already adopted the name εὐθυμίαν for man’s highest good. See Introdutory Note, § 1.

τὸ δ’ εἰς ξην. In the Politics Aristotle more and more tends to substitute this phrase for the name εὐθυμίαν which he had borrowed from the Academy. It emphasises the view that a good life is an ἔνταξη.

τὸ εἰς πράττειν. In [Plato] Aelcb. 1, 116 b the ambiguity of this phrase is similarly turned to account. ὁσίσ καλῶς πράττει οὐχι καὶ εἰς πράττει—ναῦ.—Οἱ δ’ εἰς πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαιμονεῖται—Πώς γὰρ οῆ; We must remember that Aristotle is here giving the views of others and is not answerable for the fallacy. He himself gives a very complete proof below 1098 a, 7 sqq. Cf. also the definition of εὐθυμίας as εὐπορία μετ’ ἄρτητος (Introdutory Note, n. 1).

οἱ πολλοὶ, here opposed to οἱ σοφοὶ. But cf. 1095 b, 16 n.

§ 3. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is not answered till a, 26 ένοι δ’ φόντο.

νοοίσασας κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Rep. 583 c ὄμω οἷς μεμφιεῖσθαι, ἄτι έγαθός, τοις τῶν καμάρωνοι λόγως; ...ότε οὖν ἄρα ἠτίν έξων τοῦ λόγως, άλλα σφίξεις ἔλεησθε πρός κάμοιν έξων τοῦ.

συνειδότες...θαυμάζοντες. We gather from EE. 1214 b, 7 (Θέσθαι τινα σκοτον του καλου έχει, ήτοι τιμήν ή δόξαν ή πλούτον ή παιδείαν) what these regard as happiness. For έπιρ αἱθος, ‘over their heads,’ cf. Gen. An. 723 a, 22 έκνων εύνην άπερ ἡμᾶς το λεγόμενον, Isocr. Paneg. § 11 έπιτιμησι των λόγων τού επιρ τούς έδηθας ἔχοντες.

ένοι δ’ φόντο, ac. the Platonists. The imperfect tense is used because Aristotle is speaking from personal recollection of the school. So ἐγὼ ἔρμαι a, 32. He sums up the Platonic view
πολλά ταύτα ἀγαθά ἦλλο τε καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δ’ καὶ τούτων τὰ ἄκτιόν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἰσος ἐστὶν, ἵκανον δὲ τὰς μᾶλιστα 30 ἐπιπολαξουσάς η δοκοῦσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λαυβανέτω 5

to άγαθεὶς εἶναι. μάλιστα τε γὰρ τάγαθον λέγεσθαι κατ’ ἐκείνης ἅλθος (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ἀδιόπτητα τάλα ἀγαθά ἐκείνης εἶναι), καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναρισμένον γὰρ τὸν μεταχειρίσας ἀναρισμένον καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα της ἰδέας, ἴ ἡ λέγεται τὸ μετέχειν ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τούτον ἔχειν τῶν πρόσον τρόσ ὁ ὅσος. ὅστ’ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἰδέας.

1095 a, 28. ΕΕ. 1214 b, 28 πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκόπευτον, ὅσα ἔχουσι τινὲς περὶ αὐτῆς, περίεργον πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τοὺς παιδαρίους καὶ τοὺς κάμινους καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὅν ἢς ὅπερ νοῦν ἔχουν διαπαράσης. δύναται γὰρ οὐ λόγον, ἂλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἤλεκτας ἢ μεταβαλόντος, οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἤτοι ἤ κολάσεως· κολάσεις γὰρ ἡ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἔλαττων ἀστίτη, ἴδμως δὲ ταύτας οἴδε τὰς τῶν πολλῶν (cf. 1095 b, 19 sq.) ἐπισκοπήσων (ἐκῆ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδόν περὶ ἀπάτων, καὶ μᾶλιστα περὶ εὐθαμονίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγοις μηθεῖν δεομένοις ἄλλα πάθους). ἔτει δ’ εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἐκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δήλου ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ κρατιστοῦ καὶ ἐφ’ ὑπό τῆς ἀράτης ἐστίν. ταυτὰς οὖν καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἔξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφίβοτυποῦντων ἐλέγχου τῶν ἀνατιμεύμενών αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσίν. (Cf. Τοπ. 104 b, 1—105 a, 9.)

thus: ‘Over and above the many good things we know there is another Good which is good in itself and the cause of the goodness of all the good things we know.’

καθ’ αὐτὸ. One of the marks of τῶν καθόλου, An. Post. 73 b, 26 sqq.

καὶ δ’ ἀγαθὰ. Τhis implies κατὰ παράνυ, the other mark of τῶν καθόλου.

§ 4. ἀπόσας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We need not discuss mere θέσεις of the wise (cf. 1096 a, 2 κ.), nor contradictions of τὰ δοκοῦσα by ὁ ταχὺς (cf. Τοπ. 104 b, 23).

τὰς μᾶλιστα ἐπιπολαξουσάς, ‘the most prevalent’ (lit. ‘those that come to the surface’), the common meaning of the word. Cf. προβολοῦσας, b, 18.

ἡ δοκοῦσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, ‘or are thought plausible.’ The phrase λόγων ἔχειν regularly means ‘to have something to say for themselves,’ or ‘to admit of something being said for them’ and is exactly equivalent to εἰσόγον εἶναι. It can have no other meaning here.

§ 5. μὴ λαυβανέτω δι’ κ.τ.λ. A note justifying the dialectical method which is here used. This is not a case for syllogistic reasoning from the ἀρχή, but for dialectical search after the ἀρχή.
distinction between reasoning a priori and a posteriori. The ἄρχη is the logical prius of all legislation and action, but current moral judgments and existing institutions are more known to us. Cf. Top. 141 b, 5 ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν γνωριμίατον τὸ πρότερον τοῦ νόστου, οἷον στοιχεῖον γραμμής καὶ γραμμὴ ἐπίπεδου καὶ ἐπίπεδου στερεοῦ
... μὴ δὲ ἀνάπαυσιν ἔνατες αὐσθαίνει μαλακτὰ γὰρ τὸ στερεῶ υπὸ τὴν ἀλθῆναι πίστει.

§ 6. Ἡθος κ.τ.λ. The man who has been trained in good habits has the ἄρχη implicitly, and it can be made explicit by a dialectical process. For ἱθαίρ cf. ἱσογή 1179 b, 31.

ἡθεία, the reading of Lb, seems preferable to ἰθέως Kbb. We have not settled yet that ἰθός comes from ἱθος.

§ 7. ἄρχη γὰρ τὸ δτὶ κ.τ.λ. The word ἄρχη is used in its regular sense, for which see Introd. § 22. Since the starting-point or first principle of Politics is 'the that,' i.e. the fact that the definition of Happiness is whatever we may find it to be, and since any one who has been well brought up either has that definition or can easily get it by a dialectical process, the one thing needful for the intending student is a good up-bringing. He need not know anything of First Philosophy or Physics; for in Politics we treat the definition of Happiness as ultimate

B. A.
κοῦντος, οὔτεν προσδησεῖ τοῦ διότι, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἡ ἱάθοι ἂν ἀρχαῖοι ραβδίως. ὅτι δὲ μηδέτερον ἑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκούσατο τῶν Ἡσιόδου—

10

οὔτος μὲν πανάριμος δέ αὐτός πάντα νοηη, ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κάκεινος δέ εὑρίσκετε πληνη.

ὅτι δὲ κε μὴ τούτος νοέη μὴ ἄλλον ἀκοών ἐν θυμῷ βάλλει, δ' ἔ ρειν ἀχρήσιον ἄνηρ.

V. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν οὖν παρεξήγημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἁγάθων καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἁλόγως εὐθύος ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικάται τῆς ἡδονῆς 2 δὲ καὶ τῶν βίων ἀγαπᾶσθαι τῶν ἀπολαυστικῶν—τρεῖς γὰρ εἶσι

1095 b, 14. ΕΕ. 1215 a, 26 διαρθημένοις δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν <οὐδ' ἀρμαθετοτυπῶν τῆς τοιοῦτης εἰθημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἁναγκαίων χάριν σπονδαζόμενων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικάς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμῶν καὶ τῶν βαναύσιων (λέγω δ' φορτικάς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομέναις μόνον, βαναύσιοι δὲ τὰς ἑδραλίας καὶ μυθαρκικὰς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ἢν<ας> ἀγορὰς καὶ πράσινες κατηλικάς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταπεινώμενων, τριών ὑπον

(cf. Introd. § 23). Aristotle uses τὸ ὅτι (‘the that’) as opposed to τὸ διότι (‘the why’—diotis is the indirect form of dia ti;) especially of the definitions which form the οἶκεια ἀρχαὶ of any science, which assert existence but are not capable of demonstration by that science.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ. sc. ὁ τοῦ ὑβειαν ῥήματος καλώς.

λάβων δὲ. For λάβειν used to express the result of the dialectical process, the λήψις of a πρότασις, see Introd. § 25.

μηδέτερον, sc. τὸ ἔχειν ἢ τὸ λαβεῖν ἂν ἀρχαῖοι ραβδίως. If a man neither sees that the Good for Man is what we shall find it to be, nor can be made to see it dialectically, we can have nothing more to say to him. He is, as it were, morally colour-blind.

τοῦ Ἡσιόδου. "Εργά 291 sqq.

V. § 1. ‘Ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The dialectical examination of the θέσεως now begins. First we discuss the beliefs of the many.

ὅθεν παρεξήγημεν, 1095 a, 30. οὐκ ἁλόγως, ‘as might be expected’ of οἱ πολλοί. The phrase is equivalent to ἀλογος or εὐθύος.

ἐσοχαίν ἐκ τῶν βίων, ‘appear from their lives,’ ‘to judge by their lives.’

§ 2. οἱ μὲν πολλοί, resumed by οἱ μὲν σὺν πολλοῖς (δ, 19) and opposed by οἱ δὲ χαριστεῖς (δ, 22). Βεγ καὶ, ‘which is just why.’ It can be the only reason, though of course they do not formulate it as a theory of life.

τρεῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This classification of the ‘three lives’ was current at the time; for we find it both in Plato and Isocrates. Cf. Rep. 581 c Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγουμεν τὰ τρία ταῦτα γένει εἶναι, φιλόσοφον,
τών καὶ πρώτων ἁθέτητον ἄγαθον ὡς μεγάτων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἁρετῆς καὶ φρονίμητος καὶ ἱδονής, τρίς ὀρόμεν καὶ βίους ὅτας, οὔτε οἱ ἐπὶ ἐξουσίας τυχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ἐκ τῆς ἀπαντης, πολιτικὸς φιλόσοφος ἀπολαυστικὸς. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βαδίζεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρεῖ τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὸς καλὸς (αὐτὸς δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἁρετῆς), ὁ δὲ ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἱδονὰς τῶν συμπτικῶν. διόπερ ἐτεροῖον τὸν εἰθαμένον προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἀδέξη καὶ πράτηρ. Ἀναγαύεσθαι μὲν ὁ Κλασμόνιος ἐρωτευθείς τε ἐκ οἴκουμένικος. θείας, ἠτέλειαν όν καὶ νομίζει, ἀλλὰ ἀποτέλεσμα ἃν τοις σοι φανεῖ. τοῦτο δὲ ἀπερικράτητον τὸν τρόπον ἐκείνου, ὡς τὸν ἐρμούντα ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνει μή μέγαν ὡς καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον τὰς τυχόνες φιλόσοφον, φιλοσόφοι...Οὐθ' οὖν, ἦν δὲ ζήσε ὡς τοις τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις...Ἀνεπικράτεις αἱ τῶν τῶν τῶν βίων ἱδονῶν, τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἱκάνους μάλιστα ἐγκωμίασε. They are then referred to as ὁ χρησιμοτικὸς, ὁ φιλόσοφος καὶ ὁ φιλοσόφος. Ισοτρ. Αντιδ. § 217 ἦν μὲν ἢν ὄνομα ἢ ἀέρος ἢ παρά ἢ ἡ εἶναι ὁ διότι πάντα πάντα πράξεις. Ιαμμιλικος (V. Πυθ. § 58) says of Pythagoras ἐκεῖνον ἔγορ ἐξεις τὸν εἰς τὸν θεὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντων τὸ ἐπὶ τὰς πάντας ἐργάσεις ἀποκατάλειπες τὰ ὑπ’ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πάντα ἀθρόροις τῶν ἐνάρετων ἐκείνων εἰς τὴν Ἰσαγωγὴν τοῦ ἱδόνος ἐκείπε, ὁ δὲ ἀξίος ἐκείνῳ καὶ σῶματος ἐναρέτων ἐκείνων ἐκείνων ἀθρόροις. ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐναρέτην ἐκείνων ἐκείπε· τὸν ἰδίον τὸν σῶματος ἐναρέτων. ὡς τὸν κατὰ τὸν ἐπί τῆς ἀκρίβειας, συναρέτων τῶν θέλει ἐναρέται καὶ δύναμης ἡμῶν καὶ ἁρετῆς ἐργῶν καὶ λόγων· ὡς τὸν δ’ αὐτὸ τὸν βίον πάντων ἐκείνων τὰ πάντα ἐναρέτων ἐκείπε οὕτω οὖν ὡς ἐναρέτης καὶ ἱδονης καὶ ἀθρόροις· τὸν κατὰ τὸν ἐπί τῆς ἀκρίβειας· τὸν δὲ ἀθρόροις τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ ἐκείνων καὶ ἱδονης καὶ συναρέτην τῶν θέλειν· εἰ δεικτίζουσίν τις ἀκρίβειαν καὶ χρησιμοτικὸν καὶ χρησιμοτικὸν καὶ ἀθρόροις καὶ συναρέτην τῶν θέλειν. Τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἤγορα καὶ ἡγεμονία ἐκείνων καὶ συναρέτην τῶν θέλειν· εἰ δεικτίζουσίν τις ἀκρίβειαν καὶ χρησιμοτικὸν καὶ χρησιμοτικὸν καὶ ἀθρόροις καὶ συναρέτην τῶν θέλειν. Cf. also EE. (loc. cit. p. 21) on Αἰπισ.
perì mēn toû tôn àlôs: Íkanôs gàr kai en toû égêkklîous elêrthai perì autoûn, trítos δ' ëstìn ò theôrëtikos, épèr oû 7 5 trîn ëpëiskêvîn en toû epômëniôs poîmâmêthâ. Ò ðè ùhrima-8
ìstîs ðia òstîs ëstîn, kai ò plûûtôs ðîlôn òti oû ò ùhrô-

τῶν μὲν οὖν 'Αναξαγόραν φασίν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινα διαπο-
ροῦντα τοιαύτην ἄττα καὶ διερωτώτα τίνος ἕκεν: ἂν τις ἄλοιπο γενέσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ μη γενέσθαι. Τούτῳ, φαίνει, θεωρήσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ
tὸν ἄλον κόσμον τάξιν. οὔτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τέκνῳ τῆς
ἀφερεώς ὑπὸ τιμᾶν εἶναι τῷ ζήν: ὁ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μεταξὶ
ἑτραφόρην τῶν Συσβαρτίθην (Hdt. vi, 127) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν
ζωτῶν τῶν ἀπολαυστικῶν βιῶν, οὗτοι δὲ πῶς εἰ τῷ χάριν φαινομένη
τάττειν τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν. Εὗτος δὲ τίνες οὖν ἐν φρόνῳν συμβολῶν οὔτε

παράδοξοί τῶν γνώμῶν τών κατὰ
φιλοσοφῶν, ὧν οὔτε οὐκ εἶσται ἄνελ-
γει, καθάπερ ἤδη 'Αριστάππης, ὧν
πάντα κυνεῖται καὶ 'Ἡράκλειτος, ὧν ἐν
τῷ θεῷ καθάπερ Μελίσσος φύσει.
De Caelo, 306 a, 12 ἐκαστὸς τῶν τὰς
θεσεῖς εἰς τῶν λόγων διαφερόταταν.
ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις. There can be
no doubt that in Aristotle’s time ἐγκυκλίοι was a word applied to things
that were a matter of ‘routine,’ that belonged to the ‘trivial round.’ Iso-
krates (De Pace § 87) says that during the war ἐν τῷ τότῳ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων
tάφρος παιδῶν καὶ ἐπιστάς τῶν ἐναυσίων.
Aristotle himself speaks of ἐγκύκλια
diakoumîstata (Pol. 1255 b, 25) and
ἐγκύκλια diakoumî (ib. 1263 a, 21).
Cf. also the ἐγκύκλια λησθείσης.
With the present use of the word we
may compare De Caelo 279 a, 30 ἐν
tοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφῶμασι. The
meaning will therefore be ‘in every-
day discussions or writings,’ and will
not be very different from that of
ἐξωτερικῶς λόγος, on which see τιτος a, 26 p.

§ 112 a, 20. 1155 b, 16. 1172 a, 26.
According to Eucken, this usage is
commonest in the Topics, Rhetoric
and Ethics, which means that it is an
elegance belonging to Aristotle’s more
popular style (Intro. § 7). There is,
therefore, no occasion to doubt the
genuineness of passages where it oc-
curs.

ἐν τοῖς ἐπιμένοις, in the Tenth Book.
The Kth reading ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις may
be based on the notion (strangely re-
vived by Rambauer) that the discussion
of the Platonic theory which follows
is a discussion of the theorematikôs.
Aristotle can dismiss this Life without
vitiating his argument; for we have
to do just now only with the beliefs of
the many.

§ 8. βία ὡς ñstis ëstîn. I owe this
edemolition to Mr James Watt of
Balliol College, Oxford. The miss-
have Blaós τῖν eòw, but we may read
BIAOÎTΣÎΣÎΣÎΝ as we please. It
has long been seen that the meaning
must be that the money-maker is not
a free agent, and so his opinion does
not count. But can a χρηματιστήθη, or
even a χρηματιστικής βία, be called
Blaós in this sense? Elsewhere the
word is only used of φόρα, κόπησην
and the like; and, though we can say βία
μενον ἀγαθον χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι. δὲ αὕτα γὰρ ἀγαπάται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκείνα· καὶ τοιοὶ πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὕτα καταβέβληται. ταῦτα μὲν ὁμον ἀφείσθω.

VI. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἵσως ἐπικέφασθαι καὶ διαποτῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καὶ προσάντον τῆς τοιαῦτης ξητήσεως γνομής διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖ τὰ εἶδη. δόξεις δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐτὶ σωτηρία γε τῆς
tάς σωματικάς ἦδον καὶ λοιπον μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἄρετῆς. αἱροῦσαι γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ δόξης χάριν αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλουσεν εὐδοκίμησις. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυχόνοντο τῆς προσφυγίας τῆς προσφυγίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν πολιτικὸν κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τοίς καλοῖς ἔστιν πράξεως προσφυγίας αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πλεονεξίων ἕνεκεν ἄπτονται τοῦ ἔνθα ὁμοσ.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερῶν ὅτι πάντες ἐτὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδοκίμονα, πολιτικῶν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαμβανόν.

πέρασαι καὶ βία εξείρηται, we can hardly say βία τῆς. The conjecture is confirmed by a reading of the Vetus Versio, recensius autem quis violenter est. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 8.

καταβέβληται. Cf. Plato Soph. 332 θ. δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβάληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βοϋλομένῳ μαθεῖ. The metaphor, as Gomperz has pointed out, is that of scattering seed. So Herod. i. 132 φάτων καταβάλλειν, ὦμορεν ἱσταρε, δισειματε. So the καταβάλλεινα μαθεῖοι of Pol. 1337 δ. 22 are the popular subjects of instruction. Of course πρὸς means 'against.' Though the thing is clear, yet diatribes against them like the Πορτρεπτικῶς are widely circulated.

VI. § 1. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, τὐ νὰ ἄγαθόν. It has not yet been mentioned by this name, but the two marks of τὸ καθόλου are given above, 1093 a. 27 n. We should now go on to the beliefs of the wise; but first we must apply our dialectic to showing that Plato was wrong in speaking of a universal good. Introd. § 28.

καλτέρ προσάντων κ.τ.λ. The word προσάντων literally means 'up hill.' This apology is thoroughly Platonic in tone and even in style. Cf. Rep. 595 b Ὀρθέως, ὃς δ' ἐγώ, καὶ φίλος γέ τις καὶ καί αὐτὲς ἐκ παύοντο ἐξουσία περὶ Ὀμόρου ἀποκλοῦσις λέγειν, εἰσαγαγεῖν, 'have imported.' The word is commonly used of introducing novelties, and suggests something arbitrary. Cf. De Caelo 271 b, 11 πολλάκιστον εἰσαγαγεῖν, 'by importing the notion of a least magnitude into mathematics.'

δόξεις δ' ἂν ἴσως, 'it will surely be admitted' even by those who think it ungraceful of me to attack Plato. That Aristotle was sensitive to this charge appears from frag. 10, thus quoted by Proclus, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διάλογοις αὐτὸν τακτοῖς κακοῖς μὴ δίνατον τῷ λόγῳ τοῖς συμμαθέας καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ὑπήκοα διὰ φιλοσοφίαν αντιλέγει. ἐπὶ σωτηρία γε τῆς ἄληθείας, another Platonic touch. Cf. Theait. 164 a εἶ δοσάμεν τοῖς πρὸ τῶν λόγον. Σο 1104 a, 10 πειρατῶν βοήθειαν.
15 ἀλήθεια καὶ τὰ ὀλεθρεία ἀναιρέσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὅστε· ἀρμοῦν γάρ ἄντονι φίλουν ὅσιον προτημαν τὴν ἀληθείαν.

Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἴδεας ἐν 2 οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὥστερον ἔλεγαν, διότερον οὖθε τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἴδεαν κατασκεύαζον· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι 20 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἦ

1096 a, 17. ΕΕ. 1218 a, 1 ἐπὶ εὐσείας ἔπασχε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὥστερον, οὐκ ἄστι κοινων τί παρὰ τούτῳ, καὶ τούτῳ κριτικοῦ. εἰτὶ γὰρ ἡ τὶ τοῦ πρῶτον πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινῷ καὶ κριτικῷ διὰ τὸ ἀναφορέουσαν τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖται τὸ πρῶτον, οἷον εἶ διὰ διπλασίων

cal τὰ ὀλεθρεία ἀναιρέσιν. Aristotle here as elsewhere partly identifies himself with the Platonic school. Cf. Met. 990 b, 8 ἐπὶ καθ' οὗ τρόπους ἔλεγεν δυσταύρυντος. ἀκολουθοῦν τούτων... εἰ ἐστιν δὲ καὶ οὗ ἒν ὀλοκληρωμένων τοῦ ἴδη γίγνεται κ.τ.λ. 997 b, 3 ἐστὶν όμοιον τὸ ἴδη ἀκτικό τε καὶ ὀσίας εἶναι καθ' αὐτάς. Not that ἀναιρεῖ is used of cancelling a will.


§ 2. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες κ.τ.λ. This word has the same associations as ἐν εἰσαγωγέας above. Cf. Top. 159 b, 39 οἱ κομίσαντες ἀλλοτριὰς δόξας, Met. 990 b, 2 ἕτερα τούτων ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐκδίωκαν (said of the ἴδεα).

ἐποίουν. This word also suggests something arbitrarily 'set up.' Cf. Met. 995 b, 16 οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰ ἴδη. So κατασκεύαζον below. For the tense see note on φιλότητα 1095 a, 26.

ἐν οίς τὸ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. In a numerical series we have priority and posteriority. For instance 1 is prior to 2 because if there is 2 there must be 1, but not vice versa. For this sense of πρότερον cf. Cat. 14 a, 34 where the second kind of priority is given as τὸ μὴ ἀπαρχηγέουσα κατὰ τὸ τὸν ἐννα ἀκολούθουσάν, οἷον τὸ εἰς τῶν δύο πρότεραν διόπτων μὲν μάρτυροι ἀκολούθει ἐφικτά τὸ εἰς ἐννα, ἐφικτά δὲ ὅτως ὁκἀ ἀναγκαῖον δόλο εἶναι, ὡσεὶ περὶ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησα τὸ εἰς τὸ λεγόν.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν. If there were a 'form' of number, it would be prior to the first number of the series. Which is absurd. Met. 999 a, 6 ἐπὶ εὖ οἰς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὥστερον ἐτικτικός, οὐκ ὅσιον τὸ εἰς τούτων ἐννατά ἐν τῷ παρὰ τούτῳ, οἷον ἐπὶ τῷ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐννατά τοῦ παρὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ ὀσία, ὃν ἐστιν τὸ ἀριθμόν παρὰ τὰ ἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 'in the category of ὀσία.' For the doctrine of the Categories see Introdt. § 28. They too form a series the terms of which are 'not convertible according to sequence of being.' If there is quality there must be substance, but not vice versa. Substance is the πρῶτον of them all; but, if there were a common 'form' of which they all partook, it would be prior to Substance. Which is absurd.

τὸ...καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὣς ὀσία, 'the essential, i.e. substance.' τὸ καθ' αὐτό
3 "Ετεί δ’ ἐπεὶ τάγαθων ἵσαχος λέγεται τῷ δύτι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τῇ λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἰ 25 ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τί τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ διαίτα καὶ ἐτέρα τοιαύτα), δὴν ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἐρ γενὸς τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἐν’ οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐλεγέτ’ ἐν τάσσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀλλ’ ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

is what a thing is 'in (or rather 'by') itself,' as opposed to its accidents (συμβεβηκότα). Met. 1056 b, 2 συμβεβηκότα καὶ πρὸς τέμνεται φύσει τῶν καθ’ αὐτά.

πρότερον τῇ φύσει. For the posteriority of the other categories to the τῷ ἐστι, cf. Met. 1058 a, 13 τοσαυτάχως δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὅτως φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν πρῶτον ὃν τῷ ἐστὶ... τά δ’ ἄλλα λέγεται δύτα τοῦ τοῦ ὅτι τῶν μὲν ποιήσεως εἶναι, τά δὲ ποιήσεως, τά δὲ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ... τά ἀγαθὰ γὰρ (Cat. ποιώση) ἢ τό καθήµερον (Cat. κεῖσθαι) οὐκ ἄν τούτου λέγεται.

τοῦ πρὸς τί. Met. 1088 a, 23 τὸ πρὸς τί πάντων ἧκεστα φύσει τοῖς ὁσία τῶν κατηγορίων.

παραφάσις—a biological metaphor. Cf. Rhet. 1356 a, 25 συμβαίνει τῇ ὅπως... οἰον παραφάσει τῇ διαλεκτικής εἶναι.

τοῦ δύτος, i.e. τοῦ τῇ ἐστί. The word is used in its narrower sense, not in that which it has in the next sentence.

§ 3. ἵσαχος... τῷ δύτι; "in as many senses as the word 'is.'" The ὅν is here used in a wider sense as the substantive corresponding to the copula ἐστι. In this sense it includes all the categories, which therefore are sometimes called γένη τοῦ ὅτως.

ἐν τῷ τῇ. The regular term is ἐν τῷ τῇ ἐστι, cf. supra 19.

τοῦ μέτρου... καιρός... διάστατα. The medical sense of these words is chiefly in Aristotle's mind. Cf. Top. 107 a, 8. There does not seem to be any satisfactory parallel for διάστατα in the sense of τόπος ὑπὸ τοῦ διάγομαι (Schol.).
30 "Ετι δ’ ἔτει τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἴδεαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἢ ἢ ἢ μία τις ἐπιστήμη, νῦν δ’ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καρποῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικῇ ἐν νόσῳ δ’ ἱατρικῇ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἱατρικῇ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστικῇ.
35 Ἀπορήσεις δ’ ἂν τις τά ποτε καὶ βούληται λέγειν. 1096 a autótekastou, εἴπερ ἐν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτός λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἢ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους, οὐδὲν διοίκουσιν εἰ δ’ οὕτως, οὐδ’ ἢ ἄγαθον. ἀλλὰ μὴν 6

1096 a, 30. EE. 1217 b, 34 οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἔστι μία ὡστε τοῦ ὄντος οὕτως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ ὀμοσσυχμόνων λεγόμενα ἄγαθα μᾶς ἐστι θεωρήσας, οἷον τοῦ καρποῦ ἢ τοῦ μετρίου, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρα ἑτέρον καρπὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἑτέρον μέτριον, ὁπόν περί τροφῆς μὲν τοῦ καρποῦ καὶ τοῦ μέτρου θεωρεῖ ἱατρική καὶ γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πράξιν, ὡστε σχολή αὐτῷ γε τὸ ἄγαθον θεωρήσας μᾶς.

a, 35. EE. 1218 a, 10 οἴστε τοινῦν, φασόν, αὐτὸ τὰ ἄγαθαν. τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρὸς τῶν λόγων τῶν κοινών τούτῳ δὲ τί ἢ ἐὰν εἶπεν ὅτι αἵδιον καὶ χωριστὸν; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λευκόν τὸ πολλάς ἡμέρας λευκόν τοῦ μιᾶς ἡμέρας· οὕτω οὖδὲ <τὸ ἄγαθον μᾶλλον ἄγαθον τοῦ αἵδιον εἶναι> οὖδέ δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἄγαθον ταῦτα τῇ ἴδιᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ ἔπαρχε τὸ κοινὸν.

b, 5. EE. 1218 a, 15 ἀνάσαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτόν ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικνύοντο τὸ ἄγαθον αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναμολογομενῶν ἐχειν.

§ 4. καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μιᾶς κ.τ.λ. Eudemos (loc. cit.) calls these τὰ ὀμοσσυχμόνων λεγόμενα.

οἶον καρποῦ. Καρπὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐν χρήσει. For its use in strategy cf. Thucydides and Demosthenes μαστίν, and for its use in medicine cf. Hippocrates Aρ. 1 'Ο βίος βραχύς ἢ δὲ τέχνη μακρῆς· ὁ δὲ καρπὸς λείπει, ἢ δὲ πεῖρα ἁφαλεῖ, ἢ δὲ κράσις χαλεπής· τοῦ μετρίου, ἢς τοῦ ἐν τῷ τοσῷ ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐν τόνῳ. Cf. 1138 b, 28 π. § 5. Ἀπορήσεις δ’ ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. We have had three arguments to show that the good is not καθόλου, we now have two to show that it is not χωριστὸ. Τί ποτε καὶ is impatient. 'Whatever they can mean by adding the prefix αὐτό- to things.' Cf. Met. 1040 b, 32 παύοντι ὁδὸν τὰς αὐτάς τῇ ἐλέοι (ἐὰν οὖσαὶ) τοῖς φθοραῖς—ταύτας γὰρ ἔγειραν—αὐτοανθρώπον καὶ αὐτότεκτον, προστίθετες τοῖς ἀληθοῖς τὰ ἤμια τὸ αὐτό. οὖδ’ ἢ ἄγαθον, sc. δεῖσε τὸ ἄγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπον. Mr Bury proposes to read οὖδὲ <τὸ ἄγαθον> ἢ ἄγαθον, but the brachylogy is quite Aristotelian.
οὐδὲ τῷ ἄιδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἄγαθον ἔσται, εἰτέρα μηδὲ 7 λεικότερον τὸ πολυχρώμιον τοῦ ἐφημεροῦ, πιθανότερον δὲ 5 ἐδείκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄγαθῶν συνοτικὰ τὸ ἐν 9 οἷον δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσατο δοκεῖ.

τὸ ἄγαθον, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὁμολογοῦμενα εἶναι ἄγαθον δεικνύονται, εἰς ἀρίθμῳ ὡς ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐγκλεία ἄγαθον· τὰεσι γὰρ καὶ ἀρίθμῳ, ὥς τοις ἀρίθμοις καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἄγαθον ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄγαθον. δει δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογοῦμενων, οἷον ἕγειρες ἱσχύος συφροσύνης, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκούστοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλὸν. πάντα γὰρ τά τε τάξεις καὶ ἡμερία· οἳ ἄρα, ἐκείναι μᾶλλον· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα μᾶλλον. παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἄγαθον, ὡς ἡ ἀρίθμῳ ἀφιεται· οὗτος γὰρ ὡς ἀφιεται λέγουσιν φαινοῦν, ἀλλὰ λιῶν ἀπλοῖ τούτο φαι, καὶ ὁρίζει εἶναι πᾶς ἐν τοῖς ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷον ζωῆς μὴ ὑπάρχει; δει δὲ τοῦτο πραγματεύεται, καὶ μὴ ἀξίων μηθεῖν ἀλάγων, καὶ μετὰ λόγου πιστεύεσθαι οὐ βάδιον, τὸ τε φάσαι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀφιεται ἀνὸς τοιοῦ ἄγαθον οἷον ἀληθείας ἔκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἄγαθον ὑπέρθεται, ὡς ἀληθείας, σῶμα ἐγκλείας, αὐτούς ἄλλο ἄλλον.

§ 7. πιθανότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eudemos (loc. cit.) is fuller on this, but we do not know enough about it to be quite sure of the interpretation. Spen- sippus is criticised (1) for trying to prove things to be good because they are numbers instead of showing that number is good because admittedly good things are or imply number; (2) for saying that the One is the good because all numbers aim at unity. At the same time, Aristotle says that, strange as this theory may be, it is more plausible to say the One is the Good than to say the Good is one. But there must also be some reference to the theory of Spenippus that the good is not eternal. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 30 ὅσον δὲ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν, ὡστερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι. So ib. 1091 a, 33 we are told that some thought ὡστοριεγενῆ and said that προελθοῦσι τῷ τῶν ὀντων φόρεσι καὶ τῷ ἄγαθῳ καὶ τῷ καλῶς ἐμφάνεται.

His superior plausibility consists, then, in this, that, instead of starting from one universal eternal good and deduc- ting all other goods from it, he makes the One the good to which all things tend and places it not in the beginning, but in the end. A uni- versal good seems more conceivable as a yet unrealised ideal than as a first cause.

ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄγαθῶν συνοτικὰ. Met. g80 a, 32 τὰς ἱρμας δὲκα λέγων εἶναι τὰ κατὰ συνοτικὰ λεγόμενα—

1. πέρας καὶ ἐπιρρ. 2. περινεόν, ἀρτιόν. 3. ἐν, πλῆθος. 4. δεξίον, ἀριστορέον. 5. ἄριστον, ἃν. 6. ἱμαλόν, κυκεφαλόν. 7. εὐθύς, καμπήλον. 8. φῶς, σκῦνος. 9. ἄγαθόν, κακόν. 10. τετάραμος, ἔτερομεν.
ἈΛΛΑ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος: τοῖς δὲ λεγθείσιν ἁμφιβολίας τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς Ἀγαθοῦ τῶν λόγων εἰρήσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἴδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπόμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἡ φυλακτικὰ ποι σή τῶν ἐναντίων καλοτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἢλλον. δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι διπτῶς λέγοιτ' ἀν τἀγαθα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, βάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.  
χωρίαται ὁμίλω ἀπὸ τῶν ὑφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεφώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἱδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν; ἦ ὡσα καὶ μονομένα διώκεται, οἶνον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὅρᾶν καὶ ἱδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δὲ ἄλλο τι διώκουμεν, δύοις τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἁγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν; ἦ οὖν αὐτό κάθας πλήθυ τῆς ἱδέας; ὥστε μόνων ἐσται τὸ εἴδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστι τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τάγαθον λόγον ἐν αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεδέσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν χώρι καὶ φυσικῇ τῶν τῆς λειωτήτης. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἱδονῆς ἐπεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταῦτα

§ 8. τοῖς δὲ λεγθείσιν κ.τ.λ. 'We can descry a possible objection to our arguments on the ground that Plato's words do not apply to every good.' For ὑποφαίνεσθαι cf. Plato, Soph. 245 ε τὰ ὑπὸ ὑποφαίνοντα. καθ' ἐν εἴδος, 'are so called because they are the same in species.' Aristotle opposes τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγμένα τὰ πρὸς ἐν which include τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ and τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καλοτικῶν. See further b, 27 n. In Rhet. 1362 a, 27 we find among received definitions of the good καθ' τὸ ποιητικὴν ή φυλακτικὸν τῶν τουτότων... καὶ τὰ καλοτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρμένα. § 10. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The argument is put in the form of a dilemma, the two horns of which are introduced by ἦ (b, 17 and b, 19). Things good per se either include something more than the Form of Good or they do not. If they do not, what is the use of the Form? If they do, in what does their specific identity consist?

μόνων ἐσται τὸ εἴδος. 'The species (of things good per se) will be purposeless,' seeing that there are no good things of which it is the εἴδος. It will be a species to which nothing belongs, a form of which nothing partakes, a type which is nowhere realised. This is one horn of the dilemma. § 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. The other horn. If these too (i.e. ὡσα μονομένα διώκεται) are good per se and καθ' ἐν εἴδος λεγμένα (b, 10), the definition of good must be the same in all of them, or they will not be a real species at all. Snow and white lead are both called white καθ' ἐν εἴδος, and therefore the definition of whiteness (χρώμα διακριτικὸν ὄρθος Top. 119a, 30) is the same in both. Is this true of the Good?

τιμῆς...φρονήσεως...ἡδονῆς. These are the ends of the "three lives." Of
course φρόνησις is used in its wide Platonic sense to include 'wisdom' of all kinds.

ταύτην ἡ ἀγαθά. These are the emphatic words. The definitions of snow and white lead are different too, but not ταύτην ἢ λέγειν, in so far as they are regarded as belonging to the species of white things.

κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Note the preposition. Cf. § 12 and the notes. § 12. πῶς δὲ λέγεται; sc. ἀγαθά. If they are not καθ’ ἐν λεγέμενα, in what sense are they all called by one name?

tοῦ...δημιουργάς. δημιουργήματα are defined as ὁ δῆμος μόνον κοινών, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦχον λόγον τῆς οἰκείας ἑτέρως. Cf. 1192 a, 30. The usage of the term, however, fluctuates somewhat. Here 'chance δημιουργήματα,' where there is absolutely nothing in common but an accidental identity of name, are distinguished from certain other δημιουργήματα, for which see next note.

τοῦ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς...πρὸς ἐν. This is the class called παρώνων in Cat. 1 a, 12, a name which merely implies modification of the name by some infixion or suffix (πτώσει). They form an intermediate class between ἄμαντα and συμφώνωμα, the latter of which are also called καθ’ ἐν λεγέμενα. For example, τὸ ἄγαιον means 'the healthy' in the sense (1) of what produces and preserves health (πρὸς ἐν), e.g. healthy exercise, (2) of what is a sign of health (ἀφ’ ἐνὸς), e.g. a healthy complexion, (3) of what is capable (δεικτικῶν) of health, e.g. a healthy man. Cf. Met. 1003 a, 33. So in Met. 1060 b, 37, we speak of an ἀτρεκοῦν λόγος (ἀφ’ ἐνὸς) and an ἀτρεκοῦν μαχαίριον (πρὸς ἐν). As Professor Stewart well says: "A knife and a lecture may both be called 'surgical.' They are both called 'surgical,' not as an ox and a horse are both called 'animals' (συμφώνωμα), nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called κλεῖς (δημιουργήματα)."

κατ’ ἀναλογίαν. This is Aristotle's own view. Things predicated in different categories can only be the same κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, that is their sameness can be represented as a proportion. This meaning of ἀναλογία is illustrated by the example ὁδικὴ : ὀφθαλμὸς : : νόσος : : ψυχή. This illustration would at once appeal to Aristotle's audience, as it comes from Plato Rep. vi. To take another illustration from the matter immediately in hand, we may say καιρὸς : χρόνος : : τὸ μέτριον : ποιότης.

§ 13. ἕτερ ἀντών. Cf. 1096 a, 4 b.

Ἀλλα...φιλοσοφίας, sc. τῆς προφήτης. As Ramsauer points out, we have hints of such a treatment in Met. 1078 a, 31 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑτέρων τῷ μὴν
περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστων ἐν τῷ τοῦ κοινῆς κατηγορούμενος ἀγάθων ἢ χωριστῶν αὐτὸ τι καθ᾽ αὐτὸ, δήλου ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἰχε πρακτῶν οὐδὲ καθτόν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν δὲ τοιούτων τις ξητείται. τάχα δὲ τῷ διδείτεν ἐν δέκτην εἶναι ἐνορίζειν ἑκ. 1097· αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κατηγορούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τούτι· ἔχουσες μᾶλλον εἰσόριζες καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, καὶ εἰδομένης, ἐπιτευχόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν ἐν τῷ τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἑαυτε ὡς ταῖς ἐπιστήμης διαφορέως· 5 πάσας γὰρ ἀγαθοὺς τίνος ἐφίμηκας καὶ τὸ ἐνδεδε τοπικοῦσας παραλείπουσι τὴν ἀνόητον αὐτῶν. καὶ τοιαύτῳ τῇ μηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνών ἀπαντας ἀγαθοῖς καὶ μηδὲ ἐπικοίτες οὐκ εἰπολογοῦν. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑφεληθησταί ὑφάντητας· 1096 16 τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐκδώσεις τοῦ αὐτό τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν, ἀνάγκης (ὅτι γὰρ ἄμα ἀναρετικὸς τι καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι καὶ ὄνειδημα εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην). εἴ δὲ σειτόμως εἰπέιν περὶ αὐτῶν· λέγωμεν ὅτι πρώτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἓν ἡ μή μόνον αὐτοῦ ἄλλα καὶ ἀλλού ὑπὸν ἑγέτα τὸ λοικὸς καὶ κατὰ· ἐπεζήγκεται δὲ πολλοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ πρᾶπος καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. 32. E. E. ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ 1217, 23 ἐτείνει· εἴ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, μή ποτ᾽ οὐδὲ χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ πρᾶξεις.
VII. Πάλιν δ’ ἐπανέλθομεν ἐπί τὸ ξητούμενον ἀγαθὸν, 15 τι ποτ’ ἀν εἰ, φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ. ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ιατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὀμοίωσι. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τάγμαθι; ἦ σοὶ χάριν τὰ λοιπά πράπτεται; τούτο δ’ ἐν ιατρικῇ μὲν ὑγεία, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ’ οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ’ ἄλλο, ἐν 20 ἀπάτῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος. τούτων γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπά πράττουσι πάντες. ὧστ’ εἰ τί τῶν πρακτῶν ὑπάρχων ἐστὶ τέλος, τούτ’ ἀν εἰ, τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείον, ἡ πράξις, μεταβαίνον δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς τῶν αὐτῶν ἀφίκται: τούτῳ 30 δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφήσει πειρατέον, ἐπεὶ δὴ πλείον φαί- 25

theatémnon, the Platonic word. oútos, sc. kathlou. málloν δ’ ἵσως τὴν τοῦδε. This is said not of the doctor’s art but of its application. Cf. Met. 981 a, 14. mállon èis toú tórmw óròmwe tò mòi émevróus tòn ánev tòs empihria lógon ékhontos... a, 17 ai de præx'éis kai ai genviní páthai perí tì kath ekasth elain’ ou épòr oú thérw oú mi ékasth oú tòs empihria, plhn allh h kath súmbéthkhs, allh Kallh ò Sowkath h tòs allwv tò òs òs lógon lógmwv, ò súmbéthkhs aútrwph evai.

VII. § 1. Páliv δ’ ἐπανέλθομεν κ.τ.λ. Having disposed of the universal good, we may now consider the beliefs of the wise (i.e. Plato) about the good, restricting it to the single práxei, tékhni on proaireseis of politeih. ekásth, sc. tékhni. This particularises the question. Even if we reject the universal good, the Platonists will still give answers about the ends of a particular art, of which we may make use.

oú χάριν τα λοιπα. Cf. Top. 146 b, 10 ou charw tállass.

§ 2. metabainwv, ‘shifting its ground.’ The verb metabainwv is technically used of the dialectic process. Cf. Top. 101 a, 33 metabainountes òti ἐν μη καλος φαινομαι λόγων. So EE, 1316 b, 30 metabainwv sunevollóghouv (Introd. § 25). Adopting the Platonic personification of the λόγος, we can say ὁ λόγος metabainwv in the same sense. The meaning, then, is that, if the Platonists are ‘moved on’ or forced by criticism to take a fresh step, that is, to limit the good which we are seeking to that of some one art, their account of it comes into agreement with that from which we ourselves started.

diaphèsaí. This refers to another formula of dialectics, for which see 1138 b, 36 ἐλπίζει μὲν οὖν δέ σαβεῖ and the note.

§ 3. épei de’. So Hél. reads for the épei de of the MSS. Professor Bywater, regarding metabainwv...peiratév as
νεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ΄ αἱρούμεθα τινα δι’ έτερον, οἷον πλούτου αὐλός καὶ ὅλας τὰ ὀργανα, δήλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ’ ἀριστον τέλειον τι φαίνεται. ῥώτει εἰ μὲν ἐστίν ἐν τὶ μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ’ ἀν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, 30 εἰ δὲ πλείον, τὸ τελειώτατον τούτων. τελειώτερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ διακτόν τοῦ δὲ έτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δὲ άλλο αἱρέτων τῶν <καὶ> καθ’ αὐτὰ καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ αἱρέτων, καὶ ἀπλὸς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἱρέτων αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δὲ άλλο. τοιοῦτον δ’ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ’ ἐστιν δοκεῖ 5 1087 διὰ τούτων γὰρ αἱρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι’ αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δὲ άλλο, τιμήν δὲ καὶ ἴδρυμα καὶ νοῦν καὶ πάσαν ἀριστήν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι’ αὐτὰ (μηθενὸν γὰρ ἀποβαινοντος ἐποίηθη ἃν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, 5 διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονίσεως. τὴν δ’ εὐδαιμο- νίαν οὖν διείσθαι αἱρέτων τῶν χάριν, οὕτ’ ἀλλοι δὲ άλλο. φαίνεται δε καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ δὲ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθον αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ γὰρ τέλειον ἁγαθόν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ.
γενείσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικί καὶ ὀλοις τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἐπειδή φύεται πολιτικὸς ἀνθρώπος. τούτων δὲ λεπτῶν ὄρος τις ἐπεκτείνονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς <τῶν γονέων> καὶ τοῖς ἀποκεκούσι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τῶν φίλων εἰς ἀπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν εἰσαχθὲς ἐπισκεπτέσθαι τὸ δ' αὐτάρκεια τίθεμεν ὃ μονοΐμενον αἵρετον ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ ἰδίῳ μηδενὸς ἐνδεδ' ὅποιον δὲ τῇ εὐθαυμονίᾳ οἰλόμεθα εἶπεν· ὥς τι δὲ πάντων αἵρετοτάτην μὴ συναρτημομομένη—συναρτη
tomoμομενή δὲ δὴλον ὡς ἀἵρετοτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπορεχεὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον,

ἡ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ αὐτήτης πεποιημένον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Cf. Poet. 14.58 a, 21 sqq. φύεται πολιτικὸς ἀνθρώπως. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, 2 ὃ ἀνθρώπως φύεται πολιτικὸν ἔδωκεν ἔστι. I have given the reading of Lb: for it seems most likely that the K⁴ reading πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρώπως has been accommodated to the Politics.

§ 7. τοῖς, sc. τῶν φίλων κ.τ.λ. ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. This is not consistent with 10, even if γονεῖς can stand for προγόνους. Rassow's γονεῖς τῶν γονόν (Forsch. p. 111) is a highly probable conjecture.

ἐὰν ἄρετον πρόεισιν. Cf. 1094 a, 20 n.

εὐθαυσά, sc. in the discussion of άλλα. 1170 b, 20 sqq.

τὸ δ' αὐτάρκεια κ.τ.λ. By αὐτάρκεια we do not mean τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρέταν but τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρέταν 'what suffices by itself.' The ἀρέτα is understood by μονοϊμον. Most mss. (not K⁴) have ἀρετή καὶ ἀρετῶν or ἀρετῶν καὶ ἄρειν, which points to the true explanation.


μὴ συναρτημομομενή, 'not included in the enumeration' (of good things), 'not as one good thing among others.' It must include all particular good things, and therefore cannot be put on the same line with or made co-

ordinate with them (ἀναστοχον τῶν ἄλλων ἁγαθῶν Θελ.). So in the Philebus Plato had shown that neither φύεται nor ἐνδεδ' could be the good because φύεται + ἐνδεδ' is better than either alone. Cf. 1172 b, 28 n. The best commentary is Rhet. 1363 b, 18 ἄναγκη τὰ τῶν πλείω ἡσύχασθαι τοῦ ἐνδο καὶ τῶν ἀλλων, αὐτόμενον τοῦ ἐνδο ἡ τῶν ἀλλων, μεῖν ἁγαθών ἐλεύθεροι ὑπερέχει γὰρ, τὸ δ' ἁνακτάρχου ὑπερέχεται. It is only if all other goods are contained in it (ὑπερέχει), that we can be sure no πρόεισιν is possible. If ἕνεκα συναρθεῖται ἡ ἐδαυμοσία, then ἐδαυμοσία + ἕνεκα will 'exceed' ἐδαυμοσία alone. Cf. also Top. 117 a, 16 ἢ τὰ πλείω ἁγαθά τῶν ἀλλων (αἵρετων), ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἡ ἔθνη τὰ ἄρετα ἐν τοῖς ἐρείπιοι ὑπερέχει, τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἐν τὸς πλείον, to which Alexander (p. 347 Wallis) notes as an exception ἄλλα ὀδὸν ἐνδομοσία μετὰ τῶν ἄρετῶν αἵρετωτάτης τῆς ἐδαυμοσίας μόνης, ὡς ἐν τῇ ἐδαυμοσίᾳ περιέχομαι καὶ ἀρετώτατα . . . ὡς ἐν τῷ ἐρείπῳ ὑπερέχει τοῖς περιέχομαι τόνα τὰ περιέχομαι ὡς' ἄρετώτατα, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ τῶν Ἕβρων ἔρθησα, τοῦτ' ἐστιν οἷον συναρθεῖται· διὰ δεῖ προσδιορίζονται τὸ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο εἰναι τὰ πλείω καὶ περιέχομαι ἁγαθά αἵρετωτάτα τῶν ἀλλων καὶ περιέχομαι, ἐν τοῖς συναρθεῖται περιφοκόν. This προσδιορισμός is made in Rhet. loc. cit.
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20 ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεξὸν αἰρετῶτερον ἀδελτεῖον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐτάρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.

‘Αλλὰ ἱσούς τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἀριστον λέγειν ὅμοιον λογούμενον τι φαίνεται, ποιεῖται δὲ ἐναραγότερον τι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ λεχθήναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἀν τούτῳ εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἑργον 10 25 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αἰσθήτη καὶ ἀγαθοματαιποῦ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτη, καὶ δῶξος ὅπι ἔστιν ἑργον τι καὶ πράξεις, ἐν τῷ ἑργῷ δοκεῖ τάγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειν ἀλλ' καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τῷ ἑργῷ αὐτῷ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος 11 μὲν καὶ σκυτοῦσ ἐστὶν ἑργά τιμα καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δὲ 30 οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἑργῶν πέφυκεν; η' καθάπερ ὀφθαλμῶς καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὀλος ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τῇ ἑργῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἐν ἑργῷ τί; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἀν εἰς ποτὲ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12 ἡ γνώσιν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἔχεται δὲ τὸ ἔθιον, ἀφοριστεία ἄρα τῆς θεραπτικῆς καὶ αἰείθησιν ἐκῆν.

1097 b, 24. EE. 1319 a, 5 ὡστε καὶ ψυχῆς (sc. ἡ βελτίστη ἔξεις ἄρετης)· ὅστι γὰρ τῷ ἑργῷ αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἔξεις ἐστιν βέλτωτο τὸ ἑργόν· καὶ ὡς ἔχομεν αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς ἄλλας, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἑργά τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἄλλα ἔχομεν, καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ ἑργόν.

τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος. Here again the leading statement is expressed by the participle (cf. 1094 b, 11 n.). ‘Happiness, then, is complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.’

§ 9. τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἀριστον λέγειν. ‘To identify Happiness and the Best.’ The addition of the article to both terms shows that it is indifferent which is subject and which is predicate.

ἐναργότερον... ὥστε. Cf. ἀλληθὰς μῖν, αὐθεὶς ή σαφῆς 1138 b, 26 n.

§ 10. ληφθείη. Cf. Introd. § 25. We are still ‘taking’ ἑργῶν προτάσεις from the wise.’

τὸ ἑργόν. The following ἑργῶν comes from Plato, Rep. 353 d, sqq., where the ἑργὸν of anything is defined as δ' ἐν ὧ δὲ μονὴ ἐκείνῃ τοῦ τις ἥ ἅρστα.

ὀσπέρ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is an ἐπαγωγή. Its conclusion is ‘If Man has an ἑργόν, his good will depend on that ἑργόν’.

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. άλλ' ἄλλης ἐπαγωγή. We see that (1) every class of men has an ἑργόν, (2) that every part of man has an ἑργόν. It is therefore ἐπαγωγή that Man as such should have an ἑργόν.

§ 12. ξενιστεὶ δὲ τῷ ἔθιον. The ‘proper’ function of man cannot be something ‘common’ to him and to vegetables.

πὴν θεραπτικὴν καὶ αἰείθησιν ἐκῆν. The life of nutrition and growth, the presence of which differentiates the
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ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ· 13 καὶ ἵππος καὶ βοῦς καὶ παντὸς ζῷος. λείπεται δὲ ἡ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσος· τοῦτον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστευθέν λόγον, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοοομένον. διιττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης 5 τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν θεσίων· κυρίωτερον γὰρ αὐτὴ δοκεῖ λέγει·

1098 a, 5. ΕΕ. 1219 a, 9 φανερὸν τοινῦν ἐκ τοινύν ὅτι βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἐξεῳ· τὸ γάρ τέλος ἀριστῶν ως τέλος· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος τὸ ἀριστὸν καὶ τὸ ἐσχατόν, οὐ ἐνεκα ταλλα πάντα. ὅτι μὲν τοινῦν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἐξεως καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, διόλως· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται δικαίως, τῶν μὲν γάρ ἑστιν ἑπερῶν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρήσει, οἷον οἰκοδομικὴς οἰκία ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἰκοδομησείς καὶ ταυτικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ ὑγιαναίς, τῶν δὲ ἡ χρήσις ἔργων, οἷον ὑφως ὀρατίας καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὅτι αὐτή ἀνάγκη, ὅποι ἔργον ἡ χρήσις, τὴν χρήσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἐξεως.

αἰσθητική τις, the 'sentient life,' which differentiates animals and plants. Cf. De An. 413 b, 7 θετικᾶς ἐνέργειας τὸ πανομοτό μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τὰ φυλέματα μετέχει. See the whole passage.

αἰσθητική τις, the 'sentient life,' which differentiates animals and plants. Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἔργον ἀριστον τῶν ἐθελίων μέρων τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ καὶ τὰ φυλέματα μετέχει. See the whole passage.

§ 13. πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσων. The active life of the rational part. Τὸ λόγον ἔχον is that part of the soul which 'can give an account of itself;' and is therefore capable of πράξεις (including θεωρία) directed to an end. Observe that, though λόγον ἔχος may be translated 'rational,' λόγος does not mean 'reason' here any more than in ordinary Greek. τοῖτον δὲ...διανοοομένον. This remark interrupts the argument and destroys the grammar. The language too is late. The adjective ἐπιστευθής can hardly have been used by Aristotle. The interpolation refers to the distinction made at the end of Book i, and is quite irrelevant here.

ὑπόκειται...λεγομένην. It may be either a θέος or an ἐνέργεια (in the language of the Academy a χρώμα). The distinction between the two is the same as that laid down in the De An. 414 a, 4 sqq. See especially 417 a, 31 sqq. where the distinction is illustrated by the contrast of τὸ ἔργον ἐπιστήμην and τὸ θεωρεῖν.

κυρίωτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reason is that the ἐργον is the end of the θέος and therefore better. Where there is an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν that is better than the ἐνέργεια (1094 a, 5); but, when the end is the ἐνέργεια itself, it is the final cause, and the θέος is only a δύναμις in relation to it. Now the δύναμις is referable to the ἐνέργεια (1170 a, 16 sqq.) as that which determines it and makes it what it is (τὸ κόρον). Cf. Met. 1050 b, 5—34.
§ 14. *εἰ δ’ ἄστιν κ.τ.λ. The definition of Happiness now emerges from the dialectic process.

κατὰ λόγου. This follows from its being ἐνέργεια τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσα. The activity of that part of the soul which ‘has a ground’ for its activity, will be explicable from that ground, and therefore ‘according to rule.’

ἡ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. The phrase λόγων ἔχουν may mean ‘to be able to give an account of oneself,’ but it may also mean ‘to admit of an account being given,’ ‘to be explicable.’ If the λόγων ἔχουν is only so in the latter sense, κατὰ λόγων may be too strong an expression; but, even in that case, a λόγος or ‘ground’ is implied, though it may not be explicit.

τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ...τῷ γένει, ‘generically the same.’ Aristotle is meeting the objection that to pass from the function of an individual of a given class (τοῦδε) to that of a good individual of the class (τοῦδε σπουδαῖον), from the ἔργον of Man to the ἔργον of the good man, is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλα γένη. Eudemos takes the Socratic example of the shoemaker. If σκυτοτομεῖ (the ἔξις) and σκυτοτομεῖ (the ἐνέργεια) have an ἄρετή, then (the ἔργον of the shoemaker being a shoe) the ἔργον of a good shoemaker will be a good shoe.

καὶ ἄπλως δὴ κ.τ.λ. These words mark the ἔπαγγεῖον, like καὶ δὼς 1097 b, 26. The only difference is that καὶ ἄπλως lays stress upon the elimination (ἀφαίρεσις) of the particular instances, while καὶ δὼς lays stress on the inclusion of all other particulars.

προστιθέμενος κ.τ.λ., ‘the excess in goodness (of the good individual over the individual simply) being added to the function.’ We must make the same πρόθεσις in both cases. If we say ‘good shoemaker,’ we must say ‘good shoe.’ Here ἐνέργεια is used in its usual mathematical sense of ‘excess’ or ‘differ-

ence.’ Cf. Index s.v.

ἀνθρώπον δὲ...εἰ δ’ οὕτω. Professor Bywater (Constr. p. 24) thinks this is clearly a duplicate of what precedes. I confess that I hardly like to put a limit to the capacity of Aris-
καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαῖοι δὲ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ 15 καλῶς, εἴκοσιον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται 15—εἰ δὲ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνδρότητιν ἄγαθον ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀριστὴν καὶ 16 τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δὲ ἐν βίῳ τελεῖ. μὴ γὰρ χελεδων ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μια ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαιμόνα μια ἡμέρα οὐδὲ διήγος χρόνος.

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐργον ἃν ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωῇ σπουδαία. τούτ’ ἀρα ἄρτι τῷ τέλειον ἄγαθον, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.  ὅπως δὲ εἰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἀριστα τῶν ἁγάθων, * * * αὕτη δὲ ἡ ἐξ η ἐνέργεια), ἐπεί βελτίων ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίωτης ἔξεως ἡ βελτίωττος ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ βελτίωττῃ ἔξει, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριστον εἶναι. ἢν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον. ἔτιν ἀρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐνέργεια.

a, 18. EE. 1219 a, 35 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τελεῖον τι, καὶ ἐστι ζωῇ καὶ τελεία καὶ ἀτελῆς, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑσσαινως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἢ δὲ μόριον), ἢ δὲ τῶν ἄτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἄτελῆς, ἐπὶ ἢν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελειῶς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελεῖων.

little for long and complicated protases even when they involve repetitions and grammatical awkwardnesses. He never seems to be sure that he has said all he meant to say and constantly 'tries back.' Cf. Zell's note. μετὰ λόγου. Like κατὰ λόγον (1295 a, 10 n.), this phrase belongs to ordinary Greek speech, where it means almost the same thing. It implies, however, that the agent is conscious of the rule he follows, that he acts not merely 'by rule' but 'with a rule,' and we shall see later (1144 b, 25 sqq.) that Aristotle insists on this distinction. For the phrase itself cf. Plato, Protag. 324 b where μετὰ λόγου κολάζεων is opposed to ἄγωγοτος τιμωρεῖται to express punishment deliberately inflicted for a certain purpose clearly realised.

§ 16. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, 'in a complete life.' The authoritative commentary on this is EE. 1219 b, 5 τὸ μισθὸν μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαιμονία μή παύει, μηθ’ ἐπικείμενος τίταν ("any"), ἀλλ’ ὅταν λάθη τέλος’ οὐδέν γὰρ ἄτελε εὐδαιμονία, οὐ γὰρ ἄλωι. (The parenthesis about Solon has obscured the meaning of this, cf. p. 48.) Cf. also 1101 a, 13 ἐν πάνθι τυι καὶ τελείῳ (sc. χρόνῳ), ib. 16 μὴ τῶν τυχόντων χρόνων ἀλλὰ τέλεοι βιον, 1177 b, 25 λαβοῦνας ἤνδος βίου τελείου. It certainly refers, then, to duration, and the later Peripatetic way of putting it (cf. MM. 1182 a, 5 τέλειοι δ’ ἐν ἑν χρόνῳ δον ἀνθρώπους βιο结, Stob. Ecl. ii, p. 132, Wachsmuth τελείων δ’ εἶναι τούτοις δον ἄρα ἁρμόνως ἡμῖν <το> πλείστον δ ἐδει) is not really wrong. For, if we bear in mind that nature as a rule (οὐ εἰπὲ τὸ πολὺ) fulfills her ends, it will not seem amiss to describe a ‘complete’ life-time, one in
Περιγραφέθηκε μὲν οὖν τὰ γαθάθον ταύτη... δει γὰρ ἴσως ἢ ὑποτυπώσαι πρῶτον, ἐδ' ὁστερον ἀναγράφαι. δόξεις δὲ ἄν παντὸς εἶναι προσαγαγεῖ καὶ διαρρήσθαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφή, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετής ἢ συνεργὸς 25 ἀγάθος εἶναι. οἷς καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγοναυσι αἰ ἐπίδοσεις παντὸς γάρ προσθῆκατο τὸ ἐδείκτην. μεμνησθεὶς δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὲν ὁμοίως ἐν ἄπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὅλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ καὶ γὰρ τέκτων ἐν 30 καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντων ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὄρθην· ο μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δὲ τὰ ἔστιν ἡ ποιῶν τι·

which the end of human life is attained, as the average life-time of man. If the ἄθροισμα καὶ ἀληθικὴ ἑσώ were the truly human life, a ὅντα τέλεια would be one in which we had time to grow nearly six feet.

§ 27. Περιγραφήθηκε μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Gen. An. 743 b, 20 ἀπόντα δὲ τά τε περιγραφαί διορίζεται πρῶτον, ὅστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακίνες καὶ τὰς σελαργήσας, ἄτεχνος ὧσπερ ἄν ὑπὸ ἑγκόρφο τῆς φύσεως δημογοργικές' καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφας τὰς γραμματές ὀστῶν ἐνιαλείφασι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζύμων. 30 ὑποντύωσα... ἀναγράφατι. The first word is a metaphor from sculpture, the second from painting. Intro. § 26.

προσαγαγεῖν, 'to carry out,' 'advance.' Cf. Met. 908 b, 23 οἱ καλοῦμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων Δάμασκος πρῶτον ταύτα προφήγαγον. Soph. El. 183 b, 28 οὶ μὲν γὰρ τά ἄρχα (τῶν τεχνῶν) εὑρότες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τε προφήγαγον· οἱ δὲ τῶν εὐδοκίμων παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν ὀσον ἐκδιαδόχησαν κατὰ μέρος προσαγαγόντων ὀστῶν περὶκινησαν. Poet. 1449 a, 13 κατὰ μικρόν ὧσπερ προκαταγώντων ὁσον ἐγκέκρητο φαβρον αὐτής. ib. 1448 b, 23 κατὰ μικρὸν πρόοδος ἑγέρθησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσυχείασμάτων.

In fact προσαγαγεῖν is the transitive verb corresponding to ἐπιδοθέναι.

Διαρρήσων, i. q. διακριβῶσιν. τά... τῇ περιγραφῇ, 'what is well outlined.' For the dative with καλῶς ἔχειν, cf. Kühner-Gerth § 419. 30 παντὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 183 b, 17 τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἀπάτω- των τὰ μὲν παρ' εὐρήμενον λεφθόντα πρῶτον πεπωμένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέ- 35 βακτε ὧστοι τῶν παραλαβόντων ὅστερον· τὰ δ' εἰς ὑπαρχήν εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰ τὰ πρῶτον ἐπιδοθέν λαμβάνομεν εἰς ἄλλοτε, χρησιμοτέρας μὲντον τολμῆσῃ τοῖς ἅστεροι εἰς τοῦτον ἐπιζητεῖν, μέγατον γὰρ ἢγοιρισθέντος, ὧσπερ λέγεται· διὰ καὶ χαλεπότατον· δειγμα τὰ κρατασίν τῇ διαφει, τοσοῦτον μικρότατον δὲ τῷ μέγεθε χαλεπότατοι ἦσαν ὑποθέταιν. ταύτης δ' ἐφαρμόσθη μόνο τὸ πρωτεύον καὶ εναπολείπτο τὰ λωτήν ἔστων οὐσίαν καὶ περὶ τῶν ῥήτορους λόγους αὐθεντικοὺς, σχεδόν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσις τέχνας.


§ 19. τὴν ὄρθην, sc. γωνίαν. The verb ἐπιζητεῖν seems to be ambiguously used here. With ὥσπερ it means desiderat, with ἄλλοτε considerat.
θεατης γὰρ τὰλθους. τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ τρότον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέων, ὡς ὡς μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἑργῶν πλείου 20 γίνεται, οὐχ ἀπαίτητον δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἀπασίν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾿ ἰκανὸν ἐν τοῖς τὸ ὁτι δεισθῆναι καλῶς, δεδομένος καὶ 1098 b 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς: τὸ δὲ πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή, τῶν ἁρχῶν δὲ αὐτῶν ἑπαγωγὴ έσθηθον οὐδὲν, αὖ δὲ αἰσθήσει, αὐτὶ δ᾿ ἐθνικῶς τίνι, 22 καὶ ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλοις. μετέτιθαι δὲ πειρατέων ἐκάστας ἡ περὶ- 23 καὶ σπουδαστέον ὃπως ὀρισθοῦσα καλῶς· μεγάλην 5

1098 a, 33. ΕΕ. 1218 b, 17 ὁρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τὰλλα δεικνύουσιν, ὃτι ἑκατόν αὐτῶν ἁγαθῶν· αὐτῶν γὰρ τὸ ὡς ἐνεκα. ὅπως ἐπείδη τὸ ὑγιαῖνα τοῖς, ἀνάγκη τὸ δὲ εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτόν· τὸ δὲ ὑγιείαν ἡγεῖσαι αὐτῶν ὡς κυρίως, καὶ τότε τὸ εἶναι ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ εἶναι τὴν ἁγίαν, ἐτούτοις δεικνύουσιν οὖθες ὃτι ἁγαθὸν ἡ ἁγία, ἀνὴρ πιστωσία ἡ καὶ μὴ Ιατρὸς (οὕτως γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκάστης ὀρισθοῦσα), ὃς περὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλην ἁρχὴν ὀδημαίαν.

θεατης γὰρ τὰλθους, from Plato, Rep. 475 c τοῖς τὴν ἀληθείαν...φιλο- θεομαναίαν.

ὅπως μὴ κ.τ.λ., from Plato, Theait. 277 b περί μὲν διὰ τὸν ἄλλον, ἐπειδῆ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστά- μεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, πλέον δὲ προκεχώρεσα γινεῖσθαι ἡμῶν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον, καὶ Laws 807 c πάρεργον γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐργῶν διακλίνει γέρνεσθαι.  

Cf. Agathon fr. 11 Nauck—

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον ἐργῶν ὡς ποιομένα, τὸ δὲ ἐργῶν μὲν πάρεργον ἐκποιομένα.  

§ 20. τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ δότι (1095 b, 7). We should not ask to have the definition of Happiness, which is the ἁρχή of Politics, deduced from anything higher. We must only expect to have τὸ δότι, the fact that it is so, exhibited to us (δεισθῆθαι here opp. to ἀποδεικθῆθαι) dialectically.

τὸ δὲ ὁτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Cf. 1095 b, 6 ἁρχή γὰρ τὸ δότι. We cannot demonstrate the definition of εὐθυμίας, we cannot show why the Good for Man is what it is. All we can do is to make clearer what it is by a dialectical treatment of the beliefs of those who have been trained in good habits.

§ 21. ἐπαγωγὴ, 'by induction.' See Introd. § 23. The ἁρχὲς of physical science are apprehended by induction.

αἰσθήσει, 'by intuition.' See Introd. § 23. The ἁρχὲς of mathematics are apprehended by intuition.

ἐθνικῶς τίνι, 'by habituation.' The ἁρχὲς of Politics must be apprehended by habituation. The citizen whose character has been formed by habitual obedience to the laws of his state is the man who can apprehend it. 'Εθνικῶς, then, is a sort of practical ἐπαγωγή.


§ 23. μεγάλην γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. De Caelo 471 b, 8 τὸ μέγαν παραβιβασάν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφασταμένου γέρνεσθαι
1098 b, 11. E.E. 1216 b, 26 περί πάντων τούτων ἠτός τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυροῖς καὶ παραδείγμασι χρωμένων τοῖς φαινομένωσι. κράτισσον μὲν γάρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογούνται τοῖς μηθησόμενοι, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβεβαζόμενοι ποιήσωσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἐκατόσοι σικείον τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλληθείαν, εἰ ὁ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύεις τοὺς περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν μὲν λεγομένων αὐτός, προοίμως ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαβάνοντι δὲ τὴν γνωριμίαν τῶν εἰσόδων λέγεσθαι συγκεκριμένα.... 1217 a, ιο καλῶς δὲ ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρίς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικμένων, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀριθμόν, ὅτι προεξέχειν οὐ δὲ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένωσι (νῦν δ' ὅτ' ἂν λέειν μὴ ἔχουσι, ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον δεδοχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθεῖς μὲν ἔστων, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ὅν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἐστί γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθεῖς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ' εκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

b, 12. E.E. 1218 b, 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἰρετῶτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθαρέρ διαφόρως καὶ ἐν τοῖς εὐσεβείως λόγοις.
ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς κυριότατα λέγομεν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ, τὸς δὲ πράξεως καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς 15 ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχῆς τίθεμεν. Ὅστε καλῶς ἄν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τῷ δόξαν παλαιάν ὤντας καὶ ὁμολογομένην ὑπὸ 3τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων. ὄρθως δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεως τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ τέλος· ὁυτὸ γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτῶν. συμμέρει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ 20 εἰ ἐξήν καὶ τὸ εὗρον πράξεις τῶν εὐδαιμονία τὰ σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐδοκία, στὶς εἰρήνης καὶ εὐπραξίας. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα διὰ τὲ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπανθήτω ὑπάρχῃ τῷ λεγέντω· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταύτα ἡ τούτων τοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἡ οὐκ ἀνευ ἡδονῆς· 25

b. 18. EE. 1219 a, 40 ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦτα πᾶσιν ὡμέν. τὸ γὰρ εὗρον πράξεις καὶ τὸ εὗρον τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, διὸ ἔκαστον χρήσεις ἑστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῇ ἐκ καὶ τῇ πράξεις (καὶ γὰρ τῇ πρακτικῆς χρησική ἑστίν· ὅ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεῖς τοις χαλκοῦν, χρήσατα δὲ τὸ ἵππος). Cf. Introd. § 13.

b. 23. EE. 1214 a, 30 τὸ δ᾽ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐξανακαίρως καὶ καλῶς εἶναν ἐν τρισὶ μᾶλλον τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀρετιστῶτοι, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγαστον εἶναι φασίν ἄγαθον, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐνοίκο περὶ τῶν μεγάλων αὐτῶν διαμειβομένοι, συμβαλλόμενοι φάσοντες τάτορον μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς ωσαν μείζον ἄγαθον τὴν φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότεροι τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δὲ ἐκ ἀμφοῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ τούτων εἶναι τὸ ἐξανακαίρως.

teleutaión καὶ τρίτων ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρησμῶν ὁρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή, ώμοι τ᾽ ἔπειρα μάσα, πράξεις δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς. A similar division is implied in Euthyd. 279 b and Phileb. 48 e. 

κυριότατα. Cf. 1098 a, 6 n.

καλῶς ἄν λέγοντο, 'our definition will be right.'

§ 4. τὸ εἰ ἐξήν κ.τ.λ., 'the belief that the happy man lives well and farces well,' which was referred to above 1095 a, 19.

§ 5. τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα, 'the desiderata.'

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ. Here again the reference is mainly to the Philebos. ἔτερος δὲ κ.τ.λ. This refers to Xenocrates who included ὑπηρετικὴ δόνωσις in his definition (cf. Introductory Note, n. 3).
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

[Α. vili. 6]

ἐφεξον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἑκτὸς εὐθηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὅλγοι 7 καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες οὐδετέροις δὲ τούτων εὐλογοι διαμαρτή-
νειν τοὺς ὅλους, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἦ καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. 30 τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνφθός ἐστιν 8 ὁ λόγος: ταύτης γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ 
τὸ ᾽ἐν οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐν κτῆσι ἢ χρησί τοῦ ἄριστοσ ὑπολαμβά- 
νειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἡ ἐνέργεια. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξειν ἐνδέχεται 1099 ν ορθῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχοντας, οἷον τὸ καθευδοντι ἦ 
καὶ ἄλλας ποι ἐξηγηκότε, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οἷον ὅτι τοῖς 
πράξεσι γὰρ ἔξα ναγήσης, καὶ εἰ πράξεις. ὁσπερ δ' Ὅλη 
πίστιν οἵον οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυροτάτοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' 
5 οἱ ἀγανομοίμων—ταύτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν—οὗτοι καὶ τῶν 
ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐνθύμολοι 
γύνονται. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἡδύς. τὸ 1100 
μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἵκαστο δ' ἐστιν ἢδυ πρὸς ὃ
λέγεται φιλοτιμότος, οἷον ὑπόσις μὲν τῷ φιλέπτην, θέμα
δὲ τῷ φιλοθεόρῳ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ
II φιλοδικάλοι καὶ ὠδοὶ τὰ κατ’ ἅρτην τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς
μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἤδεια μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύετε τοιαύτη
ἐδώ, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἤδεια τὰ φύετε ἤδεια τοιαύτη
δ’ αἱ κατ’ ἅρτην πράξεις, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτο φοίν ἤδεια καὶ καὶ
II καθ’ αὐτῶς. οὗτοι δὴ προσδείκται τῆς ἤδειας ὁ βιοι αὐτῶν 15
φῶσπερ περίπαττον τινός, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν ἧδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
πρὸς τοὺς εἰρήμενοι γὰρ οὐδ’ ἐστίν ἄγαθος ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς
καλαῖς πράξεσιν οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτε ἂν εἶποι τῶν μὴ
χαίρωντα τὸ δίκαιοτραγεύν, οὔτ’ ἐλευθερίαν τὸν μὴ χαίρωντα
ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν ὁμολογοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 20
13 εἰ δ’ οὔτω, καθ’ αὐτᾶς ἂν εἶναι αἱ κατ’ ἅρτην πράξεις ἤδειαι.
ἀλλ’ μὴν καὶ ἄγαθαί τε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἔκαστον,
ἐὰντερ καλῶς κρίνεις περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος κρίνει
14 ὁ ως εἴπομεν. ἀριστον ἁρα καὶ καλλιστον καὶ ἤδειον ἡ

a, 24–30. EE. init. Ὅ μὲν ἐν Δῆλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ
gνώμην ἀποφημάμενοι συνεγραφέν ἐπὶ τὸ προπάλαιον τοῦ Λητῆου,

soul which feels it, than with anything
external. The life of the good man
is therefore pleasant 'in itself' (καθ’
αὐτῶν), not accidentally (κατὰ
συμβεβηκόν). Goodness is pleasant to him
because he is a man, whereas horses
are not pleasant to the φιλίττος για
man, but ἤ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ φιλέπτη

φιλοτιμότος, 'φιλο-so-and-so.' This
generic name for all compounds be-
ginning with φιλο- occurs below 1118b,
21. 1125 b, 14. It has been restored
by Vahlen in Rhet. 1363 b, l. 1.
οὐκ...καὶ ὠδος, ἀν ἐπιγραφῇ. Cf.
1098 π, 10 π.
§ II. τὰ ἤδεια μάχεται. Cf. 1166 b,
18 στηρισθῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ γνωρίζῃ, καὶ τὸ
μὲν δέ μαχηθέντων ἄλγει ἄνεγγυμένων
τῶν, τὸ δὲ ἤδεια. See the whole
chapter. As the pleasures are κατὰ
συμβεβηκόν they may be in conflict, οὐ

gάρ πάνω συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβε-
βηκόν (1157 a, 35).
τοιαύτα, sc. ἤδεια.
τοιαύτα, sc. φιλέπτη ἤδειαι.
§ 12. περίπατον. Camerarius quotes
the Peripatetic Kritolos (ap. Philon.
2, 452) καταγωγούσον ἀφθαρσοῦν ἀφ
ἀμορφοῦ καὶ ἐδειχθείς ἐνταῦθα περίπατος
καὶ νόθον κομίζει, μηχρεὶς γαρφοί.
The idea here is surely rather that of
a poetich than that of an amulet (for
which sense cf. 1100 b, 29 n).
πρὸς τοὺς ἀρημόνοις. This com-
pletes the proof of the essential plea-
sants of good activities. Not only
(1) does the good man take pleasure in
them, but (2) he is not good unless he
does so.
§ 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ. τ. ἕνα. They fulfill
the requirements not only of τὸ ἰδοῦ,
but also of τὸ στυγβοῦ and τὸ καλὸν, and
each of these in the highest degree.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ  [Α. VIII. 14]

25 ευθαμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπί-γραμμα—

καλλιότατον τὸ δικαιότατον, λυστὸν δ᾿ ἐγχαίνειν·
ησυστὸν δὲ πέφυχ᾿ οὐ τις ἐρέ τὸ τυχέων.
ἀπαντὰ γὰρ ἑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταῦτας
30 δὲ, ἡ μὲν τοῦτον τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐθαμονίαν.

Φαίνεται δ᾿ ἱμω καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἄγαθῶν προσδεομένης,
καθάπερ εἵπομεν ἄδυνατον γὰρ ὡς ὁ πάθος τὰ καλὰ
πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὑπάτα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,

dielων οὖχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τὸ τε ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
τὸ ὄντος, ποιήσας
καλλιότατον τὸ δικαιότατον, λυστὸν δ᾿ ἐγχαίνειν·
πάντων ἡσυστὸν δ᾿ οὐ τις ἐρέ τὸ τυχέων.

ημὲς δ᾿ αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἢ γὰρ εὐθαμονία καλλιότατον καὶ ἀρίστων
ἀπάντων οὕσα ἡσυστὸν ἔστιν.

§ 14. κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπιγραμμα. Eudenom makes this the beginning of his Ethics with good literary effect. The γεφία is also found in Theognis, 225, where, however, the pentameter runs πρήγμα δὲ τοποθέτασθ' οὐ τις ἐρέ τ' τυχέων. Sophokles in his Creousa (fr. 326) worked it up in his own way—

Καλλιότατός οὖσα τού ὅποιον περικείαν,
λυστὸν δὲ τῆς ἀναλογίας ἁσύστος δ᾿

πάρος τὸ λόγιον ὥστιν ἐρέ καθ᾿ ἡμέραν.

The authority of Aristotle is sufficient to prove that it was really inscribed on Leta's temple at Delos in the same way as the γεφία of the 'Seven Wise Men' were set up at Delphi. Cf. Preger, Inscr. Metr. p. 165.

§ 15. Φαίνεται...προσδεομένη. We now turn to the question of 'external goods.' In spite of its being an ἐνεργείαν ψυχῆς, the good life evidently stands in need of something over and above τὰ ψυχικὰ. The word προσδεομένη is appropriate because external goods cannot be said to inhere (ὑπάρ-

χεως) essentially (καθ᾿ αὐτόν) in the good life as pleasure does. Contrast 1099 a, 15 οὕτω δὲ προσδείηται τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.

καθάπερ εἵπομεν. No such statement has been explicitly made; but we have seen (1098 b, 16) that some τῇ ἐκτός ἑντηρίᾳ χυμασαλαμβάνουσιν, and that they are not likely to be wholly wrong. We are still testing our definition by τὰ λεγόμενα.

ἀχορήγητον ὑπάτα, just as a tragedy cannot be produced unless its cost is defrayed by a χρησίμος, though all he can do is really external to it and in no way affects its excellence as a tragedy (Poet. 1453 b, 7 τὸ δὲ τῇ ἕθει ἄχρηστον καὶ χρησίμα δοθῆναι ἔστι). The metaphor is a favourite one with Aristotle. Cf. 1101 a, 15. 1177 a, 30. 1178 a, 24. 1179 a, 11. Pol. 1288 b, 33 ἀρετήγητον τῶν ἁναγκαίων, 1295 a, 28 φύσιος δεῖ καὶ χρησίμα δεῖχναι. In the κοινή it was no longer felt as a metaphor. Polybius uses χρησίμα for material of war, what Thucydides and Demosthenes call παρασκευή,
καθάπερ δὲ ὄργανον, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς 1099 b
16 δυνάμεως ἔνιοι δὲ τητάμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον
εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάντω γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ
τίν πάντων παναίσχυς ἢ δυσκήνης ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἀτεκνος,
ἐπὶ δὲ ἱσώς ἢππον, εἰ τι πάγκακοι πάδες ἔλεγον ξῆλος, ή 5
ἡ ἁγαθὸν ὄντες θευνάζων. καθάπερ οὖν εὐπορεύμεν, ἑοικε προσδεί-
σθαι καὶ τὸς τοιαῦτας εὐμερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτα τάπτοσιν
ἔννοι τῆς εὐτυχίας τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἔτεροι δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

1099 b, 7. ΕΕ. 1214 a, 24 πόλλοι γὰρ ταύτῶν φασι εἶναι τὴν
eὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. b, 11 μᾶλλον δὴ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ
dιαρκαίατε ἡμείς προτεστάτες μήτε ἥμισυ, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ
ζῆν εἰς, καὶ τίνων ἀνεί τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδείκτει τοῦθεν ὑπάρχειν.
οὐ γὰρ ταύτων, ἐὰν τὰ ἀνεί σῶν τοῖς ὑμνίσκειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιείας
ἀρχηγὸς ὃ ἔζηκε τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πόλλων, οὐδὲ τὸ τίνι
cαλὸς ἢ καλὸς ἢ καλὸς (ἐκτιμεῖ τῶν τοιοῦτον τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἢ
ἐν ὑγίεια ὑμῶν τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων οὐκ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν
τούτων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οὐκ ἄνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἐγκανον ἢ
κακὸς μετέχεις οὕτως ἢ υπάρχειν ἢμῖν οὐτ ἁγαθὸν οὕτως καλῶς,
τὸ δὲ ἴδια μᾶλλον τῇ ἑκάστῃ φύσιν· ἢ δὲ μὶ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ
ὑμῶν οἰκείον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τῶν εἰρημένων κρεσφορίαν καὶ τῶν
περιπάτων οὐ μετα δείτων). ἢ οὐ γὰρ ταύτ' αὕτη τῆς ἀρμοτητῆς
περὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἔστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὅν ἀνεί γὰρ οὐκ
ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἐνοι κέρη τῆς εὐτυχίας εἶναι νομίζουσι.

πολλά μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first class of external goods consist of the
instruments (ὄργανα) of happiness.
§ 16. ἐνιαί δὲ κ.τ.λ. The second class of external goods are the neces-
sary conditions (ἀπὸ οὗ δὲν) of happiness. The same division occurs below
1099 b, 27.

τητάμενοι. A tragic word occurring nowhere else in Aristotle. The use
of such words in passages like this is characteristic of his style. So we have
it in Plato's Laws 810 b τητάμενα μεθ' οὗ τα καὶ ἀριστολοι.

ρυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον. Another poetic touch. Cf. 1100 b, 28 θλίβει
καὶ λυγυρίζει τὸ μακάριον.
οἶον εὐγενείας κ.τ.λ. Cf. the list of

what are called, in a popular sense, μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας in Rhet. 1360 b,
18 εὐγενεία, πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, πλούτου, εὐτεκνία, εὐγειρία, κάλλου,
ἰθύς, μέγεθός, δύναμις ἀγωνιστική, δόξα, τιμή, εὐτυχία, ἀρετή. It is from
such lists we may best gather the Hellenic ideal of life.

μονώτης. Cf. 1097 b, 9 n. Here it is contrasted with πολυφιλία etc. in
the Rhetoric (see last note). Aristotle has a strong sense of the pain of the
μονώτης... Cf. 1109 b, 16 sq.
§ 17. εὐμερίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n.
The word became hackneyed in the

τὴν εὐτυχίαν. The proper word in connexion with external goods,
IX. "Οθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖαι ποτέρον ἐστὶ μαθητὴν ἢ ἐδυσ-
υο τὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θέλαν μοίραν ἢ
καὶ διὰ τύχην παραρίγνεται. εἴ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ 2
θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώπως, εὐδοξον καὶ τὴν εὐδαμονίαν θεσ-
δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσφι βέλτιστον,
ἀλλὰ τούτο μὲν ἤσως ἄλλης ἢ εἰ τί σκέψεως οἰκεῖότερον, 3
15 φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτος ἐστίν ἄλλα δὲ ἄρετην

1099 b, 9. EE. 1214 a, 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτόν ἐν τοῖς τὸ ἐθ ἐχεν
καὶ πός κτητόν, ποτέρον φύσις γίγνονται πάντες εὐδαμώνες οἱ τυχα-
νόντες ταύτης τῆς προστρεχομένας, ὡσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χρωμα
λαδινικά, ἢ διὰ μαθησιῶν, ἢς οὕτως εἰπτήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαμονίας,
ἡ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὕτω καὶ φύσις οὕτω μαθοῦν ἄλλη
ἔυθεσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαίλε μὲν τοῖς φαίλες ἔθνεσιν, ἠρωτα
λεῖ δὲ τοῖς ἥρωτας), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' ὁδὸν τῶν πρῶτων, δυνά
δὲ βάτερου, ἢς καθαπέρ τοῖς μυθολογίσεως καὶ θεωρήματοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
ἐπιτελία διαμοιονούν τινος ὡσπερ ἐνθυσιακῶς, ἡ διὰ τήν τύχην...ὅτι
μὲν οὖν ἡ παραστα σιδα τῶν ἀπακίων ὢν τῶν ὢν ἀπάρχει τοῖς
ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἀξιῶν (ἀπαντα γὰρ αἱ γενεάς σχεδὸν πέπτουσιν εἰς
ταῦτα τὰς ἀρχαῖς καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ
ἐπιτήμης ἢ τις συμπάγης πράξεις).

Cf. Rhet. 1362 a, 5 ἀλλ' ἔνδε τὸ τούπαρ
τῶν θυγατέρων οὕτω ἀπὸ τούρχη ἐμ' οἷς ἐστιν ἡ φθόνος.

Ἑπερὶ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν. These words depend very loosely on ἔθεν, but that
is no reason for expunging them. The meaning is ‘while others identify it
with goodness.’ The remark is relevant because it allows the two extreme views.
And it is necessary to connect the argument with the next section.

IX. § 1. "Οθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. ‘It is
just this (viz. the fact that some
identify Happiness with εὐνοχία, others
with ἀρετή) which gives rise to the
difficulty.’

ποτέρον...ἀσκητόν. These are the
views of those who identify Happiness
with goodness. Cf. EE. loc. cit.

ἡ...παραρίγνεται. These are the
views of those who identify it with
eὐνοχία. Cf. EE. loc. cit. For
the two views cf. Archilochos fr. 15
Πάπτα τῆς καὶ μοῖρα, Περικλῆς, ἀνόηθ
δίδωσιν, and fr. 16 Πάπτα πόνοι τοῖς
tῆτας μελετή τε βροτεία, τε

§ 2. οὐ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
admits the prima facie plausibility of
the naive religious view that εὐδαμονία
is good fortune sent by dispensations
of divine providence. Θεὸς μοίρα is
the religious equivalent of τύχη, and
is commonly so used by Plato.

§ 3. ἄλλης...ἐκέχεως, sc. τῆς θεολο-
γίας. ‘Hæc magis sunt declinantis
quam pollentis. Ubi enim ad dei
derumque vel naturam vel voluntatem
perventum est, Aristotelem
constat plerumque ἐκέχεων.” Ram-
sauer.
καὶ τών μάθησιν ἡ ἀσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι τὸ γάρ τῆς ἁρετῆς ἀθλοῦν καὶ τέλος ἁριστῶν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θείων ταῖ καὶ μακάριων, εἰς δὲ ἀν καὶ πολλοκοιων. δυνατῶν γὰρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς μιᾷ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἁρετὴν διὰ τῶν μαθησιῶν καὶ ἐπιμελείας, εἰ δὲ ἔστιν αὐτῶ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἐπὶ λογον ἔχειν 2ο ὀντός, εἰπτε τά κατὰ φύσιν ὅς οἴον τα κάλλιστα ἔχειν ὅτω πέρυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πάσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα <τά> κατὰ τὴν ἁρίστην τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ 7 κάλλιστον εὑπηρέσαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελεῖς ἂν εἴη. συμμαφέας

b, 18. EE. 1215 a, 8 ἐτι δὲ πρὸ ἐργοῦ τὰ τοιαύτα μὴ λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς δὲ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψει, ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχεται μετασχετοῦ τοῦ εὗ καὶ καλός ξήν, εἰ τὰ μακάριοι ἐπιφυλακότερον εἰς εἰς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθε αὐτὴν καὶ ἐντεύτην ἡν ἡν ἡ ἁρίστην ἡ κατά. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἤ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλός ξήν ἐντεύτην ἀν ἐπιμολοῖς (οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμελείας ἢ κτίσις εἰς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· δὲ δὲ τῷ τῶν ποιῶν τῶν ἐναι καὶ τᾶς κατ' αὐτῶν πράξεως, κοινοτέρον δὲ εἰ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ λεότερον, κοινοτέρον μὲν τῶν πλείον ἐνδεχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, δυοτέρον δὲ τὰ καῦσαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν παρασκευάζονι ποιῶν τῶν καὶ τᾶς πράξεως.

§ 4. εἰτε δὲ ἀν καὶ κ.τ.λ. "But, at the same time, it must be—". This is not an argument, but a reservation. Aristotle wishes to guard against a common and easy perversion of the religious view. We may call Happiness θεὸν and the like; but we must regard it as in the reach of all, as not as confined to the favourites of heaven, a Polykrates or Croesus, as Stewart well says.


§ 5. ἐπὶ λογον. Aristotle simply opposes one plausibility to another in accordance with the dialectical character of the passage.

§ 5. ἐπιρτα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν κ.τ.λ. The higher we ascend in the scale of causes, the more evidence do we find of teleology. The four chief causes are Chance, Nature, Mind (Man) and Necessity (112 a, 31). The works of Nature are as good as they can be (cf. Phys. 260 b, 22 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον del φυλακαμβάουμεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρξειας, ἐν δὲ δυνατίν). Much more will this be true of the works of Man.

§ 6. <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἁρίστην, sc. αἰτίαν, i.e. διάνοιαν, Intelligence or Man.

πλημμελεῖς ἄν εἴη. This is a simple appeal to cultivated feeling. The word is Platonic.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ  [A. IX. 7]

25 δ' ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἕτοιμον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχής ἐνεργεια [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ποιά τις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἁγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἄναγκαιον, τὰ δὲ συνεργά καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὁργανικῶς. ὡμολογοῦμεν δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἰ ἦν καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ; 8 τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἀριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ 30 πλείοντάς ἔπιμελεῖαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιοῦ τινα καὶ ἁγαθοῦ τούς πολίτας ποιήσαι καὶ πρακτικοῦς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως 9 οὖν οὕτω βοῶν οὕτω ὑπνοι οὕτω ἀλλ̃ τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον

1100 ἀλλομένι οὖθ᾽ εἴστε γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐλόμεν τε κοινωνίας τοιαύτης ἐνεργειας. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὴν αὐτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαιμον ἔστων 10 οὔτω γὰρ πρακτικός τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δει γὰρ, ὡσπερ 5 εἰσομεν, καὶ ἀρετὴς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ 11 μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοπαῖ θυγατρὶς κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ εὐνδέχεται τοῦ μάλιστ᾽ εὐθεὐθείας μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπετειῶν ἐπὶ ῥήματι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τροικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου.

1100 a, 1. EE. 1219 b, 5 καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἰναι εὐδαιμονία μήτε παίδα μήθ᾽ ἡλικίαν πάσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ ᾿ blackColor ἔχει καλῆς, τὸ μή ζῶντ᾽ εὐδαιμονίζειν), ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν λάβη τέλος: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτέλες εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ γὰρ ἄλοιπον.

§ 7. καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, 'as a consequence of the definition,' as well as dialectically. Note how the style changes at once from the literary to the scientific. Introd. § 7.

ποιὰ τις, i.e. κατ' ἀρετὴν, which I take to be a gloss.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, sc. τῶν ἄντικαν.

τὰ μὲν... ὁργανικῶς. A scientific description of the two classes of goods described in a literary way above, 999 b, 1 sqq. They are ('ἐς ὑποθέσεως) ἄναγκαια (1) as ὁν ὅπε ἄνευ, (2) as ὁργανα.

§ 8. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ. 1094 a, 27 sqq.

ἀρα τῇ κ.τ.λ. As an ἐπιστήμη. Politics must know the best way of attaining its own end. We may therefore draw inferences from the actual practice of lawgivers. As they try to make the citizens good, it is evident that they think it possible to produce Happiness thus.

ποιοὶς τινα καὶ ἁγαθοῖς, 'of a certain quality, i.e. good.'

§ 9. εἰκότως σὺν κ.τ.λ. Some additions of a dialectical character loosely appended.

τοιαῦτα, sc. πρακτικῆς τοῦ λόγου ἐπιστήμη.

§ 10. ἀρετῆς τελείας, goodness fully developed in a complete life.

§ 11. πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question of τύχη brings us back naturally to that of the βίος τελείας εὐθειάτου. Cf. 1098 b, 26 ff. Theophrastos, Hist. Plant. 2, 5, 7 (of trees) τὸ τε γὰρ εὐθειὰ μάλιστα.
X. § 1. Πέτερον οὖν κ.π.λ. The best way of bringing out the relation of τοκη and external goods to the good life is by discussing Solon’s dictum. We shall find that the true solution of it is that, though we must have a τελεσιον διος, we are only bound to accept Solon’s view in its extreme form if we identify ευδαιμονια with εισεχεεια.

οδι οδηνον οδινα, ‘not even any one else,’ though he may not meet with Πραμακικ τοκι.

κατα Σκοπου. Hdt. i, 32 οκτεινων δε χρη παιατος χρηματις την τελεσιον κη απορησται. The dictum was a commonplace of the Age of the Seven Wise Men, and passed into Athenian tragedy, like so many other γεωρακιον. Soph. Trach. 1 calls it λογος...διαπεσον επερπανον φασελ.

§ 2. Ατονον. The word marks the dialectical character of the argument. It is the opposite of εισεχεεια. Popular opinion would at once reject the idea that a man is happy after he has died.

§ 3. Τηνακατα, ‘then and not till then.’ Usually τηνακατα δην οτι την την...tum dum.
καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει: τὸ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γῆρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον εἰσέδεχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐγκόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν 25 ἀγαθούς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βλοῦ τοῦ κατ’ ἄξιαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐξ ἐναύτιας ὁμόλογον ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἐχεῖν αὐτοὺς εἰσέδεχεται. ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοντ’ ἃν εἰ συμμεταβαλλοῦ καὶ ὁ τεθνεώ καὶ γίνοντο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν πάλιν δ’ ἀθλοῖς, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ’ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον 50 συνκινεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐγκόνου τῶν γονεῶν. ἀλλ’ ἐπαντέλεον 6 ἐπὶ τῷ πρότερον ἀπορθηθὲν’ τάχα γὰρ ἁπαθετηθεὶς καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἶ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὡς ὑπὲρ καὶ τῇ 7 τοῦτο μακαρίου ἑκατόν ὅχι ὡς ἴσον μακάριον ἀλλ’ ὃτε πρότερον ἰν, πῶς οὖν ἄτοπον εἰ ὅτ’ ἐστιν εὐδαιμονίαν μη 35 ἀληθευόντας καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι 1100 τοὺς ἐξωτικὰς εὐδαιμονίες διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μονόμεν τὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφεῖναι καὶ μηδαμοῦ εὐ-

§ 4. κατὰ λόγον, ‘accordingly,’ ‘consistently with his life.’ The editors as a rule see that ‘according to reason’ will not do here, but it has not always been seen that this use of the phrase determines its meaning in such passages as 1095 α, 10. The original sense of the phrase is ‘in proportion’ and hence it is used of anything that, being ‘according to rule,’ can be calculated upon and is uniform or consistent. The opposite of τὸ κατὰ λόγον is τὸ παράλογον, that which violates all rules of probability and is therefore incalculable. Cf. Plato, Polit. 283 c ἐνα κατὰ λόγον ἐπαινόμεν κ.τ.λ. Rep. 500 c κόσμῳ... χάρι καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχεται. τοῖς ἀποστήμαις, the different degrees in which the descendants are ‘removed’ from their ancestor. 

ἄτοπον. Cf. 1100 α, 13 ν. This sentence shows clearly that there is no question of the dead man being aware of what takes place. If he were, there would be no absurdity in his being at one time happy, at another wretched. What is absurd is that our estimate of the success or failure of his life as a whole should be indefinitely subject to revision.

§ 5. συνκινεῖται. The use of this word is, of course, flatly inconsistent with the view that the dead man φέρεται. The inconsistency, however, is not Aristotle’s. We may learn from Rohde’s ‘Psyche’ how very inconsistent and illogical popular views on this subject were. Cf. e.g. Isokr. Aigin. § 42 εἰ τίς ἐστις αὐθεντής τοῖς τεθνεῶι τῶν ἐνδέει γεγομένων.

§ 6. ἀλλ’ ἐπαντέλεον κ.τ.λ. The λόγισις of the first ἀπορία, viz. πότερον εὐθὺς εὐδαιμονίεσθαι ἐστιν ἐν ἦν; (1100 a, 31...1101 a, 21). τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, sc. the ἀπορία raised in § 3. Cf. § 4 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει. 

§ 8. χαμαλέοντα κ.τ.λ., changing colour with the changing ground of external circumstances. The words χαμαλέοντα καί χαβρός Ἰδρυμένον seem to come from some poet.

§ 10. τὸ λόγον, viz. that activities according to goodness and not fortune determine happiness. The difficulty just discussed (τὸ πῦν διαπορθήθη) confirms this; for it has arisen διὰ τὸ μὴ χρήσεται τοῖς εὐδαιμονίας ἦπερκεῖται. Now fortune does not abide; goodness does.

καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Cf. 1140 b, 18.

αἱ τιμώσταται, sc. αἱ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, as we shall learn later on. συνεχεῖται. Cf. 1177 a, 21.

§ 11. τὸ ἤποιμον, sc. ἡ βεβαιότης.

τοιούτος, sc. εὐδαιμων.

πάντων. Masculine. The reservation is made because τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἄριστῳ συνεχῶς ἑνεγείρει.

καὶ θεωρήσει. All through this passage, Aristotle has the θεωρητικὸς βίος distinctly in view.

ὁ γ’ ὁς ἄληθος κ.τ.λ., from Simonides. The passage is quoted and discussed in Plato, Protag. 339 b. Ἀλήθ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἄληθεν γενέσθαι χαλεπῶν χερσὶν τε καὶ ποιεῖν τὸν τετράγωνον ἄρει φόγον τετραγώνον.
25 ῥοπῆν τῆς ξωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει—καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἢ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται—ἀνάπαυσιν δὲ συμβιανύοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον’ λύτας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἔμποδίζει πολλὰς ἐνεργείαις. ὃμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλαμπτεῖ τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῆς εὐκάλυπτος πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναληπτικόν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὡς καὶ μεγαλόψυχος, εἰ δ' εἰσίν αἱ ἐνεργείαι κύριαι τῆς ξωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, 13 οὐδεὶς ἀν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλων· οὐδέποτε γὰρ 35 πράξει τὰ μοντα καὶ τὰ φάβλα. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγάθων καὶ ἐμφρονά πάσας αὐδέμβας τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ καλλίστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγάθων τῷ παρόντι στρατηγόν ἄχρησθαι πολεμικῶς καὶ σκυτυὸν τῶν δοθέντων 5 σκυτῶν καλλίστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἀπαίτεσται. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλως μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ ἐυδαιμόνιον, οὐ μὴν μακαρίον γε, ἄν Πριμακίδας τύχας περιπέτεια. οὐδὲ δὴ ποιικὸς γε καὶ εὐμετάβαλος· οὗτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἐυδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥή- 10 διός, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγά- λων καὶ πολλῶν, ἐκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο πάλιν

§ 12. λύτας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Α Fragment of Theophrastos preserved by Pindarich seems to belong to this discussion. Cf. V. Per. c. 38 ὁ γοῦν Θεοφράστος ἐν τοῖς Ὁμικοῖς διαπορήας εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέφεται τὰ ἴθη καὶ κινούμενα τὰς τῶν συμπιστῶν πάθεις ἐξ- ἱσταται τῆς ἁρετῆς, ἰστόρηκεν δὴ κούσον ὁ Περεκλῆς ἐπικοσμοῦντος τῶν τῶν φιλῶν δείξει περιπάτον ὑπὸ τῶν γνώσεων τῆς ἀρχηγοῦν δὲ περιπατίων ὑπὸ τῶν γνωσωτὰς ἑαυτῶν τὴν ἀμικτέραν. Cf. Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, p. 23 and 1153 b, 19 n. μὴ δ' ἀναληγάθησαι. The ἄναληγαθος (1115 b, 26) is the man of stupid insensibility, insensibility to pain being regarded as the mark of a coarse nature. He is closely akin to the ἀναληγάθος (1104 a, 24 n.), but the insensibility of the latter is intellectual rather than moral. Kleon bids the Athenians not to show themselves ἀναληγάθοτεροι than the Miletus (Thuc. iii, 40). and Demosthenes (D. Cor. 35) quotes Aischines as speaking of the ἀναληγαθίας of the Theban power. See also 1126 a, 3 n. § 13. οὐδέποτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ΗΙς ἐπεργείας will never be of the kind called αὐνάμα τοῦ supra 1100 b, 11, and it is these alone which can make a man positively ἄθλως.
§ 15. ἡ προσθετέων κ.τ.λ. Rassow thought this a later Peripatetic addition, inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle's criticism, though in harmony with the view of MM 1185 a, 5 that a τέλειον βίος is δοσον ἄνθρωποι βιούν. If we make this addition, it seems we might as well accept Solon's dictum at once, as Eudemus appears to do (1129 b, 6). But the difficulty disappears if we keep what is said about Πραμακαί τόχαι clearly in view. These are first mentioned (1100 a, 5 sqq.) before the discussion of Solon's dictum has begun, and that discussion itself is limited to the question whether we may or may not call any other man—other than the man who meets with Πραμακαί τόχαι—happy so long as he lives. We must, then, make this particular reservation whatever conclusion we come to on the main question.

κατὰ λόγον. Cf. 1110 a, 23 n.

§ 16. μακαρίους δι' ἀνθρώπους, another reservation. Happiness is an ἐνέργεια and therefore complete at any moment or in the whole (1174 a, 13 sqq.), but τὰ ἀνθρώπους αὐθανατά συνεχείς ἐνέργειαν.

ΧΙ. § 1. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων κ.τ.λ. The λόγος of the second ἀφορία, viz. τότερον συμβάλλεσθαι αἵ τῶν ἀπογόνων τόχαι; (1101 a, 22...b, 9).

συμβάλλεσθαι, sc. τρόσ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἡ μή.

§ 3. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. A complex protasis, the two members of which are καθάπερ...ἄπαντας καὶ διάφορα...πράττεσθαι. The apodosis begins at εὐλογιστῶν δή. The answer to this question is made to depend upon
what is laid down above 1100 b, 23—25.

§ 4. ἐκαστον, accusative with συμβαίνειν.

προύτάρχειν, 'to be assumed' δὲ
τῶν δράματος (Poet. 1460 a, 29 sqq.).
To take place 'behind the scenes' or ‘before the curtain rises.' The murder of Laios, for instance, does not affect us as it would do if it formed part of the action. The regular word for 'action' in this sense is πράττεσθαι.

§ 5. συλλογιστέον. ‘We must estimate’ or ‘allow for this difference too.’ The word is not used in its technical sense. L² and the Vetus Versio (ita) read ταύτη for ταύτην, which would mean 'we must allow for the difference in this way too.'

τὸ διαπορείσθαι, sc. συλλογιστέον.
'We must allow for the fact that a difficulty is felt.' Lambinus conjectured τάδε δὲ διαπορείσθαι, Rassow τάδε δὲ διαπορείσθαι. But the difficulty has been already alluded to above 1100 a, 11.

γοῦν. This seems to be implied by the γὰρ of K² and the εἰς of L².

ἐκ τούτων, sc. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἀδικοῦν. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 26) points out that this is a poetic word and suggests ἀδικοῦν, ‘obscure,’ cf. De An. 403 a, 19.

ἡ ἔκκλησις, sc. ἡ κεκηκακὼς.

ἐν δὲ μὴ, sc. διακελεῖται. This shows clearly that the question is not mainly one of the dead man's own feelings, but only of our estimate of his life.

XII. § 1. ἐπισκεψιμότατη κ.τ.λ. Happiness is not a mere δύναμις. Is
1 πηλίων· δήλων γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων ὅση ἐστίν. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπανεπιτυχον τῶν ποιῶν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν ἐπανειπεῖν διὰ τῶν γὰρ δίκαιων καὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπανοούμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ 15 ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἴσχυρόν δε καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκατόν τῶν ποιῶν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄγα-3 ἔργα τι καὶ σπουδαίαν. δήλων δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τῶν θειες ἐπαίνων· γελοίοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερό-μενοι, τούτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γνώςαθαι τῶν ἐπαίνους δι' ἐνεφαράς, ὀσπερ εἰπομεν. εἰ δ' ἐστιν ὁ ἐπαινος τῶν τοιού-των, δήλων ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἐστιν ἐπαίνοις, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τις γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν θει-τάτων [μακαρίζομεν]. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς 25 γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαίνει καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὅσ
tὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκμὸν λόγοι τὸ καθ' ἐκατόν ἔργον· τὸ δ' ἐπάνος <τοῦ> τοιούτου εἶναι καθόλου· τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονισμος τέλος.

it ἐπαινετὸν or τίμιον, i.e. has it a relative or an absolute value?

tίμιον, 'precious.' Cf. MM. 1185 b, 20 sqq. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγάθων τὰ μὲν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαίνετα, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγει τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οὐν ψιχῆ, ρνοῦ, τὸ ἄρχαιον...τὰ δ' ἐπαινετα' οὖν ἀρετα...τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις οὖν ἄρχη τόλμου ιχθοὺς κάλλους...τούτου γὰρ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα εἰ δὲ δίνηται χρῆσαθαι καὶ ὁ φαιλος κακῶς, διδ δυνάμει τὰ τοιάντα καλοῦνται ἀγαθά. Εἰ δὲ δ ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰκάσθαι. τούτως γὰρ καὶ τα δυνάμει διὰ τὸ καλοῦνται ἀγαθά. Εἰ δὲ 
if this is correct, the δυνάμει here are identical with τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. Cf. also Topics 126 b, § 4 καὶ εἴ τι τῶν β' αὖτη τίμων ἢ ἀρετῶν εἰ δύναι ἢ τὸ δύνατον ἢ τὸ πιστικόν (cf. 1096 b, 11) ἔθηκεν.

§ 2. τὰ ποιῶν τι εἶναι κ.τ.λ. 'in virtue of some quality and relation.'

§ 3. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τούτων θεοὺς ἐπαινον, 'from the praises of the gods.' Here we see περὶ c. acc., used as in 1098 b, 14. περὶ ψυχῆς and 1101 a, 28 περὶ αὐτῶν, develop into a regular genitive equivalent, just like the Latin de. Though barely noticed in the grammars, this construction is quite common in Plato, being used chiefly to avoid a cumulation of genitives. For other examples see Index s.v. περὶ.

γελοίοι γὰρ φαίνονται, sc. ols θεοί. 'It strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standard' (personal construction). The goodness of the gods is independent of their relation to us, and so praise of them based on a reference (ἀναφορά) to human needs and desires is absurd.

§ 4. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. τῶν πρὸς τί πώς ἐχόντων, the 'relative.'

[μακαρίζομεν], suspected by Susmilch and bracketed by Bywater.

tῶν ἀγαθῶν, sc. τὰ θείατα μακαρί-ζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ  
[Α. ΧΙΙ. 4]

θείοτερον τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐθείας 5
καλὸς συννηγορησαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῷ ἰδίῳ: τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπανεισβάλαι τῶν ἁγαθῶν οὐσίαν μηρύνει χρότο ότι κρείττον ἐστὶ
30 τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιούτων δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεόν καὶ τάγαχον πρός
tαύτα γὰρ καὶ τάλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὤ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινοῦ 6
τῆς ἁρετῆς, πράκτικοι γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης, τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν
ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν ἰσος οἰκείοτερον ἐξακριβοῦν
7
τοῖς περὶ τα ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις. ήμιν δὲ δὴ ἦλθεν ἐκ τῶν
1102 εἰρήμενον δι' ἐστιν ἡ ευδαιμονία τῶν τιμῶν καὶ τελείων.
δοκεῖ δ' οὖτως εἶχεν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁρχή ταύτης γὰρ 8
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ τάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἁρχήν δὲ
καὶ τὸ ἄξιον τῶν ἁγαθῶν τιμῶν τι καὶ θεοῦ τίθεμεν.

Χ. Χ. Π. 'Επει δ' ἐστίν ἡ ευδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια τις
κατ' ἁρετῆς τελείαν, περὶ ἁρετῆς ἐπισκεπτόν τὰ εἰσήρχει τάχα
γὰρ οὕτως ἃν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαμεν. 9
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀληθείας πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα 2
πεπονημένα. ἴσως τοὺς πολῖτας ἁγαθοὺς ποιεῖι καὶ

1101 b, 31. EE. 1219 b, 8 ἐτι δ' οἱ ἐπαινοὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς διὰ τὰ
ἐργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων.

§ 6. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐθείας κ.τ.λ. 'And Eudoxus is thought to have
pledged ably the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence.' On
Eudoxos see 1173 b, 9 n. This reference probably indicates the real motive
of the paragraph.

§ 6. δ' μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινοῦ κ.τ.λ. Rhet. 1367 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων
δ' ἐπαινοῦ, ἵνα δὲ τοῦ σκοποῦν τὸ κατὰ προαιρεῖς, περατεῖα, διεισάγω
πράξεως κατὰ προαιρεῖς...ἐστι δ' ἐπαινοῦ

LOGOS εἰρημένου καθό σεβήσθαι τῆς ἁρετῆς. δεῖ δὲ

10 τὰ πράξεις ἐπειδή

δοκεῖ τὸ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστὶν...διὸ καὶ ἐγκώμια οἴσα

πράξας τὰ δ' ἴδρα σημεία τῆς ἐξέλεος εἰσο, ἐπεὶ ἐκανομεὶ δὲ καὶ μὴ πεπρα-

γότα, εἰ πιστεύομεν ἐκαὶ καὶ ἐλεοῦντο. EE. 1219 b, 14.

§ 8. ἁρχή, sc. πράξεως, for it is τὸ ἔνεκα, the Final Cause of human
activity.

τίθεμεν. Hoc loco clausulum im-
ponere debebant libro primo, Susenbühl.

Χ. Χ. § 3. τελείαν. Cf. 1100 a, 4 n.

περὶ ἁρετῆς. The first step in the analysis will be to deliberate about
the production of goodness. See Intro-
ductive Note to Book II. The first point to note is the distinction
between the two kinds of goodness.

§ 2. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ. λ. A con-
firmation of our view from the practice
of the masters of our science. If

πολιτική is a science, the true πολι-

τικὴ must know how to secure its
end. Cf. 1099 b, 29 n.

1103 b, 31. EE. 1219 b, 14.
3 τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Ἐφρηούς τοὺς Ἑυδήμων καὶ Δακεδαμοῦς νομοθέτας, καὶ εἰ τινὲς ἑτέροι 4 τοιούτω γεγονόταί εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὐτῆς, δῆλον ὅτι γίνομεν ἂν ἡ ἥτησις κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἄρχον 5 προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἄρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γὰρ τάγαθον ἀνθρώπων ἔχομεν καὶ τὴν εὔθειαν 6 μονᾶν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἄρετην δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην ὡς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐθείαν δὲ 7 ψυχῆς ἐνεργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ὑποτεύχῃ ήχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς εἰδεῖν πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡςποτ’ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν θεραπεύουσα καὶ πᾶν ἄρτον ἀφίτο, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑποτευχῇ τῆς μητροίς· τῶν δ’ 8

§ 3. τοὺς Ἐφρηοὺς καὶ Δακεδαμοῦς νομοθέτας. In his Laws, Plato had already introduced a Spartan and a Cretan to discuss legislation with an Athenian. Spartan and Cretan institutions alone seemed to be deliberately designed with reference to an end, and therefore seemed to be alone scientific. Plato and Aristotle were both aware that the end they strove to realise was but a partial one and that they were therefore one-sided. But that did not alter the fact that they alone set an end consciously before them.

§ 4. ἡ σκέψις αὐτῆς, sc. ὅπως τοῖς πολίταις ἀγαθὰ ποιήση. ἡ ἥτησις, sc. ὅπως τοῖς ἄρετης. τῆς...προαίρεσιν. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n. Here προαίρεσις is almost equivalent to πρόθεσις.

§ 5. εἰδέναι πώς; sc. εἰ’ δὴν ἴκαμεν ἴκει πρὸς τὰ ἠγαθὰ (infra 24). τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν θεραπεύει. Suggested by Plato, Charm. 156 ἀλ’ ὡςποτε ἴκαμεν ἴκει καὶ εἰ ἴκαμεν ποῖον ἄρετης ἄρετης, ἐπένθη τῷ προμαχήσει τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλόγῳ, λέγομεν τοῖς ἄρεταιν τοῖς ἄρεταιν ἴκαμεν ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ἀναγεννήθη ἴκαμεν καὶ τῆς κοινῆς θεραπείας εἰ μέλλον καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν εἰ ἴκαμεν, καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ προμαχήσει ἴκαμεν ἔστιν εἰς ἐκείνην τοῖς ἀριστοῖς. εἰ ἴκαμεν τὸν ἰσχυρὸν ἀπεκδίδω γιὰν ἵκαμεν ἡ ἀριστοτελῆ ἐκ δὴ σωμάτων τῶν ζωτικῶν διὰ τὴν πᾶν τὸ σώμα τρέφεται μετὰ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μέρος ἐπιθεωρεῖ θεραπεύει.

καὶ πᾶν <τῶς> σώμα, sc. δὲ εἰδέναι πως. Ramsauer’s insertion of the article is generally accepted, see Byv. Contr. p. 26. The phrase comes from the passage of the Charmides quoted above.
ιατρῶν οἱ χαριτωτες τολλά πραγματευόνται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνώσιν, θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, 8 θεωρητέον δὲ τοῦτον χάριν, καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἰκανός ἔχει πρὸς τὰ 25 ξητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἐξακριβῶς ἐργαδέστερον ἱσον ἐστὶ τῶν προκείμενων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 9 ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἑυς, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγου ἐγεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ πό-10 τερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ τὰν τὸ 30 μεριστών, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ διὸ ἐστὶν ἀγάριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτόν καὶ τὸ κολλοῦν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει καὶ τὰς ἐργήμενας, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κολλὸν καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιακοριστὸν, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οἷον οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

οἱ χαριτωτες, ἰ. e. οἱ σοφοὶ (cf. 1905 a, 18), scientific physicians as opposed to mere practitioners.

τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνώσιν, i.e. the 'theory' of the body, or physiology, as opposed to practical therapeutics.

§ 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, 'in extraneous discourses.' The only question that can arise is 'extraneous to what?' The different views which have been maintained are conveniently summarised in Susemihl-Hicks, Politics p. 561. There can be no doubt, I think, that Diels has given the right answer, and that the meaning is 'extraneous to the Aristotelian school.' I believe, further, that this is in almost all cases merely another way of saying 'in the writings of the Academic school.' That is certainly the meaning here.

τὸ μὲν ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle himself did not believe in 'parts of the soul' at all: Plato did, but this is not his division, for it is practically certain that it was first formulated in this way by Xenocrates. There is a part of the soul which 'knows what it is doing,' and a part that does not.

 Cf. 1908 a, 3 n.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ δεο, 'verbally two.' This phrase is often opposed to ἄριστος ἐν (cf. 1131 b, 16 n.). Cf. Phys. 162 a, 21 τριῶν γὰρ ὅσων ἀρχὴ μέσου τελευ- τῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἕκατον ἄρμα ἐστι, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἄριστον, τῳ λόγῳ δὲ δεο. 253 b, 12 τὸ σημεῖον μὲν οὖν ἄρμαθον καυσοῦ, καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ἑταρείου, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ εἰ ἄριστον λόγῳ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ τελευτής, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀρχή. Gen. Conr. 320 b, 12 βλέπων τόναν ποιεῖν ταῦτα ἀχώριστον τὴν ὀλην ὧν οἴσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μιᾶν τῷ ἄριστῳ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μιᾶν.

ἀχώριστα. Cf. De An. 413 b, 14 καὶ εἰ μοῦρον, πότερον οὖσαν ὡστ᾽ εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἡ καὶ τόπῳ. 439 a, 10 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς... εἰτε χωριστοὶ δοτοι εἰτε καὶ μὴ χωρι- τοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον. 432 a, 19 πότερον ἐν τῷ μοῦρον αὐτῆς χωριστῶν ὑ ἀμέτρητο ἡ λόγῳ.

πεφυκότα, i.e. φύσει. The distinction, then, is between the dialectical and the physical account of the soul. Cf. below 1147 a, 24 n. for λογικῶς and φυσικῶς.
1102 a 32. EE. 1219 b, 36 ἀφήρηται δὲ καὶ εἰ τί ἄλλο ἐστὶν μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικὸν. ἀνθρωπινὴς γὰρ ψυχῆς τὸ εἰρήμανα μόρια ἵδια· διὸ οὐδὲ ἀληθὲς αἰ τὸν θρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰετικὸν ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἤ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνεῖκι καὶ ἀρχήν καὶ πράξειν· ἀρχεῖ δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὗ λογισμοῦ ἄλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἃρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. καὶ ὅστε ἡ ἐνεργεία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἄρτεων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς κατανόησιν ὑπέλοιον.

б, 5. EE. 1219 b, 16 καὶ τὸ ἀποροθενέων δ' ἐνιστὲ ὤδηλαν ἐκ τούτων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐδὲν βελτίωσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαίλων τῶν Ἰμιου τοῦ βίου· ὂμοι γὰρ καθεστῶτες πάντες· αὐτών δ' ὅτι ἄρχην ψυχῆς ὄ ὑπνος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνεργεία. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τί μόριον ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικὸν, ἢ τούτων ἀρέτη οὐκ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς δόλης ἀρέτης, ὅστε οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ γὰρ μάλλον ἐνεργεία τὸ θρεπτικὸν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ἀρετικὸν ἀτέλει ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ. οὖν δὲ τοῦ μῆ (π' Κασαυβόν) κυνεύεσθαι μετέχοντα, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι βελτίωσιν αἰ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἢν μὴ διὰ νόσον ἢ πτήσιν.

πρὸς τὸ παρόν. For our purposes the logical prophecy furnished by the theories of the Academy will be sufficient. It is not necessary to base polemik on phusikē.

§ 11. καὶ τοῦ φυτικῇ. Cf. supra 1097 b, 33 το μὴν γὰρ καὶ καὶ καὶ βλέπεται καὶ ταῖς φυσικής, ἐγρήγορηται τοι ἢ τοῖς τελείοις.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. The argument is that the sort of soul we find in all organisms kept up by nutrition (including plants), and in the embryos (of animals) where there is nothing besides, we may reasonably assume to exist also in developed animals, though in them there is something besides.

eὐλογότερον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 π. The word shows that this is purely a logical schέσις.

§ 12. ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς. Cf. De Sommo 454 b, 33 το ἑργον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεστῶτες μάλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τὸ τοῦ μάλλον, ὃς οὐδὲν προσ-θέμεταν πρὸς τὴν τῆς αἰσθήματι.
οδευν—οδευν φασιν οιδεν διαφέρειν το ήμιου του βλου τους ευθαλοιμα των αθλιων: συμβαινει δε τοιτο εικοτως: ἀργα 13 γαρ ἐστιν ο υπνος της ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται στουδαία και φαυλη —πλὴν ει τη κατα μικρον και δικουνται τινες των κυνήσεων, 10 και ταυτη βελτιω γίνεται τα φαντάσματα των ἐπεικιών ἢ των τυχόντων: ἀλλα περι μεν των άλλων ἄλλας, και το θρεπτικου 14 εταέων, ἐπειδη της άνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἀμοιρον πέφυκεν: ἐοικε δε και ἄλλη τις φύσις της ψυχῆς ἀλογος εἰναι, με- τέχουσα μεντοι τη λόγον. του γαρ ἐγκτασεως και ἀκτασεως 15 του λόγου και της ψυχῆς το λόγον ἐχον ἑπαυνουμεν—ὅρθος γαρ και ἐπι τα βέληστα παρακαλεῖ—φαινεται δ εν αὐτοις και ἄλλο τι παρά των λόγων πεφυκός, ὁ μάθεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει το λόγορ. ἀτεχνος γαρ καθαπερ τα παραλευ- μέα του σώματος μόρα εις τα δεξια προσαρμομένων κυνήσαι 20 τούτου τον εις τα ἄριστα παραφέρεται, και ἐπι της ψυχῆς.

§ 12. μεν φασιν κ.τ.λ. This is probably a free quotation from some comic poet.

§ 13. τινιν ει πη, to be taken closely with ἡσπιστα διάδειλαι above. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 20) reads τινιν ει μη with Aspasios and Μπ. In EE. 1219 b, 24 (p. 59) we have διον δε τοι μη κνευσθαι μετέχουσι, και αι φαντασιαι βελτιων αι των στουδαλων. Here μη gives no sense, and Cusanbon was surely right in reading πη. But, if so, πη must surely be right here too. It should be noted also that the reading of Μβ may be simply an instance of the tendency of scribes to substitute the vulgar πλην ει μη for the more correct τινιν ει.

tines ton kyniseon, i.e. the 'motions' of the senses ('impressions'). Cf. Her. ἐρυστον 46a a, το τοφανταρ το ἀντα της κυνησου των αιθηταμων, ἄτεν ει τω καθεδειν δή, τι καθεδει, τοϊν' εστιν ουσιων.

ἐπεικῶν...τυχόντων. Attic 'litotes' for ἐγχαον and κακῶτ. For ἐπεικῆς cf. 1137 a, 35 n. For the difference between the dreams of good and bad men, see Probl. 957 a, 25.

§ 15. φύσις της ψυχῆς. Aristotle in his Platonic passages uses φύσις with the genitive in a somewhat vague sense. Often it seems merely periphrastic. See Ind. Ar. 838 a, 8 sqq. Here it is equivalent to μόρον or δόσμα.

tou ghar ektrastou kal ektrastou. The meaning of these terms is fully discussed in Book vii. Both the 'continent' and the 'incontinent' man have a right λόγος or rule of action, though the one follows it and the other does not. The fault of the ἀκτρας does not lie in the λόγος ἑχει, but it must therefore be something else.

ἐν αὐτοῖς, i.e. in the ἐγκτασει as well as in the ἀκτασει. The ἐγκτασει does not follow his λόγος or rule without a struggle. It is in this that he differs from the σώματα whose desires are in complete harmony with his principles. See infra § 17.

ἀντιτηνον, a Platonic word. Cf. Phaidr. 254 n.
The argument is the same as that by which Plato proves that θυμός and ἐπιθύμια are distinct.

§ 17. ἀκαρσία γιὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. As the fact of ἀκαρσία showed it to be ἄλογον, so the fact of ἀγκάρσια shows that it μετέχει τὴ ἁλογν. We have now proved the existence of a higher part of τὸ ἄλογον, which is simply the ὀρεκτικόν of Aristotle’s own system.

τὸ τοῦ σωφρόνου καὶ ἀνδρέου, i.e. the irrational part of the man who has the ἀρετή of the irrational part, i.e. the σωφρόνων who has the ἀρετή of ἐπιθυμία and the ἀνδρέων who has the ἀρετή of θυμός. See below 1117 b, 24. The fact that the irrational part may not only ‘obey’ the rational, but may even be ‘in harmony with’ it, shows that it μετέχει ἁλογον.

πάντα...δομοφωνεῖ, ‘it is in complete harmony with—.’

§ 18. καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικῶν. This is a hint for those who know the De Anima. The force of ὅλως is to include θυμός and βουλήσις as well as ἐπιθυμία.

§ 19. ἐπὶ χρῆ κ.τ.λ. The inadequacy of the twofold division is now brought out from the other side. If, to save the unity of τὸ ἁλογον, we say that τὸ ὀρεκτικόν belongs to τὸ ἁλογον ἁγορα, then that in turn will split up into two ‘parts.’
Nicomachean Ethics. Book II.

Itself and a part of the soul which can not. This distinction has been adopted by Xenocrates, the present head of the Academy, and will therefore make a good starting-point.

We must, however, note at once that the part of the soul which is strictly speaking "irrational," the part which has to do with nutrition and growth, cannot be the seat of the goodness or badness of man as such. And yet there is a case where a part which we must call irrational does affect human conduct. If we consider what happens in the case of the man who does what he knows to be wrong, we are forced to admit that the judgment (λόγος) which he forms is right, and therefore that the rational part of his soul is in just the same state as if he resisted the temptation. His weakness must accordingly be attributed to the irrational part. On the other hand, if we look at the case of the man who does not yield to the temptation, we see that this part of the soul cannot be wholly irrational either, seeing that it is capable of understanding and obeying a judgment.

Perhaps, then, it will be thought better to call this part of the soul "rational," and there can be no objection to that, provided we remember the cases of moral weakness and moral strength, and do not confuse it with the rational part in the strict sense of the word. We must say in that case that the rational part has two parts, one rational in the strict sense, and the other in the sense that it is able to understand and follow a rule given it from without. We have, then, by means of dialectic, discovered the existence of a part of the soul which we may call either the higher part of the irrational soul or the lower part of the rational, as we please.

This discussion is an admirable example of what Aristotle means by the dialectic method. All he wishes to bring out is the existence of what in his own psychology is called the "sentient and appetitive soul," and it might seem to us that a reference to

2 Heinze, Xenocrates p. 140 sqq., makes it extremely probable that the division was due to Xenocrates himself.

3 See R.P. 336 and Zeller, Aristotle, II, pp. 21 sqq., for the relevant references. Aristotle's own psychological division crosses that of the Academy chiefly in this respect, that, while he assigns Desire, Temper and Wish alike to the appetitive soul, the Academy had to refer the latter to the "rational," and thus to separate it in an arbitrary way from the other forms of Appetition. Aristotle's advance upon the earlier theory was his recognition of the appetitive character of goodness as well as of badness. Here, however, he does not care to insist. So long as we recognise the existence of this
The De Anima would have been more satisfactory than an attempt to twist the doctrines of Xenokrates into a new form. But Aristotle does not wish to assume a knowledge of his own system in the course on Politics, and he therefore tries as best he may to make the popular psychology of the Academy the basis of his argument. The way in which he does this is most ingenious, though to our minds much less convincing than a brief exposition of his own psychological views would have been. The use which he makes of the Platonic term μετέχει and the way in which he takes advantage of the different senses of the phrase λόγων διέχει are particularly instructive.

§ 2. These two parts of the soul will each have its proper form of goodness, and this distinction will correspond to that drawn in ordinary speech between goodness of character and goodness of intellect. For the present it is with the latter, the goodness of the sentient and appetitive soul, that we have to do.

The recognition of a form of goodness which was not in the strict sense of the word intellectual and reflective had already been forced upon Plato as a result of his criticism of the Socratic paradox that "Goodness is knowledge." In his earlier dialogues Plato had taken the various recognised forms of goodness one by one and had discussed the question whether they were knowledge or not. The result of all these dialogues is practically the same. The recognised forms of goodness are not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word; for as soon as we draw all the conclusions which follow from the assumption that they are, we find ourselves unable to hold fast the distinctions between them. Any single form of goodness, if regarded as knowledge, turns out to be knowledge of the good, and therefore identical with goodness as a whole.

Now it is evident that this view will prevent us from giving the name of goodness to almost everything that commonly goes by that name. By working out to its logical result the doctrine that goodness is knowledge we have really proved at the same time that the "sentient" soul, though that also, as we shall see, is of fundamental importance for the psychological groundwork of his Ethics.

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See especially the Laches, Charmides and Protagoras.
time the existence of another kind of goodness which is not knowledge. In the Phaedo\(^5\) this distinction between two kinds of goodness appears already, though there “popular goodness” is rated very low, and the only true goodness is still wisdom or “philosophic goodness.” But if we follow the course of Plato’s ethical thought we find that the reality and worth of this secondary form of goodness is more and more fully recognised. The “first education” in the Republic aims solely at the training of character (νόμος), and the whole of the Laws is practically directed to the same end.

§ 3. The distinction between goodness of character and goodness of intellect does not correspond, then, to that between knowledge and conduct, which the traditional rendering “moral and intellectual virtues” is apt to suggest to us. As a matter of fact, Aristotle held that conduct depended upon intellectual goodness just as much as knowledge did, while on the other hand he admitted the existence of a kind of art and a kind of knowledge which were not strictly speaking intellectual, but depended on something more closely resembling character\(^6\). There is conduct which is intellectual and art which is not.

Though it is beside Aristotle’s purpose in the Ethics to insist upon the point, we know that the soul with which we are now concerned is not only appetitive, but also sensitive, and we shall therefore expect to find an analogy between the development of goodness from appetite and the development of knowledge from sense. It is worth while to point out in what this consists.

The object of sensation\(^7\), though it is always individual, “a this” (τὸ ἄρ), necessarily implies a universal element. What we perceive is not strictly speaking the “this” which is the object of sensation, but always “a such” (τὸ ἄρ). We perceive Kallias, indeed, but our perception is of certain things which “mean” Kallias, that is of a man having certain qualities which enable us to identify him as Kallias. The whole content of our perception

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\(^5\) Phaedo 68 d sqq.

\(^6\) Cf. Rhet. 1354 a 7 where we are told that many orators succeed διὰ συνθέσεως ἀπὸ ἔξω. The chief example is, of course, the medical ἔμμαχος.

\(^7\) On all this see Zeller, vol. ii. pp. 58 sqq. It seems necessary to draw attention to the fact that τὸ ἄρ means “a this.” The Greek for “this somewhat” would be τὸ ἄρ τὸ ἅρ.
is therefore universal in character, and the function of sense-perception is just the discrimination of those universal qualities.

In the case of creatures endowed with memory, these sense-perceptions remain in imagination (φαντασία), and a number of such memories make up an experience (ἐμπειρία). For instance, we say that a man has experience when he has an idea that this or that was good for Kallias when he had this or that disease, and for Sokrates, and so on for other individuals. Aristotle rates experience very high indeed for practical purposes, and he is never tired of citing its value in the practice of medicine. Practice has to do entirely with particulars and is therefore the peculiar province of experience.

But nevertheless experience does not reach the level of Art or Science. These do not arise till the universal implicit in experience is made explicit, till we pass from “This was good for Kallias and Sokrates and so-and-so when they were too hot” to “This is good for the human body in a fever.”

The development of goodness is precisely parallel to this. The object of appetite is individual like that of sense, but it too implies a universal. For, though we desire or wish for a particular thing, we really desire it because it is “a such.” For instance, we desire this food or that honour, but only because they are pleasant or beautiful, and these are universals. These are the qualities which appear in imagination (φαντασία) and so move appetite.

Now the retention in memory of a number of such images of the pleasant or beautiful produces an ἡθός, that is a tendency to desire or wish for similar things as pleasant or beautiful, and this is precisely parallel to experience. And it is of the utmost value in practice; for it is with particulars that practice has to do.

At the same time, this is not human goodness in the full sense any more than experience is science or art. We do not reach the stage of intellect till the implicit universal has been made explicit, till we pass from “This, that and the other thing is pleasant or beautiful” to “This kind of feeling or action is good for the human soul.”

§ 4. Closely connected with the question of the two kinds of goodness was the question “Can goodness be taught?” or does it come by nature or the grace of heaven, as was believed in early times? Clearly, if goodness is knowledge, it can be taught; but
the criticism of Plato's earlier dialogues is largely directed to showing that there are no teachers of goodness in the ordinary sense of that word. In Aristotle we find the solution of the problem taken for granted. It is impossible to teach goodness of character; that can only be acquired by habituation. But goodness of intellect can be taught, with this reservation, however, that the intellectual capacity is presupposed, and that a good character has already been formed. You cannot make any one good by teaching; but, if a man has the gift, his goodness of character may be raised into an intellectual form and become the practical wisdom of the lawgiver.

Aristotle does not even tell us in the Ethics what habituation is, and we have to turn to Eudemos for a definition of it. The main point about it is that habituation must be in acts of the same quality as the acts which issue from the character when formed. It is this which makes it necessary for us after all to discuss the nature of goodness; for it is only if we know what goodness is that we shall be able to stamp the actions of those for whom we are legislating with the right quality. Before, however, we go on to discuss the definition of goodness, it may be well to sketch briefly the ideas which underlie Aristotle's doctrine of habituation as we may gather them from the Physics and elsewhere.

The sentient soul has the natural capacity of being moved by the imagination of pleasure and pain. These imaginations are constantly being presented to it; for every act of sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and the images of these feelings are stored up in memory. But the capacity of the soul to feel pleasure and pain is a rational capacity which may become active in two opposite ways. The capacity of taking pleasure in a good act is also the capacity of taking pleasure in a bad act. The capacity will therefore remain dormant unless there is something to determine it in the one direction or the other. This something is to be found in appetite, which converts the mere capacity of pleasure and pain into a desire to have the pleasure and avoid the pain.

But the soul is not in a perfectly neutral state as regards the pleasures and pains which it feels. Its life is a process, and it has

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8 On this point see especially the Gorgias and Meno.

9 Cf. 1103a, 17 n.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

its source of motion and rest in itself. Now every continuous process implies an end to which it is directed, and the qualitative changes in the soul which we call feelings are only the incomplete processes which mark its growth. They are all really directed to the soul's completion, to its attaining the true nature or true form of the human soul. Hence the need of guidance from one who knows this form, and can decide in the light of it which of two alternative possibilities of feeling to actualise.

§ 5. We have asked how goodness is to be produced and we have seen that it is produced by habituation, and by habituation in the same acts which result from goodness when it has been produced. We must, then, ask what goodness is, and first of all we must find its genus.

If Aristotle had been basing his account of goodness on his own philosophical system, there would have been no difficulty about this. We have seen that goodness is a “completion” (τελειόωνος) of a thing which is by nature capable of such a completion, and we know that such completions are called ἔξος or conditions, a word taken from medicine and gymnastics. The acquisition of such a ἔξος is no mere motion (κίνησις) or alteration (ἀλλαγὼνος) like the feelings which are its matter; it is a “form,” and displays all the characteristics of forms. But the fact is that we must go to the Physics for Aristotle's moral philosophy; here we only arrive at the knowledge that the genus of goodness is ἔξος by a dialectical argument from the “division” of the category of quality. Here is another instance where the doctrine of the categories is assumed as familiar to Aristotle's hearers. (Cf. Introd. § 28.)

The differentia of goodness, the “Mean,” is more scientifically arrived at, doubtless because both the doctrine itself and the metaphysical groundwork on which it rests were quite familiar in the Academy from the days of Plato's Philebos onwards at least. Quality is a category that admits of quantitative determination or degree, “the more and less” as the Academy called it: it is continuous and therefore infinitely divisible, at least potentially. Now, feelings and acts, which are the matter of goodness, being qualitative motions, are continuous, and the degree of feeling which is right for a given person in given circumstances may therefore be quantitatively expressed. This is all that is meant by the doctrine of the mean; for the Greek word μέσοτηθς does
not mean only or even primarily the arithmetical mean: it is the oldest word for a proportion of any kind and however determined. We must admit that a feeling like fear is capable of such determination; for we must fear either more or less or equally. And the same is true of an act like giving away money; for we must give away either more or less or an equal sum. But to say that Aristotle makes only a quantitative distinction between goodness and badness is to miss the whole point. Aristotle has expressly refused to identify goodness either with the feeling or the outward act. It is the permanent condition of soul, and conditions of soul do not differ quantitatively, nor are they motions. They do not come into being or cease to be by motion or alteration, though they are and are not in virtue of an alteration in something else, that is, in the soul.\(^{10}\)

10 The locus classicus on this subject is Phys. 245 b, 3 seqq. "Οτι δε το τωλωσμουν απας αλλαιουνται υπ’ των αισθησεων, και εν μονον υπαιρχη τοτους αλλαιοσις δυο καθ’ αυτα λεγεται πασχειν υπ’ των αισθησεων, ηκ τωδε θεωρητον. των γαρ άλλων μαλιστα δε τι βουλαρύνη τε τοις σχηματις και εν ταις μορφασι και εν ταϊς εξεις και ταϊς τοιν τοιν λήφει και αποβολας αλλαιοσις υπαιρχειν εν ουδετερος δ’ αυτοι του το μεν γαρ σχηματιζωμεν και ρυθμομενον οτι παντελεοτη (i.e. τελειωθη, τελος λαβη, ου λεγομεν εκεινο εξ ου εστι ου τον ανθρωπον χαλκον η την πυραμίδα κηρων η την κληριν έξουσι, αλλα παραμεινασαντε το μεν χαλκειν, το δε κηρων, το δε εξουσιον, το δε πεπαθος (ηc. ου των αισθησεων και ρυθμομενον προσαγορευμενοι (ηc. εκεινο εξ ου εστιν) υπαιρχει γαρ και θερμω και σκληρων των θαλαμων η των κηρων, και και μονον εστως, αλλα και το γραφη και το θερμω χαλκων λεγομεν, δια αυτω το παθει προσαγορευσεις την ηλιον. οτι’ ει κατα μεν το σχημα κατα την μορφην εν εν δε την ελεον (i.e. the ηλιον) εστι το σχημα, κατα δε τα παθει και τας αλλαιοσις λεγεται, φανερον δει ὁκι δε ειναι αληθεια αυτις αλλαιοσις. ἡτι δε και εισεν ουσιν ἄτοπον ἣν δόξεις, ἡλιοσις των άθρωμων η την αλειαν η άλλα οντων των γεγονημενοι η άλλα γίνεσθαι μεν ὅσον έκαστον αναγκασων αλλαιομενυν τοιου, ουδε την ηλιον παραμονην η μακαμονην η θερμαινομενη έ οξυραινην ου μενοι τα γεγονημα γε αλλαιοσις, ουδ’ η γενεσις αυτων αλλαιοσις εστιν. αλλα μην οδη αι εξειν οδη αι το τω αποστοι αι αι της φωτης αλλαιοσις. αι μεν γαρ αρητα αι δε κακια των εξεων ουκ εστι δε οτι δε αρητη οτι η κακια αλλαιοσις, αλλ’ η μεν αρητη τελειωσις της οτην γαρ λαβη την ευτοις αρητη, τοτε λεγεται τελειος εκαστον τοτε γαρ μαλιστα εστι το καθα φωτιν, άλλον ρυθμος κολοσ οτην μαλιστα γένεται κολοσ κατα ρηθειτο, η δε κακια φθορα τοτου και εκαστοι, άλλον ουδε ουδε την τω αποστολειωσι λεγομεν άλλαιον (αποστοι γαρ ει ο θεριγκα και ο κεραμος άλλαιον, η ει θεριγκασι και κεραμομενη άλλαιοσι ουλοθαι αλλα μη τελειωσαι ει αλλια, τον αυτω τροπον και επι των ετων και των καιρων και των εχθην η λαμμακοντων α μεν γαρ τελειωσαι η δε εκαστοις εισην, άλλων ουκ αλλοσι, άλλων δε και φωμε ανάμειν ειναι τας αρητας εν τω προς τα πως εξειν. τοις μεν γαρ τοις σωμασιοισ, ουν ουν ηγεμεν και ενεισα, εν κρασε και συμμετερη θερμων και ψυχρων τεθειν, η αυτων προς αυτα των
§ 6. It is important to remember that the theory of goodness as a “mean” or ratio between opposites is only one case among others of a principle which served to explain all the difficulties which earlier thinkers had felt about becoming, the difficulties which Plato had expressed in the Phaedo, and which he finally settled in the Philebos by his doctrine of περιτοί καὶ αὐτοὶ, which is currently understood as a στέρησις, and only attains its own existence when it reaches its proper form or τέλος. By its very nature it is that which is capable of receiving opposites; it is the substratum in which opposites inhere. Such a substratum we must assume because it is impossible that the one opposite can become or approximate to the other. Cold iron may become hot iron, but cold can never be heated. Now the form which is the cause of all becoming is always a ratio (λόγος) or mean (μεσότητις) between the two opposites, it is a definite “interval” as musicians call it, a fixed proportion in which the opposites neutralise one another and give rise to a new product. If Aristotle had only known the theories of modern chemistry, they would have seemed to him a most perfect exemplification of the principle; for what the modern chemist calls atomic weights are just of this nature, and a chemical formula like H₂O is the most typical instance of

ἐπίσης ἡ πρὸς τὸ περιτός ἡ ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλιον καὶ τὴν λείχισι καὶ τὸ ἀλλαὶ ἀρέτας καὶ κακίας. ἐκάστη γὰρ ἔστι τῆς πρὸς τί ποιοῦ ἔχειν καὶ τῆς ποιήσας παθεῖν ὡς ἡ κακία διατίθηται τὸ ἐχεῖν Ὀλείσσα. ἦν ὁδ' ἂν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φείσθαι περίπεχες. ἐπεὶ ὅταν τῇ πρός τί ὁδός ὁδόν ἄρετα ἀρεταὶ ἀλλοιωσάσθαι, ὅταν αὐτῶν ἄρετα ἀλλοιωθέντας ἤγεται ἐφ' ὅλως μεταβολὴ ὑδατομαλία, φανέρων ὅτι ὅλως αἱ ἐτέρῳ ὅλους αἰ τῶν ἄρετων ἀποβολαι καὶ λύψῃ ἀλλοιωσάσθαι εἰς τάς ἄλλας γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἦλθος αὐτῶν καὶ φείσθαι ἀλλοιωμένως τῶν ἄρετων ἀρετηκής, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ὅσον ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ψυχήν ἢ ἔργου καὶ θείου, ἢ ὃς τῶν συγχώσων ὅσοι πρῶτοι. Πρὶν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάστης λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή ὁδ' ὃν ἀλλοιώθηκεν τέρμα τοῦ ἀλλοιωθέντας ἄρετα ἄρετα ἀπαθητής ὥστε δει καθαρίσθηκεν, ὅ τι ἐν κακία παθητικόν ἐναστώς (ο. κα. ὅτι ὃ καὶ

de) ἀπαιθητ.] ἡ ὅμως δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ὁμοίων ἦν ἀνασάθη γὰρ καὶ αἰτεῖ τῷ πρὸς τί ποιοῦ ἔχειν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελείωσας, ἣ δὲ κακία κακίας, ὅπως ἄδει ἀρετὴν διατίθηται πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίως παθεῖν, ὡς καὶ κακία κακί τῷ ὁμοίως ἄρετα ἀρεταὶ ἀλλοιωθέντας ἤγεται ἐφ' ὅλως μεταβολὴ ὑδατομαλία, φανερῶν ὅτι ὅλως αἱ ἐτέρῳ ὅλους αἰ τῶν ἄρετων ἀποβολαι καὶ λύψῃ ἀλλοιωσάσθαι εἰς τάς ἄλλας γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἦλθος αὐτῶν καὶ φείσθαι ἀλλοιωμένως τῶν ἄρετων ἀρετηκής, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἱλικίου, ὅσον ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ψυχήν ἢ ἔργου καὶ θείου, ἢ ὃς τῶν συγχώσων ὅσοι πρῶτοι. Πρὶν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκάστης λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή ὁδ' ὃν ἀλλοιώθηκεν τέρμα τοῦ ἀλλοιωθέντας ἄρετα ἄρετα ἀπαθητής ὥστε δει καθαρίσθηκεν, ὅ τι ἐν κακία παθητικόν ἐναστώς (ο. κα. ὃ καὶ ὁ πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίως παθεῖν, ὡς καὶ κακία κακίς, ὅπως ἄδει ἀρετὴν διατίθηται πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίως παθεῖν, ὡς καὶ κακία κακίς, ὅπως ἄδει ἀρετὴν διατίθηται πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίως παθεῖν, ὡς καὶ κακία κακίς, ὅπως ἄδει ἀρετὴν διατίθηται πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίως παθεῖν, ὡς καὶ κακία κακίς, ὅπως ἄδει ἀρετὴν διατίθηται πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίως παθεῖν, ὡς καὶ κακία κακίς, ὅπως ἄδει ἀρετὴν διατίθητα
what he calls a λόγος or μεσότης. Unfortunately he did not know this remarkable confirmation of the theory he had inherited from Plato, and we can only quote examples which seem less striking because biology has not yet been reduced to organic chemistry.

Health had been regarded since the times of the Pythagoreans as a sort of ἀρμονία (“tuning” or “pitch,” not “harmony”) of the opposites warm and cold, dry and moist, in the human body. The formula or ratio of this proportion exists in the soul of the doctor, and its presence there is the efficient cause of health in the human body as well as its formal and final cause. It is exactly in the same way that the lawgiver has in his soul the formula or λόγος of goodness, and it is the efficient cause of goodness in others.

Again, in discussing the fact of growth, Aristotle is met by some old difficulties which were raised for the first time, so far as we know, by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. As the latter put it “How can flesh arise from what is not flesh, or bone from what is not bone?” How, in fact, do the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, become organic tissues (ἄμοιβαμέρη)? Aristotle says “If flesh arises from both of them but is neither of them, nor yet a compound in which both are preserved, what remains but that the product of them should be matter? The destruction of one opposite either produces the other opposite or matter. Surely then, since there are degrees of heat and cold, when the one is in actuality it will be potentially the other; but when it is not completely actual, but cold as compared to heat, and hot as compared to cold, since things that are mixed destroy one another’s excesses, then neither will the matter nor either of the opposites be completely actual, but something intermediate. In so far as it is potentially more hot than cold or the opposite, in that ratio it will be three times as hot potentially as cold, or twice, or whatever the ratio may be. That which is actually hot is potentially cold, and what is actually cold is potentially hot, so that if they are not equal they change into one another—and so with the other opposites—the elements first change in this way, and after these flesh and bones and the like, the hot becoming cold and the cold hot, when they have reached the mean (τὸ μέσον).”

11 Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 286, sqq.
22 I have selected this passage from many others which might have been
It is in this sense, then, that goodness is a mean; it is the form which is the true nature of the human soul when fully developed. To say that Aristotle makes the distinction between goodness and badness a quantitative one is like saying that music is merely mathematics, or that the distinction between the different compounds of an acid and a base is only one of degree.

quoted as being, perhaps, specially instructive; but the main thing to remember is that "the Mean" is no isolated ethical doctrine, but the regular Platonic and Aristotelian way of explaining the Formal Cause. The misleading view of it as a mere medio tussiminius ibi is due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's ethical doctrines are commonly studied; and this in turn is due to the peculiarities of Aristotle's own method. The passage is as follows:—

Gen. Corr. 334 b, 2 sqq., ὠμοιοὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῖς μίαν αὐτῶν ὧλην ἔχει ταύτα ἀποφαγήν τοῦ ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἢ τὸν λόγον διπλασίας θερμῶν διαλέγει ὡς ψυχήν, ἢ τὴν καλλίτητα, ἢ καὶ τὸ  ἄλλον τρόπον ποιοῦν. ἦται δὲ μιχθέντων τὰλλὰ ἐκ τῶν ἑνάκτων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ἑκείνων διαλέγει πῶς ὡστο καὶ τῇ ὧλῃ, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐσφασίων τρόπων; καὶ ἦται ὡστο μὲν μίξις, ἐκείνως δὲ ὧλῃ τὸ γνῶμεν. ἔτει δὲ καὶ πάχυντα τάκτητα κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διασφάλιστο, ἦται γὰρ τὸ ἐνέργεια θερμῶν διαλέγει ψυχήν καὶ τὸ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς διαλέγει θερμῶν, ὡστε λαὸς μὴ ισορρ. μεταβαλλεῖ εἰς ἀλήθεια (ὁμοιοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐκτός ἄλλων ἑνάκτων), καὶ πρῶτον ὧλην τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβαλλεῖ, καὶ δὴ τοὺς σώματος ἑαυτῶν τὰ ἀνθρώποι, τοὺς ἑνάκτους λαὸς θερμῶν ἢ ψυχὴν, τοὺς δὲ ψυχρούς θερμῶν, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον θέληταν εὐθανῶς, γὰρ ὠδηγεῖται—τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἤδειον ὡς ἤμοιοι ὧλη καὶ τὸ ἐξήλθεν καὶ ἔφυγεν καὶ τὰ ταύτα κατὰ μεσόντα ποιοῖς σόμα σώμα καὶ ὡς καὶ τὰ καὶ τάλλα.
\[\text{1103 a, 17. EE. 1220 a, 39 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔθος, ὃσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄνομο σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίθεσιν, ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ ὕπερ ἀγωγὴς μὴ ἐμφάνη τῷ πολλάκις καινεῖσθαι τῶν οὕτως ὅπη [τὸ] ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀσύκοις οἷς ὄρκυμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἃν μυρακίς μῆς ἀφ’ ἀμφότερον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τούτῳ μὴ βιά), διὰ ἐστὸ τὸ ἔθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τὸν ἀλόγον μὲν> δυναμένον δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ἐθικὸς.

I. § 1. \[\text{Διατήρησ…τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, as shown above 1103 a, 3 sqq. We take up the question of how goodness is produced without asking what it is; for this is a practical investigation. We shall, nevertheless, be forced to ask what it is later on.}

τὸ πλειόν. This is a necessary reservation; for we shall see that besides teaching goodness of intellect implies (1) cleverness, which comes by nature, and (2) goodness of character, which comes by habit. Cf. \[\text{1144 a, 20 sqq.}

ἡ δ’ ἀσυκὴ ἡ ἔθους. Aristotle simply assumes the solution of this old problem (cf. Introductory Note) to which Plato finally came. Cf. Laws 729 e πᾶν ἔθος διὰ ἔθους. We have to go to Eucides (loc. cit.) for a definition of habit. That is habituated which "from being often moved in a certain way under guidance which is not innate, is now active in that way."

περιγίνεται, ‘is gained,’ ‘is the result of.’ Contrast φύει ἐγώ. παρεκχελευται below, which imply no previous process.

παρεκχελευτ. This is the reading of K and Hel. There seems to be no instance of παρεκχελευτ, the usual reading, in the present sense, while παρεκχελευτ is used transitively in Athenaeus 701 b and the scholiast on Ar. Knights 956, where it refers as here to a change in προφήθα. The}
Ἡθικὰ Νικομάχεια

2 'Εξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὦτι οὖνὲμα τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἤμιν ἐγκυμίαται. οὖθεν γὰρ τῶν φύσεων ἄτοι ἄλλοι θεῖται, εἰς ὅλος ὁ λόγος φύσει κἀτ' ἐφαρμόσεις οὐκ ἀν ἐθισθεὶς ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκης ἐβίβαξα τὰς ἄνω ῥήματος, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κἀτ' ἐλλ' ἄλλο οὖν ὁ ἄλλοι περικυκτῶν ἄλλοι

a, 20. Met. 1046 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἄψυχοις ἰναπάρχοντων ἀρχαὶ τιανάται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψυχοῖς καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντι, δηλοῦν ὦτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἄτοι ἄλογα αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πάσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἑπετήμεια δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητεῖαι εἰσὶν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πάσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἄλογα μία ἐνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνοντος μονήν, ἡ δ' ἲατρικὴ κλίσιν καὶ ἰαίμαι. αὐτοὶ δὲ ὡς ὅτι λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπετήμεια, δὲ δὲ λόγῳ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρχη τὸ πράγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν ὅσ' ὑπάρχουσιν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀμφότερον, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς τὸ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον. ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῶν τοιαύτας ἐπετήμειας εἰσὶν μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἰσὶν δὲ τοῦ μὲν καὶ αὐτάς, τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτὰς καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ, τοῦ δὲ πρόσων τινὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκής. ἀποφαίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἀποφαίνεται δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπὸ στέρησιν ἡ πρώτῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, αὐτὴ δ' ἀποφαίνεται θανάτῳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγύνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπετημή

intransitive use, though not found elsewhere, presents no difficulty. Observe the etymological theory implied by the use of παρά (ὁθος παρά τὸ θεός). The Greeks did not think of words as 'derived' from other words, but as deflexions or declensions (πτώσεις, έγκληματες, παραγωγας) from a normal form. Cf. Plato, Crat. 400 b ἀν μὲν καὶ σμικρὸν τι παρακληρον, 410 a σμικρὸν τι παρεξδιανοεῖ, 308 d σμικρὸν παραγγελον. So παρώνιος cf. 1096 b, 27 π.

§ 2. 'Εξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ. That ἰθικὴ ἄρετα comes ἐθισθεὶς is assumed, but Aristotle digresses a little to show the inconsistency of this with the view that it comes φύση.

οὔθεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first argument is that τὰ φύσει are not affected
by habituation, goodness is, therefore
goodness does not come by nature.
This really depends on the distinction
between λόγοι δύναμεις and δύναμεις
μετά λόγου, for which see Met. loc.
cit. Every λόγος expresses both
the thing and its negation (the first es-
sentially and the second accidentally),
and therefore every δύναμις of the
λόγοι δύν., the part of the soul that
can give an account of itself, is also a
δύναμις of its opposite. But where
there is no λόγος the δύναμις can only
become actual in one way.
§ 3. περισσότερος. δεξιάσθη, i.e. φύσει
dexteriōs aúthn aúthn.
teleiouméνous. Though stated
almost parenthetically, this is meant as
a hint to those hearers who are ac-
quainted with Aristotle’s system. Cf.
Met. 1021 b, 20 καὶ ἡ ἄρετή τελειώσις
τίς· ἔκαστον γὰρ τὸ τέλος καὶ οἴσια
πάσα τοῦ τελεία, ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ἔδοξον
τῆς ἀλκείας ἄρετῆς μηδὲν ἐνεργεύοντα
τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγάλου. Nature has
not only its ἀρχή κινήσεως in itself, but
also its ἀρχή στάσεως (Introds. § 27).
The process of growth stops when the
form is fully embodied in the matter.
The ἀποκελίσμον is then said to be
complete (τέλος εἶναι, τέλος ἔχειν) or
to have attained its true nature (ἔχειν
τὴν φύσιν 1152 b, 13 n.). It is for this
reason that the γένεσις of ἄρετῆ is not
an ἀλλωσεις—the ἐπειδῆ is not capable
of alteration—but takes place ἀλλοωµένων τινός, in this case by alteration
of the soul. Cf. Phys. 246 a, 10
Introductory Note n. 10.
§ 4. ἔτι ὅσα κ.τ.λ. In things that
come by nature, the capacity precedes
the act, in things that come by habit
the act precedes the capacity. For
the full explanation of this we must
refer once more to the Metaphysics
(loc. cit.). Capacities are either con-
genital (συγγενεῖς) or acquired, whether
by habit or teaching. The reason
why, in the case of the latter, the act
precedes the capacity is just that
they are metam λόγων δύναμεις, and
accordingly of opposites. They will
not, therefore, become active as soon
as they are brought into contact with
the appropriate object. They cannot
act in two opposite ways at once, so
they will not act at all till something
determines in which way they are
able to be active. As we are dealing
with the δύναμεις of τὸ ἑστικόν, this
something will be some form of ἀγρίας, or
at least something which has an ap-
pettive element in it (προαιρεῖσθαι).
cit.), but we see from Met. 1049 b, 10
and De An. 415 a, 16 that πρότερον

1103 a, 26. Met. 1047 b, 31 ἀποσώ ὑπὸ τῶν δυνάμεων ὁδὸν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἰον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει ὑπὸ τῶν τύχης τῶν αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ μακράτης ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς τεχνῆς τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσασαι ἔχειν ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐτί τοῦ πάθεων οὐκ ἀνάγκη. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν τί δυνατὸν καὶ ποτὲ τῶς καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη προσεύχεσθαι ἐν τῷ διαμερισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον δυναταί
Μαρτυρεΐ δὲ καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν: οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθήσαντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ
καίνω ταῖς δὲ δύναμις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγου, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα καὶ αἱ δύναμεις ἀλογικοὶ, κακείναις μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμφύσει ἐστὶ ταύτας δὲ ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ, τὰς μὲν τιμώμενα δύναμες ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὡς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πληροισίον, τὸ μὲν ποιητὸν τὸ δὲ πάθητον, έκείνας δὲ οὐκ ἀνάγκης. οὕτω δὲ των ἑναντίων, ὡστε ἂμα ποιησίς τάναντι τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύναμον. ἀνάγκη ἀρὰ έτροφον τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον λέγω δὲ τούτῳ δρέξειν ἢ προάρχειν. ὁποτέρου γὰρ ἂν ὄρεγνται κυρίως, τούτο ποιησίς, ὅταν ὡς δύναται ἐπάρχει καὶ πληροισίζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ. ὡστε τὸ δυνατόν κατὰ λόγον ἀπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὢρεγνται, οὐ δ’ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιητὴν. ἔχει δὲ παράνομον τοῖς παθητικοῖς καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοισθαι [ποιηταῖν]. εἴ δ’ μη, ποιητὴν οὐ δυνήσεται. τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἐξω κωλυστὸν προσδιορίζονται οὐδὲν ἐπὶ δει τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἐστὶ δύναμις τοῖς ποιηταῖν ἐκτὶ δὲ οὐ πάντως ἄλλῳ ἔχοισθαι πως, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθησίας καὶ τὰ ἐξω κωλυόνται: ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταύτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διοικητικῷ προσώπων ἐνα. διὸ οὖν ἐὰν ἂμα βούληται ἡ ἐπιθυμητή ποιητὴν διότι ἡ τάναντι, οὐ ποιησίς: οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἂμα οὐκ ἡ δύναμις, ἔτει ἂν ἂντιν ὡδίνους ποιησίς.

here is only χρώμων πρότερον. In another sense πρότερον εἰς τῶν δυνάμεων αἰ ἐνέργειας καὶ αἱ πράξεις (ε.τ. τού ποιητικοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεται) κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων τεχνῶν, 'in the case of the arts as well,' e.g. ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰθείου (Met. loc. cit.). This is the point in which teaching and habitation resemble one another.

οὕτω δὴ is the apodosis to ὡσπέρ kai above. "The clause of comparison ὡσπέρ κτ. does duty twice over."

Bywater, Contr. p. 27, referring to Riddell, Dig. § 200.

§ 5. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ κ. τ. Λ. This is not a third argument to show that goodness does not come φόνου, but a reinforcement of the original statement that it comes ευθείᾳ. For the appeal to the practice of νομοθέται, cf. 1099 b, 29. 1103 a, 7.
5 μὲν Βούλνημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτον ἐστιν, ὥσοι δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ποιοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τοῦτο τούτη πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγάθης φαινόμενη.

"Εστὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πάσα ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ φθέρεται, ὡσοὶ δὲ καὶ τέχνη. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζεσθαι καὶ [οἱ] ἄγαθοι καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρίσται. Τὸ ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἰς οἰκοδομεῖν ἄγαθοι οἰκοδομοῦν ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὦτως ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἔγινοντο ἄγαθοι ἡ κακοὶ. οὐτὸ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρετων ἔχειν. πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γνωμεθαί οἱ μὲν δικαίως οἱ δὲ ἀδικοὶ, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ θείζομενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἡ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὡσοὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργὰς οἱ μὲν γὰρ σωφρονεῖν καὶ πρόοι γίνονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἀκόλουθοι καὶ ὀργογλῶσαι, οἱ μὲν καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸ. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογίων ἐνὶ ἐξεις γίνονται. διὰ δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας σοιάς ἀποδεικνύοι.
κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τοιτῶν διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ ὠτός ἡ ὠτός εἰθής ἐκ νέων ἐβδέξεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπλωλ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν η ἄροφοια πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἐνεκά ἔστιν ὀστερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἰνα εἰσόμεν τὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἅρετη σκεπτόμεθα ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ἀγαθοὶ γενόμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἀν ἢν ὁφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὸ περὶ τάς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτικόν αὐτάς· αὐτάς γὰρ εἰσὶ κόρια καὶ 30 τοῦ ποιῆς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον πράττειν κοινῶν καὶ ὑποκείσθω [ἡθή-

1103 b, 26. ΕΕ. 1216 b, 20 οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἅρετης οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμίαταν τὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γνώσκειν καὶ τῶν ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλήμεθα τὶ ἔστιν ἄρετει ἀλλ᾿ εἰς ἄρειον, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἀλλ᾿ εἰς δίκαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἦσαν μᾶλλον ἡ γνώσεις τοῦ ἄρετος ἢ ἔστι τὸ ἔγνωστον καὶ οὔ ἔχειν τὴν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἡ γνώσεις τοῦ ἔστι τὸ ἔχειν.

important to notice the introduction of this category.

II. § 1. Ἐπεὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The genuineness of this passage has been suspected, and it is certainly true that (i) it says over again much that has been said already, and (ii) that it anticipates much—especially the doctrine of the Mean—that will find its proper place later on. It is also true (3) that § 8 is continuous not with this but the preceding passage, and (4) that this passage is not referred to in the recapitulation 1105 a, 13. But these are all characteristics of the skroamoic style. It is to be noted also that there is a great difference between the discussion of the Mean here and later on. Here it is explained dialectically by a mere analogy; later on it is discussed ἐνίκης. Now this is a very characteristic procedure, as we shall see.

πραγματεία, ἡ περὶ τὰ ὄντα πραγματεία, ἡ δικαίως ἐστὶ προσαγωγεῖν πολιτείᾳ (Rhet. 1356 a, 26). In this sense of a ‘branch’ of philosophy the word is a synonym of μέθοδος. Cf. 1104 a, 1 n.

οὐ θεωρίας ἐνεκά. Contrast Phys. 194 b, 17 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸν εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία. The statement that a theoretical study of goodness would be of no use will not seem too strong if we remember that in a practical science the product is ‘better’ than the activity. From this it follows that such a study would not completely attain its end.

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον. The least misleading translation is ‘according to the right rule.’ The phrase comes from the Academy (see next note), and was too familiar to need explanation.

κοινόν, ‘is common ground,’ i.e. common to us and other schools, especially the Academy. That this is the meaning appears clearly from 1144 b, 21 sqq. For the meaning given to κοινόν cf. κοινὴ γνώμαι, δόξαι, κοινὰ ὄνομα, ‘believed, accepted names.’

ὑποκείσθω. Cf. 1129 a, 11 ὄν ἐσ-
σεται δ' ὁστερον περὶ αυτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄρθρος λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρεταῖς].

1104α Ἐκείνω δὲ προδομομολογεῖσθαι, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν 3 πρακτέων λόγος τύπωρ καὶ οὐκ ἄκριβος ἀφεῖλε λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὑλὴν οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέον, τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδέν " ἐστικός ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὕδε τὰ ύμνια. τοιούτων δ' ὄντος τοῦ 4 καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκριβες. οὕτε γὰρ ὡς τέχνην οὐθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίστει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερακῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς 10 κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος 5 λόγου πιερατέων ὑποθέσεων. πρῶτον οὖν τούτῳ θεωρητέον, οὗτος ἐν τοῖς παραγγελίας ἐνεκίνηται καὶ υπερβολὴς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις τῶν ὑποκλίων ταῦτα, "Let it be assumed as the basis of our discussion.' Hel. and some inferior mss. read ἐπερειχθεὶν, but no parallel to this expression can be found in Aristotle. The words which follow in brackets are justly suspected by Professor Bywater. They imply the identification of the ἄρθρος λόγος with φρονεῖν, which in this bald form is post-Aristotelian. See, however, 1144 b, 27 n.

§ 3. τῶν πρακτέων, περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν Bekk. Sus. Bywv. with Hel. I have reverted to the reading of all the best mss. Aristotle is not here speaking of the difficulty of practical science in general, but of the difficulty of laying down rules as to how we should 'qualify our activities.'

τῶν ... ἄκριβῶν ... κατὰ τὴν ὑλήν. Cf. 1094 b, 11 sqq. The comparison goes down to τά ύμνια, which are here substituted for the products of the arts in the former passage. This is because an example of τὰ ποιητικὰ is wanted, and ύμνιαν has for one of its meanings ύμνια ποιητικά (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.).

§ 4. περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. General rules of conduct are hard to give: a system of casuistry is still less capable of exactness.

ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίστει, 'it comes under no professional tradition,' as medical treatment, for instance, does. Cp. Prohl. 885 b, 27 cf. ἑταῖροι παραγγέλουν, Rhet. ad Alex. 1431 b, 4 παραγγέλματα πολιτικὰ, διεκκ. For πίστει cf. ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίστει (Τορ. 103 a, 37).

It is curious to note that, in the hands of the Church, casuistry became just such a professional tradition.

ὁσπέρ καὶ κ. τ. λ. Mr Stewart is doubtless right in supposing that Aristotle had in mind the passage of Hippocrates quoted in the Introduction, § 26.

§ 5. πιερατέων ὑποθέσεων. A Platonic touch. Cf. 1096 a, 14 n.

§ 6. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things like goodness.' There is no need to seek a definite reference for the pronoun. Aristotle is here employing the dialectical method of σχέσεις ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογ. δεῖ γὰρ κ. τ. λ. Cf. Isokr. Dem.

§ 34 τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ
χρήσται) ὀσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱσχύος καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὁρῶν·
tὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐκλείποντα 15
θείρει τὴν ἱσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτα καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ
πλεῖον καὶ ἐκάστῳ γινόμενα θείρει τὴν ἱσχύν, τὰ δὲ
7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὐξεῖ καὶ σφέζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ
ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετῶν.
ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβοῦμενος καὶ μηδὲν ἱπτὸ
μένου δειλὸς γίνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ἄλος φοβοῦμενος ἀλλὰ
πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πᾶς-
σης ἡδωνῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμίας ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλου-
στος, ὃ δὲ πάσαν φεύγων, ὀσπερ ὁ ἀγροκος, ἀναλογητὸς
τις. θείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἤπτο τῆς 25
ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐκλείψεως, ὅπερ δὲ τῆς μεσοτήτος σφ-
8 ζεται. ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον αἱ γενεσίας καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ
φθαραί ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ἤπτο τῶν αὐτῶν ἤγονται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνεργείαι εν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν. καὶ γὰρ ἤπτο
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἑναρωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἱσχύος· 30

1104 a, 27. ΕΕ. 1220 a, 22 ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίωτη
dιάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίωτων γέγενσα, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἁριστά περὶ
ἐκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστου ἄρετης, οἷον πῶνοι τε ἁριστοὶ καὶ τροφή ἄφ’

tεχνῶν ἔχει τὴν διάρμωσιν. The parenthetical clause introduces
the reason for what follows (i.e. the choice of health and strength as
instances) according to the common idiom. The dialectical method here
employed consists in finding the things that are ‘productive and destructive’
of goodness by finding what is productive and destructive of things similar.
This is quite without prejudice to the more ‘physical’ account of the
matter later on.
§ 7. ἀναλογισμὸς τις. Here and in
some other places (1107 b, 8. 1108 b,
11. 1109 a, 4. 1119 a, 7) Aristotle
uses this word, though with some
hesitation, in the special sense of
‘insensible’ to pleasure. In this sense
it is contrasted with ἀνάλγησις, of
which it is more commonly a synonym.
Cf. 1114 a, 10 m.

φθαραί δὴ κ.τ.λ. For the reading
see Bywater, Contr. p. 27. The par-
ticle δὴ is here inferential. Tr. ‘then.’
§§ 8–9. ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.
"Ὅτι ἡ ἄρετή εἰς ὅν ἠγόνετο, περὶ ταύτα
καὶ ἐνεργεῖ (1105 a, 16). This section
is continuous with c. i, §§ 6–8, cf.
c. ii, § 1 n. Note that ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
is substituted for δὴ τῶν ἄνθρωπων with
no difference of meaning. γίνεσθαι
being treated as the passive of 
τικεῖν. Bekker has καὶ αἱ ἀνεργίες, but
the article is omitted in K and obscures
the sense. The γενεσίας καὶ αὐξήσεις
on the one hand are opposed to the
φθαράν on the other.
καὶ αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι, sc. αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
ἐξουσίας, i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἁριστῆς.

B. A.


ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

[Β. Π. 8]

γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφῆν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύνατ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ λόγχυρος. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρτων· ἐκ τῆς γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεισθαι τῶν ἰδονῶν γνώμημα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεια ἀπέχεισθαι αὐτῶν. ὥστε δὲ 1104 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· εὐθυμομένου γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γνώμημα ἀνδρείας, καὶ γενόμενα μάλιστα δυνητικόμενα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

III. Σημείων δὲ δει ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεσι τὴν ἐπιγραφήν· 5 μένην ἰδονὴν ἡ λύπην τοὺς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχθάνειν ὃν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἂν τῆς εὐεξίας ποιόν ἔριτρον· ἐν τάσιν διάθεσιν ἢπτο τῶν αὐτῶν γέγενεν καὶ φθείρεσθαι τῶν προσφερομένων, ὡστε ἐπιέα ἡπτο τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ἐφαρ. ταῦτα δὲ ἡδή ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀρά της οἰκείου διάθεσις ἢποτον ἡ γίνεσθαι τῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄριστων περὶ ψυχῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς, ἢς πράττεται τὰ ἀριστεῖα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθείρεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς ταύτα ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς υπ' ὅν καὶ αὐξεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, πρὸς ᾧ βέλτιστα διατίθενται.

1104 b, 4. ΕΕ. 1220 a, 34 σημείων δ' ὅπι περὶ ἢδεα καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάζεισιν ιατρείας οὔτε καὶ γενέμεναι διὰ τῶν ἓνατών, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσὶν.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν...ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐσωπν-τας, 'will be in pari materia.' This way of expressing the ὅλη is Platonic. Cf. Polit. 286 d ἐξ ὑπὸ καὶ ἐν ὅις δημιουργούντο, Phileb. 59 d τό μὲν δὴ φρονήσεως κτλ...ἀ τοῖς φαινεῖ καθαρεύει δημιουργούς ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἐν ὅις δεὶ δημιουργοί τι παρεκεῖσθαι (cf. 1094 b, 12 π.). καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικονισθον ἡ βλέπων καὶ λαμβάνοντα σκόπον καὶ γινώμενα διὰ τῶν ἓνατών, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσὶν.

1104 a, 14 sqq. we find inter alia ἡ ἄγχος ἐν θερµῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ ὅλως τὸ θέλειν ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ὃς ἐστιν ἡ κύρια ἡ κύρια, μετάφραση, δικαίως καὶ τὸ χρόνος ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ὃς ἐστιν ἡ κύρια ἡ κύρια, δικαίως καὶ τὸ χρόνος ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ὃς ἐστιν ἡ κύρια ἡ κύρια, δικαίως καὶ τὸ χρόνος ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ.

The ἐνέργεια here described are (fully-
developed) κυριακὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ (ἀλλο-
διάν) and in particular, κυριακὴ ἐν πάθει. For πάθος is the ὅλη alike of the γένεσις and φθορά of good-ness and also the ἐν ὃς of good activities. Note that ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς is replaced in the summary by περὶ ἀρετᾶς, and that Eu- demos says πρὸς ταύτα ἡ κυριακὴ (i. q. ἐνέργεια) ἀρετῆς.

III. § 1. Σημείων δὲ κτλ. Ὁτι ἢποτον ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἢδεας καὶ λυπηρὰς (1105 a, 13).

Σημείων...ταῦτα. It is in ac-
cordance with the practical character of this discussion that the theory of the relation of goodness to feeling should apparently be introduced only to justify a practical rule for diagnosing ἐξεις by their symptoms. For Σημείων...ταῦτα, 'to take as a
HPICA NIKOMAXEIA

τῶν σωματικῶν ἤδονῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων χαίρων σώφρων, ο δὲ ἀυθέμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ο μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἡ μὴ λυπομένους εἰς ἀνάρειος, ο δὲ λυπομένους δειλός, περὶ ἤδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστίν ἡ ἤθική ἁρετή, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἤθικὴν τὰ φαιλὰ πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν ἱκαλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. Διὸ δέ ἡχαῖα πως ἐθύμου ἐκ νεών, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φεῦγω, ὡστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ, ἵνα γὰρ ὑπῆρχε παιδεία ἀυτὴ ἐστίν. Ἑτεροί δὲ αἱ ἀρεται εἰσὶ περὶ πράξεως καὶ πάθους, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάθη πράξει ἐπεταίρησεν ἤδονη καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄν εἰπὴ ἡ ἁρετή περὶ ἱκαλῶν καὶ λύπας. μὴν οὖσας δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις ηὐμίμη-


περὶ ἤδονας. For the preposition cf. περὶ ταῦτα 1105 a, 16.

ἐί δὲ ἢ κ.κ.λ. Eight arguments in favour of the position advanced. The important argument is the fourth (§ 3). The first three lead up to this, while the remaining four are supplementary and illustrative of it.

§ 2. Ἡχαῖα. Cf. 1095 b, 4 and 2. γεγονεὶ in 1179 b, 31.

οἱ ὁ Πλάτων φοινικ. The article and the present tense show that Plato in his writings is meant. The idea is found already in Rep. 401 e ὧν ὃς ἄρεται καὶ χαίρει, but Aristotle is no doubt alluding to Laws, 623 a. Ἀγνὸν τολμῶν τῶν παῖδων παιδείας εἶναι ἀρετὴν αἰσθάνειν ἤδονην καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν ὡς ἁρετὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κακία παραγένεται πρῶτον, ταῦτα ἔρχεται: φοινίκως ἄλλη καὶ ἀληθῶς δέξας βέβαιου, ἐνώπιον ὑπὸ τινὰ ὁ πρὸς τὸ γέρον παραγένεται· οἱ δὲ οὖν ἐτοί ἀνθρώποι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάσα ἐκφθαγμένα ἀγαθά. παιδεύσεις ἔλεγεν τὴν παραγένεταιν ἀρετὴν πασίν ἀρετὴν, ἤδονην δὲ καὶ μίλα καὶ λύπη καὶ μίσος ἃν ὀρθώς ἔν

ψυχαῖς ἔγγυστοι μήτε δυσμάλων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντας δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνώσας πλὴν λόγων ὁρθῶς εἴπεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσεγγιστῶν εἰδώλ. αὐτὴ δέ ἡ συμφωνία σώματα μὲν ἁρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἤδονας καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένων αὐτής ὀρθῶς, ὅστις μισεῖ, μὲν αὐτὴν τὸν ὄρθως ἐθύμοις εἰς ἀρχῇ μέχρι τελεσε τετέρας, στερεότερον δὲ τὰ χρή στερεότερον, τούτ' αὐτὸ ἀντικείμενον τὸ λόγῳ καὶ παιδεία προσαγωγῆς κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ἐδέξαν ὀρθῶς ἀν προσαγωγῆς. So Ar. Pol. 1340 a, 15 τῷ δ' ἁρετῇ (συμβεβηκέ) περὶ τὰ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ ταξιν καὶ μισεῖν.

§ 3. Ἑτεροί δὲ κ.κ.λ. Supplementary proofs that ἁρετή is περὶ ἤδονας καὶ λύπας.

περὶ πράξεως καὶ πάθην. That ἁρετή has to do with πράξεως is clear from the account of it given above (1105 b, 13 sqq.); that ἤθικὴ ἁρετή has to do with πάθη is clear from the fact that it belongs to τὸ ἀρετικόν.

ἐπεταίρησε ἤδονη καὶ λύπη. This important doctrine is assumed throughout. Every feeling can be reduced to pleasure or pain, and the difference between feelings is due solely to the differences of the φαινόμενα which give rise to them. The relation of pleasure to πράξεως or ἐνέργεία is discussed in the Tenth Book.

§ 4. μηνοῦν αἰς καὶ κ.κ.λ. In medicine cures are effected by op-


1104 b, 18. EE. 1221 b, 27 εἰλημένον δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταύτα λεκτών ὑπὲρ ἡπιοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ ἀρέται κατὰ ταύτα διὰρρησάται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσις διανοητικά, ὁμ ἐγγον ἀληθικα, ἡ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἦσεν ἡ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἄλογου, ἔχουσις δὲ ὁρεῖν (οὔ γὰρ ὅποιον μέρος ἦσεν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρείς, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη δὴ φαύλον τὸ θέσος καὶ στουδαίον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύτας. ἤδην δὲ τούτῳ ἐκ τῶν διαμέρεσεως τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἔξεσις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λίπη καὶ ἱδροῦ διαφέρουσιν: ὅστε διὰ τὰ ταύτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐμπροσθενθέν θέσεις συμπαίει πάνων ἡμείς ἀρέτην περὶ ἡδονάς εἶναι καὶ λύτας. πίστης γὰρ ψυχῆς ὑπὸ οἰωνίων πέρικες γίνεσθαι χειρῶν καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταύτα καὶ περὶ ταύτα ἐστὶν

posites (e.g. fever is cured by a cold remedy). If the remedy is pain, then pleasure must be the cause of the disease. The medical parerga expressed in such phrases as βοηθῶν τῷ μέν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν etc. is often discussed in medical writers. See Mr Stewart's note.

§ 5. προφυ. This is the reading of Kp and is not likely to be an invention. The other mss. have the more commonplace πρότερον. The reference is to 1104 a, 27 sqq., and the principle there laid down, ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ εἷς ὄν γενέτερον, περὶ ταύτα καὶ ἑνεργεῖτι. This shows that pleasure and pain are the oikeía τάθη of ἀρετῆς. Cf. Phys. 246 b, 10 oikeía δὲ (πάθη) ὑφ' ἑντ' ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φιλερθεῖσαι πέρικες.

πρὸς ταύτα. Another variation of the phrase expressing the object to which the activity is relative. Cf. the note on p. 83 and Eudemus there referred to.

τὴν φύσιν ἔχω. A variation of ἐνεργεῖ which is easily explained, if we remember that the oikeía φύσις or τελεωσίς of any ἔξος is its ἐνεργεία. Things are said ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν, εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει (opp. εξελάσασθαι) when they are complete. Translate 'shows its true nature.'

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, "by the rule."

διὰ καὶ ὑποίτων κ.τ.λ. Comm. Ανοί. ἑτέρω δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν Στοιχεῶν ἤ ὅδε αὑτὴν. The word ἁμάθεια is found once only in what remains to us of Greek philosophy before the Stoics; but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the reference here is to Speusippus. Cf. Clem. Strom. ii, 21 (Σπευσίππων φοβε οὐχ ἀγαθοῦ τῆς ἀδύναμος). Eudemus (l. c.) refers the definition to πάντες,
καὶ ἤμειλας· οὐκ εἰ δὲ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἄλλ’ οὐχι 25 ὡς δει καὶ ὡς οὐ δει καὶ ὡτε, καὶ οὐσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ἔντοκετε ἁρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῆ, ἡ δὲ κακία τοιαύται. 22 γένοιτο δ’ ἣ ἦμιν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἐτί περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὡστών τῶν εἰς τᾶς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν 30 τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδον. καὶ [τριῶν] τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς καταρθωτικός ἔστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα ἐτί περὶ τὴν ἡδονῆν. κοινῇ τε γὰρ αὐτὴ τοῖς ἔχουσι, καὶ πάσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἰρέσιν παρακολουθεῖ 35 ὡς καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἢδον αἴρεται. ἐτί 1105 μ’ 3 δ’ ἐκ νηπίου πάσιν ἦμιν συντεθράπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπο-

η ἡδονή (l. ξεϊs Bonitz). δεὶ ἡδονᾶς δε καὶ λύπας φαίλοντο εἶναι φανάτων, τῶν διάκεισαι καὶ φεύγειν ἡ ὅση μή δει ἡ ἀμή δει. διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες πραγμάτων ἀπαθεῖαι καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ λύπας ἐγίνεται τὰς ἀρέτας, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδον. This is an ένδοενος. Cf. Top. 105 a, 27 and 118 b, 27 τοσοῦτον τὸ αἴρετον λέγεται καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐδὲν τὸ συμφέροντο τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ ἢδον. It is used later in the discussion of φιλα. Often τὸ συμφέρον φίλεμον is dropped (e.g. 1110 b, 9). In that case it is regarded merely as a means towards the other two.

καταρθωτικός. A word coined to form an opposite to ἀμαρτητικός. The verb καταρθοῦνε means ‘to succeed.’

κοινῇ...τοῖς ἢδοις. The point is that pleasure is possible to all, even though they may not understand beauty or use.

§ 8. συντεθράπταί, i.e. συντραφόται ἐστί, ‘has grown up with us.’ Hippocrates (p. 306, 24) καὶ διὸνς τὸ συντραφόται καὶ συνανεπθεῖσαι, ἣ μή
τρίγασθαι τούτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχωρομένον τῷ βίω. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δὲ ἦττον, 5 ἦδονή καὶ λύπη. διὰ τούτων οὖν ἀναγκαίοι εἰναι περὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἥδονας καὶ λύπας τὰ πάσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἁρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτων χρώμενος ἀγάθος ἐσται, ὁ δὲ κακὸς κακὸς.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστω ἡ ἁρετή περὶ ἠδονᾶς καὶ λύπας, καὶ 15 ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὐξέται καὶ φθείρεται ἡ ὤστως γινομένως, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

IV. Ἀπορήσωμε δ' ἂν τις πώς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ κακά σώφρονα σοφόφρονα: εἰ γὰρ πράττοντο τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, 20 ἢ ἢσθι εἴσι δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὡστε εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἤ οὖν ἐπὶ 2 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδεχεται γὰρ γραμματικὸν τι

θεραπευθῶς τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις, (p. 307, 23) ὃ δὲ ἀπὸ παιδίων συνήχθη, καὶ συνέτροφεν (of diseases).

ἀποτρίφωμαι ... ἐγκεχωρομένον. The metaphor is taken from washing out stains. The figurative use of ἀποτρίφωμαι occurs more than once in Demostenes, and is worked out at length by Plato, Rep. 429 d sqq.

κανονίζομεν. The verb occurs only here in Aristotle, but the metaphor of the ‘rule’ occurs several times and is still felt as a metaphor (cf. 1113 a, 33). The word κανών did not become technical till a later date.

§ 10. καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος. Fr. 105 (Byw.) θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλέπτων, ὅτι γὰρ ἂν χρῆσθαι γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς ὑφέσθαι. (Early Greek Philo-

sophy, p. 140). No doubt θυμός was here used in the Ionic sense in which it is equivalent to ἐνσώμα.

περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπότερον κ. τ. λ. For this test cf. 1109 a, 12 sqq.

§ 11. ἤτοι λύπας, 1104 b, 4—1105 a, 13. καὶ ἄτοι ... γινομένων 1103 b, 6—25 and 1104 a, 10—26. καὶ ἄτοι ... ἐνεργεῖ 1104 a, 27—b, 9. The section on the Mean (1104 a, 11—27) is not specially referred to. Cf. 1103 b, 26 n.

IV. § 1. πώς λέγομεν. 1103 a, 31, 34, b, 2. This ἄτορια serves to bring out more fully the character of ἐνσώμα. It falls under the general principle that what exists δυνάμει can only be made to exist ἐνεργείᾳ by something already actual. The form
τοίχαια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλων ὑποθεμένων. τότε οὖν ἐσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικῶν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς. τούτῳ δ' ἐστί τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμ-25
3 ματικήν. ἔτι οὖν ὑμιοί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γνώμενα τὸ εὐ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταύτα πώς ἔχοντα γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γνώμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτὰ πώς ἔχῃ, δι-καίως ἢ σωφρόνισι πράττεται, ἄλλα καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων 30 ποι ἔχων πράττῃ, πρότον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἐπειτ' ἐὰν προαι-ρούμενοι, καὶ προαιρούμενοι δὲ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ πρότον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαιῶσ καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταύτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναρμολογεῖται, πλὴν 1105 b
αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι: πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ισχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν άλλὰ τὸ πῶς δύναται, εἰπέρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκης πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ 4 σωφροσύνη περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σῶ-5 φρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἡ τοιαύτα οία ἄν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σω-φρων πράξειν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σωφρόνισ οὕτω οὐχ ὁ ταύτα πράττων, ἄλλα καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σῶ-
§ 6. ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. This practical exhortation brings the discussion of how goodness is produced to an appropriate conclusion. There is no Royal Road to goodness. We cannot become good by studying moral philosophy or listening to sermons.

V. § 1. τί ἄρετι ἢ ἄρετὴ. The connexion of thought is left to be inferred as usual, but it is quite plain. We found (1103 b, 22) that δεῖ τὰς ἐνέργειας ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι, seeing that they are κύρια καὶ τὸ ποιᾶς γενόσθαι τὰς ἐξεις (ib. 31). And that means further that the acts which are to produce goodness must be τοιοῦτα σοὶ ἐν ὧν ἁγιάζει πράττοι (1105 b, 6). We cannot therefore know what sort of acts make a good ἔθιμον till we have defined this ποιῶν of the appetitive soul which we call goodness.

§ 1105 b, 19. EE. 1220 b, 7 λεκτέον δὴ κατά τί τῆς ψυχῆς ποιῶν τὰ ἄθικ. ἄστι δὲ κατά τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἂς ὡς παθητικόι λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐξεις, καθ' ἂς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τὰ πάντων ποιῶν ἢ ἀπαιτεῖ εἴναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἐξεις. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιοῦτα, θυμὸν φῶς τοῖς ἀρεταῖς.
ὅργῆν φόβου θάρσου φθόνου χαρᾶν ψυχαίν μέρος πόθου ἐλεον, ὅλον οἷς ἐπεται ὡδου ἡ λύπη· δυνάμεις
ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλων οἷς ἐπεται ως ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ αἰσθητικῇ ὡδοινή ἡ λύπη καθ’ αὐτὰ. καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεις καθ’ αὐς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ

and this is the sense in which we are using the word here. Now in this sense a πάθος is not a ποιότης, but a κλίσεις κατὰ τὸ ποιότις οἵ τινος. We can see the distinction well from Met. 1020 a, 33 sqq., where the two senses of τὸ ποιότις are given as (1) ή διαφόρα τῆς ωνίας (cf. 1106 a, 14 n.), and (2) τὰ πάθη τῶν κακῶν. As goodness and badness are said to be πάθη in this sense (b, 19 ὁ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι), this is clearly not the meaning of the word here. Nor can the πάθη here mentioned be identified with the κακία καὶ ποιότητες of the Categories, which are temporary qualitative affections (such as tastes and colours) accompanying a πάθος, but not the πάθος itself. The latter is there described thus: "Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀναφωτιστὰ 

δικαία κακῶν (1119 a, 9), but we ought rather to say it is the ἰδέα of self-preservation accompanying a λύπη τις ἡ ταραχῇ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλων οὐκ ἀρετῆς φοβητικοῦ η λυπηροῦ. The opposite of φόβος is θάρσος, which therefore involves a feeling of pleasure arising from a φαντασία of the opposite kind.

φθόνον χαρᾶν. The latter seems to be used here in a special sense as the opposite of φόβος, which is λύπη ἐκι φαλαινῆς ἀνέργειάς τῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν τούτος (Top. 109 b, 36).

ψυχαίν μέρος. As φοβητικὸς ἐγαθόν (cf. 1155 b, 29) φοβία is ἐν τῷ βουλήσει (Top. 126 a, 13), and so we should understand the classification of all seven from φθόνοι onwards. They are all κινήσεις produced by the φαντασία of something good or bad, and therefore belong to βουλήσεις. As a πάθος, φοβία is more correctly called φοβητική (1157 b, 28). It is a disinterested feeling of pleasure when good happens to another or pain when ill befalls him (Rhet. 1381 a, 4), and μέρος the opposite.

πάθος, intense feeling of the pleasantness of the absent and pain of the present.

ζῆλος is the pain a man feels at seeing good things in the possession of another like himself, not because the other has them but because he himself has not (Rhet. 1388 b, 30), while ἐλεός is pain at the φαντασία of evil happening to another like oneself (ib. 1385 b, 13).

οἷς ἐπεται κ.τ.λ., i.e. κινήσεις ἡ ἀναλώσεις which are necessarily either μεθ’ ἱδρυήν ἢ μετὰ λύπη (see the foregoing notes).
δὲ καθ' ὅς παθητικοί τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ὅς δυ-
25 νατοὶ ὁργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεύθαι: ἐξεὶς δὲ καθ' ἀς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὐ ἡ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὁργι-
σθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἡ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὐ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τάλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν 3
οὐκ εἰσίν οὐθ' αἰ ἁρεταί οὐθ' αἰ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα
30 κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαίοι ἡ φαιλοί, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἁρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
οὗτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε πεισόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φο-
βοῦμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὁργίζομενος, οὔδ' ψηγεῖται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὁργι-
1106 χόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς—κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἁρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
ἐπαινοούμεθα ἡ πείσεται. ἔτι ὁργίζομενος μὲν καὶ φοβοῦ-
4 μεθα ἀπραιρέτως, αἰ δὲ ἁρεταὶ πραιρέσεις τινεῖς ἥ οὐκ
ἀνεμ πραιρέσεως, πρὸς δὲ τούτως κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
5 κυνείσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἁρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
οὐ κυνείσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεϊσθαι πως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ

πάθη οἰ ἐνεργοῦσιν, οἷον ὁργίλος ἀνάλγυτος ἰρωτικὸς αὐξυνητικὸς
ἀναισχυντός. ἐξεὶς δὲ εἰσιν ὅσοι αἰτιαὶ ἐις τὸ τάθη ἡ κατὰ λόγον
ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναύτιος, οἰον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη δειλια ἀκολοθία.

Συνόψεις. In the present context, these are φυσικαί, and therefore ἄλογα, δεδόμενα. Cf. Cat. 9 a, 16 δοί κατὰ
dόξας φυσικὴ ἡ ἀδυναμία λέγονται. They are susceptibilities or insusceptibilities to feeling.

ἐξεὶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note that ἐξεὶς here are not only qualities, but also relations. Cf. Cat. 11 4, 20 ὅτι δὲ δὲ ταχύ-
τευθαὶ μὴ τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὅτε ποιήσῃς τῷ πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς πολλὰ τῶν
πρὸς τι συγκατάθειται; τὰς γὰρ ἐξεὶς καὶ διαθέας τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι
ἐλέγομεν. The γένος is ἐν πρὸς τὶ, for we say ἐπιστήμη (ο ἁρετή) τινός,
but the particular is not. We do not say γραμματική (ο ἀνδρεία) τινός.

σφοδρῶς, sc. ἔχομεν, a natural brachylogy for ἔχομεν ὡστε σφοδρῶς
ὁρμισθηναι.

§ 3. πάθη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Three
arguments to show that goodness is not a πάθος, (1) feeling is not in itself
good or bad, (2) feeling does not imply will, (3) feeling is a motion (or
process), while goodness is a state or disposition. All this comes simply to
saying that πάθη are not ποιήσεις.

§ 4. πραιρέσεως. The meaning
of πραιρέσεως is explained in Book III.

Cf. for the present Met. 1020 b, 23
μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει
τὸ ποιῶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπύρων, καὶ τούτων
μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶς ἔχουσι πραιρέσεως.

κυνείσθαι. Cf. Met. 1022 b, 15
πάθος λέγεται ἐνα μὲν πρὸς ποιήσῃ
καθ' ἡν ἀλλοιωθάντα ἐνδέχεται. In
Phys. 216 a, 26 ἀλλοιώσις is defined
as qualitative motion (κίνησις κατὰ τὸ
ποιη).

Diakēisthai is synonymous with
ἕχω in the Ethics, though in the
δυνάμεις εἰσίν: οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, [οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψευδό-

μεθα] ἔτι δύνατοι μὲν ἐσμὲν φύομεν, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ δὲν γινομέθα φύοις εἰπομεν δὲ περὶ τοῦτον πρῶτον. εἰ 10 οὖν μῆτε πάθη εἰσίν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μῆτε δυνάμεις, λέστεσα ἔξεις αὐτῶς εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἰρηται.

VI. Δὲ δὲ μὴ μονὸν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ 2 ποία τίς. ῥητῶν οὖν ὅτι πάσα ἀρετή, οὐ ἄν ἡ ἀρετή, 15 αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἠχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐργὸν αὐτοῦ εὐ ἀποδί-

δωσιν, οἷον τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἀρετή τὸν τὸ ὀφθαλμὸν σπου-

δαίον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐργὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ γὰρ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἀρετή εὖ ὀρόμεν. ὅμως ἡ τοῦ ὑππον ἀρετὴ ὑππον τε σπουδαίον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμέεν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ- 20

§ 2. ῥητῶν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument is that the differentia of good-

ness will be the same as the differentia of the activities which (1) produce goodness, and (2) result from good-

ness. Now we have seen above (1104 a, 11 sqq.) that the προηγηθὲ καὶ φθαρθὶκα of goodness are activities in a mean, and also (1104 a, 27 sqq.) that activities in a mean are the result of goodness. They are both πρὸς τὴν ἔξειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως. Therefore goodness will be a ἔξειν ἐν μεσότητι.

So far, then, the differentia ἐν μεσό-

τητις has been reached in a purely dialectical way. That it was the differentia of good acts was found by σκέψις ἐν τῶν διαλογ. (cf. 1104 a, 12 n.), and that it is the differentia of good-

ness is shown ἐν τῶν εὐσταθεὶς (cf. Ind. s.v.).

ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετή. The illustration is from Plato, Rep. 353 b, ἀρ' ἐν ποτὲ διματα τὸ αὐτὸν ἐργὸν καλὸς ἀπεργάσαντο μη ἐχομεν τὴν αὐτῶν ὀσκείν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ τοῦ ὑππόν ἀρετή. The illustration is suggested by Plato, Rep. 335 b.
Άριστοτέλος [B. VI. 2]

βάτην καὶ μείναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων 3 ὁποιοὶ ἔχεις, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἰ ἡ ἡ ἔχει ἃφ' ἢς ἄγαθος ἀνθρώπος γίνεται καὶ ἃφ' ἢς εὐ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, ἢδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἐτί 4 25 δὲ καὶ ἃδ' ἔσται φανερὸν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποιὰ τὶς ἔστιν ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὲ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλείον τὸ δ' ἐλαττον τὸ δ' ἵσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ δ' ἵσον μέσον τι ύπερβολής καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἵσον ἀπέχον ἃδ' ἐκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστιν ἐν καὶ ταύταν πάσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ δ’ μήτε πλεονά-

1106 a, 26. ΕΕ. 1220 b, 21 διωμασμένον δὲ τούτων, ἀπετέλεον ὅτι ἐν ἄπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστιν ύπερφυκή καὶ ἐλλεῖψι καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὁδὸν ἐν γυμνοστίκη, ἐν λατρείᾳ, ἐν οἰκοδομῇ, ἐν κυβερνήτη, καὶ ἐν ὅποιον πράξεις, καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀπεχθ. ἢ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχεῖ, ἢ δὲ πράξεις κάνησις. ἐν πάσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βαλλομεν'; τότε γὰρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος παντοτόκῳ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βέλτιστην ἔξιν· καὶ τότε δήλον δια τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθειρεῖ ἄλληλα, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἄλληλοι καὶ τὸ μέσον ἐναντία. τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἐστιν, ὁδὸν τὸ ἵσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μεξιών, τοῦ μεξιώνος δὲ

§ 4. ἢδη, supra 1104 a, 10 sqq.

ἡ φύσις. We now show φύσις, that the differentia of ἀρετή is ἐν μεσίτης. Cf. Introductory Note. With the change of method, the Platonic reminiscences disappear. In- trod. § 7.

συνεχεί καὶ διαιρετῷ, 'continuous and (infinitely) divisible.' The current rendering of διαιρετῷ by 'discrete' is a mere blunder and makes nonsense of the argument. The word for 'discrete' is διωμασμένον. Everything which is continuous is also potentially divisible ad infinitum, and the point is that πάθη καὶ πράξεις which are the 'matter' of goodness are just such infinitely divisible continua; for, regarded as κινήσεις, both πάθη and πράξεις are συνεχεῖς. We shall best understand the doctrine of the mean by thinking of a scale which is capable of infinite graduation. There is one right degree, and all below it down to zero are ἐλλείψεις, all above it up to boiling-point ὑπερβολὰς.

ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. This distinction entirely removes the objection that Aristotle makes the difference between right and wrong a quantitative one. The bad man feels and acts more or less, as the case may be, than the good man, but this does not imply that the good man's feelings are always 50° centigrade and his conduct middling.
θα, μήτε ἔλλειπε· τοῦτο  δὲ ὅχι ἐν, οὐδὲ ταύτων πάσης.
ἀφοῦ εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὅλγα, τὰ δὲ μέσα
λαμβάνουσα κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον Ἰσόγ, γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ
ὑπερέχει τούτο, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 35
ἀναλογίαν· τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὅχι ὅπως ληπτεύον· οὐ γὰρ
εἰ τὰ δέκα μιαὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὅλγον, ὃ ἄλλα
πτης δὲ μιᾶς προστάξει· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἤσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
tὸ ληψωμένον ὁ ὅλγον· Μίλιοι μὲν γὰρ ὅλγον, τῷ δὲ
ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ· ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
8 πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τὴν ὑπερβιβάλῃ μὲν καὶ 5
τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζήτει καὶ τοῦτ' ἀφεῖται,
μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πάγωματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
9 εἰ δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὑ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ
μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τούτο ἀγούσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰῶ-
θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοὺς εὑ ἐχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐθ' ἀφελεῖν το
ἔστων οὕτε προσθεῖναι, ἦν τὴς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλ-
λεῖψεως φθειροῦσι τὸ εὑ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σφόδρος, οἱ
δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνάται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τούτοι βλέποντες
φράζουσιν), ἡ δ' ἠρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
αμεῖνον ἐστὶν ἄστερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἐν εἰς το- 15
χαστικὴ. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ περὶ πάθη
καὶ πράξεως, εὖ δὲ τούτως ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή καὶ ἔλλειψις
καὶ τὸ μέσον· οὕτω καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι-

δανον. ᾧστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἡθικὴν ἁρετὴν περὶ μέσαν ἠττά εἴναι καὶ
μεσότητα τινα. ληπτεύον ἁρα ἡ ποία μεσότης ἁρετῆ, καὶ περὶ τοια
μέσα.

§ 8. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
λογίαν. Θεον of Smyrna p. 85, 10
quotes from Thrasyllos the definition
ἐν τὰ ἀρχαῖο υπερφύσει καὶ
ὑπερφύσει. This is not what we
call a ‘proportion,’ but a series in
106, 15 τοῦτον δὲ ὅ σει ὁ Ἀδραστός
μᾶς τὴν γεωμετρικὴν κυρία λέγεσθαι
ἀναλογίαν καὶ πρῶτην...καυσύνων δὲ
φθείρι καὶ ταυτάς ἄλλας μεσοτήτας ὃς' ἐνίοιω
καλεῖται μεσοτήτας.

Ἀν. 659 b, 19 μᾶλλον ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα
καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοι
ἡ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. If we find that
the excellence of a work of art con-
sists in this, that you cannot add to it
or take anything from it, then a
fortiori this will be true of goodness
as it is of nature.
θυμήσαι καὶ ἀρμισθήναι καὶ ἐλέσαι καὶ ὀλὼς ἡσθήναι
καὶ λυπηθήναι ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐστὶν, καὶ ἀμφότερα
οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δὲ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ’ ὄλας καὶ πρὸς ὄλας καὶ ὁ δὲ
ἐνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μέσου τε καὶ ἀριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ 11
καὶ ἐλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσου. ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ
25 πράξεις ἐστὶν, ἐν ὂς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
ἐλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ καταρθοῦ-
ται· ταῦτα δ’ ἀμφοῦ τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν 13
ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. ἠτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ-
14 τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστὶν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπελεύρου, ὡς οἱ
30 Πθαγάρειοι εἰκάζου, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
δὲ καταρθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ ἄρι-
σταν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπόν
δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν); καὶ διὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψις, τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄπλως, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοῖ.

"Εστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα

1106 α, 36. EE. 1227 b, 5 ἀνάγκη τούν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ

§ 14. τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπελεύρου.
Aristotle here makes an ingenious use—
of a Pythagorean idea which had at
first a cosmological rather than an
ethical signification. According to the
Pythagoreans, the world was built up
of geometrical figures, and these arose
from the limitation of the unlimited
(space). The unlimited once limited
was a point, twice limited a line and so
forth (Early Greek Philosophy, p. 312).
The limit was thus the principle of
order. Just in the same way the in-
finately divisible continuum of feeling
and action requires to be determined
according to the ὀρθὸς λόγος. There
are infinite possibilities of wrong in it,
but there is a certain degree in it which
is right, and that is the limit, the
meστὴ τρὸς ἡμᾶς.

ἐπιτυχεῖν ἢ σκοποῦ ἢ ἐπιτυχεῖν.
For the metaphor of the σκοποῦ cf.
1094 a, 22 n. Goodness is στοχα-
στική τοῦ μέσου and we may think
of the μεσότης as the bull’s eye in
the target. The possibilities of missing are infinite, there is one right place
to hit.

ἐσθλοὶ κ.τ.λ. The authorship of
this verse is unknown.

§ 15. ἔξις προαιρετική. We have
seen that the genus of Goodness is
ἔξι (1105 b, 19), that is, a habitual
attitude towards feeling, developed by
habitation from a neutral ὄνομα. We
have seen too that we cannot say
A man is good unless he acts προαιρέτως, 'with purpose' and βεβαιός καὶ λογικός τόν ἄκριβα ἔγγραφον (1105 a, 31). This gives us ἐξα προαιρέτως, 'a condition of the will.'

ἐν μεσότητι σώσα τῇ πρός ἡμᾶς. The difference of this ἐξα προαιρέτως is that it aims at the mean relative to ourselves (1106 a, 14 sqq.). The word ἔσω implies that τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ of the ἐξα is ἐν μεσότητι, so Eudemus is quite right (loc. cit.) in saying προαιρετική μεσότητι.

ἀριστερή λόγων. We took as the basis of our discussion that we must act κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (1103 b, 32). It is now indicated that this is what determines the Mean. The Mean is, in fact, a provisional formula. We cannot yet say what determines the proportion. There is still an unknown quantity in our "Rule of Three" problem. See the beginning of Book VI. καὶ ὃ ἐν ὧν φρόνιμος ἐργαζόμενος. This is added as a hint of the direction in which we are to look for our standard. We know already that φρόνιμος is a διάφορη ἀρετῇ (1103 a, 6), and now we are told that the Mean is determined 'by what the wise man would determine it by,' a sufficient ἐνδοξος. We must, then, be content for the present with our provisional formula, the Mean. We shall learn more when we come to Goodness of Intellect.

§ 16. καὶ ἐν μεσότητι ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν...τὰς ἐκ τῆς κακίας.

τοῦ δέοντος. See 1094 a, 24 b.

§ 17. διὸ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that Goodness is a Mean in its essential nature (οὐδενία) and by its definition (τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν ἐναντίον), but from the point of view of what is best it is an extreme. When we go beyond the Mean, though we are ascending towards the upper extreme of our scale of feeling, we are yet descending in the scale of excellence. The explanation of this is to be found in the fact that goodness is a τέλειος, and that therefore all badness, whether of excess or defect, is opposed to it as στρεφόμενος σὲ ἐκλογής.

τὸ τί ἦν ἐνα. This curious phrase means the real nature (οὐδενία) of a thing as expressed in its definition by genre and specific difference. Its origin is easily understood if we take such a phrase as τὸ τί ἦν ἐναντίον λόγου λέγοντα, 'what it was for him to be a man,' 'what his being a man was.' The imperfect is to be explained as a "philosophical" imperfect (Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, § 40), and represents the definition in a
Ἀριστοτελός καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότητος. οὐ πᾶσα δ’ ἐπειδήχεται πράξις
οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν τάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἐνὶ γὰρ εὖθυς ἀνώμασται
συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαιλότητος, οἷον ἐπισκαφερκαλία
ἀναισχυνσία φθόνοις, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ
ἀνδροφοβία· πάντα γὰρ ταύτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα λέγεται
τῷ αὐτῷ φαύλα εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν
οὐδ’ αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατ-
ορθοῦν, ἀλλ’ αἱ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ’ ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ
περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐν τῷ ἢν δεῖ καὶ ὑπὲρ τόσον μοιχεύειν,
ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀμαρτάνειν ἑστὶν.
δομοὺν οὖν τὸ ἄξιόν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν καὶ δειλαίειν
καὶ ἀκολασταῖνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλ-
λείψεις· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψεως με-
σότητα καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐλλείψεως.
όπηρ δὲ σοφοσύνης καὶ ἀνηθείς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλείψεις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι ποι ἀκρόν, οὕτως οὖν
ἐκεῖνον μεσότης οὐδ’ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν
(mutatis mutandis) αἱ ἀμαρτάνειν· δοκεῖ οὖν οὐδ’ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλείψεως μεσότητος ἑστὶν, οὕτω μεσότητος ὑπερβολή καὶ
ἐλλείψεις.

VII. Ἀἰὲ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ

living way as the result of a process, not as a dead formula. This is characteristic of Greek philosophy all through, based as it was on discussion and debate.

§ 19. εὖθυς ἀνώμασται κ.τ.λ., 'have names which at once involve badness.' For συνειλημμένα cf. EE. I. 11, Met. 1025 b, 32 τὸ μὲν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ἔληπτης.

VII. § 1. Δὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The definition must now be tested by its applicability to particulars, i.e. particular forms of goodness. So the
καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἔκκατα ἐφαρμότευε. εν γὰρ τοῖς πέρι τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινώτεροι εἴσιν, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς μέροις ἀληθινώτεροι. περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἔκκατα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς συμφωνεῖν • • • λυπητέον οὖν ταύτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρείσθω ἐκαστὸν ἐκ τῆς ύπογραφῆς.

| δρυμλότησις | ἀναλγεία | προτότης |
| θρασύτητις | δείλα | ἀνδρεία |
| ἀναισχυντία | κατάπληξις | αἰῶνας |

definition of ἐθικομοιωσια was tested by its applicability to the relevant facts. Cf. 1968 b, 9 sqq. and De Mot. An. 598 a, 11.

κοινώτεροί, ‘of wider application.’ This is the reading of the best mss. and the Greek commentators (πλείους ἐφαρμόζων Παρ.). Cf. e.g. De An. 414 b, 23 γένοιτο δ’ ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχεδίων λόγος καυσός, δι’ ἐφαρμόζειν μὲν τάς, ἐδοῦ δ’ ὁδόν οὖν ἐστι σχῆμα. The reading of the Vetus Venetio and inferior mss., κοινώτεροι, is not so appropriate; for, as will be seen from the references in Eucken, Malhode pp. 46—47, κενοὶ and κενολογία (De An. 409 a, 2 διαλεκτικῶν ἑφευρεῖ καὶ κενοῖ) refer chiefly, if not solely, to arguments not based on the μίαν ἄρχαι of the science. Here Aristotle is pointing out the respective advantages of both universal and particular.

ὅτι can hardly be anything else but an accusative absolute: it cannot stand for ὅτι εἰτὶ. Bonitz would therefore delete ὅτι in the next clause. There may be a lacuna in the text. Cf. 1145 b, 28.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. In EE. 1220 b, 37 it is called a υπογραφή, though we have διαγραφή 1228 a, 28. Cf. δια-

γραμμα. We have references to a υπογραφή in De Interpr. 22 a, 22 Hist. An. 510 a, 30 and elsewhere.

It seems, then, that Aristotle’s ἀκρονοί were illustrated by a sort of syllabus. In the case of the Analytics this must have been quite necessary, and there are other parts of the Ethics that are not intelligible unless we assume a diagram.

§ 2. περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρης.
Both fear and its opposite are mentioned because they form a single continuum. It is possible for the soul to pass by continuous ἀλλώσωψ from the one to the other. We may therefore look at the Mean from two points of view, and there are thus two excesses and two defects. For it does not follow that δ’ ἐν τῇ φοβεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ (which is what Aristotle means by δ’ ἐν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων) will be the same as δ’ ἐν τῇ ϑορρεῖ ὑπερβάλλων. They are different ἐξαἰτια altogether; for we are not dealing with the mere τοῦτον καὶ συνεχῆς. It may well be, however, that one or other of the ἐξαἰτια has no special name, or that the same name is given to both; but this must not blind us to the qualitative distinction between them.

B. A.


ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπον τελός. περὶ ἢδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσος, 3 ἤττον δὲ κἂν ὑπὸ όμοιῶν περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότητι μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολογία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἢδονᾶς οὐ τάνω ἄριστως: διότερον οὖν ὁνόματος τετυχώ-

κασιν οὖν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δὲ- 4 σιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψεων μεσότητι μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ὑπε-

ριβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἐλλευψίας ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἔναντι λοις δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν οὖν μὲν γὰρ ἀσωτὸς ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλεῖπει, δ' ἐν ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλεῖπει, νῦν μὲν ὁν οὖν τύποι καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίον λέγομεν, 5 15 ἀρκοῦμενοι αὐτῷ τοῦτος. ὑστερον δὲ ἀκριβεστέρον περὶ αὐ-

άκολογία
φθόνος
κέρδος
ἀσωτία
ἀλαζονεία
κολακεία
ἀρέσκεια
τρυφερότης
χαυνότης
δαπανερία
πανοργία
αναυθησία
ἀνώνυμον
ζημία
ἀνελευθερία
eἰρωνεία
ἀπεχθεία
ἀθάνατία
cακοπάθεια
μικροπυρχία
μικροπτρέπεια
εὐθήνεια
σωφροσύνη
νέμεσις
δίκαιον
ἐλευθερίας
ἀλήθεια
φιλία
σεμνότης
καρτερία
μεγαλοφυσία
μεγαλοπτρέπεια
φρονίμοις

τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλει τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλεῖπει. ὁργίλος μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ μᾶλλον ὥς ἐν ὁργιζόμενοι καὶ βάστων καὶ πλεῖον ὥς δὲν, ἀναλήγητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσι καὶ ὅσι καὶ ἔρισέ μὲν ὁ

§ 3. οὐ πάσας. We shall see which later on.

καὶ οὖν ὁμοίως. I have adopted Mr Bywater's suggestion to insert οὖν ὁμοίως from 1117 b, 26. The καὶ in the common text has no meaning. Here is another determination which shows we are not dealing with mere quantity.

οὐ πάνω γίνονται, 'cannot be said to be common.' Cf. Ind. s.v. οὐ πάνω ἀναίσθησιν. This is not the usual meaning of the word. Cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

§ 4. περὶ δὲ δόσιν κ.κ.λ. We pass now from μεσότητες ἐν πάθεσιν to με-

σότητες ἐν πράξεις

δὲ τῶν διορισθησεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθήσεις ἄα, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει εὐθερίᾳ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρὰ), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλὰ καὶ βαναναία, ἐλλειψε δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δὴ αὐτὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑλευθεριότητα, τῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὡστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἄτιμων μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοφυσία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαλασάς της λεγαμένης, ἐλλειψε δὲ μικροφυσία. δὴ δὲ ἐλεγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἑλευθεριότητα, <τῷ> περὶ μικρά διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ ζυγὸς τῆς μεγαλοφυσίας, περὶ τιμὴν ὁδοιος μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν ὡστε: ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὅρεγενδαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἦτον, λέγεται δὲ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλει οἰς ὁρεξεῖς φιλότιμοι, ὁ δὲ ἐλλειπῶν ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διάθεσες, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλότιμον φιλοτιμία. οἶδεν εἰπικάζονται οἱ ἀκροὶ θέσεως τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν μέσων φιλοτιμίων καλούμενεν ἔστι δὲ ἀφιλότιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπὸ μὲν

ρήτη δὲ χρὴ φοβοῦμενος μὴθ' ὅτε μὴθ' ὡς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἡ μῦθ' δει καὶ ὃν ὁ δει καὶ ὡς ὁ δεῖ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλουθος ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἰππευρετικὸς καὶ ὑπερβάλλει πάντων ὅπως ἐνεῖχέν τε, ἀναίθητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλειπῶν καὶ μοῦν ὁς ὁ βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἄλλ' ἀποθις ὅσπερ λίθος· κερδαλείος δὲ ὁ πανταχθὲν πλεονεκτικός, ὑμισθιοῦ δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἄλλ' ἀλιγαχοθεί ; ἄλλας ὁ δὲ πλεῖο τῶν ὑπερχάρῳ συνποιοῦμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττως· καὶ κόλας μὲν ὁ πλεῖο συνποιεῖν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθήτικος δὲ ὁ ἐλάττως· καὶ τὸ μὲν λιαν πρὸς ὡδηγὸν ἀρέσκεια, το δ' ἀλήγα καὶ μόγις αὐθάδεια: ἕτε δ' ὁ μὲν μηδεμίων ὑπομενόν λύπην, μοῦδ' ει βέλτιον, προφρόβως, ὁ δὲ πάσαν ὁμοίως ὡς μὲν ἀπλώς εἰσὶν ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορὰ δὲ λέγεται σκληρῶς καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπάθητικος· χαῖνος δ' ὁ μειζονῶν ἀξίων αὐτῶν, μικρόφυσιος δ' ὁ ἐλαττώνως· ἕτε δ' ἀσώτως ὁ πρὸς ἀπασαν διαπάνην

§ 6. διαθήσεις. ἰ. ο. ἔνα. Cf. 1106 a. 6 π.
§ 8. τῷ περὶ μικρά, sc. εἴσαι, differ in being concerned with small things. The insertion of τῷ is due to Ramsauer.

ἐπισκάζοντα, a legal metaphor. For the κλῆρον καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπισκασίας see Λθ. πολ. c. 43; 4: 56, 6 with Sandys’s notes.

7—2
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ [B. VII. 8]

1108 a ἐπανοοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δὲ ὅτε τὸν ἄφιλότιμον. διὰ τινα δὲ αὐτίαν τούτῳ ποιοῦμεν, εἰ τοις ἐξής ῥηθήσατε· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγομεν κατὰ τὸν ύφεγημένου τρόπον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐκλειψις καὶ 10 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ αὐνοῦμόν ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν μέσων πράξιν λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα προφητήτα καλέσμενον· τῶν δὲ ἀκρῶν ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὄργανος ἔστω, ἢ δὲ κακὰ ὑρ- γίλοτής, ὁ δὲ ἐκλειπων ἀόργητος τοις, ὁ δὲ ἐκλειψις ἀόρ- γησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἐχουσια μὲν 11 τινα ἀμοιβήτηα πρὸς ἄλλης, διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων πάσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσὶ περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεως κοινωνιάς, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἄστι περὶ τάλαθας τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδον. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδί τὸ δὲ ἐν πάσιν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέων οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἦν 15 μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πάσιν ἡ μεσότητα ἐπανετο, τὰ δὲ ἀκρα οὐτ' ἐπαινετα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ἰσχεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελειθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἀπασαν ἐκλειπων· ὅρως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκιος, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρότας, ὁ δὲ ἐκλείπει τὸ πρότας· καὶ ὁ μὲν πανούργος πάνως καὶ πάντως πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δὲ εὐφύσιος οὐδ' ὅθεν ἀλλ' φθονερός δὲ τῷ λυπεσθαί ἐπὶ πλεῖστον εὐπραγίαις ἢ δὲ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὑρίσκει οὗτος φθονερόν εὑρίσκει τοῖς φθονερόν εὑρίσκει τοῖς φθονεροῖς εὑρίσκει), ὁ δὲ ἐναντίος ἀνωπομήνος, ἐστι δὲ ὁ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ μὴ λυπεσθαί μὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίωσι εὑρίσκει τοῖς, ἀλλ' εὐχερείς ὡστε οἱ γαστρόμαργης πρὸς τροφήν, ὁ δὲ διοχετής κατὰ τοῦ φθόνον ἐκτιν.—τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἐκατόν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτως ἐχειν περιέργεον διωρίζειν· ὁδοιαμα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε ποιητική, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τούτο προσδιορίζοντα, ἀλλὰ τούτοι.
οὐν καὶ τοῦτων τὰ πλέον ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον ὃς ὀστερὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς ὀνοματοτοιχεὼν σαφῆνεσι ἐνεκ "καὶ καὶ τὸν εὐπαρακολούθητον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄληθες ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀληθεία λεγένθω, 20 ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονέα καὶ ὁ ἐχον αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν εἰρωνεύσῃ καὶ εἰρων. περὶ δὲ δὲ τὸ ἡδον τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδίᾳ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐπρᾶπλος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐπραπάλω, ἡ δὲ ύπερβολὴ βεβο- 
μολοχία καὶ ὁ ἐχον αὐτὴν βαμολόχος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλειπών 25 ἀγαρικὼς τις καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐροκικία. περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδον τὸ ἐν τῷ βλεφάρι ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἠδον ὡς φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δὲ ύπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἵνα ἐναι, ἄρ- 
σκος, ἡ δὲ ὁδελεία τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ ἐλλειπών 30 καὶ ἐν πάσιν ἄρκησε δύστηρος τις καὶ δύσκολος, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ εἰσὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες. ἡ γὰρ 
αιδὸς ἄρετὴ μὲν οὖν ἐκέκκατον ἐπανεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτους δὲ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δὲ ύπερβάλ 
λον, ὡς ὁ καταπληξία τοῦ πάντα αἰδούμενος. ὁ δὲ ἐλλειπῶν 35 ἡ μηθέαν ὅλος ἁμαρτικόντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμει- 
σις δὲ μεσότης φθόνων καὶ ἐπιχαρεσκίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ 1108 β 
λύτηρ καὶ ἱδρυτή τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαλλον τοῖς πέλα 
γαμομένας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεστικός λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνα- 
ξίοις εὐ πράττονται, ὁ δὲ φθονόρος ὑπερβάλλων τούτον ἐπὶ 
πάς λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαρέσκος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ 40 
ἐστι πρὸς τὰς συνοφραγίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἄπλως μὲν οὖ 
ν διωρίζων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δὲ ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἔξω 
καταλόγων τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

§ 14. ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is exactly equivalent to περὶ τὰ πάθη. For εἰς τὸ σαί. τ. q. περὶ τ. ἀν. αὑτ. cf. Ind. s. v. περὶ, and for the declension of πάθος in the plural cf. Ind. s. v. These μεσότητες differ from e.g. ἀνδρεία and 
ἀσφασία in not being ἔξω, but more παθητικαῖοι παθήτες (cf. 1105 b, 
21 n.). It is interesting to note, however, that the principle of μεσότης applies here too.

§ 15. νέμεις is the feeling of satisfaction at people getting their deserts. It is not further discussed in E.N., but its association with αἰδῶς is as old as Homer. Here too our principle holds good.
ΑΠΑΣΤΩΤΕΛΟΥΣ

Λυπείσθαι ἦστε καὶ χαίρει. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἀλλοθι καιρός ἦσται: περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἔτει οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἐκατέρω ἐρώμεν

ΠΟΣ ΜΕΣΟΤΗΤΑΣ ἔΙΣΙΝ; [ἍΜΟΙΩΣ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν 10 ἈΡΕΤῶΝ].

VIII. Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσον, δύο μὲν κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καὶ ὑπερβολῆς τῆς δὲ καὶ ἐλέεσθε, μᾶς δ᾿ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσοτήτος, πάσας πάσας ἀντικείναι πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀκραὶ καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλήλως ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ 15 μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὠσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἵσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἐλαττωματικὸν τοῦτον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλαττωματικόν, οὕτως αἱ μὲν καὶ μεσοτήτος ἐξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλεημοσύνας ὑπερβάλλουσα πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλεῖπον εὑρείς τοὺς πάθεσιν καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἄνδρεως πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θράσυν φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν βραβευτικὸν δειλὸν· ὁμοῦς δὲ καὶ ὁ σόφρον πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναθητητὸν ἀκόλαστον, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον.

1108 b, 11. ΕΕ. 1222 a, 6 ἔτει δ᾿ ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξω ἃν ἡ πρακτικὴ τῶν βελτίων καὶ καθ᾿ ἣν ἀριστα διακείναι περὶ τοῦ βελτίωτον, βελτίωτον δὲ καὶ ἀριστον τὸ κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων, τούτο δ᾿ ἔστι τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλεημοσύνας τῆς πρὸς ἢμᾶς, ἀναγκαῖον δὲν εἰκὴ τὴν ἡδυκὴν ἁρετὴν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκατόν μεσοτήτη εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσον ἀττα ἢδοναι καὶ λυπᾶσαι καὶ ἱδέαι καὶ λυπηρός. ἐσται δ᾿ ἡ μεσοτήτις ὅτε μὲν ἢδοναι καὶ λυπῆσαι, ὅτε δ᾿ ἢλπισεις, ὅτε δ᾿ ἢμιτοσθέρας. ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ χαῖρε τῷ ἢδε υπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπησθεὶς τῷ ἡμιτοσθέρας, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἄπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τῶν ὀρὼν, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς ὁ πολλὸς. ὁ δ᾿ ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεί.

ἔτει δ᾿ ἔστι τις ἔξω ἃν ἡ τοιοῦτος ἦσται ὁ ἐξων αὐτὴν ὡστε τοῦ

§ 16. Ὁμοίως... Ἀρετῶν. The term λογικαὶ Ἀρεταί occurs nowhere else in Aristotle, and the διαθέσεις Ἀρεταί are not μεσοτήτες.

VIII. § 1. Τριῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The question of the nature of the ἀρετῆς between the three conditions is of cardinal importance to Aristotle. The extremes are opposite to each other and also to the means. We shall see that Speusippus made much of this and drew unwarrantable conclusions from it. It is necessary to guard against such arguments as that, since intemperance is a vice, insensibility must be a virtue.

διαθέσεως, not distinguishable from ἔξω. Cf. 1106 a, 6. n.

§ 2. ὠσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον κ.τ.λ., the stock illustration of this form of ἀρετῆς. Cf. 1153 b, 5.
ανάλησιςτος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέρος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελευθέρον ἂσωτός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀσωτόν ἀνελευθέρος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρείαν ὁ μὲν δειλός θρασύν ὁ δὲ θρασύς δειλὸν, καὶ 25 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἄλληλως τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντίως ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἡ πρὸς τὸ μέσον, πορροτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἄλληλοι ἡ τοῦ μέσου, ὡσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν 5 τοῦ μεγάλου ἡ ἀμφότερος τοῦ ἰσον. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸν μέσον 30 ἐνίοτε ἄκροις ὁμοιότητι τῆς φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἁρσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίατητα. τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἁρμονίατη 35 τὰ δὲ πλείον ἀντέχοντα ἀπ' ἄλληλον ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, οὕτω καὶ 6 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀντέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον

αὐτὸν πράγματος οὐ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν οὐ δὲ τὴν ἄλλημα, ἁνάγκη, ὡς ταύτ' ἄλληλος ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ. οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἄλληλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρέτῃ.

ΕΕ. 1234 a, 34 ἐστὶ δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἡ ἐκεῖνα ἄλληλοι, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' ὀδηγέρων γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετ' ἄλληλων, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐντὸς οἵ αὐτοὶ θρασύθεντα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀσωτὰ τὰ δὲ ἀνελευθέρα, καὶ ἄλλως ἀνωμαλοὶ κακῶς. όταν μὲν γὰρ καλὸς ἀνωμαλὸς ὁ σώματι, οἱ μέσοι γίγνονται: ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως τὰ ἄκρα.

ΕΕ. 1222 a, 22 συμβαίνει μάλις τοῖς ἀντιδίαις ἐνθα μὲν φανεροτρέπει εἶναι πάσας, ἐνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐναγοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλλημα. αὐτὸν δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ὡς οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ ταύτα (? τῆς ἀνυπότετρος ἡ ὁμοίωτητος) πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν θάντων ἄν γεματιέρα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην ἔχει, ὡς δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλημασι, ὡς. <ὅτι> πλοῦς ἀνεχεῖ οὕτω δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σώμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον τὴν ὑπερβολή τῆς ἄλλημας καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἢ ἄλλημα ὑπερβολής. ὡστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικὲς ζεῖσι αἱ ψυχογνωμαστικαὶ φιλοσοφίας.

§ 5. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is another peculiarity which has a great interest for Aristotle, and is worked out in detail with regard to each ἀρετή. It is evident that rashness is 'liker' courage than cowardice is. This again shows we are not dealing with mere quantity.

τὰ δὲ πλείστων κ.τ.λ. The full definition of ἐναντία is τὰ πλείστων ἄλληλων διαστήματα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (Cat. 6 a, 18).
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

1109 α ἀντικείται μᾶλλον ἐφ’ ἄν μὲν ἡ ἐξελευσις ἐφ’ ὅν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷς ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ βρασύτης ὑπερβολή ὑστα ἀλλ’ ἡ δειλία ἐξελευσις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναίθησις ἐνδεια οὐσα ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ-βολή οὐσα. διά δέ διὰ αἰτίας τούτου συμβαίνει, μάλιστ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἔτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τούτο ἀλλὰ τοινυντίων ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ βρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον ἀ γ’ ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν τῷ γὰρ ἀπέ-χοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντίωτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αἰτίη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἤμων αὐτῶν πρὸς ἡ γὰρ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ῥετομέν πως, ταύτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτῷ μᾶλλον 15 εὐφύκαμοι πρὸς τὰς ἴδιους, διὸ εὐκαταφροτεροί ἐσμεν.

μᾶλλον ἐσονται καθ’ ἑκατέραν τὴν ἄρεσιν, ἐνθα μὲν αἱ πολυποιότεραι, ἐνθα δ’ αἱ ὑποστατικότεραι, καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ μετρῷ καὶ τῷ ὡς δ’ ὁ λόγος ἐνθα μὲν αἱ ἁπάνω καὶ οὐκ ἀμφως, ἐνθα δὲ δ’ ἀπολαυστικοὶ καὶ οὐκ οἱ πενητικοὶ. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτο διότι ἡ φύσις εἶναι ὑπὸ πρὸς ἀπαντὰ ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκεν τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ’ ἦτον μὲν φυλάττον εἰςμέν, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταύτ’ ἔχει καὶ πέρι ψυχῆς. ἐναντίων δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἐξ οὗ ἐφ’ ἡν τῇ ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ’ ἡν οἱ πολλοὶ (ἡ δ’ ἐτέρα ὡστερ ὢν οὐσα λαυταίτε: διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἀναίθητον ἑστὶ, οἷον ὁργῇ πραιτήτε καὶ τοῖς ὀργίλοι τῷ πρόσφ. καίτοι ἄτιν ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ὅλῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλακτικόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεισθαι ραπτίζομεν. ἀλλ’ ὅλοι οἱ τοιούτοι, ἐπὶ εκείνοι δὲ πάντες ῥέοντοι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE. 1234 b, 6 αἰ ἐναντίωσενς ὑπὸ δοκοῦντος ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν καὶ ὑπερβολῆν ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἐξελευσις. αἰτία δὲ τὰ τρεῖς ῥηθέντα

§ 7. ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. This aria is generally given in some such short form as χειρῶν γάρ. So 1122 a, 14, (μεῖζων ἦτοι καίνων), 1125 a, 34 (χειρῶν ἡστα), 1126 b, 31 (ὁ χειλετοί χειρῶν), 1127 b, 32 (χειρῶν γάρ).

§ 8. ἐξ ἤμων αὐτῶν. This second aria is made use of 1122 a, 15 (μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἀμαρτάνουσιν), 1125 a, 34 (καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον), 1126 a, 30 (καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται: ἀνθρωπο-κατότερος γάρ), 1151 b, 30 (διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἐτέραν εἰς διάλογος ἐταίρησαν ψυχῆς).

ΧΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

πρὸς ἀκολογίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιμὸτητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλ-
λον ἑναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται,
καὶ διὰ τούτο ἡ ἀκολογία ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα ἑναντιοτέρα
ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

IΧ. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἡθικὴ μεσοτής, καὶ 20
πῶς, καὶ ὡς μεσοτής δύο κακίων, τῆς μὲν καὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τῆς
δὲ κατ' ἐλλείψιν, καὶ ὡς τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ
tοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τούς πάθεις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεισι, ἰκα-
νὼς εἰρήται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι: ἐν ἑκάστῃ
γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλων τὸ μέσον οὐ παν-
τὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅργισθήναι παν-
tός καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανήσαι-
tό δὲ ὄς καὶ ὄς καὶ ὄς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὄς, ὀυκέτα παν-
tός οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διότερ τὸ εὖ καὶ στάντων καὶ ἔπαιντων καὶ
καλὸν. διὸ δεῖ τῶν στοχασήμων τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν 30
ἀποχορεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἑναντίον, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψώ
παρανεῖ
tούτοις μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργε

νή.

ὁ, ὁλεγοῦν τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡγεῖς ἀναισθητῶν, καὶ ὡς ἐφ' ὁ
ἀμαρτανόμενος μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἑναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον,
ὅτι τὸ ὑμοιότερον ἦττον ἑναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονε τὸ θράσος
πρὸς τὸ βάρσος (2) καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἔλευθερότητα.

Β, 20. ΕΕ. 1222 b, 5 ἐτεὶ δ' ἐγνωρίσατε ἡ διάλογὴ τῶν ἐξεών
καθ' ἐκατα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλεῖψεις, καὶ τῶν ἑναντίων
ἐξεών, καθ' ἄξονα κατὰ τῶν ὁρθῶν λόγων (τὰς δ' ὁ ὁρθὸν λόγων, καὶ
πρῶς τίνα δεῖ ὅρων ἀποθέαται λέγει τὸ μέσον, ὡστερον ἐπισκεπτέον),
φανερὸν ὅτι πάσαι αἱ ἡθικαὶ ἁρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι περὶ ἱδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλεῖψεις εἰσὶ, καὶ ἱδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἑρμήνευν
ἐξεών καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται, ἀλλὰ μὲν ἡ γε βελτιώτητ ἐξεὶ ἂ
περὶ ἐκατα μέγῳ ἑστὶν. δηλοῦ τοῖνυν ὅτι αἱ ἁρεταὶ ἡ πάσαι ὑ τῶν πινὲς
ἐστοίν τῶν μεσοτήτων.

ἔπιθες, 'growth,' tr. 'in the
direction of our growth.'

IX. § 1. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. After
the recapitulation which, as usual,
breaks the argument, we have some
practical rules for attaining the mean.
This is a practical science.

§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Rule 1.

ἡ Καλυψώ. The words are really
said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some
1109 

10 δ' ἡ δείκτη, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀνατιθήμεν· τά γάρ ἀπέχουσα πλείου τοῦ μέσου ἐναντίωτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν 8 ὁμών αὐτῆς αὐτῆς, εἴ τινος τοῦ πράγματος, ἐτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἦμων αὐτῶν πρὸς ὧν ἀρτι ὁ μᾶλλον ἰσοτομεῖ πώς, ταύτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται· ὅπως ὁ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τάς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροι ἔσμεν

μᾶλλον ἦσσονται καθ' ἐκατέραν τήν ἄφεσιν, ἢ ὅταν μὲν αἱ πολυτούστεραι, ἢ ὅταν δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ μετρώ καὶ τῷ ὧν ὅ λόγος ἤθα μὲν ὁ ἀπόνοις καὶ ὁ ἄμφος, ἢ ὅταν δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός καὶ ὁ πενηθικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτῳ διότι ἡ φύσις εἴθερε οὐ πρὸς ἀπάντω ἰσομεῖ σφίστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἦτον μὲν φιλότονοι ἀστικοὶ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ἰσομεῖς δὲ ταύτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίων δὲ τίθεμεν τήν ἔχειν ἐξ' ἄφεν τῷ ἀραμτόνιμον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐξ' ἄτιν ὑπολογίζομεν (ἡ δ' ἐτέρα ὅστερον οὐκ οὕτως λαμβάνει· διὰ γάρ τὸ ὅλγον ἀνασφάλετο οὕτως), οἷον ὧργην προκύπτῃ καὶ τὸν ὀργῆν τῷ πρὸς· καὶ τοῦ ἄρα ὑπερβολή καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζοντας ἐρωτεύομεν. ἀλλ' ὅλγον οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἢ' ἐκεῖνο πέντε ῥέουσι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. ΕΕ 1234 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντίοτερεῖς οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἄκρους πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὀμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ κατε ἐλλείψει· αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ τέρτα ῥηθέντα

§ 7. ἢ αὐτὸν τοῦ πράγματος. This aitia is generally given in some such short form as χείρων γαρ. So 1122 a, 14 (μεῖζον ἢτοι κακῶν), 1125 a, 34 (χείρων ἢστιν), 1126 a, 31 (οἱ χειρεποὶ χείρων), 1127 b, 32 (χείρων γαρ).

§ 8. ἢ ἦμαν αὐτῶν. This second aitia is made use of 1122 a, 15 (μᾶλλον ἢτοι τῶν ἀραμτόνιμον), 1125 a, 34 (καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον), 1126 a, 30 (καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωποκτόνων γαρ), 1151 b, 30 (διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὅλγισι εἶναι φαρέαρα).
πρὸς ἀκολογίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιμότητα. ταῦτ’ οὖν μᾶλ-
λον ἕναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἢ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται,
καὶ διὰ τούτο ἡ ἀκολογία ύπερβολὴ οὔσα ἕναντιωτέρα
ιστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

IX. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ἁρετὴ ἢ ἡθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ τοῖς,
καὶ ὃτι μεσότης δύο κακίων, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ύπερβολὴν τῆς
δὲ κατ’ ἐλλειψιν, καὶ ὃτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοιχαστικὴ
tοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκα-
νός ἐρῆμαται. διό καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ στοιχασαιν εἶναι: ἐν ἐκάστῳ
γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντ-
τὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὔτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παν-
tὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργόριον καὶ διδανθῆσαι:
τὸ δ’ ὃ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὃτε καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παν-
tῶς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον; διόπερ τὸ εὐ καὶ στάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ
καλὸν. διὸ δὲ τὸν στοιχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν 30
ἀποχρεῖται τοῦ μᾶλλον ἕναντίον, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψώ
παραινεῖ
τοῦτον μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργει

νῦ.

διὸ, ὁλγόντος τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἠδα ἀνασθήτων, καὶ ὃτι ἐφ’ ὁ
ἀμφότερον μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ: τὸ δὲ τρίτον,
ὅτι τὸ ὀμοίωτερον ἦττον ἑναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον τέτοιον τὸ βράσος
πρὸς τὸ θάρσος (?) καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἐλευθεροτήτα.

α, 20. ΕΕ. 1222 b, 5 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐλλιπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἔξων
καὶ ἐκείνα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αὐτὶ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἑναντίων
ἔξων, καθ’ ἃ ἔχουσιν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ’ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ
πρὸς τόν δεῖ ὅτε ὀρθὴν ἀποβλέπωμα λέγει τὸ μέσον, ὡστερον ἐπισκεπτοῦν),
φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἡθικαὶ ἁρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι περὶ ὑδῶν καὶ λυπῶν
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ἐστί, καὶ ἡθων καὶ λυποῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔρημων
ἔξων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται, ἀλλά μὴ ἡ γε βελτιώτη ἔξις ἢ περὶ
ἐκεῖνα μάς ἕστιν. ὁμοιοί τοῖς ὅτι αἱ ἁρεταὶ ἡ πάσα ἡ τούτων τινὲς
ἀσέσται τῶν μεσοτήτων.

ἐπίδοσις, ‘growth’, tr. ‘in the
direction of our growth.’
IX. § 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Αφτ
the recapitulation which, as usual,
breaks the argument, we have some
practical rules for attaining the mean.
This is a practical science.
§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Rule I.
ἡ Καλυψώ. The words are really
said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some
BOOK III.

THE WILL—COURAGE, TEMPERANCE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our deliberative analysis of Happiness has shown us that it mainly depends upon goodness of character, and we have seen that goodness of character is produced by habituation. We had to ask in the next place what quality our acts must have if their repetition is to produce goodness of character, and we found that acts which are to produce goodness must be of the same quality as the acts which proceed from goodness when it is formed. This made it necessary for us to define goodness, that is, to ascertain its "formal cause," and now that this is done, the next step will clearly be to discuss its "efficient cause."

It cannot be said that this connexion of thought is explicitly marked by Aristotle himself, and the commentators have generally failed to see it. But we must always remember that the reasons given by Aristotle for undertaking any inquiry are not necessarily or even usually the real motives of that inquiry. It is characteristic of him (1) to keep the metaphysical groundwork of his practical science in the background as much as possible, and (2) to enumerate all the incidental advantages, especially those of a practical character, that are likely to follow from the discussion. We shall have occasion to notice this peculiarity more than once in the sequel.

§ 2. In the first place, then, it is clear that a good act must be voluntary. An act of which we can truly say "I couldn't help it" is neither a sign of character nor productive of it. We must first of all, then, determine the limits of the voluntary. This was a question much discussed in the Athenian courts, especially in
connexion with charges of homicide. Homicide was primarily a religious offence since it carried with it religious impurity or blood-guiltiness, and therefore every form of it, from the accidental or involuntary up to deliberate murder, came under the cognisance of the courts. The speeches of Antiphon are specially instructive with regard to the moral consciousness of the Athenian dikast on this subject, and it is from this, in accordance with his usual method, that Aristotle starts. For us the chief interest of the discussion lies in his anticipation of some of the most important distinctions of Roman and later law. This goes far to justify his claim to be regarded as a teacher of lawgivers. It would have been well for Athens if law had been administered consistently on principles such as those here laid down.

§ 3. It is clear, however, that to call an act voluntary is merely a negative description of it. The acts of children and the lower animals may be voluntary in the sense that they are not done under compulsion or from ignorance; but they are not acts in the full sense of the word at all, and are therefore no sign of character. To be this an act must be willed, that is it must be “intended” or deliberately adopted as a means to some end which forms the object of a wish. This distinction too was already recognised by the Athenian law of homicide, which distinguished φόνος ἤ προνοια from ordinary homicide even of the voluntary kind. What we want, then, as the efficient cause of action is something related to acts in general as what lawyers call “malice” is related to wrong-doing. This Aristotle calls by the name προσέπως, a word which was much used in his own day to express the deliberate adoption of any course of conduct or line of action.

By a piece of dialectical argument we are led to see that Will—for this is after all the best rendering of the word—is neither a purely intellectual nor a purely appetitive function. It is the union of an intellectual element, Deliberation, with an appetitive element, Wish. Further, as we only deliberate about things “in our power,” we may say that it is a “deliberative appetition of things in our power.”

§ 4. We have come at last in our deliberation to something in our power (ἐφ’ ἡμῶν), and so our practical analysis of a good act is complete. The only doubt which can arise as to the question whether an act of will is in our power or not is with regard to
the object of Wish. Is it in our power to wish for the good? Aristotle answers this question in the affirmative, though with an important qualification. It is character that determines the object of wish, and character is produced by activities which are willed and therefore voluntary. We have, therefore, the formation of character in our own hands, though it is true that when the character is once formed we may not be able to change it.

The efficient cause of action, then, is Will. In willing man is an efficient cause just as he is the efficient cause of his children (ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπων γεννᾷ). To produce Happiness we have only to reverse the order of the series which our deliberative analysis has revealed; though, as our aim is to produce it for the State, that is, for others, we have not yet fully solved the problem with which we started.

§ 5. Now that we know what goodness of character is, the next step will be to go through all its recognised forms and show that our account holds good of each. If we are right we must be able to show that every kind of goodness has as its matter some feeling or act which admits of quantitative determination, that it has as its form a "mean" or proportion in the sense explained, and that its efficient cause is a deliberative wish or will.

So far as we can trace any principle in Aristotle's treatment of the various forms of goodness, he seems to proceed from the more self-regarding virtues to those which have to do with others. This can be the only reason for separating justice from its usual companions Courage and Temperance. The reason given for taking the two latter first is purely "exoteric." They are, we are told, the forms of goodness proper to the "irrational parts," i.e. Temper and Desire, a purely Academic "division."

We notice at once in the treatment of Courage and Temperance a striking difference between Aristotle and Plato. Plato always tries to extend the scope of these virtues as widely as he can, while Aristotle's chief endeavour is to narrow them down to their most literal meaning. Partly, no doubt, this may be attributed to a difference of temperament between the two thinkers, but it is primarily due to the different objects each was aiming at. Plato was seeking for principles of universal application to life, Aristotle is looking for facts by which to test his theory of goodness, and it was important for that purpose to have facts as definite and unmistakeable as possible.
Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὕσης, καὶ 30 ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκούσιοις ἑπαίνου καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ ἐλέους, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἵσως διορίσεται τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.

3 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βλα. ἤ δὲ ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα: 1110α βλαβον δὲ οὐ ἢ ἀρχή ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτῃ οὕσα ἐν ἢ μηδὲν συμ-

1109 b, 30. EE. 1223 a, 9 ἐπεὶ δ' ἦ τε ἀρετῆ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἑπαίνετα τὰ δὲ ψεκτὰ (ψήγεται γὰρ καὶ ἑπαίνεται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ' ὅσον αὐτὸι αὑτοὶ ἐσμέν· ὅσον γὰρ ἄλλοις αὑτοῖς, ἐκεῖνοι καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἑπαίνον ἔχει), δὴλον δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ τὰς ἐντὸς ἀν αὐτοὺς αὑτοῦ καὶ ἀρχῆ πράξεων. λῃτστον ἥρα ποιῶν αὐτὸς αὑτος καὶ ἀρχῆ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ διαλογοῦμεν, ὡς μὲν ἐκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκαστῆς, ἐκεῖνοι αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὡς δ' ἀκούσια, σὸν αὐτον αὐτον. πάντα δ' ὡς προελάμβανε, καὶ ἐκὼν δὴλον ὡς. δὴλον τοῖνος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐκούσιων ἄν εἶπαν.

1110 a, 1. EE. 1224 a, 10 τὸ τε γὰρ βλαβον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ
άκουσιν τῶν βιασών εἶναι φαμεν. ὅστε περὶ τοῦ βίας σκετέτων πρῶτον τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκκύοσιν καὶ ἀκουσιν. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βιασόν καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖται, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἐκκύοσι καὶ τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βιασόν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφόσιων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἀνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κατὰ βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμεν, ταῦτα δ’ ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ αὐτὰ ὁρμὰν φησίται, οὐ βία, οὐ μὴν οὖθ᾽ ἐκκύοσι λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ἀνυπόκοιος ἡ ἀνάληψις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βία φαμεν. ὅμως δὲ ἐπὶ ἐφόσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκφεύγων ὅρμαν βία πολλά καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ τοιοῦτα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμήν ἐξωθὲν τι κυβ. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀφόσιως ἀπλῆ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐφόσισι πλούσιες· οὐ γὰρ ἀλεί ἡ ὀρέξεις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὅστ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐκφεύγων ἀπλοῦν τὸ βιασόν, ὅστερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφόσιων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὀρέξεις ἐναντίες, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ἑκ’). ἐν δ’ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐναντίον ἄμφος, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοί, ἡ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν. οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ παιδῶν πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρῖον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄγιο διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βιασόν ἄπαν λυπηρόν εῖναι, καὶ ἀδείας βία μὲν ποιεῖ χαιρῶν δὲ. διὸ περὶ τῶν ἐγκατηγορήσεων καὶ τῶν ἀκρατών πλεῖστοι ἀμφισβήτησιν ἐστίν· ἐναντίας ἡμῖν ἄρματα ἔχοντας ἀκύστος αὐτῶν πράττειν, ὅστ’ ὁ τ’ ἐγκατηγορήσεως βία, φασιν, ἀφέλεις αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ἴδιων ἐπιθυμίων (ἀλλει γὰρ ἀφέλεως ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν πρὸς ἀντιστείνωσαν τὴν ὀρέξεις), ὁ τ’ ἀκρατής βία παρὰ τῶν λογισμῶν. ἦτον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἴδιου, ἡ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρειν, ὅστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἔκων καὶ οὐ βία, ὡστε οὐ λυπηρῶν. ἡ δὲ πειθὼ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιστέκειται. ὁ δ’ ἐγκατηγορήσεως ἐφ’ ἄτεύσεσθαι ἐγεί, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βία ἀλλ’ ἔκων. ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία

tive cause is to limit compulsion as a condition of the involuntary to actual vis maior. Where the agent contributes to the cause, the case is more complicated. The contribution may be of two kinds, either fear of greater evils (meius, 'duress per minus') or hope of greater goods, as in the case of the man who does a wrong thing to save his parents or children. Are these voluntary agents?

η ὁ πάσχον. This is added as a sort of correction. It is really a πάθος, not a πάθος.

§ 4. ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει, 'admits of dispute.'
τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν ὅπερ οὖνεις ἀποβάλλεται ἔκων, ἐπὶ σωτηρία δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δὲν λοιπῶν ἄπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μεκταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσίν

Ἄ τείςεσα ἰγνώσθη, οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μάς βία καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμπετείτησαν τῶν βίων, καὶ ήν καὶ ἐτί τῶν ἄφοιχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ αἰ τις προσφύγη τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, καθ’ ἀυτὸ ἐπηθή τοῦ λειψάνου ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τι τῶν ἐξωθηθήναι παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄμην κινήσῃ ἣν ἔφη, βία φακέως, ὅταν δὲ μὴν, οὐ βία. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ ἡ καὶ αὐτῶν ὀμήν ἐνὶσχύει ἰγνώσθη—ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐχθρικοὶ· ὅτι οὐ βία ἀδελφοί ἐλκεν ἐκοῦν διά γε ταῦτα πράττοντες ἐν, οὐδ’ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. τὴν γὰρ ἐξωθήνῃς ἄρρενα, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὄμην ἢ ἐμποδίζουσαν καὶ κακοῦσαν, ἁπάντῃ λέγομεν, ὡσπερ εἰ τὰ λαβᾷ τὴν χειρὰ τύπου τῶν ἄπιστῶν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιστήμων· ὅταν δ’ ἐσωθῇ ἡ ἀρρενὴ, οὐ βία. ἔτει καὶ Ἰσομηνή καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἐνεμετασκεπάσθη. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεραυνόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην πρότατον ἡγησία, καὶ χωρὶς τὴν ἄντ’ ἐλπίδος ἠδονήν, ὅτι ὑπάρχον ὑφελήθησται, ἢ καὶ ἡ ἡγησία ὑφελήθη ἐνεκάτων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής χαρίζει μὲν πυρράχινοι ἐκεραυνόμενοι ὁ ἐπιστήμων, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἄντ’ ἐλπίδος λύπην, ὡστε γὰρ κακῶν ἀπαντῆσιν· ὅταν τὸ μὲν βία ἀκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὁρείν ἀπὸ καὶ διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν ἀκάτερον ἀκοῦστα ποτε ἀπαντῆσιν· κεχαρισμένα γὰρ οὐκ ἐκατέρω ἀκροβάτησαι ἐν ἀλλήλων. ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὁλην μεταφέροντες ψυχή, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῆς τοῦτον ὀρόσων. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνεδέστη τοῦτο λέγειν· ἢ δ’ ὁ ἐνδεστάτης ψυχή καὶ τὸ ἀκρατοῦς τοῖς ἐκεραυνοῦσι πράττει, βία δ’ ἀδελφῖν ἀλλα γὰρ ἐν ἐκάνως τι, ἐπὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφοτέρα ἐξερεύνη. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φθονοῦ ἐπάρχει, ὅτι ἐνωμένη τῆς γενεσίας καὶ μη προσβαίνεις ἐνεμετασκεπάσθη, ἦν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὅτι ἐφεύρει ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἐνέστην. σχεδον δὲ τούτοις δυσκόλους διαρριζόμενοι, τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεστάτοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶς, καὶ ὅταν ἐνωμένης τῆς γενεσίας εὐθυγραμμοῖ γένεται ὢν, οὖν πολλὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τάλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἀφετέρως καὶ τῶν ἀκάτερος πράττει, ἀπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκάτερος, οὐ τὴν ἀυτὴν.

§ 5. ἐκβολᾶς, merarium iacturarium. In a contract quoted by Demosthenes against Lakritos § 11, we have the reservation πλὴν ἐκβολῆς ἐν ἀλλαξεις ψυχήν καὶ ἐκβάλλεισαν. ἀπλῶς is to be taken closely with ἀποβάλλεται ἔκων. 'No one, except in special circumstances, voluntarily sacrifices his property.' The word ἀπλῶς merely marks the absence of qualifying circumstances, such as are indicated in the clause ἐν τῇ σωτηρίᾳ κ.τ.λ.

§ 6. μικταὶ, because the efficient
αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἑοῖκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκοῦσίοις· αἰρεταὶ γὰρ ἕστι τότε ὅτε πράπτονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστὶν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε ἑν πράπτει λεκτέον. πράπτει δὲ ἐκῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἄρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖ τὰ ἀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεισ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν· ἐν δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἄρχῃ, ἐπὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μὴ, ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἑσάς ἀκούσια· οὐδὲς γὰρ ἐν ὅλοις καθ' αὐτό τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ 20 ταῖς πράξεις δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνιότερ καὶ ἐπανούνται, ὡσιν ἄσχοροι τὶ τῇ λυπηρῷ ὑπομένωσιν αὐτὶ μεγάλων καὶ κα- λῶν, ἃν δ' ἀνάσταλων, σφέγονται· τὰ γὰρ ἀσχολεῖ ὑπομεί-

1110 a, 11. EE. 1225 a, 2 λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἄλλαν τρόπων βιά
καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πράξει, οὗ διαφωνοῦσιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ἀρέτεως,
ὅταν πράπτωσιν ἢ καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ φαύλων ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ
μὴ τούτων πράπτωσιν, πληγαί ἢ δεσμοί ἢ θάνατοι ὁσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ
φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πράξει· ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἐκάκως τοιούτων
αὐτῷ τούτῳ; ἔκειν γὰρ μὴ πιστῶν ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνῳ ὑπομέναι τὸ πάθος
ἐν ἑσας τούτων τὰ μὲν φαῖν τις ἃν τὰ δ' οὐ. ὡσιν μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῇ
τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, δεὶ ὡσιν πράττει δὲ μὴ βουλέται,
HÔIKA NIKOMAHEIA

In this case the but involuntary; for the attribution is at a minimum.
the weakness inseparable an nature.
via $\delta$ ierws k.t.l. Still, this case, the act is not voluntary; for there is no compulsion, and the act may that the most painful death and will, therefore, be voluntarily.

πρωτίδον Ἀλκμάωνα. The holiast quotes the lines—
κεν μὲν υπ' ἐπίθετου παρακήφαλος

$\delta^\prime$ ἀρματ' εὐθαικεῖν εἰς Θῆβαι ἰδων
Alkmene killed his mother Eriphyle to escape the curse of his father Amphiaras. The lines quoted below 1136 a, 13 on the same subject probably come from the ‘Alkmone’ too. See note in loc.

§ 9. ἦστι δὲ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ. The fact of the difficulty and of the consequent praise or blame proves the acts voluntary.

§ 10. τά δὲ ποία κ.τ.λ. This is a recapitulation rather than a duplicate passage.

8—2
μὲν, ὅτι δὲν ἦν αὐτία ἐν τοῖς ἑκτὸς ἦ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται; ὁ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἦστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δὲ λέγεται, καὶ ἦ ἀρχή ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, 5 καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἦστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δὲ λέγεται, καὶ ἦ ἀρχή ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἦστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δὲ λέγεται, καὶ ἦ ἀρχή ἐν τῷ πράττοντι.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἐσκεφτεὶς ἐκούσιοι· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστά, ταύτα δὲ ἐκούσιαι. πολλαὶ δὲ αὐτὶ ποιῶν αἰρέτειν, οὐκ ἔστω ἐποδηναί, πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφυγαί εἰσίν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστά. εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίνει βιαία 11 10 εἶναι (ἀναγκαζόμεν ἡγεῖες ἔσχον ὤντα), πάντα ἂν εἶναι ὦντοι βιαίαι· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττονται. καὶ μὲν βία καὶ ἀκούεις λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοίοι δὲ τὸ αἰτιάσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ἢρτο τῶν τοιοῦτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν 15 καλῶν ἑαυτῶν, τῶν δὲ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔσκεφτε δὴ τὸ βι-12

ινα μὴ Ἰρέμια, καὶ ὄλως Ἰνα μὴ ἄλλος ἦ Ἰνα [μὴ] χαίρει. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ, εἰς δ' ἀνάγονται δόλον, τούτῳ ἢστον δ' ἦ αὐτοῦ φόβοι ὦν τε φέρειν· δ' δὲ μὴ ὦν τε, μὴδ' ἢστο τῆς ἔκεινος φύσει ὄρθευσις ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἐνθουσιῶν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἔτοιμων τε, καὶ πρὸ ἔτοιμων, καὶ πρὸ ἔτοιμων τε. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· ὡστε καὶ διὰνοιαὶ τυχεῖ καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἕμαν εἰσίν, ἡ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαῦτας διανοιαῖς καὶ λογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡστ' ἐπιθυμίας ἐφ' ἕμαν τινας λόγους κρείττους ἕμας.

νῦν is equivalent to ὅτα πρᾶττει above and opposed to ἀνάλοι, ἄντι τῶν ὀντὼν is opposed to καθ' αὐτᾶ.

ὅ γάρ πρᾶξει κ.τ.λ. This is fundamental. There is no such thing as an act which is not this particular act in these particular circumstances. It is, therefore, a false way of speaking to say that a certain class of acts is involuntary. An act performed is always this act. Hence too the difficulty; for there can be no scientific rules about particulars.

§ 11. εἰ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ. A caution against an error which language is apt to lead us into. The truth is that it is not τὰ καλὰ or τὰ ἡδέα which are the motive or efficient cause of our acts, but our own ὁρείς, which is an internal, not an external, ἀρχή.

καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν κ.τ.λ. This distinction in our attitude towards τὰ καλὰ and τὰ ἡδέα has not been mentioned above, but the want of logical connexion is merely formal. Aristotle is dealing with real life, and we know that it is only bad acts of which men try to shake off the responsibility in this way. No one ever declines to be responsible for a fine act on the ground that it was so fine he couldn't help doing it.
αινι ειναι ου ἐξωθεν ἢ ἀρχη, μηδεν συμβαλλομένου του βιασθέντος.

13 Το δε δε ἄγνωιν οιχ ἐκούσιν μεν ἄπαν ἑστιν, ἀκούσιν δε το ἐπίλυσιν και εν μεταμελεια; ο γαρ δε ἄγνωιαν πράξεων ὑπούν, μηδεν τε δυσχεραίων ἐπι τη πράξει, ἐκων 20 μεν ου πέπραξεν, δε γε μη ἤδει, ουδε αθ ἄκων, μη δυσποι-μενος γε. του δη δε ἄγνωιν ο μεν εν μεταμελειᾳ ἄκων δοκει, ὁ δε μη μεταμελείμενος, ἐπει ἐτερον, ἐστιν οιχ ἡκων.

14 ἐπει γαρ διαφέρει, βελτιων ὅνμα ἐχειν ἵδιον. ἐτερον δη ἐσκε και το δε ἄγνωιαν πράττειν το ἀγνοούντα; ο γαρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζώμενος ου δοκει δε ἄγνωιαν πράττειν ἀλλα διὰ τον εἰρημένων, ουκ εἰδως δε ἀλλαι ἄγνωσιν. ἄγνως μεν ουν πας ὁ μοχθηρος δε δει πράττειν και διὰ την τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν αδικου και διὸς κακοι γινονται; το δε ἀκούσιον βουλεται λέγεσθαι ουκ ει τις 30 ἄγνως τα συμφέροντα; ο γαρ ἢ ἐν τη προαιρεσει ἄγνως αιτια του ἀκούσιον ἀλλα της μοχθηριας, ουδε η καθολου

1110 b. 18. EE. 1225 a. 36 ἐπει δε τουτον ἐχει τελος, και ουτε τη δρεξει ουτε τη προαιρεσει το ἐκούσιον ὀρωσαι, λοιπον δη ὄρισασθαι το κατα την διανοιαν. δοκει δη ἑταιριον ειναι το ἐκούσιον την ἀκούσιον.

§ 13. Το δε δε ἄγνωιαν κ.τ.λ. We now pass to Ignorance, the second condition of the Involuntary, and consider the limits of its application. ἐ γαρ δε ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. If he is not sorry for the act, he makes it his own by his acquiescence in it. Cf. the plea in Antiphon, Τετρ. B. 8 αυτημένων μεν ουδε σωθελών των, συναλγοντων δε και συλλυπο-μενων.

τοῦ δη...ο μεν...ο δε... For the construction cf. 1117 a. 7.

οιχ ἐκων, 'non-voluntary' as opposed to 'involuntary.' The contradictory is substituted for the contrary. § 14. ἐτερον δη ἐσκει κ.τ.λ. To be involuntary the act must be performed not merely in ignorance but from ignorance. ἄγνως μεν ουν κ.τ.λ. This is not the case of the ἀκρατῆς who knows the right and does the wrong, but that of the ἀδελαστος to whom wrong is right. § 15. βουλεται λέγεσθαι, 'really means.' ἢ εν τη προαιρεσει ἄγνωι...οιδε η καθολου. Grant and Stewart seem right in refusing to draw a distinction between these two in the present passage. Ignorance shown in the deliberate preference of bad acts to good, and ignorance of the universal rules of conduct, come to the same thing, ignorance of the major premise of the practical syllogism. Προαιρεσει has nothing to do with the minor premis as such.
(ψέγουται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἄλλα ἡ καθ' ἐκαστα, ἐν 1111 αἷς καὶ περὶ ἐ ἡ πράξεις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἐλέος καὶ συγγεραφία· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνώσις ἀκούσιας πράττειν ἑσώς οὖν οὐ οὐχ ἐν οὖν δειον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστὶ, τίνα· τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνότε δὲ καὶ 5 τίνι, οὖν ὁρμάνω, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οὐν ὁρμάνως, καὶ τὶς, οὖν ἤγεμα ἂν σφόδρα. ἀπαντά μὲν οὖν ταύτα ὁδεῖς ἂν ἄγνοησις μὴ μακρομενός, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὖν τὸν πράττοντα πῶς γὰρ ἐαυτὸν γε· ο δὲ πράττει ἄγνοησεν ἀν τις, οὖν ἑλεγοντές φασιν ἑκπεσεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἃ ὅσκ εἴδεις διε ὁπορ-

καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ δι' ἢ ἢ ἢ ὁ ἢ ἑνεκα (ἐνότατο γὰρ οὖν μὲν ὅτι πατὴρ, ἀλλ' ὁ γὰρ ἢ ἡ αὐτοτρίτον, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡ σῶστρα, ὥσπερ εἰ Πελεάδες, ἦνοι ὁς τοῖς μεν πάμα, ἀλλ' ὡς πέπλοντο καὶ οὖν τοῦ δ' ἢν κόμητον τῷ ἄγνοισιν καὶ ὡς καὶ ἢ ἢ ὡς ἄγνοιαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοῦ δὲ δ' ἄγνωσιν, καὶ δ' καὶ ἢ δι' ἢν, ἀκούσιον τὸν ἑνεκα ἐκούσιον. οὐσία μὲν οὖν ὕπ' ἢντι ὑπ' ἢν πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἄγνοιαν καὶ δι' ἢντι, ἐκδιομεν τοῦτο ἢντι· οὐσία δ' ἄγνωσιν, καὶ δι' τὸ ἄγνοιαν, ἢντι. ἢπε τὸ ἐπιστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδότα διητον, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἢξευν, ἐν δε τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, δ' ἢξευν μὴ χρώμενοι δε ἐστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως <ἀν> ἄγνωσι λέγοισθε, ἢπε τὸ ἢς ὡς ὡς δικαίως, ὡς εἰ δ' ἢμελείας μὴ ἢξορσί. ὑμοίοι δὲ καὶ μὴ ἢξευν τις ψέγοιτο ἃν, ὃ δ' ἡμιόν ἢ ἢμελείας ἢ ἡμέλειας ἢ ἡμέλειας ἢ ἡμέλειας ἢ ἡμέλειας τουτ' ὅποιον προσδιορισμιν.
The verb ἐκπίπτειν is sub-attested in this sense, though mon, and is doubtless a word from the chariot-race (ἐκπίπτειν, λύον). A clear is Lucian, Nigrinos § 77 γιγάντες καὶ Μηδέρα κατεληπτήν ἐν ἑλικάκη κατερρηχόμενον, φθείρεσθαι βουλόμενος ἔγειρε καὶ ἀνεκπόθηκε, καὶ ἂν λεπτε καὶ ἡ γλώττα δεμάρχης just the condition in nan ἔγειρε τε πράττει. This attestation, though it has been 10 old; for Heliodorus has γὰρ πεπί άλλων συγχυθάντω διατελεῖ τε καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστήριων ἔσωθα, and Camerarius renesse ēripit se. There is no for ἐκπίπτειν c. acc. in the old by the common version it escaped them unawares τε which was speaking: (reading and 'έπει). Ἁλεχύλος. This is the reference to the accusation of i for revealing the mysteries. He tells us that Herakleides of the details in Book 1 of Ὀμῆρον. The indiscretions of were in the Τοξοτίδες, Ἀποκρίτης, Ἀττυκεία καὶ Ὀλίγιον βουλόμενος κ.τ.λ. This is to some rhetorical exercise ἐκπίπτειν in the style of Ἀτταμαλλος. δ' ἐν τε κ.τ.λ. Ignorance δ' ἐν τε κ.τ.λ. Ignorance (ἐν τίνι ἡ πράξει). For ἀγώνα of the person as a πρόφασις of συγγραφή, cf. Dem. Meid. § 38.

ὁσπέρ ἡ Μερότη. Cf. Pocct. 1454 a, 5 ἐν τῷ Κρεσσόντου ἡ Μερότη μέλλει τῶν ὦν ἀποκτείναν τε καὶ ἀποκτείναν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἂν ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων. ἐσφαίρασθα...κάμηλον εἶναι. Ignorance of the instrument (τίνος). Xenophon (Eq. vili, 10) speaks of ἀκόνια ἐσφαίρασιν. ἐπὶ συνήθει τίς. We see from a, 5 above that this is the explanation of what is there called ignorance of the ὄν ἐνεκα. For the reading here see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. In MM. 1188 b, 31 a similar illustration is given—οἷον φασὶ ποτέ τῦν γυναῖκα φιλτρον τοῦ δούναι πεινεῖ, εἶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀποκαλῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλτρον, τῆς ἄνθρωπον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποτελεῖν κ.τ.λ. There is a case just like this in Antiphon Καταργεῖα φαρμακεία κατά τῆς μνημοσίας. Cf. § 9 ὅπερ ἐπὶ βαθμῷ φάσκοντα διδώθηκέναι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ φιλτρόν. See also EE. 1325 b, 4 quoted on p. 118.

βιβλία βουλόμενα. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. The word means 'just to touch' and is appropriate in connexion with 'sparring.' The mistake here is ignorance of the manner (τῶν). The man thinks he is touching ἥρμα, whereas he really strikes σφάδα.

§ 18. ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξει. I bracket these words with Ramsauer. They are awkward here and occur in their proper place two lines below, where the phrase means, as it ought to do,
'Οστός δ' ἀκούσθην τοῦ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγνοιαι, τὸ ἐκούσθην τὸ βία καὶ δ' ἄγ

the object of the act. It is true, indeed, that in § 20 it seems to be used in a wider sense to include all the particular circumstances of the act other than the agent, but this will hardly justify its use in two meanings within the limits of the same sentence.

§ 21. Ἰσον γάρ κ.τ.λ. The reference is to Plato’s Laws 863 b, sqq. where the discussion of τὸ ἐκόσιον καὶ ἀκούσθην starts from the enumeration of three αἰτία τῶν διαμεταμέρων, viz. θυμός, ἴδινη and ἀγνώ.

§ 23. Ἰσον γάρ κ.τ.λ. There are certain acts proceeding from temper or desire which ought to be performed, and for the performance of which we are praised. It is absurd to say that such acts are involuntary; for there is no sense in saying that it is right to perform an involuntary act. Are we, then, to adopt the convenient doctrine that only the bad acts which proceed from temper and desire are involuntary while the good acts are voluntary? On what principle can we
καὶ θυμὸν, ἂ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἄκου-
24 σίως; ἂ γελοῖον ἕνως γε αἰτίου δυντὸς; ἀτοπόν δὲ ἵσως τὸ ἀκούσια φαίναι ὅν δεὶ ὀργεῖσθαι· δεὶ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι 30 ἐπὶ τι αυτὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινων, οἷον ὑμεῖας καὶ μαθησιώς.
25 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμ-
26 μέμαν ἡδέα. ἐτὶ δὲ τὶ διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ

ἀλλήλων. ἐτὶ ἡ μοιχητρία αδικατορίων πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία μοιχητρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅ δ' ἀκρατής δ' κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖν ἐκοινών, ὡσ' ὅ ἀκρατής αὐτής καὶ ἐπιθυμιᾶν· ἐκώλ ἁρὰ πράξει, καὶ ἐκοινώνω τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαιν· καὶ χάρα ἀτοπον εἰ δικαιότερον ἐστὶν ἀκρατεῖς γενόμενοι. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειν ἂν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαιν ἐστὶν εἶναι, ἕκ δὲ τόνδε τούτων νομίζων. ἀπὸν γὰρ δ' ἐκὼ τε πράττειν, οὐκόμοις πράττει, καὶ δ' βούλεται καὶ ἐκὼν. Βούλεται δ' οθὲς δ' ὅπεται εἶναι κακὸν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δ' ἀκρατεῖος σοὶ ἡ βούλειται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρὰ δ' ὅπεται βελτίστον εἶναι πράττειν δ' ἐπιθυμίαιν ἀκρατεῖον ἐστὶν. ὡστε ἀμα συμβῆσαι τὸν αὐτόν ἐκόντα καὶ ἂκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτὸ δ' ἀδύνατον. ἐτί δ' ἡ ἐγκράτησις δικαιοπραγηθεῖ· καὶ κάλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἡ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρέτη, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράσινον τὰ πράσινα ἐπιθυμίαιν κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν. ὡστ' εἰ τὸ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐκοινών, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (ἀμφὸ ἐπὶ ἔκατο τὸ ἀκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἄλλων ἐπὶ ἐκοινών, καὶ ἄλλων), τὸ δ' παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαιν ἀκούσιαι, ἀμα ἀμα ὄ ἀπὸ τὸ αὐτό πράσει ἐκὼν καὶ ἀκον.

δ' αὐτὸς λόγοι καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ θυμὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις. καὶ τὰ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν λυπηρὸν, καὶ βίαιον ἡ κάθεσις, ὡστ' εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκκοινών ἂν εἶν τὸν. ὅσκε δὲ καὶ Πρακτήν καὶ λέγει εἰς τὴν ἱσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέπεις ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἡ κάθεσις αὐτοῦ. "χελετοῦν γὰρ," φησι, "θυμὸν μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὀνείρεσθαι." εἰ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἂκοντα πράττειν ἀμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος,
λογισμόν ἡ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; 
φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, 

1111 b dokei δὲ οὖν ἦτον ἀνθρωπικά εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα [πάθη], ὡστε ἐκκαι αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, <αι> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἀτοπον δὲ τὸ τεθέναι ἄκουσία ταῦτα.

II. Διαφυσιμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, 5 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἐπεται διελθεῖν οἰκείοτατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκει τῇ ἁρτῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἡθο κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἂ προαιρέσεις δὲ ἐκουσίων μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δε, ἀλλ' μᾶλλον ἐκουσίων τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν. τεκμήριον δὲ πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἐκώντες ἀνευ ὁργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

λείπεται ἀρα εἰ το βουλόμενον καὶ ἐκουσίον ταύτῳ σκέψασθαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τούτῳ αὐθάνατον. ὑπόκειται γὰρ θυμὸν καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ μοχθερία αὐθάνατος τοκίων, ἡ δ' ἀκραία μοχθερία τις φαίνεται συμβηγόν τοι τοῦ ναυτίου, βουλεῖται μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς δὲ οὕτως εἰς κακά, πράττει δὲ όταν γίνεται ἁρκατή. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐκουσίων, τὸ δ' ἐκουσίον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, όταν ἁκραίη γένηται, οὐδετέρα ἀδίκησε, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν δικαίωτερος ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἁκρατής. τούτῳ δ' αὐθάνατον.

1111 b, 4. EE. 1225 b, 18 περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, διαπορίζομεν πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.

ΕΕ. 1228 a, 11 ἐτὶ πάντα ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαιρέσειν βλέπομεν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα — καίτοι αἰρετύτερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἁρτῆς — ὡστε πράττομεν μόνον φαύλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδείς. ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἰδίᾳ τὴν προαιρέσειν ὁποία τις, διὰ ταύτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποιὸν τις. αἰρετύτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινοῦτερον δ' ἡ προαιρέσεις. ἐκ τῶν κείμενον οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμολογείται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

§ 27. ἀνθρωπικός is used, like the Latin humanus, with special reference to the weaknesses of mere human nature.

τὰ ἄλογα, i.e. τὰ μὴ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα. The word πάθη is omitted by the first hand of the best ms. (K²), and is better away. If we retain it, we must assume that ῥυμός and ἐπιθυμία are called ἄλογα πάθη in a loose popular way. Really, they are forms of ὀρέξεως.

Π. § 1. περὶ προαιρέσεως. See Introductory note.

μᾶλλον...κρίνειν, ‘to be a better test of character.’ This has been shown above, 1105 a, 36 sqq.

§ 2. οὐ ταῦταν δέ. This distinction becomes of great importance later on in the discussion of moral weakness (ἀκραία). A man may perform a wrong act voluntarily and therefore be fully answerable for it, and yet it may not show that his character is depraved. The acts of children and the lower animals are of this sort, and
ἩΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔκοινσιν καὶ παίδες καὶ τὰλλα ζῷα κοινοῦνε, προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαιρήσης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαιρέσειν δ᾽ οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες το αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βουλημένην ἢ τίνα δύον οὐκ ἐκαστὶν ὅρθως λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαιρέσεις καὶ τῶν ἁλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐπιθυμών μὲν πράττει, προαιροῦμενος δ᾽ οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατής δ᾽ ἀνάμισπαλν προαιροῦμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμών δ᾽ οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσεις 15 μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίονται, ἐπιθυμία δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἤδεος καὶ ἐπιλύσῃ, ἡ προαιρέσεις δ᾽ οὐτε λυ-

ΕΕ. 1225 b, 19 δισκαλοποίησε γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέρφικε καὶ ἐν τούς θέαναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταῦτα τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν ἢ ταῦτα ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρὰ τινῶν, καὶ ἦγοντιν δοξεῖ κάντων ὡς ἄν δυνάμεν ἐναντίον ἡ προαιρέσεις, ἦτοι δόξα ἢ ἰδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦνται. οὐ μὲν οὖν τὸν ἦστιν Ὄρχημα φαινόντος. ὡς γὰρ βουλήσεις ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἡ θυμός σειπάθεια ἔρεις γὰρ ὀργιζόμενοι μηθεὶς πεποιθώς τούτων. θυμός μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τῶν θεών ὑπάρχει, προαιρέσεις δ᾽ οὐ. οὐ δει καὶ οὐ περάσει αἱμο-

so are acts done when we are taken unawares. Full moral, as distinct from legal, responsibility—to use a modern distinction—only arises when we adopt the act as our own as a means to the realisation of some end.

§ 3. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ. We do not know who gave these inadequate definitions or whether there is any reference to particular people at all. The passage is dialectical, and could be expanded into a Platonic dialogue on the model of the first part of the Theaitetos with its successive definitions of knowledge.

οὐ γάρ κοινὸν κ.τ.λ. The argument is directed first of all to showing that προαιρέσεις cannot be identified with any form of apposition. In the first place, it cannot be the same as Temper or Desire; for they are found also in irrational creatures, while προαιρέσεις is not. Observe that this argument does not apply to Wish, the third form of apposition; for it, like προαιρέσεις, is only found in rational creatures.

§§ 4—5. The next three arguments are especially devoted to showing that προαιρέσεις is not identical with Desire. For (1) in the case of the morally weak man and of the morally strong man we find a conflict between προαιρέσεις and Desire. This is fully worked out in Book vii. (2) Desire never comes into conflict with Desire, but προαιρέσεις does. This does not mean,
of course, that there can be no conflict of desires, but merely that there cannot be conflicting desires with regard to the same object. We cannot desire both to be asleep and to be awake; but we may desire to be asleep and intend to keep awake.

of course, that there can be no conflict of desires, but merely that there cannot be conflicting desires with regard to the same object. We cannot desire both to be asleep and to be awake; but we may desire to be asleep and intend to keep awake.

§ 8. θυμός δ' ἐτί ήττον. If it cannot be identified with Desire, a fortiori it cannot be identified with Temper. Everyone can see that acts proceeding from Temper are ἀποκαταστάσις in the highest degree.

§ 7. ἀλλά μὴν οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that Wish, the third form of appetition, is, like προαιρεσία, confined to rational beings; but we cannot identify προαιρεσία even with Wish.

For (1) we may wish for what we know to be impossible, but we cannot will it. (2) We may wish for what, though possible, is not in our own power, but we cannot will it. (3) We wish for the end, but we will the means.

κ.τ.λ. τῶν ἀνυμάτων. The kal comes from Aspasios and is confirmed by EE. above. See Bywater, Contr. p. 32.

§ 10. οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. We see, then, that προαιρεσία cannot be identified with any form of appetition, and that it is distinguished even from Wish by being confined to what is in our own power (ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ). We have now to consider the possibility of its being
identified with the intellectual state known as Belief. In the first place, it cannot be identified with Belief in general; for that has to do with every kind of object, and not merely with things in our own power. Belief is true or false, while προαιρέσεις is good or bad.

§ 11. ἄλλα ὁποῖα τινι. Nor can it be identified with any species of Belief, that is, not even with belief as to things in our own power as right or wrong. For (1) Belief does not determine character. (2) To believe that a thing is good for us is not the same as to will it. (3) We praise a belief for its truth, an act of will for its righteousness. (4) We only will what we are fairly sure is good for us, we believe without knowing very well. (5) We find that some persons have excellent beliefs, but that their προαιρέσεις is bad.


§ 15. εἰ δὲ προγνωστικὸν κ.τ.λ. This we shall find to be the case. The
οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ταύτων ἐστι δόξη τινί. τί οὖν ἡ ποιῶν τι ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡ οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ’ ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ-
15 αἱρέτων. ἀλλ’ ἀρα γέ τό προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προ-17 αἵρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δὲ ἔσοικε καὶ
tοῦνομα ὡς ὅπρο ἐτέρων αἱρέτων.

III. Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου-
λευτὸν ἐστιν, ἡ περὶ ἕνων οὐκ ἢστι βούλη; λεκτέων δ’ ἵσως 2-
20 βουλευτῶν οὗ τε ὑπὲρ οὐ βουλεύοιται· ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἤ μακφό-
μενος, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ οὐ τὸ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἁδικῶν οὐδεὶς 3
βουλεύεται, οἶον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀνύμετροι. ἀλλ’ οὕτω περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, 4
ἀδὲ δὲ κατὰ ταύτα γνωμένων, εἰτ’ εξ ἀνάγκης εἶτε καὶ

dialectical argument, by showing that προαίρεσις cannot be identified either
with appetite or thought in any
form, prepares us for the view that it
is the union of both.

§ 16. τί... η ποιῶν τι; what is its
genus and differentia?

ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. This gives
the genus, the τί ἐστιν. τὸ προβε-
βουλευμένον. This word seems still
to be chosen under the influence of
Attic legal terminology. Antiphon,
catá τῆς μετρίας § 5, uses προβολή
as a synonym of προαίρεσις. Cf. also the
use of the verb below 1135 b, 15–30.

§ 17. μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας,
‘is accompanied by a reason (ground)
and thought,’ i.e. is based upon con-
sciousness of a ground.

ὅτι δὲν, κ.τ.λ. τὸ προαμερὼν. The fact
that the object of προαίρεσις is a choice
between two alternatives proves that
it implies a λόγος; for it is only λόγος
that can express at once a thing and its
opposite. Cf. Met. quoted on p. 75.

III. § 1. Βουλεύονται δὲ κ.τ.λ.
We have seen that προαίρεσις contains
an intellectual element, namely De-
liberation. We have first to examine
this, and to determine its scope.

§ 3. περὶ... τῶν ἁδικῶν. The ex-
amples given show that the objects of
First Philosophy (or Theology) and
Mathematics are meant. Both of
these are eternal and immovable,
though the objects of the first are
separate from matter (χωρίων), while
those of the second are ‘in matter,’
though separated in thought. Met.
1026 a, 13 sqq. Zeller (Eng. trans.) 1,
33.

περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. The κόσμος here
means the spherical πρῶτος ὀρθοδόξως.

τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς.
The incommensurability of the side
of a square with its diagonal was the
companion difficulty to the incom-
mensurability of the diameter of a
circle with its circumference, which
makes it impossible to square the
circle.

§ 4. περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει. These
will be the objects of ἀστρολογικῆς or
φωσῆς according as they happen ἐκ
ἀνάγκης or φώσης. The ‘solstices and
risings (of the constellations)’ are an
example of the first, the growth of an
animal would be an example of the
second.
§ 5. peri tôn ἄλλων ἄλλως. This must be equivalent to ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν. Rain and drought are not regulated by an internal motive or efficient cause like organic growth. We have the phrase in Part. An. 14.1, 19 ἃ ἄλλος ἄλλως καὶ ἡ ἄλλη, where it is opposed to τετράνυμον.

peri tôn ἀπὸ τόχης. When τόχη is distinguished from τῷ αὐτῶ οὕτως, it is what happens by chance in the province of human thought or purpose. It is, in fact, related as an αἰτία κατὰ εἰμιθέσεις to Thought just as τῷ αὐτῶ οὕτως is related to Nature. The finding of the treasure might have been due to design if the man had any reason to believe that there was a treasure buried in his vineyard. See Bonitz on Met. 106g a, 30.

§ 6. ἄλλο οὕτως κ.τ.λ. The successive elimination of Nature, Necessity and Chance from the sphere of Deliberation would leave us with the remaining cause, Man. But even here there is a limitation.

Σκύθαι. Eudemos substitutes ‘Indians.’ We may perhaps see in this a trace of the extension of the Macedonia...
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

§ 8. ἄκριβεσι. Κτ. Ιντροδ. § 26. οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων, 'for instance about spelling.' This is explained more fully by Eudemus (loc. cit.). The doctor may go wrong (1) in the treatment he adopts, an error of δάσκω, (2) in applying it to the particular case, an error of αἴσθησις. The latter kind of error alone is possible in the case of spelling; for it is not an open question how a particular word is to be spelt.

§ 10. τὸ πῶς δέ. I have followed Rassow in inserting these words. It is true, as Hywater says (Contr. p. 33), that we can interpret the text as it stands, by supplying πῶς ἀποθέσθαι in thought. But the fact that MM. (118b, 24) has τὸ δὲ δεῖ seems to decide in favour of Rassow's proposal.
λεύμεθα δ᾽ ὦ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. ὥστε γὰρ ἱερός ἁγιοῦσθαι εἰ ὑγίασθε, ὥστε ῥῆτορ εἰ πείσει, ὥστε πολυτικός εἰ εὔνομάν ποιήσει, οὕτω τῶν λοιπῶν οὕτως περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ ἥμενου τὸ τέλος τοῦ πόσο καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐσται σκοτοῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γνώσθαι διὰ τίνων βάστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοπήσατε, δι᾽ ἐνετὸς ἐπιτελομένου πόσο διὰ τοῦτον ἐσται κάκευνο διὰ τίνων, ἐστὶ ἢ ἀν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἰτίαν, ὅ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατον ἡμᾶς ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἢ ἡμῶν ὑγίασθαι τῶν ἑωρημένων πρῶτον ὡσπερ ἄνεμον πρός διάγραμμα—φαίνεται δ᾽ ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ὑγίασθαι εἰ πάσα εἰσὶν βουλευέσθαι, οὗτοι αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἢ δὲ βουλεύεσθαι πάσα γνώσθαι· καὶ τὸ ἐσχάτον ἐν τῇ ἀναλώσει πρῶτον εἰσὶν ἢ τῇ γενέσει· κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτο ἐν·

βουλεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτο κεῖται πάση, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τούτο τευχόντων, τότεν τὸδε ἡ τάξις συντείνει, ἡ δεδομένου τούτῳ πῶς ἐστι. βουλευόμεθα δὲ τούτου πάντες ἦσαν δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀναγέγρομεν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἀρχῆς. εἰ δὲ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηδεῖς μὴ παρασκευάζομεν μηδὲ βουλευόμεθα εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλεύεται δὲ ὡς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ ἐστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ ἐναὶ καὶ μη τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δήλον ὅτι ἡ προαιρέσεις μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑκατονταβουλευτικῆς. ἀπαντεῖ γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἢ καὶ προαιρομεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἣ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα προαιρομεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικὴν, ἡν ἡμῶν καὶ αἰτία βουλευτικῆς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὑπέρεται διὰ τὸ βουλευτικῆς τινα. ὑπὸ δὲς ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ᾧς ἐστὶν ἡ προαιρέσεις, οὕτως ἐν πάσῃ ἡμῖν, οὕτως πάντως ἠχοῦσιν ἀνθρώποι: οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βουλευτικῆς, οὐ δέχομαι τοῦ διὰ τι, ἀλλὰ διάδασαν μὲν εἴ ποιήσατε ἡ μὴ ποιήσατε ὀβλέθα παλαιὸ ἵππεις, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ ὀσκέτα. ἐστὶ γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρωτητικὸν αἰτίας τούτος. ἢ γὰρ ὥσιν ἑκατονταβουλευτικῆς τῶν αἰτίων ἐστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τι ἠκούεσθαι, οὐ δὲ ἑκατονταβουλευτικῆς ἡ γένεσιν τι, τοῦτο αἴτιων φαμέν ἐστιν, ὡς τοῦ βολεύουσα τῇ κοιμηθείς τῶν χρηματῶν, ἐν τούτῳ ἑκατονταβουλευτικῆς διὸ οὐ μηδεὶς ἔστατο σκοπός, ὡς βουλευτικῆ. ὡστε ἐπεὶ τὸ πᾶς καὶ διὰ τίνων. These two phrases are equivalent. Below we have ὑπὸ ὀσκέτα (b, 18) and τοῦτο διὰ τίνος (b, 39).

§ 11. οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν. This is fundamental. Cf. Introd. § 22.

Β. Α.
μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ δὲν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐὰν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπράττυ
d' αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ δι' ἄγνωσιν, ἐκὼν πράττειν ἢ ἀπράττυ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν
tοιοῦτων πράσσων οὐ διακριότατος ὑμᾶς προσνόηστε, ἀνάγκη τὸ
μὲν προαιρετὰν ἢ πράσσων ὑμῖν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκκούσιον 
μὲν προαιρετῶν καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαιρετῶν πάντα ἐκούσιον εἶναι, 
τὰ δ' ἀκούσαι μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαιρεσιν. ἀμα δ' ἐκ τοῦτων 
φανερῶν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ 
μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προαιρεσιῶν μοιχουσίων
ἐκ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβώσων, ἀλλ' ἀποκολλά τῇ 
τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐρωτήσω ἐν τῇ 
τῶν 
δικαίων ἐπισκέψεως ἡ ἐκ προαιρεσιῶν ὅτι ὅπερ ἀπλῶς 
βουλήσης οὔτε δόσα ἐστὶν, δόλου, ἀλλὰ δόσα τε καὶ ὀρέσεως, ὅτα 
ἐκ τοῦ 
βουλεύσασθαι 

1112 b, 34. ΕΕ. 1227 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται αὐτὸ 
βουλεύου 
βουλευου 

§ 14. Δ' οὗ ἢ i.e. τὸ δραματικὸν. τοὺς 

§ 16. οὗ γὰρ ἢ ἂν ἢ ἂν κ.τ.λ. De-
liberation, like Demonstration, has 
its limits. Cf. Introd. § 22. We 
cannot demonstrate first principles 
nor yet particulars. In the same way 
we cannot deliberate about ends nor 
yet about particular acts. The latter 
are a matter for αἰσθήσεως. In neither 
case is there an infinite progress or 
recess.
§ 17. ἀφωρισμὸν, 'determined,'

i.e. it is no longer in the form of a problem. For the expression cf. 
1142 b, 11.

κριθέν. Cf. a, 12 κρῖνατες, Bywater, Contr. p. 83.

δὲν ... ἀναγάγῃ, 'when he has reduced the efficient cause to himself,'

when he has traced back the series of causes to something integral to himself.

τὸ ἡγούμενον, 'the commanding part.' This shows that προαίρεσις is really what we call the will, though the idea is, generally speaking, foreign to Aristotle's thought in this form.

In the Stoic philosophy τὸ ἡγομαστόν plays a very important part. There is no need, however, to suspect that this is a later interpolation; for Aristotle is using popular language, and ἡγεῖσθαι was already familiar from Plato in a similar metaphorical sense. In like manner Aristotle calls it τὸ κόρον in Met. 1048 a, 10 (p. 77). Translated into Aristotelian language, this literary phrase means that προαίρεσις is the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, the ἀρχὴ θεῶν ἢ κόρων. Cf. De An. 406 b, 24 φαίνεται καίων ἢ ψιχῆ τὸ ζῷον ... διὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν καὶ κόρων.

§ 18. τοῦτο, sc. that τὸ προαίρεσιν ἀφαίρεσιν is τὸ ἡγομαστόν, and that προαίρεσις is subsequent to βούλευσιν and the cause of γραψίς. The union of the imperative with the deliberative power arises from the fusion of thought and appetition in this 'part of the soul.'
§ 19. Βοιλέντικη δρέσεις. The definition of προάρεσις as a 'deliberative appetite of things in our power' is really the fundamental doctrine of the Ethics.

κατά τήν βοιλένσιν, 'in the direction of (on the lines of) the deliberation.' Appetition follows all the steps of deliberation, but in the reverse order. Cf. the phrases κατ' εθέταις, κατ' ελαφοπλας.

IV. § 1. 'Ἡ δὲ βοιλένσις κ.τ.λ.' We now come to the appetitive element in προάρεσις, which has problems of its own.


§ 2. τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is the Academic view derived from Plato's Gorgias 466 e sqq. where παινὸς δ' βοιλένσις is distinguished from παινὸς δ' δοκεί.

ἡ. For this idiomatic use of the imperfect, cf. 1115 a, 2. 1117 a, 16. 1117 b, 11.

§ 4. τῷ...σπουδασφ. exactly equivalent to τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐ τῷ ἐπιείκει. Cf. 1099 a, 23. So τῷ φαίλῳ = τῷ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, τῷ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, κατ' ἀλήθειαν, εἰσα, κατ' ἀλήθειαν.

ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπί τῶν σωμάτων κ.τ.λ. The argument in favour of relative drawn from morbid conditions is Cyrenaic. Cf. Sext. Math. 112 (RP § 210) καθά γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτεινὸς (suffering from vertigo) καὶ εὐπρεπός (saundered) ὠρχητικῶς ὡπὸ πάσης κίνησις, ὁ δὲ σφυλακὸς ἐρμαραίηται, ὁ δὲ παραπετάτος τῶν σφυλακῶν ὡς ὑπὸ δυνῆς κίνησις, ὁ δὲ μεσοποτῶν δυσαίρει ὡς τῆς Θήρας καὶ δυσαίρει φαραγγίζεται τῶν ἠ除 (from Eur. Bacch. ν. 978 sqq.) κ.τ.λ. From our present point of view it is a sufficient answer to this to say that health is the normal condition.
καὶ οἱ μεῖναι ὑγιεινὰ ἐστὶ τὰ κατ’ ἀληθείαν τοιαύτα ὑντα, τὸ δὲ ἐπινόσου λέπερα, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ ἱλυκέα καὶ δερμα καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκατα—τὸν σπουδαίον γὰρ ἐκάστα κρίνειν ὥρθος, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνε- 30 ται. καθ’ ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξω ἐδίκαι ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἱδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείοστον ἵσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τὸ τάληθες εἰς ἐκάστοις ὑμᾶς, ἀστέρ ταυτών καὶ μέτρων αὐτῶν ὑμῖν. τοὺς πολλοὺς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἵδουνν έσωκε γίνεσθαι τοι γὰρ οὐσα διάγνωσθαι εἰς τούτον φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἱδών ὡς ἀγαθῶν, τὴν δὲ 1113 1

λύπην ὡς κακῶν φεύγουσιν.

V. Ὅντος δὲ βουλήτου μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτών δὲ

1113 a. 31. ΕΕ. 1227 a, 31 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ ὀμαστροφή οὖν εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξῆς. οὐ γὰρ ἔστω ἐκβιβάζῃ ἐκ τῶν τῶν, ἐσεὶ καὶ η ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόν γίνεται, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσιος ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀντὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἰστίν. ἀνάγκη ἀρα καὶ τὴν ἐπιτίμην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τῷ πλέον καὶ τῷ ἐλαττ.), αἰτίων δὲ τὸ τῇ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν’ οὖν γὰρ ἐχει ὅτε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν τῇ ἱδών ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῇ ἱδώνν ἀμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸνν κακῶν καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸτερον χερόν. ὅστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δήλον ὅτι περὶ ἱδώνν καὶ λύπης ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ἡ κακία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετά την-χάνουσιν οὖσι, ἃ δὲ προαιρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαύτα δὲ φέρει ἱδῶν καὶ λύπη.

τὸν σπουδαίου...κρίνε. This is the reading of Kp and seems to be more original than the ὁ σπουδαῖος... κρίνε of Lp. I have therefore adopted it, marking the preceding sentence as parenthetical.

§ 5. καὶ ἐκάστην...ἐξω. It is well to remember here that ἐξω and διάκειμαι are medical terms. Cf. τοίς εἴ δια-κειμένων above.

κανών. The kanon is the builder’s rule, the Latin norma. The metaphorical use of the word seems to occur first in Euripides. Cf. Hek. 602. El. 53.

μέτρων. This is a clear reference to the dictum of Protagoras.

§ 6. αἱροῦνται...ὡς ἀγαθῶν. All men, the good included, desire pleasure; the mistake made by ordinary people is that they wish it, i.e. it appears to them in the light of good. Cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 28 δὲ δε τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν χώραν ἐξεσθε, καὶ τὸ ἱδέοι φαινόμενον γὰρ ἔστιν ἀγαθῶν.

V. § 1. "Οντος δὲ κτ.λ. We know that our deliberative analysis of Happiness will be complete when we reach something which is ἐφ'
καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεως 5 κατὰ προαιρεσίν ἄν εἶναι καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναὶ. ὡστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἦστε, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῶν 10 ἦσται αἰσχρὸν δὲν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ 3 καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τούτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἁγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπικεκάθει καὶ φαινομένοι εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅσον οὐδεὶς ἔκων 4 15 πονηρὸς οὐδέ άκοις μακάριος ἐσθε τὸ μὲν ψεύδει τοῦ δ' ἀληθεῖ: μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς άκοις, ἡ δὲ μοιχηρία ἐκοῦ-}

1113 b, 13. ΕΕ. 1223 a, 4 ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἀνθρώπους ἄρα, ἀρχή καί κύριος, πανερόν ὦτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὅπως κύριός ἦστε τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τοιείν ἢ μὴ τοιείν, αὐτούς τούτων αὐτός ἦστιν· καὶ ὅσων αὐτίς, ἐφ' αὐτῷ.

ημῶν. It is therefore important to show clearly that good acts are ἐφ' ἡμῖν. They are so because they have προαιρεσία as their efficient cause, and all προαιρεσίαι ἐστίν. περὶ ταῦτα, sc. περὶ τὰ πρᾶτον τὸ τέλος. This is the middle term of the syllogism. All acts concerned with the means to an end are προαιρετὰ and therefore ἐκούσιοι. The activities of goodness are concerned with the means to an end, therefore the activities of goodness are voluntary. § 2. ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the deliberative analysis of Happiness. We have at last come to something ἐφ' ἡμῶν. If the activities which produce goodness are voluntary, then goodness is in our power. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is because our capacities are μετὰ λόγου, and every λόγος implies both 'yes' and 'no.' Cf. above 1103 a, 20 sqq. § 3. ἦν, 'is, as we saw.' For this idiomatic imperfect cf. 1117 a, 16. 1129 b, 11. 1134 b, 14. ἐπικεκάθει... ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. This passage shows clearly that the various Attic equivalents for ἁγαθὸς and κακὸς are used without any distinction of meaning. § 4. οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν κ.τ.λ. The Aldine scholiast quotes a fragment from the Ἡρακλῆς ὀ παρὰ Φάληρου ὑποκεχρομαθεῖσα, in which occurs the line οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν πονηροὶ οὐδὲ ἅπαν ἑκῶν. Whoever wrote the verse as we have it no doubt meant only 'wretched' by πονηρός, as Muretus and Camerarius already saw. Victoriæ substituted μᾶκαρ for μακάριος to make an iambic line on the authority of [Plato] περὶ δικαίου 374 a. Cf. Tim. 86 d κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκῶν οὐδεὶς.
§ 5. ἀρχή...τῶν πράξεων, sc. δὲν ἡ κίνησις. 

§ 6. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. We have ‘reduced’ the efficient cause to something internal to ourselves, namely πράσεις. Not only so, but there is no other ἀρχή to which we could refer it; for neither Necessity, Nature nor Chance could produce human actions. Now that of which the ἀρχή is ἐν ἡμῖν will itself be ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

§ 7. τούτως ἐκεῖ k.τ.λ. The usual appeal to the practice of νομιμότητα. Cf. above 1102 α, 7 ν.
πεινήν ἡ ἄλλη οἵτινες τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθεν γὰρ ἦττον πεισό-
ζο μεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῶ τὸ ἄργον ἑλάζοντις, ἓν ἂν
αιτίον εἶναι δοκή τῆς ἄγνοιας, οἶον τοις μεθύουσι διπλά τὰ
ἐπιτίμια. ἢ γὰρ ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυ-
σθήμαι, τοῦτο δ’ αἰτίον τῆς ἄγνοιας. καὶ τοὺς ἄγνοοντάς τι
tῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ὃ δεὶ ἐπιστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἔστι,
1114α κολάζοντι, ὁμώς δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα δὲ ἀμέ-
λειαν ἄγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ μὴ ἄγροεῖν·
tοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμελθῆμαι κύριοι. ἄλλα ἵσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὡσεὶ
μὴ ἐπιμελθῆμαι. ἄλλα τοῦ τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἰτίων
5 ζώντες ἀνεμένοις, καὶ τοῦ αἰδίκους ἢ ἀκολούθους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν
κακοργοῦσθεν, οἱ δὲ ἐν πῦτοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις διάγοντες·
αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἐκάστα ἐνεργεῖαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ 11
δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετῶν τῶν πρὸς ἡπτινοῦν ἄγνωσίαν ἢ πράξεως
διατελεῖται γὰρ ἐνεργοῦσθεν. τὸ μὲν ὅσον ἄγροεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ
10 ἐνεργεῖαν περὶ ἐκάστα αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται, κομιδὴν ἀναεσθήτων.

οἶον εἰ τρεῖς, ἔ, εἰ δὲ τέτορες, ὡκτώ. καὶ εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλου, τοιοῦτον
δ’ ἐστὶ, κάκευνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι. δήλον δ’ ἐσχειρούμεν ὅτι
ἀναγκαίον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυκικῶν· γιν’ δ’ οὕτε μὴ λέγειν οὕτε λέγειν
ἀκριβῶς οἶον τε, πλὴν τοιοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλα αἰτίων τοῦ
tὸ τρέγονον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἀρχῇ τις ἄν εἴ τοῦτο καὶ αἰτίων τῶν ὑστερον,
ὅτι εἶπεν ἐστὶν ἀνα τῶν οὕτων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναιτίων ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ
tὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτίων εἰμὶ τοιοῦτα. εἰ γὰρ τῶν ἐς ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον
tὸ συμβαθὺν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ γε ἐνέτειθεν ἐνέλεχε να ἔχελται τάναττα, καὶ δ’
ἔφ’ αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιοῦτων, καὶ ἀρχὰς
tῶν τοιοῦτων εἰς αὐτοῖς.

§ 8. Ἰδίᾳ τὰ ἐπιτίμια. A law of
Pittakos. Cf. Pol. 1274 b, 19 νόμος δ’
ζως αὐτῶ τὸ τοιοῦτο μεθύουσι, ἐν τὶ
πταίνωσιν, πλεῖον ἠμῖλαν ἀντικεῖται τῶν
νηστῶν. Rheth. 1402 b, 10 εἰ τις
ἐκθέτωμα εἶπον ὃτι τοιαύτω διὶ
ἐνγυγωμένου ἔχειν, ἐγκρούσθεν γὰρ ἄμαρ-
tάντους, ἐνεστάθης δὴ ἀδελφὸν ὁ Πιττακὸς
αἰτεῖται· ὃ γὰρ ἐν μελῶσιν ἦμισεν
ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐκ τῶν μεθύου ἄμαρτάς.
§ 10. τοιοῦτος τοιοῦτον, ἐκεῖνον, ἢ ἡ
al ἐνεργεία. Cf. above 1103 b, 21 ἐκ
tῶν ἄμων ἐνεργείῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται.
The words περὶ ἐκάστα are explained
1103 b, 6 sqq.
§ 12. ἀναεσθήτων. The word is
here used in its common meaning of
'dull,' 'stupid,' cf. 1104 a, 24 n., in
which sense it is almost a synonym of
ἀναλγετός (1100 b, 21 n.). It is a
very strong term, and is applied to the
Thebans in Dem. de Cor. § 240.
13 ἐτι δ' ἀλογον τὸν ἀδικούντα μη βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοοῦν τις πράττῃ εξ ἀν ἔσται ἀδίκος, ἐκὼν ἀδίκος ἰν ἐν, οὐ μὴν ἐὰν γε βούληται, ἀδίκος ὁν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὔδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὕμης, καὶ ταῖς οὐτοῖς ἐτυχεῖν, εκὼν νοσεῖ, ἄκρατος 15 βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἱστροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμφέρ δ' οὐκέτι, ὡστερ οὖν ἄφεντι ἂθεν ἐτι αὐτῷ δυνατόν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τῇ [βαλείν καὶ] ἰδίᾳ· ἦ γὰρ ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ· οὐτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολαστῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτους μὴ γενέσθαι, 20 ἵνα ἔκρουτες εἰσίν· γενομένων δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν δ' αἱ τῇς ψυχῆς κακίας ἐκοινώσαμεν ἐστο, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμώμεμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δὲ ἀγνυμανίαι καὶ ἀμέλειαι. ὅμως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθενεῖαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· οὐδεὶς 25 γὰρ ἄν ὁμοίωσιν τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔλεγον· τῷ δ' εἴ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἁκολούθα τὰς ἀν ἐπιτιμήσατα. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακίαν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμώνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὖν. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακίων 30 ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἂν εἶνεν. εἰ δὲ τὰς λέγει ὅτι πάντες ἐφείτονται τού 

§ 13. ἤτι δ' ἀλογον κ.τ.λ. It is unjustifiable (οὐχ ἔχει λόγον) for a man who acts dishonestly to say he does not wish to be dishonest. He is making himself so to the best of his power, and that voluntarily. The reference is to the paradox of Sokrates, cf. MM. 1187 τής, 8 εἶ γὰρ τε, φήσεων (ὁ Σοκράτης), ἐφιστάμεθα ὑπερανέντοις τῶν ἀν βούλεσθαι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκος, οὐδές ἐν ἀντίο τῆν ἀδίκιαν. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4; iv, 6, 6 sqq. § 14. καίτω. Rassow's emendation of ms. καί. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34. προμεμένω, sc. τῇ ὑγείᾳ. τῷ [βαλείν καὶ] βῆσαι. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34. I prefer to bracket the more common βαλείν rather than the more striking βῆσαι. No one would require a note on βαλείν. ἀρχή, sc. ἄθεν ἢ κινητις. § 15. οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ. We have once more two common τῶν: (1) the analogy of bodily states, (2) praise and blame as a τεκμηριωτον of τοῦ ἐκολουθο. Cf. Plato, Protag. 323 c sqq. § 17. εἶ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. “If any one were to say that we are not responsible for our φαρσαία, we answer (1) that if a man is responsible in a sense for his ἐξία, he is responsible in the same sense for his φαρσαία, (2) that if a man is not responsible for his ἐξία, he is not responsible for any of his bad acts at all. It is all a mere question of natural endowment.”
for our character, then goodness is as involuntary as badness. Plato cannot mean this.

§ 19. Εἰς ἐν τῷ κ. τ. Λ. We may try to maintain that goodness is voluntary by holding either (1) that the φαντασία of the end is not given to a man by nature, but is partly due to himself (παρ' αὐτών), or (2) that the end is given by nature, but the means are voluntary. But both these views will make badness voluntary to the same extent as goodness.

tὸ δὲ αὐτῶν. Mr Bywater's proposal to read τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν is attractive.

§ 20. Εἰς ὑπὸ τ. Κ. τ. Λ. The argument may be summed up thus. (1) Our πράξεις are in our power and we have
οὰ, ὁσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐξων συναντοί πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιοῦτε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἃν εἰεν' ὁμοίως γάρ. 

21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἁρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τὸ τε μίνος τύπος, ὅτι μεσοτήτες εἰσίν καὶ ὅτι ἐξεις, ὡφ' ὅν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικά <και> καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἃν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος προστάζῃ. οὖχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ ζῷ ἐξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κυρίοι ἔσμεν, εἶδότες τὰ καθ' ἐκάστα, τῶν ἐξων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἐκάστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὡσπερ 1115 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμοστῶν ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἡ οὕτως ἡ μη οὕτω χρήσαται, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι. 

23 Ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης ἐπομεν τίνες εἰσι καὶ περὶ ποία καὶ πῶς· ἁμα δ' εἶσται ἥδην καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν, 5 καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. VI. Ὁτι μὲν οὖν μεσοτήτης ἐστὶ

1114 b, 26. EE. 1228 a, 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσοτήτες εἰσί τε ἐν ταῖς ἁρεταῖς, καὶ αὐταὶ προαιρετικαί, καὶ αἱ ἐναντία κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσίν αὐταί, καθόλου εἴρησα· καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγομεν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἴσομεν περὶ ἀνδρείας. 

1115 a, 4. EE. 1228 a, 26 σχέδον δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὁ τ' ἀνδρείαι εἰσί περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἁρετῶν. διείλομεν δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρῶτον καὶ θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν τοσούτου ἀντίκειμεν αλλήλους. δήλου οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἐξεις ταῦτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείσονται σφῶν αὐτοῖς, οὖν δ' ἐδέλθω

full responsibility for them. (1) Our ἐξεις proceed from our πράξεις and are so far in our power. We have partial responsibility for them, that is we are responsible at the start (ἐν ἀρχῇ). (2) Our ἐξεις on the τέλος depends on our ἐξεις, so we are just as responsible for that.

§ 21. Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The summary as usual destroys the connexion. The words οὖχ ὁμοίως δὲ (b, 30) should be taken closely with what precedes. <και> καθ' αὐτάς, not καθ' αὐτάς. The και comes from Aspasios and the Vetus Versio. ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, 'the right rule' 1103 b, 32 n. 

§ 23. περὶ ποία καὶ πῶς, συ. μεσοτήτης εἰσίαν. Aristotle discusses all the ἁρεταί under these two heads. 

VI. § 1. Ὁτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This chapter deals with the question περὶ ποία μεσοτήτης ἡ ἀνδρεία.
περὶ φόβους καὶ κάθρη, ἦδη φανερῶς γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὲ δὴν λοιπὸν ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπών κακά, διὸ καὶ τοὺς φόβους ὀρίζουσιν προσδοκίαι κακοὺς. 10 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἄδοξίαν πειθαρχNano νύσσον ἀφίλανθον θυάτερον, ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρείας εἶναι· ἕνα γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλὸν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰχμάριον, οἷον ἄδοξίαν· ὃς μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπικείσκετο καὶ αἰδήμον, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀνασκούστος. 15 γεται δ’ ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀνδρείων κατὰ μεταφορὰν· ἔχει γὰρ τε ὦμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ· ἄφοβος γὰρ τῆς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείας.

(οὕτως γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ταρρεῖν ἢττον ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θραύντως· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο εἶναι οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἦττον ἢ δεῖ, ταρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρωνυμίατο· ὁ γὰρ θραύντως παρὰ τὸ θραύσας λέγεται παραγωγὸς. ὡστ’ ἔτει ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν τὴν ἐβλητικότητα ἐξεῖ περὶ φόβους καὶ κάθρη, δεῖ δὲ μηδ’ οὕτως ὥστε ὁθαρύνως (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείποντι, τὰ δ’ ὑπερβάλλοντι) μηδ’ οὕτως ὥστε ὁδεῖλοι (καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ταύτῃ ποιοῦσιν, πλὴν οὐ περὶ ταύτῃ ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐναντίων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ταρρεῖν ἐλλείποντι, τὰ δ’ ὑπερβάλλοντι), δὴν λέγει ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θραυστικός καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ ἐβλητικότητα.

1115 a, 10. EE. 1229 a, 32 περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ παιητικὰ φόβους. τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα φαινέται παιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοὺς γὰρ ἄλλους τιναὶ προσδεχομένους λύπην ἐτέρα μὲν αὖ τὰ ἑσύχα λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἔτερον, φόβος δ’ ἦδη, 1107 a, 33.

§ 2. προσδοκίαι κακοῦ. Plato, Protag. 358 d προσδοκίαι τινα λέγω κακοῦ τούτον, ἐπει φόβον ἐπεὶ δεός καλείτε. Laches 198 b ἡγαγόθα δ’ ἤκει δεόντα μὲν εἶναι ἃ δεός παρέχετ· ταραχλέα δὲ ἢ μὴ δεός παρέχει· δεός δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα υπὲρ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκομένα· δεός γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκιαὶ μέλλοντα κακοῦ.

§ 3. οὐ περὶ πάντα κ.τ.λ. In EE. 1229 a, 34 sqq. this restriction is made clearer by the amended definition of τὰ φοβερὰ αἰ ὅσα φαινέται παιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς, i.e. those λύπης δὲν ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικῆ τοῦ 5οῦ. But this is not an ‘Eudeman development’ for we read in Rhet. 1382 a, 21 ἢ τῶν ὁδὸς φόβων λύπη τις ἢ παραχή ἢ μεριστασία μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπητοῦ. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἴ οὐκετὶ ἄδικος ἢ βραδός, ἀλλ’ ἔστας μεγάλας ἢ φθαρταί διώκεται, καὶ τούτ’ έάν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεχως φαίνεται ὡσεὶ μέλλειν. othon ἀδοξιαίος. Cf. the Platonic definition of ἀδοξίας as φόβος ἀδοξιάς below 1128 b, 11 and see note there.

κατὰ μεταφοράν ἢ ὁ αὐτοῦ. This alludes to Plato, see § 7 n.
4πειναν δ' ἵσως οὖ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὠλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δὲ αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὖδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἀφόβος ἀνδρείος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τούτον καθ' ὑμοίοτατον· ἡν ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὀυτε ἐλευθεροὶ εἰσὶ καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐκουσαν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἰς ἑκατάνειαν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα ἄρομαι ἡ φόνον ἢ τὶ τῶν τοιῶν ἀνδρείας ἡ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθ' ἡ γὰρ ὑπομενετικότερος 35 τῶν δεινῶν, φοβερῶτερον δ' ὁ βανάτος: τέρας γὰρ, καὶ οὕτων ἔτι τὸ τεθνεωτε ποτὲ οὔτ' ἀγαθῶν οὐτε κακῶν εἶναι. 7δύνει δ' ἃν οὐδὲ περὶ βανάτον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος

αὐτὸ ἔτι, ἢν εἰ τὴς προφορῆς ὅτι λυπησται λύπην ἢν οἱ φοβοῦντες λυτοῦνται, ἡ τοιαύτην οὖν οἱ ξηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνομένοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόνοις τὰς τοιαύτας φαινομένας ἄσκοπη καὶ φόβος γίνεται ὡσαν ἡ φόβις ἀναριμητηκε τοῦ ἐχ' ἐκακός καὶ σφόδρα τως ὑπὲρ μαλακοὶ περὶ ἑνὶ ἀνδρείας ἐστι, καὶ ἅπανα καὶ καταρκεῖν καὶ καταρκεὼν [καὶ] δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ καὶ δοκεῖς σχεδον τῶν τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τοῦ βανατον καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἐχειν πῶς. εἰ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ὁπλὶ ἄλλος καὶ ψίχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικός ὅς ὁ λόγοι, εἰκονόμοις οὐσίας, πρὸς δὲ τοῦ βανατον καὶ μαλακοῦ καὶ περίφοβος, μη 31 ἀλλ' ἐντὸς τοῦ παῖδος ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν εἰκονίων μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τοῦ βανατον ἀπαθής, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἢ ἐναι δίνοει δειλός, οὗτος δ' ἀνδρείος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἔπι τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοι τῶν φοβερῶν, οὕτω τοῦτον ἢ τῇ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς πολιτικῶν. φαινεται δὲ κίνδυνος, οὕτω πλησίον φαίηται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ, περὶ δοσα φαιμέν εἰναι τῶν ἀνδρείων, εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινομένα πολιτικὰ λύπης τῆς φθορικῆς· ταῦτα μόνοι πλησίον τε φαινομένα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοιαύτα τὸ μεγεθεὶ ὥστα ἡ φαινομένα ῥωτε ἐναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἀνθρωπον. ἔναι γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαινεθαι ἀνθρώπω φοβερὰ καὶ διαταραχῶν. οὕτων γὰρ κολύει, ἄσπιρθερα καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἑξεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.

§ 8. φόνον. We might be tempted to think that φόνον is the true reading. It goes well with ὀμοιοί (ὁ ὀμοιός or murder of children and wife), and the corruption is common. This is a case, however, where the text is guaranteed by Eudemos. See above.
λαττήτι ὑ νόσσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν ἐν
tοίς θαλάσσωι; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ ἐν μεγάλῳ γὰρ
cαι καλλιστερ κυνήγῳ. ὁμολογοῦ δὲ τοιούτου εἰςι καὶ αἱ
tιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῦς μονάρχοις. κυρίως
dὴ λέγουσιν ἂν ἄνδρείς ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν βάναυσιν ἄδειης,
cαι δόκιμα πάντων ἑπιφέρει ὑπόγραμμα ὑπάρχα συναιθα
tα ἑνὶ ἑνὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάσσῃ  ἡ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἐν
tαῖς τοιαύταις δε φθοραῖς οὐδὲ
tερον ὑπάρχει.

VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πάσι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, λέγομεν δὲ τι
cαι ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε

1115 b, 7. EE. 1228 b, 4 δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἄνδρείς ἀφοβος εἶναι
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ, ὃ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικὸς, καὶ ὃ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἀλλὰ
cαι μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβείται, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὃ δὲ τὸ
ἐναντίον ὃ ὁ φοβείσθαι ἤ ἤρεμα καὶ μολις καὶ ὑγιὰς καὶ μεγάλα,
cαι ὃ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβηρά σφόδρα, ὃ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἤρεμα. τοίοι
οὐν ὑπομένει ὁ ἄνδρεις; πρῶτον πάτερον τὰ ἄνωτέροι φοβηρά ἢ τὰ ἐτέρα; εἰ
mὲν δὴ τὰ ἐτέρα φοβηρά, οὐδέν σημεῖον φαίνῃ ἀν τις εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῷ,
υὸν ἔχοντε· τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀνδρωπον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλῳ καὶ ἤττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὦ δὲ ἄν- το ὅρειος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἀνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενει τοῦ καλοῦ ζένεια· τούτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐστὶ δὲ μᾶλλῳ καὶ ἤττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐτὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαύτα φοβεῖσθαι.

ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτίων ἢ μὲν οὖν ὁ <ὅ> οὐ δεῖ, ἢ 15 ὑπὸ δὲ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἢ ὡς οὐχ ὡς ἢ, ἢ τί τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως

§ 2. καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα, sc. τὰ κατ’ ἀνθρωπον.

ὥσ πο λόγος (sc. λέγει, κελεύει, προστάτει), not 'reason,' but the 'rule' which guides him. Cf. 1114 b, 29. 1115 b, 19. 1117 a, 8. 1119 a, 20. 1125 b, 35. 1138 b, 20, 29. ὑπομενεῖ, sc. ὁ ἀνδρείας.
δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἑνεκὰς ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὅς δεῖ καὶ οὗτος, ὁμολογεῖ δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείοσ. κατ’ ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὅς ἂν ἂν ὁ λόγος, 20 πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείοσ. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἢ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξων. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἢ ἀνδρείᾳ καλῶν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τῷ τέλει.

λόγῳ ἐστὶν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελεῦει. διό καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τῶτο ὑπομένων αὐτὰ, οὕτως ἦτοι ἐξετάσθη ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρείος μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δείλος καὶ ἂ μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασύς καὶ ἂ μὴ δεῖ θαρρέει· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος ἀμφότερος ἂ δεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα μέσος ἐστίν. ἂ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται. ὃ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγαλὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ ὁκελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ἦ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ ἂ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὃ δὲ δείλος οὐδὲν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος μόνος, ἂν κελεύῃ.

1115 b, 17. ΕΕ. 1230 a, 21 καὶ ἦστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὐτῆς. ἢ ὅ, ἐλεήθης ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς οὐτὶ ἐκεῖνοι οὐδείς. ὡσπέρ καὶ τῷ θηρίῳ, ἂ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ὑμὸς τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὕτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδιάκοπος, δὲ ὡς ἂν ὑπομόνως, οὕτως ὅργην, οὕτως διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθαναίον, ἢ διὰ τὸ θυμαῖνες ἐξείν πυγμακτικός· οὐδὲ γὰρ φεύγεται οὔτως γε φοβεῖσθαι εἶναι οὔσαν· ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ πάσα αὐτῆς.

§ 5. κατ’ ἀξίαν. Not very different from κατὰ τὸ δέον.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ κ. τ. λ. The text here is not quite certain, but the argument is plain. The rule says that an act to be really brave must be done from the right motive (ὁ δὲ ἔνεκα δεῖ). It is to be shown that this means τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. This is proved as follows. The end of every activity which proceeds from a θέλει must be the end which corresponds to the θέλει from which it proceeds. To be the brave man, that is the man who embodies the θέλει (τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἔξων), bravery appears as τὸ καλὸν, and therefore τὸ καλὸν is its end. From this it follows that every act, if it is to be called brave, must have τὸ καλὸν as its end, that is, it must be performed τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα.

τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξων. We might paraphrase this by saying that the end of every activity is conformity to a certain type of character or, in more Aristotelian language, the reproduction of a form (ἐἶδος λόγος τῆς ὁτιοτατος). So the Paraphrases says that the end of every activity according to goodness is τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξων γίνεται. The good man's end is the reproduction of the form of goodness in all his acts. Now a final cause appearing as a formal cause appears as τὸ καλὸν, cf. Part. An. 648 a, 25 οὗ δ’ ἔνεκα συνεκπέφαν ἢ γέγονε τέλος, τὴν τὸ καλὸν χώραν ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἢ ἀνδρείᾳ καλῶν. Rassow here reads καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ. ἢ <δ’> = ἀνδρείᾳ καλῶν.

τοιοῦτον, sc. καλῶν. ὀρίζεται...τῷ τέλει, i.e. the end determines the form. Cf. Meteor. 390 a, 10 ἀκατά δ’ ἐστὶν ὄρωμένα τῷ ἔργῳ.
καλόν δή ἐνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείας ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
7 τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τῶν δὲ ὑπερβαλλόντων οὐ μέν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώμυμα (εἰρθητ αἰ ἑμῶν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστίν 25 ἀνωμύμα), εἰς δὲ ἐάν τις μανῶμεν ἡ ἀνάληγησις εἰ μη-
δέν φοβοῦτο, μῆτε σεισμὸν μῆτε τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
τῶν Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ χαρέειν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ
8 φοβερὰ θρασύς· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις εἰναὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ
τροποποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γὰρ ἑκείνου περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ 30
ἐχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύνατα ἐν
9 μείται. διὰ καὶ εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασὐδεῖλοι· ἐν
τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνώμονοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· ὁ
δὲ τῷ φοβείσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δεῖλος· καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὴ δεῖ
καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. 35

προαιρετικὴ (τούτῳ δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἰρθητ πρότερον, ὅτι ἐνεκα τινος
tάτα αληθεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τούτῳ ἐστι τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα, τὸ καλὸν), δῆλον
ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τῆς οὖν ἐνεκα τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ
ὑπομένειν, ὡστ' οὔτε δὲ ἀγνωσίαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεὶ κρίνειν)
οὔτε δὲ ἥδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλὸν, ἐπει, ἀν γε μὴ καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὰ μακικόν,
οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰτχρόν γὰρ.

b, 24. EE. 1229 b, 22 οἷς μὲν <οὖν> δεῖλοι καὶ θρασεῖς
ἐπιφεύγονται διὰ τὰς ἔξεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τὰ τῇ μὴ φοβερᾷ δοκεί
φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἡρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τὰ τῇ
φοβερῷ χαρακτῆρε καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἡρέμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρείᾳ τάλαθὴ
μακική. διὸτερον οὔτ' εἴ τις ὑπομένω τὰ φοβερὰ δὲ ἀγνωσίαν, ἀνδρείοις,
ὅτι εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένων φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὔτ' εἴ
γενόσκως ὅσοι οἱ κύδωνοι, διὰ θυμὸν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα
ὅτα ἀπαντᾶσθαι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμὸν
ἐστὶν. ἔτει δὲ καὶ δ' ἄλλας ἥδονας ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
ἥδονήν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστὶν τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὁμοίον οὔτ' εἴ
δ' αὐτήν οὔτ' οὗτ' οὗτ' δ' ἄλλην ἥδονήν ὑπομένα τις τὸν βάσανον ἡ φυγὴν

§ 7. ἀνάληγητος. ἐφ. 1100 b, 32 ν.
tοῦ Κελτοῦ. EE. 1229 b, 25 οἷς
ὁ Κελτός πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅτα ἀπα-
tᾶσθαι λαβόντες. Aristotēl seems to
have taken this from Ephoros; for
Strabo (vii. p. 293) says upon his
authority ὅτα αἴρεθαι πρὸς τὰς ἄλθο-
μενᾶς τοῦ Κερμόνας, καὶ δή ἀφοβών
ὁ Κελτός ἄσκοντες κατακλυζέσθαι
tὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν.

§ 9. θρασὐδεῖλος. This compound
is not found elsewhere, but may be-
long to the language of comedy.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ὅτι δύναται
μεμείθαι.
1116 ἔλλειπτε δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρείν, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφαινῆς ἔστιν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δει-λός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείως ἐπαντλώς· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐνέπιδος. περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ τε δειλός· σκιὰ δὲ τὸν ὁδοιπόρον ὑπερβάλλων καὶ ἐπιτίθεται, οὐ δὲ μέσως ἐχεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετείς, καὶ βουλομένοι πρὸ τῶν κυνήγων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίσταται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρείῳ ἐν τοῖς ἐργαῖς ὄξεις, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
10. Καθάπερ οὖν εἰρήνη, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶν περὶ τῆς ἐφοβερᾶ ἐν οἷς εἰρήνη, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν ἀφίσταται καὶ ὑπομένει ἡ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνησκεῖν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἡ ἔρωτα ἢ τῇ λυπηρᾷ οὐκ ἄνδρείου ἄλλα μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίτονα, καὶ 15 οὖν ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακῶν. VIII. Ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτον τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἐτέρα κατὰ πέντε τρόπους. πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ μάλλον γὰρ μειονῶν λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἄν> ἄνδρείως λέγοντο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ ἦν γ' τὸ ἀποθνησκεῖν, πολλαίκες ἄν δὲ ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνησκοι οἱ ἀκολούθων, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰν αὐτὸ μὲν τοῖς ἀποθνησκεῖν οὐκ ὄντος ἤδης, τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δὲ ἀκρασίαν περιπέτευσαν εὖδότες, οὐδεὶς <ἄν> ἄνδρείως εἶναι δόξεις, εἰ καὶ πάντα ἐνοίκους ἀποθνησκεῖν. οὕτω εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ ποιεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσι, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς ἄνδρείως, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησι. "φαίνεται βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἱστοῦμεν, θεανεῖν ἐρωτεῖν."

ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔλκους οὕσης εὐξασθαί ἀποθανεῖν ἀδίκατον ὀντα. 1116 a, 15. ΕΕ. 1229 a, 12 ἄστι δ' ἐδή ἄνδρείως πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὄριστητα· <τὰ> αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένοναν ἀλλ' οὓς διὰ τὰ

§ 12. ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίσταται.

For δε connecting a finite verb with a participle, cf. 1135 b, 31. 1153 a, 4.

§ 13. εἰς ἑρήνη, sc. ἐν τοῖς καλλιτέχνει, i.e. εἰς πολέμος.

VIII. § 1. "Εστὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.

We pass now to the five forms of ἄνδρεια καθ' ὄριστητα.

ἡ πολιτική. This is the courage of the citizen army, the courage that won Marathon.
Ποιυδάμας μοι πρώτος ελεγχείν αναβήσειν 25
καὶ [Διομήδης]

"Εκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρισεύων ἀγορεύων "Τυδείθης ὑπ’ ἡμῶν,

ἀμοιῶται δ’ αὐτὴ μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον ἐφημένῃ, ὅτι δ’ ἄρετὴν γίνεται: δε’ αἰδώ γάρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γὰρ) καὶ φυγὴν ἄνειδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ’ ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχικῶν ἀναγκαζόμενοι εἰς ταύτῃ, 30
χέρους δ’, ὅσον οὐ δὲ αἰδὼ αλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρᾶσι, αὐτὰ. μία μὲν πολιτικὴ: αὐτὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐς δὲ αἰδὼ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἡ
στρατιωτικὴ: αὐτὴ δὲ δ’ ἐμπερίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὡσπερ Σωκράτης ἐδή τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰς βορείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ’ ἡ δὴ ἐπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνωσιν, δ’ ἢν τὰ παιδιὰ καὶ οἱ μανήμοιοι οἱ μὲν ἐπομένους τὰ φερόμενα, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες τοὺς ὀφείς. ἀλλ’ δ’ ἡ ἐπειρία καθ’ ἢν οἱ τε κατευνάζοντες πολλάκις ἐπομένους τοὺς ἐκνοῦσιν καὶ οἱ μεθύνοντες. εὐδαιμόνας γάρ τιεύτ’ ὁ ὁίνος. ἀλλ’ δεὶ διὰ τάθος αὐτὸν τικοτόνον, ὁνὶ δὲ ἣρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἢν τὲ γὰρ ὡρίζῃ, ὑποκείμενοι μᾶλλον ἡ δειλὸς, καὶ ἐπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὡσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποτίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναι καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογοῦμενος καὶ δι’ ὄργην καὶ θυμὸν ἄκυρος. ἐκκατακτικόν γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς. διὰ καὶ οἱ ἄγνωστοι σὺν ἄνδρείου δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες ὅταν γὰρ ἐκτρώσει, τοιοῦτοι εἰσαὶ, οἱ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὡσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὁμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ: ἀντίθετον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὰ καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς ἁριστὰ μάχασται. διὰ γόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἄνδρεια. κατ’

§ 2. Ποιυδάμας κ.π.λ. II. xxii, 100.
[Διομήδης]. This seems to be an addscript. Bywater, Contr. p. 23.

"Εκτωρ γὰρ κ.π.λ. II. viii, 148.
§ 3. δὲ αἰδώ. For αἰδῶς cf. 1133 b, 10 sqq. Fritzsch Hindus ll. 2, 359

ἀ ψίλοι, ἄνερεις ἔστε, καὶ ἄλλοις ἄγορα ἐλευθερεῖς, ἀλλιώτας τ’ αἰδέοθευ κατὰ κρατερᾶς δεσμίνας.
αἰδόμενων ἄνδρῶν πλέον ἵππου ἄρα τέφασται.
αλλ' ἂν ἔστω, εἴδομεν. Τά δὲ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττωντες πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζομαι. δει γ' οὔ δὲ ἀναγκὴν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι ἀλλ' ὅτι καλὸν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἑκαστὰ ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης φήσῃ, ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιούτων δὲ ἄλλως μὲν ἐν ἄλλως, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιώται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι

§ 4. ὅπειραν κε' ἐγὼν κ.τ.λ. Πολ. 11, 391 with slight variants. The words are not Hector's, but Agamemnon's. They are attributed to the right speaker in Pol. 1385 a, 10, but there too with variants. Aristotle quotes his Homer from memory.

§ 5. οἱ προστάται. Lambinus says that Amyot affirmed he saw προστάταις "in codice quodam pontificio." But ms. authority is of no weight in deciding between these two words. Victorius renders qui in prima acie locant. Still προστάται is probably right, for it suggests the order of the δεσποτῆς to the δοῦλος. For καὶ ἀναγκώσας τύπωσεν cf. Herod. vii, 223.

οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων κ.τ.λ. Schol. Αποκ. τούτο πρὸς Ἀλκεδαμοῦς λέγει ἄν· τοιοῦτιν γὰρ ταῦτα μάχην, ὅτε πρὸς Μεσσωυόν ἔμαχοντο, ἐπολέμοι, ἀνελεφθή, καὶ Τυρναίου μεμοιχεῖτο.

§ 6. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The second form of ἀνδρεία καθ' ὑμοῦς, στρατιωτική ἀνδρεία.

ὁ Σωκράτης. In the Laches (1994 sqq.) courage is defined as ἐνυπολογία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μιᾷ, but this definition is soon shown to involve a great deal more. When Sokrates identifies courageousness and knowledge, he does not mean knowledge or experience of any special kind, but knowledge of the good. Aristotle's statement is only accurate if we understand by ὁ Σωκράτης not the final result of the discussion, but a provisional position temporarily adopted, and that too not originated by Sokrates, but borrowed by him from the culture of his time.
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"Ποιονάδιμα μοι πρώτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθησάην."
20 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωφρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκκουδώνουν ὅσοι κρείττον ὄντες, γνώντες δὲ φεύγουσιν, τῶν θανάτου μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰτίρητο γιαβούμενον· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιούτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐφεύρετο· ἄνδρεία γὰρ εἶπαται καὶ οἱ διὰ τοῦτον
25 ἀσσαπερ τὰ ποιήματα καὶ πρόσαντας φερόμενα, ὡτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἱπτερωτάτων γὰρ οἱ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κυνικούς, θεν καὶ ὁμμερος "σθένους ἐμβαλε θυμό" καὶ "μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρεν" καὶ "δριμὺ δ’ ἀνὰ μνῆς μένους" καὶ "ἐξεσθεν αἰμα" χάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔσσει σημαθιν
30 νειν τῷ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐγερσιν καὶ ὀρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλῶν πράττουσιν, οὗ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργειείς αὐτῶν· τὰ ποιήματα δὲ διὰ λάτπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγήματα ἑπεθαί, ἐπει σὰς χαὶ θλίψεις [ἡ ἐν ἔλει ἡ] ὡτι, οὐ προσέρχεταιν. ὃί
35 δ’ ἐστιν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ νπ’ ἀληθοσυνὸς καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κυνικὸν οὖν οὕτω τῶν δικτὸν προσφέροντα, ἐπὶ οὕτω γαὶ καὶ οἱ διὰ τὸν ἀνδρείον εἴεν πεποντες· τιπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐν ἀφισάταις τῆς νομής. καὶ οἱ μαγικοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσον, [οὐ δ’ ἐστιν ἀνδρεία τὸ 1117 δ’ ἀληθοσυνὸς ἡ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κυνικὸν] φυσικῶτατη δ’ ἔσσειν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσφεροντος ἐν αὐτή, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωτάτων ὄρων, ἐν ὧν παρατετειμέναι πατᾶ Κορω

πεδινῷ ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωτάτων ὄρων, ἐν ὧν παρατετειμέναι πατᾶ Κορω

Φιλαυτίῳ καὶ Ἐφραίμ ἐν τῇ τριακάτη (FHG. I. 274, 153).

§ 10. "Ομμερος. These are inexact reminiscences of II. xvi. 529 and Od. xxiv. 18. The phrase θέλειν αἷμα 'his blood boiled' occurs nowhere in Homer, but ἔκεια τοῦ περὶ καθαρὰς αἴματος was a current definition of Anger (De An. 403 a, 31). In poetry it occurs first in Theokritos, Id. xx, 15 ἐμαν θ’ ἄφαρ εξέσθεν αἷμα.

§ 11. ἦν ἐκαὶ ἐν Φαι. Ἐκαὶ παρειρκαὶ "Theophiles" was bracketed by Victorius. It seems to be a mere variant of ἐν ὧν.

οἱ δ’ οὖν. Cf. Homer’s comparison of Aias to a stubborn ass which goes on eating the corn though the boys keep on beating it. II. xi. 558 sqq.
λαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ ὕπνον ἄνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὁργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσί, τιμαροῦμενοι δὲ ἠδονοῦσι· οἱ δὲ διὰ τάς µαχώµενοι μάχεµοι µὲν, οὓς ἄνδρείου δὲ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος· ἀλλὰ διὰ τάς ἄθος· παραπλήσιον δ’ ἐχουσί τι· ὅπερ δὴ οἱ εὐθλπίδες ὑποτεθεὶς ἄνδρείου· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοῦς οὐ νεκυηκαίνει παρροῦσι ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόµοιοι δὲ· ὃτι ἄφεσιν ταραχάλει· ἂλλ’ οἱ µὲν ἄνδρείου δὲ τὰ πρότερον εὑρήµενα ταραχάλει· οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττονος εἶναι καὶ µῆχθεν ἄν’ αὐτοτεθείνει· τοιούτων δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ µεθυσκόµενοι· εὐθλπίδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς µὴ συµβῆτ’ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 15 φεύγουσιν· ἄνδρείου δ’ ὡς τὰ φοβερὰ ἄνθρωποι ὑπεταὶ καὶ φαινόµενα ὑποµένειν, ὃτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ µῆ. διὸ καὶ ἄνδρεισιν δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθήµασις φόβοις ἄφοβοι καὶ ἀτάραχοι εἶναι ἡ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ δὲ ξένου γὰρ µᾶλλον ἡ, ὃτι εἰποῦν ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ πρὸς 20 παρὰ µὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισµῶν καὶ λόγου τις προδήλωσι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ζητεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐξίσως. ἄνδρείου δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοούντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐθλπίδων, ἅλειψας δ’ ὅσον αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐχουσίν, ἐκείνοι δὲ. διὸ καὶ µένουσι τιµὰ
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ  

[Γ. VIII. 16]

25 χρόνον, οἱ δὲ ἦπατημένοι, ἐδιν ἵππων ὅτι ἔτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν, ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπετεύσεστε τοῖς Δάκωσιν ὧς Σκικυοῖοι. οἱ δὲ ἀνδρείαι εἴρηται ἡ ποσὶ τινες, καὶ οἱ δικαίοις ἀνδρείαι.  

IX. Περὶ θάρρης δὲ καὶ φόβους ἢ ἀνδρεία ὁνῆσα ὑπὸ 30 ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφοι ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβηρὰ. ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτους ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείας μᾶλλον ἡ ἢ περὶ τὰ βαρβαρά. τὸ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπὸ μὲνειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρείαι λέγωνται. διὸ καὶ ἐπιλυσυ ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίος ἐπαινεῖται. χαλεπῶτερον γὰρ τὰ 35 περὶ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἴδεων ἀπέξεσθαι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ 1117 ὑπὸ ἔτερον ἤ ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων ὢ ἀναφέρεσθαι, οἷον καὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτίοις ἢ τὰ ἀργῶς γινεῖται. τοῖς γὰρ πᾶσιν τὸ μὲν τέλος ἤδη, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ στεφανός καὶ ἀτιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεσίν, εἰς πέντε καὶ ναρκίνοι, καὶ λυπηρῶν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πάνω. διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλά ταῦτα ἐστὶ, μικρὸν ὃν τὸ ὡς ἔνεκα οὖν ἔδωκε, ἢδύναι ἥρπεται ἐγεῖνε.  

οἱ δὲ ἦπατημένοι, i.e. οἱ ἅρμαζοντε.  

Ἡ ὑποπτεύσωσι, ὦ (even) suspect that it is. Lb has ὑποπτεύσωσι, Kbd ὑποπτεύσωσι. The corruption is due to the scribes having taken ἔτερον ἤ together.  

Στὸν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. The story is told in Xen. Hell. iv, 4, 10. The Spartan cavalry had taken Sikyonian shields with a σίγμα upon them. This was in the battle at the Long Walls of Corinth B.C. 392.  

IX. § 1. Περὶ θάρρης δὲ κ.τ.λ. We now approach the question πῶς μετήγγις ἡ ἀνδρεία, and we find that it has more to do with pains than pleasures, whereas we shall see that σωφροσύνη has more to do with pleasures than pains (1117 b, 26). This is really the same question as πῶς ἀρκεῖναι ἀλλήλαι καὶ τῇ μετήγγις ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ ἐλλειψις. The fact that the βραχιός is like the ἀνδρείας while the δελος is not (1108 b, 30 sqq.) is due to the fact that ἀνδρεία is μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβηρὰ ἢ τὰ βαρβαρά. It has already been pointed out how important these questions of ἀνθίσεως are. Cf. above 1108 b, 11 n.  

§ 2. διὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The merit of ἀνδρεία does not lie in not facing the wrong things, but in facing the right things; for it has to do with τὰ φοβηρὰ, rather than τὰ βαρβαρά. That is why it is harder to be ἀνδρείας than to be σαφῆς. Ἀνδρεία implies the presence of positive pain, σωφροσύνη only the negation of certain pleasures. For the merit of σωφροσύνη lies in abstaining from the wrong pleasures, not in enduring the right pains.  

§ 3. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τόλμη, 'the end of an act which conforms to the definition of ἀνδρεία.' Cf. 1115 b, 21 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξω. Being an ἀνθίσεως καὶ ἀφθονή, it must be ἢδύναι καὶ αὐτὸς.  

ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλως, 'by the attendant circumstances,' cf. Rhet. 1307 b, 39, 1407 a, 35, 1415 b, 24.
4εί δή τοιούτον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὃ μὲν βάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπήρα τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ἀκοντε ἐσται, ἰπομενεν δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. καὶ ὅσον ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐχῃ πάσαν καὶ εὐθαμονέστερον ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ βανατῷ λυπήτηται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐχειν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγέστων ἄγαθον ἀποτελεῖται εἰδῶς, λυπήρον δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀνδρείου, ἵσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ’ ἰκείμενοι αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἄρεταις τὸ ἱδέως ἐνεργεῖ ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ’ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφαπτεται.

β. στρατιώτας δ’ οὐδέν ἵσως κολλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατάτους. ἐναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἀλλ’ ο’ ἄγαθον μηδὲν ἔχοντας: ἐταμίως γὰρ οὕτως πρὸς τοὺς κυνήγους, καὶ τὸν 7βίον πρὸς μικρά κέρδη καταλάμπτονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν 20 ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοιούτουν εἰρήθαι τι δ’ ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπῶν τόποι γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

Χ. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν: δοκούσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐστι να ἀρεταὶ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστι περὶ ἧδονας ἢ σωφροσύνης, εἰρηται ἡμῖν 25 ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὤμοιος ἐστι περὶ τὰς λύπας: ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολογία φαίνεται. περὶ πολίων οὖν τῶν ἡδωνων, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διερήθωσαν δὴ αἱ φυσικαὶ καὶ

1117 b, 20. ΕΕ. 1230 a, 34 περὶ πολία μὲν οὖν ὡσὸν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἰρηται κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἐφοδον ἱκανοῖς. περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολογίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι περιατέον. λέγεται δ’ ὁ ἀκόλουθος πολλαχῶς.

b, 28. ΕΕ. 1230 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ σωφρόν ἐστὶ περὶ

§ 5. ἐφάπτεται sc. τι. Cf. 1110 a, 14 π.
§ 6. στρατιώτας δ’ οὖδεν κ.τ.λ.
A practical remark for the benefit of the statesman. The ἀνδρεία we have been describing is not necessarily the best for professional soldiers.

Χ. § 1. τῶν ἀλόγων μερίν, sc. θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Aristotle starts as usual from τὰ δοκοῦτα, in this case the Platonic view. Aristotle did not himself believe in 'parts of the soul.' ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The question περὶ πολία μεσότης ἢ σωφροσύνης is discussed after a brief indication of πῶς μεσότης, i.e. ἦττον... περὶ τὰς λύπας.

Cf. above 1115 a, 5 π.
αἰ σωματικά, οὖν φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ
30 τούτων χαίρει οὐ φιλοτιμίας ἐστιν, οὗτων πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος ἄλλα μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἥδονας οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλουθοι λέγονται. ὦμοιος δὲ οὗτοι οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὡς καὶ μὴ σωματικά εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομάθους καὶ ἐθνικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
35 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκόλουθους δὲ οὖν
1118 λέγομεν, οὗτοι οὐσιωμένους ἐπὶ χρήματι ἢ φίλοις. περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἰγὴ ἄν ἢ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὗτοι δια τειτταί· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοὺς διὰ τὰς ὀφνεῖς, οὖν χρώμασι καὶ σχῆμασι καὶ γραφῆ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἠκάμαστοι λέγονται· κατοι δάξειν ἄν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτους, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολῆν καὶ ἠλέησθαι. ὦμοιοι δὲ καὶ εἰ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἄκοψην· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένους χαίροντας μέλεισιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὖν καὶ ἀκόλουθους λέγει, οὗτοι ἢδονας, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι. δει δὴ λαβαῖν εἰ περὶ τίνας. ὦ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὗτοι περὶ ἄπαντα τὰ ἡδέα τοῦ σώφρων σώφρων ἢδονάς ἢδονὰς, ἄλλα τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δόξος τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τῇ γενεσθειοτάν καὶ τὸ ἀπόθετον, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἀπόθετον. περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τὴν ὀφνεῖς ἢδονὰς τῶν καλῶν ἀνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἡ λέπην τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἁσμῆς τῶν εἰμαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἕτει δὲ πρὸς τὰς δὲ ὑποκρίσεις, τὰς τὰ ἀπὸ εὔδοσι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ ἀνυδοσίας, οὐκ ἢδονας οὗτοι δια τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνθρώπον θεωμένους ἢ ἐπτὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπον, ἢ ἀκρωμένους ἢ ἀδάντων, μὴ βούλιον μὴτε ἐσθίους μὴτε πίνεις μὴτε ἀφροδισιάζεις, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωμένων τῶν ἢ ἢδόνων ἀκόμην, οὐκ ἀν δαξεῖν ἀκόλουθος εἶναι, ὡστε ποιεῖ οὐκ ἦν κρίματος παρὰ τὰς Σειρήνας.

§ 2. οὖν refers to ὑμνεῖν, which is the emphatic word, as it is really the pleasures of the soul that are being divided from the more obvious pleasures of the body.

ἐκάτερος. For similar constructions ad sensum cf. 1118 b, 20. 1161 a, 16. οὐ, i.e. τοὐσιν or τῷ ὦ. The ellipse of the demonstrative or article before the relative is common. Cf. 1132 b,

1. 1156 a, 23. 1168 a, 11. 1174 a, 10. Bywater, Contr. p. 45.

§ 3. οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες κ. τ. λ. This distinctive character was already given to the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell by Plato. Cf. Phileb. 50 b ἄλλῳς ἢδονας ἄρθρον τὰ ἐνσώλαθη δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ καλά λέγομεν χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ καλά λέγομεν χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τῶν δειμών τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ τῶν φθύγγων.
§ 5. πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
There is no αἰσθανάσια in the pleasures of smell per se (καθ’ αὑτόν), it only comes in so far as they incidentally suggest the hope or memory of pleasures of another class. Plato (loc. cit.) had said τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλεονεκίας. Aristotle shows with great skill how it happens that to take pleasure in certain smells may be ἀπειλήσια. It is only in so far as they suggest pleasures of taste and touch.

§ 6. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, sc. τῶν μὴ ἀκολάσσων. Αἰσθήσεσθαι. In Probl. 950 a, 12 sqq. the example of the smell of salt fish is given, which is unpleasant when we are not hungry, ἡ τοῦ ταρχοῦ οἴνος, ἦν ἀθηνήν ἐχόμενοι τοῦ φαγεῖν. ἢ ἦν τοῦ ἡπόδου ἢ ἦδεα.

§ 7. ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἤδονις. The peculiarly human character of the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell is evidence of their 'pure' character. τὴν δ’ αἰσθήσιν... ἔσεσθαι, 'it is the smell that makes them aware of the presence of hares.'

[ἔφρων]. This word comes from Aspasio, who meant to correct what seemed a misquotation of Ι. iii, 24 ἔφρων ἢ θλασφὸν κερανίν ἢ ἄραιν αἶχα. But ἔφρων is pointless, for it does not
express a definite atēphos like sight (see Bywater, Contr. p. 36). We have had ὅπως and ὅπως, so we must now have ὅπως.


§ 9. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even taste, so far as it affords an opening to ἀκολούθως, may be reduced to touch. So far as it is strictly speaking the sense of taste, i.e. a δύναμις κριτική which distinguishes the various savours which lie between sweet and bitter, it does not appeal to the ἀκολούθως. The real ἀκολούθως would certainly refuse to be appointed wine-taster and pass his life in distinguishing vintages. That is rather on the level of artistic pleasure.

τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 422 a, 8 sqq. for Aristotle's theory of taste.

οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσιν τούτου. It is not the distinction of tastes that gives pleasure to the glutton, but the contact of food with the guttle. Would he be willing to spit it out after tasting it? Cf. Part. An. 690 b, τὴν ἔτσι γλυττά τῶν χιμών ποιεῖ τῷ αἰσθήσεις: τὸν ἐκ ἐκδοτῶν ἐν τῇ καθόθων ἴδον... καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ἐκείνω καὶ ἐκδοτῶν ἐν τῇ καταπάσθει τῇ τάσει ('tension' v. l. βλέπει 'contact') τοῦ ὀσφαλγοῦ γίνεται ἱχαρίς.
λεγομένους. διὸ καὶ ηὔξατο τις ὁφοφάγος ὃν τὸν φάρ
νυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ
άφη. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ᾽ ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία. 1118
καὶ δύξεν ἔν δικαίος ἐπονεῖδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ ἀνθρω-
ποῖ ἐμὲ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ ἡ ξῶα. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτος χαίρειν καὶ μᾶλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηρίωδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθερώτα-
τα τῶν διὰ τῆς άφης ἡδονῶν ἀφφημενι, οἴον αἱ ἐν τοῖς 5
γεμασίοις διὰ τρόφευος καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμενα: οὔ
γὰρ περὶ τὸν τὸ σόμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολαστοῦ ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ 10
τινα μέρη. XI. Τὸν δὲ ἐπιθυμοῦν αἰ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, αἰ δὲ ἓδιοι καὶ ἐπιθετοὶ: οἴον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική.

ὁφοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς
ἄτερ μόρια γὰρ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ δὲ τῶν δὲ ὄψεως ἡ ἀκοίος ἡ
οὐφροσύνης ἡδονὰς εἶναις ὁδεῖς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος ἐπὶ ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἀλλὰ
ἀνέυ ἀνείδους τῶν ἀμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταῖς, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα
μὴ λέγονται ἑγκρατεῖς: οἱ δὲ ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἶναι ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ
σώφρονες.

§ 10. ὁφοφάγος ὃν. Ευδομος
names him. He was Philoxenos son
of Eryxias. A certain pudding was
called after him (Φιλόξενος Πλα-
κεϊντε). As he was a favourite butt
of the comic poets, Athenaeus is full
of information about him. In a
comedy of Krobylos he was called
κάκων, οὐκ ἄρρητος because he liked
to burn his throat with hot slices of
fish. When he went out to dine his
servant used to take his own wine,
ol, vinegar and sauce, with which he
corrected the crudity of his host’s
cookery. Theophilos (FHG. IV, 516)
says of him ἡμέρατο ποτὸ γεράνου τὴν
φάρμαγα σχεῖν, and Machon has put
his prayer in verse:

Φιλόξενος τοῦ, ὦ λέγων, ὁ Κρόμπλρος
ἡμέρατο ποτῶν ἄρην λάργαγα πηχών,
ὅπως καταπίπτῃ φρενί, ὅτι πλεῖοντο
χρόνον
cai páno ἐμα ὑμᾶ τὰ βρομαθ' ἰδονῆν

τὸν φάρμαγα. This is incorrect, of
course, from the anatomical point of
view. Aristotle himself restricts the
name φάρμαγα to the trachos or wind-
pipe. But it was popularly used for
οἰοφάγα. Cf. Eur. Cycl. 915 ὁ φάρμας εὖπρεπής ἔστω (for dinner),
At. Frogs, 571 ὁ μαρὰ φάρμας. We
cannot expect correct anatomy from
an ὁφοφάγος, a Satyr and a παντὸς
καθαρχα. Machon says λάργαγα, which
is equally wrong.

κοινοτάτη, i.e. τοὺς ἵππους. Cf.
Probl. 950 π, 9 sqq. οἶσθαι δὲ τῶν
ἀληθείων τίττε, τὰ τού ἄλλα ζώα ἀπό
δύο μόνων τῶν προηρμένων ἔσται.

§ 11. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A further
restriction to certain pleasures of
touch.

XI. § 1. κοιναὶ implies φυσικαί.
Certain desires are common to all as
opposed to θειαί, and therefore φυσικαί
as opposed to ἐπιθετοὶ 'adventitious.'
1118 b, 16. EE. 1221 b, 15 ὄψοψας δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι καὶ οὐκόφολες τῷ πρὸς ὑποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπολαύσεις ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν ταξικήν παρὰ τῶν λόγων.
καὶ ἡ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἥδειν, ὑπερβολὴ ὑπὲρ ἀκολουθία καὶ συνέχεια, δήλαν· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σῶφρον οὐδ' ἀκολούθος τῷ μή, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκολούθος τῷ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἥδεων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τῇ τῶν λύπης δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἥδον), ὃ δὲ σῶφρον τῷ μή λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπονοιᾷ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεισθαι τοῦ ἥδεως.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκολούθος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἥδεων πάντων ἢ 1119 τῶν μᾶλλον, καὶ ἀγεταὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὡστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ταῦτα ἀιρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποτυχίαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπορο δ' ἡκεῖ τὸ δ' ἡδονή λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλεῖποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἡπτόμοντες οὐ πάνω γίνονται· οὖ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀνασκηνία· καὶ ἔρημος τὰ λυπατα ξιά διακρίνεται τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαῖρει τοῖς δ' οὕτω· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὴδὲν ἐστὶν ἢν μηδὲν διαφέρει ἐτέρου ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τετελεῖ χρόνος ἢ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος ιο·

1119 a, 5. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκηνίας μὲν οὖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκηνίας μὲν οὖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκηνίας μὲν οὖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκηνίας μὲν οὖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκηνίας μὲν οὖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκηνίας μὲν οὖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας, ὃς ὡς δὲ ἀνασκηνίας. ΕΕ. 1231 a, 26 ἀνασκη

§ 5. περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας κ.τ.λ. The question of πῶς μετατρέπεται is here briefly touched, and the relation of σωφροσύνη to pleasure and pain is contrasted with that of ἀνδρεία. To perform a brave act we must endure positive pain, to act in a temperate way we have only to abstain from pleasure. If we are σωφρονεῖμαι this will give us positive pleasure and not pain; if we feel pain in abstaining, we are ἀκολούθοι, but the pain is not positive; τῇ τῶν λύπης ποιεῖ ἡ ἥδονη.

§ 6. μετὰ λύπης... ἡ ἐπιθυμία. Cf. 1105 b, 21.

§ 7. οὐ πάνιν γίνονται, 'hardly occur.' For the use of οὐ πάνιν, cf. Ind. s. p.

οὐ τέτελε δ' ἢ ὁνόματος. Cf. 1107 b, 6 where he adds ἐστοιχεῖον τ' ἀνατριχίας. Eudemus (loc. cit.) compares the New Comedy type of the ἀγρόσκος. There were comedies of this name by Antiphanes, Anaxandrides, Anaxilas, Philemon and Menander.
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dia τὸ μῆ μᾶς γένεσθαι. ὃ δὲ σώφρονες μέσος μὲν περὶ ταύτ' ἐχεῖν οὔτε γὰρ ἢδειαν οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλος οἷς μῆ δεῖ οὔδε σφάζον τοιοῦτο ὤδειν, οὔτ' ἀπότων λυτεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἡ μετρίας, οὐδὲ 15 μᾶλλον ἢ δεὶ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεὶ, οὐδ' ὅλος τῶν τοιούτων ὤδεν· ὧν δὲ πρὸς ὑγείαιν ἐστίν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὃς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέας μὴ ἐμπόδιον τούτων ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν ὑστίαν, ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς 20 ἁζίας· ὃ δὲ σώφρον εὐτοιχίας, ἀλλ' ὃς ὁ ἀρθρος λόγος.

XII. Ἐκουσίφως δὲ μᾶλλον ἠθικαί ἡ ἀκολοχία τῆς δεηλιάς. ή μὲν γὰρ δὲν ὧσείνη, ἡ δὲ δὲν λύσιν, οὔ τὸ μὲν αἰρέτων, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λυπή ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν 25 τοῦ ἔχουσι φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἱδονή ὤδειν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον δὴ ἐκουσίν. διὸ καὶ ὑποεὐεξειότερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυθημένοι μᾶλλον πρὸς αὐτὰ· πολλὰ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ βλέπα τοιαύτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθαμβοὶ ἀκλίνουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβηρῶν ἀνάμαλω· δἐξιν 30 δὲν ὁ σῶμα ὑμῶν ἐστίν οὐκ ἔσται καθ' ἐκαστῶν·

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλεύθερος περὶ αὐτὰ, δήλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ νεφελιστή αὕτη ἡ ἱδία, καὶ ἀμφότεροι ἑναντία. ὡστ' ἂν σωφροσύνη καὶ νεφελιστή ἐξίστησι περὶ. αὐτὸ τὸ ἀκολοχία, καὶ περὶ τὰ γεγονότα τὰ εἰρήμενα τῶν αἰθητῶν μεσότης, σωφροσύνη ἐν εἴπερ. μεσότης ἄσεως ἀκολοχίας καὶ ἀνασφάλειας· ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολοχίας· ἡ δ' ἑλεύθερος ητοι ἀνώνυμος ητοι εἰρήμενος ὁ πρὸς προσαγωγονεμένη. ἀκριβέστεροι δὲ περὶ τῶν γένους τῶν ἱθονίων ἔσται διαιρετῶν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπερβολάν περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

§ 8. ὡς σὺ ἄρθρο λόγος, σκ. λέγει, κελείται, προστάτει. Cf. 1115 b, 12 d.

XIII. § 1. Ἐκουσίφως δὲ κ.π.λ.

This discussion of the voluntariness of ἀκολοχία and δεηλία is due to the need of showing how far the respective ἀρέται are really φιλί' ἱδία, and therefore how far it is true that our deliberation is really complete with regard to them.

ἀν τὸ μὲν αἰρέτων κ.π.λ. The point is that it is more in our power not to pursue a good thing than to avoid a bad one.

§ 2. ἐξίστησι, explained by φθείρα τὴν φύσιν, φθείρα here being used in the Academic sense of normal state or condition. Cf. below 1149 b, 35.

§ 3. δεξίω δὲν κ.π.λ. There is no pain in being a coward, for the coward keeps out of the way of pain; but particular acts of cowardice imply
ἐν γὰρ ἄλωτος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξήτησιν, ὡστε ὁπλα ῥυπτεῖν καὶ τάλλα ἀσχημονεύει· διό καὶ δοκεῖ 30 ἢνω. τῷ δὲ ἀκόλουθῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ἐκάστα τι—ἐπιθυμοῦντο γὰρ καὶ ὑρεγμένῳ—τὸ δὲ ἔλον ἤττουν· γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλουθος εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δόνομα τῆς ἀκο—καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παιδικῶν ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσιν ἡ ὁμοίωτητα. πότερον δὲ ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐδὲν 1119 ἀ νῦν διαφέρειν, δῆλον δὴ τὸ δι’ ἀπὸ τοῦ προ—οὐ κακὸς δὲ ἔοικε μετενενέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεὶ ἀληχρὸν ὑρεγμένον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξηθαὶ ἔχον, τοιοῦ—
5 τον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ᾿ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ἥκει καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἱδέος ὁρέξεις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπερβείας καὶ ὅπως τὸ ἄρρητον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξετ’ ἀπληστὸς γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἱδέος ὁρέξεις καὶ παυταχόθεν τὸ ἀναθητόν, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξεῖ τὸ συγγενὲς, 10 κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραί οὖν, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούσσων.

διό δεὶ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὸς καὶ ὁλόγας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μεθὲν ἐναπτιούσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπερβείας λέγομεν καὶ κεκλ. 8 λασμάνοι—ὡςπερ δὲ τὸν παιδα καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγογοῦ ἐξε, οὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν 15 λόγον. διό δεὶ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφορών 9 τῷ λόγῳ ἑκεῖνος ἤμα πάροικον τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σῶφρον οὖν δεὶ καὶ ὃς δεὶ καὶ ὅτε· οὖν δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

ἀνασθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἤδονας οἱ μὲν καλοῦντας ἀνασθητοὺς, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνύμαστα τοιοῦτοι προσαγορείουσιν. ἢστι δ’ οὐ πάν γνώμοιν τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ ἐπιπάλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτρον ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πάντως εἶναι σύμφωνοι τήν τῶν τοιούτων ἠδονὴν ἢπει καὶ ἀσθητοῖν. μάλιστα δ’ εἰς τοιοῦτοι, οἷοι οἱ κομμοδοδότις· σκαλοὶ παράγουσιν ἄργοικον, οἱ οὖν τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαία πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἠδονής.

καὶ ὁ παῖς. Cf. above 1103 a, 3 ὡςπερ τῷ πατρὸς ἄκοσμετόν τι.
§ 7. τὸ συγγενὲς. Here apparent- ly in the sense of τὸ σύμφωνον as in 1149 b, 11 and often.

ἐκκρούσσων. Cf. 1154 a, 27.
BOOK IV.

GOODNESS IN SOCIAL LIFE.

Introductory Note.

The Fourth Book shows how the principles we have discovered apply not only to the great virtues of Fortitude and Temperance, but also to those "minor morals" which make up nine-tenths of life. If our principles are worth anything at all, they must be capable of explaining these also, and in fact it is the best possible test we can apply to them. The importance of this book is entirely missed if we imagine that Aristotle is setting before us types of character for our admiration and imitation. His aim is not edification, but the application of the test of fact to a general law. From this point of view the criticism that he has strayed from moral philosophy into matters more fitting for a handbook of etiquette will be seen to be wide of the mark. Our principles must be shown to explain what the average Athenian understood by καλοκαγαθία, or they stand condemned. The lesser men who came after Aristotle did not rise to this point of view. They apologise for discussing such things, or even deny to them the name of "virtues." But Aristotle's greatness is seen in this, that he felt bound to show that the Mean was exemplified not only in the regulation of such passions as Fear and Desire, but just as much in the ordinary acts of everyday social life.
Δενωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι περὶ χρήματα μεσότητας: ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέρος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς κρι-25 σεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δῶσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὄσαν ἢ ἄξια νο-2

1119 b, 22. EE. 1231 b, 27 ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρεπεία καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητας. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσης μὲν τὰς μᾶλλον χαῖρον ἢ δὲι, ἀποβολὴ δὲ πάση λυπούμενας μᾶλλον ἢ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος, ὃ δ' ἀμφότερα ἡπτὸν ἢ δὲὶ ἀνισοτος, ὃ δ' ἀμφότερος ὃς δὲι

I. § 1. περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. The restriction of the word ἐλευθέρος to Liberality in money matters was Attic. Cf. Plato, Rep. 402 c, Thesalt, 144 δ' τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθερίας, Xen. Symp. 4, 15 ἐλευθέρος εἰς χρηματα, passages which show that the limitation did not even in Attic always 'go without saying.' Many points in Aristotle's sketch are suggested by Plato's picture of Kephalos in the Republic.

περὶ χρήματα. The first question is περὶ τοῦτο μεσότητα. Cf. 1115 a, 5 ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, sc. ἐν οἷς ὁ ἀνδρείας. ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρον, sc. ἐν ἰδιώμας πιστοις. ἐν τοῖς κρήςειν, ἐπι, ὡσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Aristotle speaks as if δικαιο-σύνεθες had already been treated in its natural place along with ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, though it had really been postponed, on the ground, as we are told above (1108 b, 7), that οὐχ ἄλλως ἑγέρσι.

περὶ δῶσιν...ἐν τῇ δόσει, a good example of the equivalence of these two prepositional phrases to express the material (ὅλη) of goodness, which is here a πρᾶξις not, as hitherto, a πάθος. Cf. also ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κ.τ.λ. above.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Cf. above 1117 b, 26 γὰρ τὰς λύπας.

§ 2. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ., 'all that has a money value,' not merely money itself. The money value is the continuum in which we have to find the μεσότητα πρὸς ἧμας. Aristotle's theory of money is discussed later on in Book V.
θική Νικόμαξεια

§ 3. ἄσωτια, 'prodigality.' Antiphanes and Euthyckles wrote comedies called ἄσωτος, and Timostratos one called ἄσωτος. Ennius and Caecillus each wrote an ἄσωτος. We shall see that all through this book Aristotle draws more on Comedy than on life. The 'Middle' and New Comedy had provided a hortus siccus of types of character, which furnished him with the material he wanted. There could be no better evidence of τὰ δοκοῦτα. ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. The plural is used because each may be either ὑπερβολὴ or ἐλλεῖψις according as we refer it to λήφης or δόξης.

ἐπιφέρομεν, 'we apply.' For φέρων, ἐπιφέρων δομὰς cf. 1119 a, 24 n.

συμπλήκτους. Of this word Bousis says "logice saepe usurpatur de coniungendis in eandem notionem pluris notis" (Ind. Ar. 718 a, 55). We may render 'in a complex sense,' 'with a wider connotation.' 'Prodigality' often connotes Incontinence and Intemperance.

§ 4. οὐ δὲ ὅλκεως προσαγορεύονται, i.e. ἄλλοτριως προσαγορεύονται. We have ἄλλοτριως ἀνοικδέλθαι in Cat. 2 b, 35 of those who answer the question τι ἐστιν ἄθρωτος in any other category than the τι ἐστιν (genus and species). So Top. 108 b, 28 οὐκ ἄλλοτριως ἀρίστεται. From Phys. 195 b, 3 we see that ὅλκεως is also opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and that term could be substituted for ἄλλοτριος in the passages above. The meaning here, then, is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγονται.

§ 5. βοσδεῖα...ἐναι. 'By ἄσωτος we mean ἀ ἐν τι κακῶν ἔχων.' The phrase βοσδεῖα ἐναι is often used in the same sense as βοσδεῖα λέγεται (for which see 1110 b, 30 n.). So below 1125 b, 33. The usage explained 1132 a, 21 n. is a little different.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

Ομε δ' ἐστὶν χρήσει τις, ἐστὶν τούτων χρήσθαι καὶ εν καὶ καὶ 5 κόσον. ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶν τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἀρίστῳ χρήσθαι ᾧ ἔχων τὴν περὶ ἐκάστου ἀρετὴν· καὶ πλοῦτῳ δὴ χρήσται ἀριστὰ ὦ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν· οὕτως δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέρος. χρήσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρησίμων δαπανῆς καὶ δόσεις· ἢ δὲ λήψεις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσεως μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλ-10 λὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἡ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεὶ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν όυ δεῖ. τὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον τὸ ἐν ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐν πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλ- λον τὰ ἀισχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδοκον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἐπεται τὸ ἐν ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λή-15 ψεῖ τὸ ἐν πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τὸ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ἡ ἐπαίνεσιν μὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ βάσιν δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τὸ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἦττον 9 προέλειται μᾶλλον ὥς ἡ λαμβάνουσιν τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευ-10 θέριον δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ

ἀποβολὴν. διχὼς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ χρήσις τοῦ κτήματος ἐστιν, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἤ ἱματίου, ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μὲν, οἷον μετὰ οὗτος ὡσ ἐν εἰς τοὺς σταθμοὺς χρήσεως τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἄλλ' ἢ ἡ πολυμησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις· χρήσιμη γὰρ ὑποδήματι· ὃ δὲ φιλαργυρός ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα ἐστιν ἑσπονδάκιος, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντί τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκός χρήσεως ἐστιν· ὃ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἢ εὐθὺ καὶ ἁστοῖο περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν αὐξήσιν διώκει· ὃ δ' ἁστοῖο ἐλεύθερος τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὃ δ' ἐλευθέρος τῆς περιουσίας διδωσιν.
δὲ ἑλευθεριώτητα ἐπανοίγεται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην. 20 11. οὐ δὲ λαμβανόντες οὐδ’ ἐπανοίγεται πάνω. φλούνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἑλευθεριοὶ τῶν ἀπ’ ἄρετῆς, ἀφελέμου γάρ, 22 τούτο δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. οὐ δὲ κατ’ ἄρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὁ ἑλευθεριώς οὐν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὅρθως. οἷς γὰρ δεὶ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τάλλα ὅσα 25 13 ἑπταὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως τὸ γὰρ 14 κατ’ ἄρετὴν ἤδω ἢ ἀλυπτικόν, ἡκισταὶ δὲ λυπηρῶν. δὲ δὲ διδοὺς ὡς ἡ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀιτιῶν, 15 οὐκ ἑλευθερίας ἀλλ’ ἀλλος τις ῥηθέται. οὐδ’ ὁ λυπηρὸς ὁ μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιπ’ ἢν τὰ χρήματα τις καλῆς 30 15 πράξεως, τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἑλευθερίαν. οὐδὲ λήγεται δὲ θεῖν μὴ δεῖ; γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη ἐν ἁλήψει. οὐ καὶ εἰς δὲ οὐδ’ αἰτητικός οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ εὐ ποιών- 17 τοσος εὐχέρεως εὐνεργειτεσθαι. οὐδὲ δὲ δεῖ, λήγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὁς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ἂν ἀναγκαῖον, 1120 ὅπως ἔχῃ διδάσκαλος. οὖ τοῦ ἀλληλοθείας, 18 διδάσκαλος, οἷον ἀλληλοθείας τῶν οἰκείων, 1120 ὅπως ἔχῃ διδάσκαλος. οὖτος τοῦτον τις ἐπαρκεί. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχόντων δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδάσκαλος, οἷος καὶ ὅταν καὶ οὗ καλῶν. Εὐλευθερίαν δ’ ἐστὶ (ἀπὸ τῶν κανόνων), as some politicians do. Cf. below 1163 b, 8.

καλὸν...ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the opposition between the end and the condition sine qua non, the final and the material cause. The ἀναγκαῖον here referred to is not the μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλος χεῖρα, but τὸ ὁδὸν ἀνεύ τοῦ ἐν (Met. 1072 b. 13), τὸ ἑν ὑπὸ λόγου ἀναγκαῖον (Part. An. 642 a. 9), the conditionally necessary, that which must be if something else is to be.

οὐδὲ ἀμελήσῃ τῶν οἰκείων. I prefer αἰκείων, the reading of L, to ἱδίων (K') which all the editors follow. Above ἱδίων (ἄντι κανῶν, δημοκρατίας) is in place, but here we want an opposite to ἀληθικῶν.

§ 15. Ἐλευθερίαν δ’ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show the need of the caution given in the preceding section.
5 σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, οὕτως καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ ἐλευθερίαν.
κατὰ τὴν ὁυσίαν δ’ ἡ ἐλευθεριότητι λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ 20 πληθεῖ τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁυσίαν [диδοσιν]. οὕθεν δὴ καὶ κωλύει ἐξ ἐλευθεριότερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ὄπ’ ἐλατ- τῶνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριότεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κηπάζ- 10 μενοὶ ἀλλ’ παραλαβόντες τὴν ὁυσίαν’ ἀπεφεύρε τὸ γὰρ τῇ ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἕργα, ἀστὲρ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ πτυχαῖ. πλουτεὶ δ’ ὁ βαδίον τὸν 15 ἐλευθερίον, μῆτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μῆτε φιλακτικὸν, προετοικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι’ αὐτά τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ’ ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ δὴ οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι 21 ὄντες ἥκισαν πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ’ οὐκ ἀλάγωσι τούτο’ οὐ γὰρ οἶν τε χρήματα’ ἐχειν μὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δῶν έχει, ἀστέρ 20 οὐδ’ ἐπ’ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δὸσεί γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ’ ἄν μὴ 21 δεῖ, οὐδ’ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἐπὶ πρᾶττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλάβωσι οὖν ἄν ἐχοί εἰς δὲ ἀναλάσεσθαι. ἀστέρ γὰρ ἐρήμητα, ἐλευθερίος ἐστιν 25 κατὰ τὴν ὁυσίαν δαπανών καὶ εἰς δ’ δεῖ· ὅ δ’ ὑπερβάλλειν 25 ἀστονος. διὸ τοὺς τυπάνους οὐ λέγομεν ἀστόνος· τὸ γὰρ πληθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ βάδιον εἶναι τὰς δόσεις καὶ ταῖς δαπαναῖς ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσεύτησιν 24 ὁυσις περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψειν, ὁ ἐλευθερίος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς δ’ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μι- 23 κροὶς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἱδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ’ ὀθὲν

§ 20. εἰναι δοκοῦσιν. Cf. infra 1167 b, 34. 1168 a, 21. Τὸ ένδοξος comes from Plato, Rep. 330 δ’ ὅ τι ἐνεκα ἁρμόνη, ὅ δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅτι μοι ἐδοξός οὐ σφόδρα ἄχαρτα τὰ χρήματα. τούτω δὲ τοῦτον ἂν τὸ τοῦλ ὅ ἄν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωσι· οἱ δὲ κτήσομαι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι διστάσομαι αὐτά. ἀστερ γὰρ οἱ προτάλ τὰ ἀγάπα ἀκομάμα καὶ ὁ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπών, ταύτη γε δὴ καὶ ὁ χρηματισμένη περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάσων ὡς ἵγον ἐστίν, κατὰ τὴν χρήμαν ἐπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.

§ 21. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται κ.τ.λ. Cf. the σκόλιον of Timokreon ὄφελεν τ’, ὁ τιμλε Πλούτου κ.τ.λ. (Bergk-Crusinus p. 260), and the Ploutos of Aristophanes.


The page contains a block of text in Greek, followed by a paragraph in English, and then another paragraph in Greek. The text is not clearly legible due to the quality of the image. The English text appears to be translated from Greek and includes references to ancient Greek literature and philosophy. The Greek text seems to be a continuous block of prose, while the English text appears to be a commentary or explanation in modern English.

The text is not a natural plain text representation, as it is not possible to accurately transcribe or interpret the content due to the quality of the image.

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"παντεια. By this word Aritos-

1121 αι δεια δει. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἀμφοτήρας μεσοτη-

ποιήσει μισθεούς ὑπὸ δει. ἡπτεταί γὰρ τῇ ἐ πεικεις δυ-

τοιαῖας θάρσεις, ὡς δὲ τοιαῖας ἐναντίας ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν 

πῶμενα γένονται ἁμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δὲ ἐναντίαι δή-

δος οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δὲν καὶ τὸ καλὸς ἔχον συμ-

αυτῷ ἀναλίλευκα, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δει-

αρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἠδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δει καὶ 

αἱ. καὶ εἰκονίωνος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέροις εἰς χρήματα 

ται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ 5 

ὅν ἀνθέμονες εἰ τὶ δὲν καὶ ἀναλώσαν εἰ ἐναντίον 

ταν τις ἄνθρωπον τούτους διαμαρτάνειν· ὡς γὰρ ἰδοντι 

ἐφ' οἷς δὲ λυπεῖται· έσται δὲ προφύσις φανερῶ 

εἴρηται δὴ ἦμων ὦτι ὑπερβολαί καὶ ἠλλοιχίας εἰς ἐστὶ 

η. τα καὶ τὴν ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ 

ή 

καὶ τὴν δικαιόμενα γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσει τίθειμεν. ἡ μὲν 

οὖν 

τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ 

διέσω τὴν ἠλλοιχία, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν 

ἐ 

τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλην ἐν μικρώ 

15 

αὐτῆς ἄσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδιώκεται· οὗ γὰρ ῥάδιον 


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1. ἔκτειναι. By this word Aritos-

2. εὐκοινώνων, 'easy to do 

3. γράφετο οὐ θεότης ἄδικος, ὁ Γρηγορία, 

4. τοῦ Σιμωνίδου. I have adopted 

5. αὐτοῦ μεμοιράσαται ἔλλοι 

6. Θεοφραστος τοῖς Περὶ ἠθῶν 

7. τὸς πλοῦσιν. The saying 

8. τὰ...τῆς ἄσωτίας, excess in giving, 

9. οὐ πάνω συνδιώκεται, i.e. οὐχ 

10. ἔκτειναι ἄδικος. There is no 

11. τοῖς καὶ τοῦ Περὶ 

12. δενείται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν 

13. πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γνώμα τῆς Ἡρώδους 

14. θρόην ποτερον γενέσθαι κρείττον 

15. πλούσιων ἡ σοφία. Πλούσιον εἰς 

16. τοῖς τῶν 

17. § 29. πλην ἐν μικρώ. If it were 

18. ἐν γεγονός οὐὰδοι, cf. 

19. τα...τῆς ἄσωτίας, excess in giving, 

20. οὐ πάνω συνδιώκεται, i.e. οὐχ 

21. ἔκτειναι ἄδικος. There is no 

22. τοῖς καὶ τοῦ Περὶ 

23. δενείται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν 

24. πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γνώμα τῆς Ἡρώδους 

25. θρόην ποτερον γενέσθαι κρείττον 

26. πλούσιων ἡ σοφία. Πλούσιον εἰς 

27. τοῖς τῶν 

28. § 29. πλην ἐν μικρώ. If it were 

29. τα...τῆς ἄσωτίας, excess in giving, 

30. οὐ πάνω συνδιώκεται, i.e. οὐχ 

31. ἔκτειναι ἄδικος. There is no 

32. τοῖς καὶ τοῦ Περὶ 

33. δενείται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν 

34. πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γνώμα τῆς Ἡρώδους 

35. θρόην ποτερον γενέσθαι κρείττον 

36. πλούσιων ἡ σοφία. Πλούσιον εἰς 

37. τοῖς τῶν 

38. § 29. πλην ἐν μικρώ. If it were 

39. τα...τῆς ἄσωτίας, excess in giving, 

40. οὐ πάνω συνδιώκεται, i.e. οὐχ 

41. ἔκτειναι ἄδικος. There is no 

42. τοῖς καὶ τοῦ Περὶ 

43. δενείται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν 

44. πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γνώμα τῆς Ἡρώδους 

45. θρόην ποτερον γενέσθαι κρείττον 

46. πλούσιων ἡ σοφία. Πλούσιον εἰς 

47. τοῖς τῶν 

48. § 29. πλην ἐν μικρώ. If it were 

49. τα...τῆς ἄσωτίας, excess in giving, 

50. οὐ πάνω συνδιώκεται, i.e. οὐχ 

51. ἔκτειναι ἄδικος. There is no 

52. τοῖς καὶ τοῦ Περὶ 

53. δενείται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν 

54. πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γνώμα τῆς Ἡρώδους 

55. θρόην ποτερον γενέσθαι κρείττον 

56. πλούσιων ἡ σοφία. Πλούσιον εἰς 

57. τοῖς τῶν 

58. § 29. πλην ἐν μικρώ. If it were 

59. τα...τῆς ἄσωτίας, excess in giving, 

60. οὐ πάνω συνδιώκεται, i.e. οὐχ
μηδαμοθὲν λαμβάνοντα πάσι διδόναι—ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὔσια τοῦς ιδίωτας διδόντας, οὔτε καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀστωτὸν εἶναι—ἐπεὶ ὦ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειν ἂν οὐ μικρὸ βελτίων εἶναι· 20 τὸν ἄνελευθέρον. εὐλάτος δὲ τὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐξεθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τά τοῦ ἄνελευθέρου· καὶ γὰρ διδόσει καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δὲ ὡς δεῖ οὐδὲ εὑ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἐθεσθῇ ἢ ποι ἀλλὰς μεταβάλει, εἰ γὰρ ἄνελευθέρος· δοσίς γὰρ οὐς δεῖ, 25 καὶ οὐ λήφηται οὔθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαίνως τὸ ἰδίον· οὐ γὰρ μοιχηρὸν οὐδ’ ἄστρον τὸ ὑπερβάλλει διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίον δὲ, ὅ δὲ τούτων τῶν 30 τρόπων ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τὸν ἄνελευθέρον εἶναι διὰ τὰ εἰρήμενα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλοὺς, ὁ δὲ οὐδένα, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἁπάτων, καθάπερ 33 εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν οὔθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τούτο ἄνελευθέρου. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλευσαν μὲν ἀνα- 34 λίσκεως, εὐχέρως δὲ τούτῳ ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοῦ τὰ υπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν

§ 30. οὔτε καὶ, 'and it is just these,' i.e. private persons as opposed to tyrants.

§ 31. ἐπεὶ, quamquam. ὥ γε τοι- οῦτος, i.e. τὸ μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα καὶ πάσι διδόναι. This is the prodigal young man of the New Comedy, who is usually a sympathetic character.

§ 34. εὐχέρως here is simply 'con-

veniently,' 'easily,' opp. to δυσχέρως. In this sentence the meaning expressed by εὐχέρως above (1120 a, 34) is given by δυσχέρως.

§ 35. τοῦτον ἐνεκα. sc. τοῦ καλοῦ. cf. 1120 a, 24.

§ 36. εὐχέρως once more with the same meaning as 1120 a, 34.

§ 37. πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἵν. Rhet. 1389 b,
μιαγωγητος ἡνὸμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
τελικας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἄφικον’ ἂν. ἂ
ἡ δ’ ἡμία ἀνιατός τ’ ἕστιν—δοκεί γὰρ τὸ γήρια καὶ πάσα
τα ἀνελθηκόντων ποιεῖ—καὶ συμφωνεῖτεν τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἀστοίας’ οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματι μᾶλλον 15
ὁλ. καὶ διατείνει δ’ ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυεῖδες ἐστίν
γὰρ πρότοι δοκοῦσα τῆς ἀνελθηκής εἶναι. ἐν δυσα-
τα, τῇ τ’ ἄξιον τῇ δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῇ
οὐ πάς ὁ διόλοκρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐνιότε χω-
καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβαλλοῦν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δώ-
σῃ ὑποτεύουσιν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις
τὸ διὸ γῆρον καὶ λεύχου καὶ λευκότων τῶν ἀιχρῶν
ὁ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ φακάς γε διὰ τούτο φυλάττεται, ἕνα μη 25
ἀγκασθῶσιν αἰχρὸν τι πράβασι τοῦτων δὲ καὶ ὁ
φόβος καὶ τὰς ὑποτέτοις ὑπονόμαι δ’ ἀπὸ τῆς

b, 21. EE. 1232 a, ο άυτων δὲ τούτων εἰδή λέγονται
τα τά μᾶλλον καὶ ἡπτον περὶ μόρια, οἱον ἀνελθηκόντως φειδολος
λέξι καί αἰχροκερδῆς, φειδωλός μὲν εν τῷ μὴ πρόνεσθαι,
ὅρις δ’ ἐν τῷ ὑπνοι προσείνησθαι, κιμβίζε δ’ ἐν τῷ ἀδορὰ
περὶ μικρὰ

§ 39. οἱον κ.π.λ. Cf. EE. 1232 a, 12 above. We are here in the midst
of the New Comedy vocabulary.

κιμβίκες. According to Coraes,
quoted by Stewart, the word κιμβίς
properly meant 'flea' (Modern Greek
τζιβίκε = κιμβίκειν). The name seems
to have been applied to Simonides (by
Xenophon, according to school. Ar.
Peace 697), cf. Athenaeus 566 φον
δην ἐν τῷ ἀδορᾷ κιμβίς ἐν Σιμώνιδη
και αἰχροκερδῆς, ως ἐν Χαριλήον φον.

κυμινοπρότης, 'cummin-sawer.'
Cf. our 'skin-flint,' 'cheese-parer.'
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

υπερβολής τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι: οἱ δ’ αὐτὶ διὰ φόβου ἀπεχονται τῶν ἀλλητρίων ὡς οὐ βρίσκων αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέραν 30 λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐτέρους μὴ ἀρέσκειν οἴν αὐτῶς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. οἱ δ’ αὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ἂν ύπερβάλλουσα τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οὐ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενου, πορνοβοσκοῦ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιούτοι, καὶ τοκιστὰ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ.

1122 a πάντες γὰρ οὖν οὗ οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ὅποσον οὖν δεῖ κοινὸν δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ αἰσχυρόκερδες φαίνεται πάντες γὰρ 41 ἐνικά κέρδους, καὶ τοῦτον μικροῦ, οὐκείθη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς 42 γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ οὖν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἐ δεῖ, οὐ 5 λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, αἰνοῦ τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πολεμοῦσαν καὶ ἑρὰ συλλῶτας, ἀλλὰ πονηρῶς μάλλον καὶ ἀσέβεις καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυριεύτης καὶ λωτοῦτης [καὶ ὁ ληστῆς] 43 τῶν ἀνελευθέρων· αἰσχυρόκερδες γὰρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἐνικά ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ οὐκείθη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ 10 μὲν κυρίοντος τοὺς μεγαστῶς ἐνικά τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δὲ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ οὖν δι’ ὅτι κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχυρόκερδες· καὶ πάσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαύται λήψις ἀνελευθέρου. εἰκότος δὴ τῇ ἐλευθερώτητι 44 ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίων λέγεται· μεῖζον τε γὰρ ἐστὶ κακῶν τῆς 15 ἀσωτίας· καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἀμιτανόσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεγομέναις ἀσωτίαν. περί μὲν οὖν ἐλευθερωτητῆς καὶ τῶν ἀντικείμενον κακῶν τοιαύτη εἰρήθοι.
ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

II. Δόξαι δ’ ἄν ἄκολουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διεξέχειν. Ἔσοδε γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματα τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι, οὐχ ὡσπερ δ’ ἡ ἐλευθερότητα διατείνει περὶ πᾶσας τὰς ἐν 20 χρήσεωι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανήματι μονὴν ἐν τούτοις ὑπέρεχει τῆς ἐλευθερότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τούτοις αὐτὸ ὑποστημαίει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. 2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τε· οὐ γάρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριπάροχον καὶ ἄρχηθεωρόν. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρῶς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ὧ καὶ 25 3 περὶ δ’. ὃ δ’ ἐν μικροῖς ἡ ἐν μετριοῖς κατ’ ἄξιαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁποῖον τὸ ἃ πολλάκις δόσκον ἀλήτη, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἑλευ- 4 θέριος, ὃ δ’ ἐλευθερίας ὀδὴν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς, τῆς τουαύτης δ’ ἔξως ἢ μὲν ἐπεισείς μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, 30

II. §1. περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας, ‘μαρτυρία.’ This was a form of goodness regularly expected of the Athenian upper classes, and showed itself chiefly in ἀρχαιογένες and ἐπήθεις. 

ὑποστημαίει, cf. 1113 A 16. ἐν μεγάθει πρέπονα. Of course in the compound μεγαλοπρεπής, πρέπει has its original sense of ‘to be conspicuous,’ but Aristotle treats it as if it meant ‘to be fitting.’

§ 2. πρὸς τι, ‘relative.’

τριπάροχον...ἀρχηθεωρόν. The trierarchy was an ἀγῶνον ἄρχηθεωρα (Dict. Ant. s. v.), the ἀρχηθεωρόν was an extraordinary one. The ἄρχηθεωρόν had to equip the sacred pilgrimages to Delos, Olympia and elsewhere. See Ἀθ. pol. 56, 3 καθῆκται δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχηθεωρ) εἰς Δήλου χορηγοῦς, καὶ ἀρχηθεωρῶν τῷ τριακοντάρῳ τῇ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀγοραῖ. These are the διὰ ἐπὶ́ of Plato, Phaid. 48 a and Bakhylides.

ἐν ὧ καὶ περὶ δ’, synonymous, ‘the object.’ Cf. above 1119 B, 25 n. The expression is condensed for πρὸς τὸ ἐν ὧ καὶ περὶ δ’. For the omission of the antecedent, cf. below 1120 B, 7.

§ 3. πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. Od. xvii, 420-1

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτὲ ὅλον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔναυσιν ὀδήσομαι ἀφεπερῶ, καὶ πολλάκις δόσκον ἀλήτη.

§ 4. μικροπρέπεια. The word does not seem to occur before Aristotle.
γεννήσαντι, οὖς καλοῦσι τίνες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκων. οὐ οἱ εἰς γάμον δαπανω ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαπητῶν, πλούσιοι οὖς, διὸ κατέχουσιν ἐνελθὲν ταῖς κατασκεύαις οἷον ἀγαθοδομισμοῦ, ἐστὶν δὲ καὶ μικροτρέπης, ὃ δὲ τοιοῦτοι δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι μὴ δάχεις χάριν μηδὲ δι᾽ ἐξουσίαν δομοῦ τῶν σαλάκων, ὃ δὲ καὶ ἄξιοι καὶ οὐ δὲ λόγος, μεγαλοτρέπης: τὸ γὰρ πρόσευ αὐτός ἐστιν: οἷον γὰρ πρόσευ τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἄξιον. δὲ εἰ δὲ πρόσευ εἶναι [καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρόσευτος (I. πράσπευτος) καὶ ἄξιον καὶ πρόσευ (περὶ δὲ Jackson)] καὶ περὶ ὅ (οὗν περὶ οἰκείου γάμον ἐτεροὶ τὸ πρόσευ καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένων) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰπὲ ἐπὶ

ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ κ.τ.λ. ΕΕ. 1233 α, 38. Ἰσοκρ. Δημ. 7 δ ἐστὶ φιλοκαλοῦ μὲν τὸ μεγαλοτρέπτει, καλλιστότερον δὲ τὸ περίτερον.

βαναυσία. The origin of the word is unknown, but its primitive application was clearly to mechanical arts unworthy of a free citizen. In the Politics we find it in this sense without any moral implication, e.g. 1277 b, 35 ἄκριτος βαναυσίαν παλαιστικήν.


§ 6. εἰν ἄρχη. No such statement has yet been made, but that will not justify us in bracketing the sentence with Ramsauer. It has been implied throughout in the discussion of ἐξω under the two heads περὶ ποία (= ἐν ἑστὶν) and πῶς (= γάμῳ ἀγαπητῷ).

The point here is that we must have πρόσευτος μέγεθος not only in the ἐνεργεῖα, i.e. the δανάην, but also in the ἐργα, the object of the δανάην. I therefore read αἱ δὲ for the ms. αἱ δὲ.


ἀκριβολογία, ‘nice counting of the cost.’ This use of the word for the habit of ἀκριβῆς λογίας instead of ἀκριβῆς λόγος (cf. ἀκριβολογοῦσθαι 1139 b, 19) is rare. The usual term for this is μικρολογία (Theophr. Char. 10). A similar idea, however, under-
loikai Nikolaia

προπαθέστατον σκέψαι ἄν μᾶλλον ἡ πόσην καὶ ἴστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπές. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθερός διαπανήσει ἀ ἰδίῳ καὶ ὡς ἱππος δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, αὑτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὑπάρχει διὰ τῆς ἴσης ἀναγκαίου ποιήσας μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτῆς ἀντικαθίστας καὶ ἑργον. κτήμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλεῖστον ἡξιον 15 οὖν, οἷον χρυσός, ἑργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλὸν (τοῦ τοῦ θεωρία θαιμαστή), δὲ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαιμαστὸν

τοιοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν όυκ ἤφετο πρέπειν, ἢν εποιήσατο Ὀλυμπία, διὰ τὴν προφετείαν δὲ ἄλλα Κίμων. ὡς δ' ὅπως ἐγχών ἐνώπιον τὴν ἀξίαν δὲν καὶ ἐν' ἐλευθερότητας ὅσατος; ἐστι γὰρ τοῖς ὑπ' ὅντι ἀνελεύθεροι.

ὁ ἀκριβῆς in Andok. 33 κατασκεύασαν and Menander ο ἀκριβῆς τῶν πρέπουσ. τοῦ νοὸν, i.e. so scarce is to count every bucket.

καὶ τῶν ἀλαχιστοῦ, it will cost and how it cheapest.'

τοιοῦτον δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. ἐν ἐν δὲ. 'It is here that the μέγεθος of the shows itself, and this is how to conduct with. He a more magnificent re-cite μεγαπρεπῆς or the he same expense.' The He is intended to show f the ἐλευθέρως and the... of the εἰλέυθερος and the. It is not the actual he spends which makes it, but the way he he clause ἀνά τῆς ἴσης does not, I think, con-nce with Liberality, but excess and defect. Sup-
καὶ ἔστων κ.τ.λ. Ὁ The goodness of an ἔργων lies in its grandeur, not in its cost. I bracket μεγαλοπρέπεια with Muretus. Its shifting place in the MSS. indicates that it is an adscript.

§ 11. τίμια. Cf. 1101 b, 11 p. κατασκευή. The word is used absolutely for 'buildings.' Here temples etc. are clearly meant.

πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτιμήμα. This is said to mean 'objects of patriotic ambition.' But εὐφιλοτιμήμα is a very strange word, and ought to mean 'easy objects of ambition.' I believe that we should read σὺν εὐφιλοτιμήμα ἢ ἀφιλοτιμήμα (the confusion of εἰ- and α-) is constant in MSS.). The greatest ληφεργία were far from being objects of public ambition, as we know; but just for that reason they attract the μεγαλοπρέπεια. Cf. what is said of the μεγαλῆς Ἀργος 1124 b, 23. Dion. Hal. has the phrase εἰς τὰ κοινά ἀφιλοτιμία.

Lambda: ο is a word of constant occurrence in connexion with the ληφεργία.

ἐστιν τὴν πόλιν. The ληφεργία of the ἐστάτορος was simply ἐστιν τὴν φόλην, and this might conceivably be πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν φιλοτιμημον. Here we have something 'grander,' appealing only to a μεγαλοπρέπεια like Konon who τῇ περὶ Κλίδων ομοιομενομενε Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τεχνης τῶν Πειραιά ἐκτόνομον τῷ ὑπὲρ τιθασ καὶ σὺν ψυχων καὶ πάντας ἄθροισιν ελεσθαν. (Atheneaus 1, 3 d.)

§ 12. τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, 'what are his antecedents?' The reference is not merely to property, though it includes that.

πρέπειν. The sentence continues after the parenthesis with πρέπει δὲ (b, 29). Bywater, Contr. p. 38. For the example given in EE. 1533 b, 11 (p. 175), cf. Plutarch, Them. 5 εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἠδὼν θεματοκλήτη καὶ δαμαλίκους τῷ Κίλιστον περὶ δεινον καὶ σκεψα τῇ Ἀλίκης λαμπρόστατα καὶ παρασκευῆς, οὐκ ἕργος τοῖς Ἐλληνσι, ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἄρτι νῦν καὶ ἀν' οἷος μεγάλας φύσει δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχρείων' δὲ μέσῳ γνώριμοι γεγονός, ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίων ἐπιτετρασθαί, διαφορικά μελετάτων ἄλαβολαν.
τροχόνον ἡ ὅν ἀυτὸς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενεῖ καὶ τοῖς
αὐδοῖς καὶ ὅσα τοιοῦτα: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει
cai ἄξιομα. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ μεγαλοπρέπης, καὶ
ὅν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ
ἐρημόκει: μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμώτατα: τῶν δὲ ἱδίων ὅσα 35
διάσαπε γίνεται, οἷον γάμοι καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ 1123*
ή πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ὡς εἰ ἐν ἄξιομα, καὶ περὶ
νόμον δὲ καὶ ὑποδοχάς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δορεάς καὶ ἀντι-
δορεάς ὑπὸ γὰρ εἰς ἐαυτὸν δαπανήρος ὁ μεγαλοπρέπης ἀλλ᾽
ci τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δόρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τὶ διομοῖν. 5
μεγαλοπρέπους δὲ καὶ οἷον κατασκευάσατο προεύθυντος
φιλοτικόν (κόσμος γὰρ τῆς καὶ ὅσον), καὶ περὶ τοῦτα
ἀλλοιων δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τοῖς ἔργοις (κάλλιστα
τὰ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἐκάστω τῷ πρὸς τούτῳ ὑπὸ γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρ-
ιότερει τεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὐδὲν ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ 10
τῶν δαπανήματον ἔκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγα-
λοπρεποῦσαν <ἀπλώς> μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλο μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ
ν τοῦτοι μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ
δαπανήματι—σφαίρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλιστὴ ἡ λήκυθος μεγαλ-
λοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ διάροι ὑπὸ τοῦτο τημή μικροῦ καὶ 15
ἀνελεύθερου—διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν τοῦ μεγαλοπρέπους, ἐν φοῖ ἀν ποιῇ
gένει, μεγαλοπρεπός ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐνυπέρβλη-
τευ) καὶ ἔχον κατ᾽ ἄξιον τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δὲ ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ

§ 14. ἂν αὐτὸς μέτεστιν, "those
they have to do with," by relationship
τῶν γένει προσεχόντων) or otherwise.
§ 15. τῶν δὲ ἱδίων, "private" as
opposed to τὰ περὶ θεῶν and τὰ πρὸς
ὅ κοινὸν.
ξίνων...ἀποστολάς. Specially used
a connexion with gifts given to the
starting guest.
§ 17. ἕπι κ.π.λ. A long com-
ponent protasis which goes down to
α. 14 δαπανήματι, followed by a paren-
thesis (α. 14 σφαύρα...α. 16 ἀνελεύθερον). The
apodosis begins at α. 16 διὰ τοῦτο.
άπλώς, inserted by Bywater (Contr.
p. 38), seems necessary to make an
antithesis to ἐνταῦθα. "Expenditure
is munificent ἀνελώς when it is great
expenditure on a great object, in a
given kind of expenditure, it is what
is great in that kind." The words
ἐνταῦθα and εἰ τοῖς are equivalent
to εἰ τοῦτῳ τῷ γένει.
§ 20. βάναυσος. Cf. above 1107b,
19. 1122 a. 31, where βαναυσία καὶ
ἀπειροκαλία are coupled. Eudemos
(loc. cit. p. 174) speaks of ἀνελευ-
θεροῦ καὶ σαλάκων, and Theo-
phrastos (ap. Stob. 11. 140 Wachsm.)
called the ἄπερβάλη by the name
B. A.
20 παρά τὸ δένον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὡσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοὺς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνει τὰ παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐραυνίτας γαμικῶς ἔστιν, καὶ κυμάδιοι χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρειν, ὡσπερ οἱ Μεγαροὶ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ποιήσαι οὖν τὸν 25 καλὸν ένεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὸν λαμπρύμενον θαυμάζεσθαι. καὶ οὖν μὲν δὲν πολλὰ ἀναλόγως, ὃλα γαρ δαπανάν, ὃ δ' ὃλα, πολλά. ὡς μὲν μικρὸ-21 προείση περὶ τάντα ἐπελείψις, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλόγως ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεί, καὶ ὁ δὲ δὴν ποιή μέλλον καὶ 30 σκοπὸν πῶς τὸν ἐξάχιστον ἀναλόγως, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐσεσιμένος, καὶ πάντ' οὖν μελείς μελείς ποιεῖ δὲν. εἰσι μὲν οὖν αἱ ἐξεις αὐτὰς κακιάς, οὐ μην ἡνίοχοι ἡ ἐπισφέρειν διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβερὰς τῷ πόλεος εῖναι μήτε λανι ἀσχήμονες.

ΠΙ. Ὅ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὅσπ-

1123 a, 34. ΕΕ. 1232 a, 19 περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τῶν μεγαλοψυχίων ἀποδιδόμενων δὲν διορίσαι τὸ ίδιον. ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ

of σαλακωλία. Cf. also Hesych. s.v. σαλακωτύναι. Ὅ δέ θεόφραστος σαλακωτύναι φησὶν εἶναι τὸν δαπανῶντα ὅτου μὴ δεῖ. Cf. Rhet. 1392 a, 3 (of the ἁθον which go with wealth) καὶ τρυφερὸν καὶ σαλακωτύναι τρυφερὸν μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ τὴν ἐνδείκνυσιν τὴν ευδαιμονίαν, σαλακωτύναι δὲ καὶ σύλλοικα διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐλαθέναι διατρέξει περὶ τὸ ἐρόμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὅσπον αὐτῶς, καὶ τῷ όλεθρίῳ ἂντι τῶν ἄλλων ὅ καὶ αὐτὸς.

παρὰ μέλος, ἵπτ. πλημμέλως, ἀδίστα, opposed to ἐμελοῖ (1122 a, 35) for which Plato has ἐν μέλει Soph. 427 d. Cf. also παρὰ μέλος φεῖγας-

θαι, εἰσεῖν Phileb. 28 b, Krítias 106 b, Laws 596 d and EE. 1233 a, 39 (p. 173).

ἐραυνίας. Ἐφοροί, being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course

bad taste to eclipse the rest in splen-
dour." Grant. Endemos refers to

κυμάδιος χορηγῶν. For the cost of a


ἐν τῇ παράδοσιν, sc. τοῦ χοροῦ.

ὡσπερ οἱ Μεγαροὶ. For the read-
ing, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38. Me-

garian comedy was thought ψοφίσκω την Ἀθήνα.

§ 21. ἐν μικρῷ ἀπολείρᾳ are to be
taken together. He will spoil the

beauty of his work 'for a trifle'
(Welleid). This use of ἐν resembles

its use in the phrase κυβοκεφάλῃ ἐν σ. 

dat. for which see Kühner § 431 t. 1.

III. § 1. Ὅ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία, best rendered 'Pride.'
\[\text{parallel text}
\]

\section*{περὶ ποία...πρωτοῦ. Cf. 1115 a, § p. λάβωμεν. For the dialectical phrase λαβεῖν περὶ with an interrogative cf. 1130 b, 7. 1139 a, 15. 1168 b, 13.}

\section*{§ 2. τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐξήν, 'the man who corresponds to the ἐξήν,' who embodies the type. Cf. 1116 b, 20. For the τόπος of σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐξήν, cf. Top. 147 a, 12.}

\section*{§ 3. διδ...δεῦτα. These words are enough to show that Aristotle is not depicting an ethical ideal of his own, as has been supposed, but is still analysing ἐνδοξά. His own ideal we learn from Book X; this is the ideal of the average Hellene, and the character described reminds one of Περαιλέστροῦ. The description itself has much quiet humour and is surely half-ironical. In An. Post. 97 b, 15 Aristotle takes the search for the definition of the μεγαλυπνίας as an illustration of method—οὖν λέγει αὐτοί· τί ἐστι μεγαλυπνία πρωτέομεν, καταφέντες ἐπὶ τῶν μεγαλυπνίας ὅτι ἐσμέν (σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐξήν) τί ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ πάντας ἤ τις νεότατα. ὄσον εἰς Ἀλκιβιάδης μεγαλυπνίας ἢ Ἀριστείδης καὶ ἅλλοι ἤ τις ἤτερος· τί ἐν ἄριστον; τὸ μὲν ἄνειρον ἐν ἔρημων ἡ Σωκράτους, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἄδοξον εἶναι ἐφυγομένως καὶ ἄνευς ἠθενὶ. ταῦτα δύο λαβεῖ τοῖς τὸ ἄνειρον ἢ τὴν ἄνειρον ἢ τοῖς τώρα καὶ ἢ μὴ ὑπομονή ἄνειρον (the definition here fulfills this condition), εἰ δὲ μηδὲν, διὰ ἐκατομὼν τὴν μεγαλυπνίαν.}

\section*{§ 4. σωφρόνων, here in its popular sense, equivalent to κόσμος, 'modest.'}

\section*{§ 5. τὸ καλὸς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Poet. 1450 b, 34 ἐπὶ δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἵππον καὶ ἅπαν προέρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν οὐ μένων ταῦτα ταταγμένα δει ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχῃ μὴ τὴν τύχην· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγίθος καὶ τὰξει ἀντί. Pol. 1236 a, 33 ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγίθος εἶναι γένεται. Probbl. 915 b, 37. 920 b, 29.}
μετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὖν. ο δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτοῦ ἄξιος ἀνάξιος ὃν ἥ
χαῖνος· ο ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἡ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῖνος· ο ἡ ἐλαττώνων·
10 ἡ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐαντε μεγάλων ἑαυτε μετρίων, ἐάντε
καὶ μικρων ἄξιον ὃν ἐτε ἐλαττώνων ἑαυτοῦ ἄξιοι. καὶ
μᾶλις· ἂν δόξην ὃν μεγάλων ἄξιος· τῷ γὰρ ἄν ἐποίηθε εἰ
μὴ τοσοῦτον ὃν ἄξιος; ἐτε δὴ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τῷ μὲν με-8
γεθεὶς ἄρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσον τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἄξιον αὐτῶν
15 ἄξιοι, οἰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ διῆλπουσιν. δὲ δὴ μεγά-9
λων ἑαυτοῦ ἄξιοι ἄξιοι οὖν, καὶ μᾶλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ
ἐν μᾶλιστ' ἂν εἰθ. ἡ δ' ἄξια λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἄγαθα: 10
μέγιστον δὲ τοὐν ἂν θείας μελισσᾶς ἢ τοῖς θείας ἀπονέμειν, καὶ ὃν
μᾶλις' ὑπερβάλλεται οἱ ἐν ἀξίωματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
20 ἄθλους· τοιοῦτοι δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τούτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ τιμῶσι τὸ μεγαλόφυσιον ἐστιν
ὡς δει. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόφυσιοι περὶ 11

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθὸν κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπανοτό.
δοκεῖ δὲ τούτ' εἶναι μεγάλα δ' ἐνδείκνυται ὃ τίνην κρατάτησθι ἔχων ἔχειν περὶ τὰ
tοιοῦτα [ἐνιαία ἡδέα]. ἡ δὲ μεγαλόφυσια κρατάτησθι· κρίνει δ' ἐν
eκατοῦ ἄρετῆ τῷ μείζον καὶ τῷ ἐλαττῶν ὀρθός, ἀπ' ὁ φύσις ἐν
κελεύσει καὶ ἡ ἄρετῆ, ὡστε ἐπεστᾶται αὐτῆς πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡ δὲ
ἐπεστᾶται πάσης.

1123 b, 13. ΕΕ. 1232 b, 14 οὖν μὲν οὖν δόξην ἢν ἐναντίων
ἐχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τιμῶν καὶ καθαροφρητικῶν εἶναι
τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δει δὴ τούτο διορίσειν εἰσείν.
ἐστιν γὰρ τιμή καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διεξῆς· γὰρ τῷ ἐπὶ
pολλῶν τῶν τυγχάνων τῷ τοῦτο τῶν ἀξιῶν λόγῳ, καὶ τάλιν τῷ τί
τῶν ἡ τιμή διαφέρει. μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμῶν ἐκ
τῶν ποιμέν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμῶν εἶναι. τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ
tάλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια ὁποίας παῦτα δοῦνα μεγαλὰ ἀληθῆς ἢστιν,

§ 6. χαῖνος. The literal sense of this word is ‘gaping.’ It is then ap-
plied to anything porous, spongy or
loose (Liddell and Scott) as for in-
stance snow. It is from this that the
meaning ‘flimsy,’ ‘frothy,’ ‘inane’ is
derived.

§ 8. τῷ μὲν μεγήθη ἄρος κ.τ.λ.
Cf. 1107 a, 6 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὀνείρο
καὶ τὸν λόγον τῶν τοῦ τί ἐν εἰπει λέγεται
μεγάλη ἢστιν ἡ ἄρετη, κατὰ δὲ τῷ ἄρα
καὶ τῷ εὖ ἀκρίτης.

§ 11. ἄνευ λόγου, 'we need not
prove,' i.e. it is evident on the face of
it even apart from the explanation
or ground. Cf. 1131 a, 13. 1143 b, 2.
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12 τιμήν εἶναι· τιμής γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἄξιοι αὐτοῖς,
13 κατ’ ἄξιαν δὲ· ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος ἐλλειπεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
14 καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλόψυχου ἄξιομα. ὁ δὲ χάος πρὸς 25
ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὲν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ
dε μεγαλόψυχος, εἰπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἀριστός ἂν εἰη·
μείζονος γὰρ ἂεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστον ὁ ἀριστός.
τῶν ὡς ἄγαθον ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἄγαθον εἶναι. καὶ
dόξεις <ἀν> εἶναι μεγαλόψυχον τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῃ ἄρετῃ μέγα.
30 15 οὐδαμῶς τ’ ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλόψυχος φεύγειν παρασείανται,
οὐδὲ ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἑκατεὶ πράξει αἰσχρά δ’ ὑ’ οὐδὲν μέγα;
καθ’ ἐκάστα ὑ’ ἐπισκοποῦντι τάμπται γελοῖος φαινοίτι ᾧ ὁ
μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἄγαθος ὦν· οὐκ εἰη δ’ ἂν οὐδὲ τιμής ἄξιος
φαύλος ὦν· τῆς ἄρετής γὰρ ἄθλομ ἢ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονείμεται 35

ὅτε καὶ ἄρετη οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλόψυχοι
tοιεῖν ἐκάστη, περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, οὔτερ εἰτομεῖ. ἀλλ’
ὁμιῶς ὀστὶ τις παρὰ τὸ ἀλλὰς ἄρετας μία μεγαλόψυχα, ὄστερ καὶ
ἴδια μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον λεκτόν τὸν ἐκοιτα ταῦτην. ἦπεὶ ὧν ἐστὶ
τῶν ἄγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμα τὰ δ’ ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν
tοῦτον ἄγαθον δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ’ ἀληθῶς τὰ δ’ μικρά, καὶ
τοῦτον ἔνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἄξιοιν αὐτοὺς, ἐν τούτοις χρήστες ὁ μεγαλό-
ψυχος. τετραχῶς δ’ ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἄξιοι εἶναι
μεγάλους καὶ ἄξιοιν ἑαυτὸν τούτους, ὡς τ’ δ’ μικρὰ καὶ ἄξιοιν τὰ
τριλοίκους καὶ ἄξιοιν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ὡς τ’ δ’ ἀνάπαυσιν πρὸς ἐκάστη
αὐτῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἰρ τοιοῦτος οὐδ’ ἄξιοι ὑ’ μικρῶν μεγαλῶν ἄξιοι
ἑαυτῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἄγαθων, ὁ δὲ ἄξιος ὄν μεγαλόν ἄξιοιν ἐν μικρῶν
ἐαυτῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιοι μικρῶν, μεγαλῶν δ’ ἄξιοιν ἑαυτῶν πρεσφος
(ἀνάρτητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἄξιον τιμαγεῖν), πρεσφὸς
cαὶ δότης ἄξιοι ὑ’ υπαρχόντων αὐτῶν τῶν τοιούτων μετέχειν μὴ ἄξιοι
ἑαυτῶν· λείπεται δ’ ἐνταῦθα ἑναντίο τούτως ἀμφοτέρους, οὕτως ὦν

§ 12. οἱ μεγάλοι. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38.
§ 14. τὸ...μέγα, ‘the grand.’ Everything is ‘on the grand scale’ with the
megaloψυχος.
§ 15. φεύγειν παρασείαν. The meaning is made quite clear by De
Motu Animalium 705 a, 17 καὶ οἱ
θιόντες θάττων θέωσιν παρασείαν
τὰς χείρας, Probl. 881 b, 6 ὁ δὲ
θάττων θεῖ παρασείαν ἡ μὴ παρασείαν.
The attitude is familiar from vase-
paintings and is certainly beneath the
dignity of our hero. Is it possible
not to see that this is a humorous
touch?
1124 αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς. ἐοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἰον κόσμοι τὸς εἶναι τῶν ἁρτῶν μεῖξος γὰρ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τούτῳ χαλεπῶς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλοψυχία εἶναι· οὖ γὰρ οἷον τὸ ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μᾶλλον 175 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμᾶς ὁ μεγαλοψυχός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἤθησεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυχόναι ἢ καὶ ἐλαττών. ἁρετής γὰρ παντελός ὁ ἄνευ καὶ ἀπρόσωπος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τοῦτο ἄξια τιμῆ, οὐ μὴν ἂλλα ἀποδείξεται γε τῷ μη ἔχειν αὐτῶς μείξοι αὐτοῦ ἀπονεμεῖ. 10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸις σάμπαν διεγερθείς· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἁξίως· ἀμαίνως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτῶν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ 18 εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλοψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτος καὶ δυναστείας καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν 15 μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτε εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς ἐσται οὔτε ἄτυχου περιπλοῦτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμῆς οὗτος ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον διν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστείαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστιν αἰρέται· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶνθαι δὲ αὐτῶν βούλονται· 20 δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή μικρόν ἔστι, τούτῳ καὶ τάλλῳ. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐπρεπήματα 19 συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιόν τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ή πλουτούντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν ὑπερέχον πάν ἑντιμητερον. διὸ καὶ τα τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν 25 κατ'. ἀλήθειας δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· φὸ δ' ἀμφοὶ 20 ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιότατα τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἁρετῆς τὰ.
§ 21. And even so, the discerning reader will come to realize that the megalophus is considered "powerful" (without goodness) because haughtiness is a sign of wealth and power. We have seen already (a, 20) that the megalophus is considered supercilious. As Aristotle goes on to say, haughtiness is the one point in which they can successfully imitate...
§ 24. ἀντενεργετικὸς πλεύονος, 'he is apt to return it by a greater benefit.' For the reading in the next clause, see Bywater, Contr. p. 39. By ὁ ὑπάρξας is meant the man who starts the interchange of benefits, 'the original benefactor.' Cf. 1136 b, 13. 1165 b, 21. In the same way ὁ ὑπάρχων is the aggressor in war as opposed to ὁ ἀμφιμενος.

§ 25. ἰδού δι ΚΑΙ Κ. Τ. Λ. Aristotle enjoys noting the traiers of this character. The μεγαλονύφος was an object of mirth from the days of the Old Comedy downwards.—Pericles got his share,—but all the same he was the type that all true Hellenes inwardly admired. 

οδ ήν, neuter, 'any benefit they have conferred.' This is Bywater's correction of ms. οδη (Asp. οδ). See Contr. p. 39. If we keep οδη, we shall have to insert δι' before οδη with Münsscher.

ἀκούειν, sc. ἰδοὺ, 'to be told of.' Bywater's correction of ms. ἰδοὐε (Contr. p. 39).

δι ΚΑΙ τὴν Θέτιν κ.τ.λ. This seems to be referred to as if it were a well-known difficulty. Achilles had told Thetis to remind Zeus of certain definite services she had done him (II. i, 394 sq.), but she contents herself with saying εἰπε δ ήν εις μηρ ἀμφιλότερον ἄνδρα | | ἐπει θεργός (ib. 503). The question why she did not take her son's advice is just the sort of πρόβλημα that ancient critics propounded, and Aristotle here gives the λύσις. Cf. Poet. c. 25.

οι Δάκωνες. The school quotes Kallisthenes εν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν who related ὑπέρ τῶν Ἄρησι τοῦ Ἀθηναίου συμμαχίας δέδομεν, λέγοντες ὅτι τῶν Ἀθηναίων δοτὰ μὲν τῶν Ἀρησιτῶν ὁ Δακικιάμοι πηκτάκες εἰ τῶν ἐπελάθακεν εἴποτε, ὅ δ' αὐτοὶ χρεῖαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκπέμαθεν τοὺς ἐρμηνευτα, ὥσπερ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑπαξ τοῖς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον. If this refers to 359 B.C., the speeches in Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 33 do not bear it out.

§ 26. ἐπ' ἐκείνου...ἐν δὲ τρίς. Both expressions are admissible. For ἐπ' cf. χαίροντας ἐπί, and for ἐν cf. γέλων ἐν σοι γέλο. Aristotle likes to vary his prepositions. So we have immediately after ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀσθενεῖς.
27 νεώς ἵσχυριζεσθαι: καί εἰς τὰ ἐντιμά μη λέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι: καὶ ἀργῶν εἶναι καί μελλήτην ἄλλον ἢ ὅπου τιμῇ μεγάλῃ ἢ ἔργον, καί ὁλέγων μὲν πρακτικών, μεγάλων 28 δὲ καὶ δυναμαστών. ἀναγκαίον δὲ καὶ φανερομοί νόμοι καί φανεροφίλοι (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβομένου, καί ἀμελείν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καί λέγειν καί πράττειν φανερῶς (παρηγοριατὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καί ἀληθευτικὸς, πλὴρ ὅσα μὴ δὲ εἰρωνεύειν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] 30 πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καί πρὸς ἄλλους μὴ δύνασθαι ἵνα ἄλλον ἢ φίλον. δουλικὸν γὰρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κὸ-1125.a
30 λακεῖς θητικοί καί οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ βαθμαστικός: οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐδὲν μηνακακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλουχοῦχο καί ὁ ὁμομοιομενεῖν, ἄλλος τε καὶ κακά, ἄλλα 31 μᾶλλον παρορμάν, οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγοι: οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑρέπ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου: οὔτε γὰρ ἔνα ἐπιμηνᾶται μεινε αὐτῷ οὐδ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι πέτανται· οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἐπαινετικός ἔστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγοι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἑχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δ' 32 ὑπαρ. καί περὶ ἀναγκαὶον ἢ μικρὸν ἱκανοῦ ὀλυφυτικὸς καί δησικός· σπουδαζέτως γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταύτα. 1ο 33 καὶ οἶδ' κεκτήσαν μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καί ἄκαρπα τῶν 34 καρπίμων καί ὀφελίμων· αὐτάρκεις γὰρ μᾶλλον. καί κενησις δε βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλουχοῦχον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεία, καί λέξεις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλύγα

§ 27. εἰς τὰ ἐντιμα κ.τ.λ., i.e., if I am right, he reserves himself for τὰ διάλεγμα. Cf. above 1124 b, 22 n. § 28. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καί κ.τ.λ. On the reading and interpretation of this passage see Bywater, Contr. p. 39. The ms. tradition is more confused than anywhere in the Ethics. ἀληθευτικός, ‘frank.’ Cf. below 1127 a, 13 sqq. δ' εἰρωνεύω. For the meaning of this word see below 1127 a, 21 n. The proud man affects a certain mock-humility in order to evade those who would trouble him with small matters. “I fear that is not quite in my line.” § 29. πρὸς ἄλλον... Ἰδίν, ‘to take his rule of life from another.’ The preposition πρὸς is used of the standard. So πρὸς τὸ καλὸν Ἰδίν, πρὸς τὰν πολιτείαν Ἰδίν etc. § 31. ἀνθρωπολόγος, apparently here only. The proud man does not care for personal conversation. εἰ μὴ δ' ὑπαρ. The proud man will not indulge in weak abuse, though, when he wants to insult and humiliate people, he will speak his mind freely enough. § 34. καλὴ κενησις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle knows in his heart that the μεγαλουχοῦχος is something of a boreu.
15 σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σάϊνην ὁ μηδὲν μέγα αἴσθησις· ὡς ὁ ἄξιος
φωνή καὶ ἡ ταχύτης διὰ τῶν τῶν.

Τοιούτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόφυσις· ὁ δὲ ἐκλείπτων μικρὸ-
ψυχος, ὁ δὲ ἵππεσθέν χαῖνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι οὐδὲ οὕτω (οὐ γὰρ κακοποίοι εἰσίν), ἡμαρτήματον δὲ.
20 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος ἄξιος οὖν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ἀν
ἀξίος ἐστι, καὶ ἐστιν κακόν ἐσείν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν
τῶν ἁγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγαθεῖν δὲ ἑαυτὸν. ὃργητε γὰρ ἃν ὁ ἄξιος
ἡμ. ἀγαθῶν γε ὑμῖν. οὐ μὴν ἡλίθιον γε οἱ τοιούτοι δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ
25 καίρων τοιείν· ἐκαυτῷ γὰρ ἐφείναι τῶν καθ' ἄξιαν, ἀφί-
στανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδε-
μάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὑμεῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτῶς ἁγαθῶν. οἱ 30
δὲ χαῖνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάφοις, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐπιφανεῖς·
οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὑμεῖς τοὺς ἑντύμιους ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἑταὶ ἐξελέγχον-

1125 a, 17. ΕΕ. 1233 a, 9 τῶν δ’ ἐναντίων, ὡςτέρ διεγράματεν,
η μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄξιον ἑαυτῶν ἁγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὑπάρχειαν θαυμάτη
(τῶν τοιοῦτων γὰρ χαῖνος λέγομεν, ὥσιν μεγάλοι διότι αξίου εἶναι
οὐκ ὑμεῖς), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον οὕτω μὴ ἄξιον ἑαυτῶν μεγάλων
μεγαλοψυχαί (μεγαλοψυχοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκεί, οὕτως ἄρχοντοι δὲ ἅ δικαιῶ
ἀν ήξιοῦσθαι, μὴ αξίον μηθεῖν μεγάλον ἑαυτῶν), ὃς’ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ
μεγαλοψυχάων εἶναι μεσοτήτα χαράττησι καὶ μεγαλοχυσί. ὁ δὲ
τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὐτὲ πάμπαν ψιλότος οὔτε μεγαλοψυχός,
περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχουσ’ οὔτε μεγέθους· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιον οὔτε ἄξιοι μεγάλων,
διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. κατ’ ὁδόν δέξειν ἐν ἐναντίων εἶναι τῶν μεγάλων ἄξιο
ὑπερτεράντες τῷ μεγάλῳ ὑπερτεράντα ἁγαθῶν. οὐκ ἕστι δ’ ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μη μεγατός εἶναι (ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἐχεῖ),
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄξιος τῷ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψυχῷ (ὅποι γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων
ἀξίοισιν αὐτῶν ἀμφότεροι): καὶ δ’ ἡμέν’ γένοιτο ἂν μεγαλοψυχὸς (ἄξιοσθενεῖ γὰρ

σέντονος, 'shrill,' as is shown by
Gen. An. 786 b, 35 δοκεῖ γεναστᾶσαι
einai φύσεις ἡ βαρυψωφία καὶ ἐν τῷ
μέλας τῷ βαρύ τῶν συντόνων βάλμων·
tὸ γὰρ βάλμων ἡ ὑπερτερή, ἡ δὲ βαρύστη
ὑπερτερή τί. This seems better than
making it a mere synonym of σπευ-
στικὸς. We want a word for the voice
as well as one for the gait. So
δέξασθαι immediately afterwards.
§ 35. οὐδ’ οὗτοι, any more than the
μεγαλοψυχής and the βάλμων. Cf.
1123 a, 31.

όκνηροι, ‘backward,’ ‘shy,’ ‘te-
tiring.’ They are not φιλιθως like the
others. Cf. 1123 b, 3.


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§ 36. σχήματι, 'manner.'

§ 37. ἀντιτίθεται. We expect ἀντικείται, but cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

καὶ γὰρ γίνεται Κ.Π.Α. See notes on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

IV. § 1. ταύτην, sc. τὴν τιμήν.

ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις 1107 b, 24.

§ 4. πλευναχώς τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦντος λεγομένου, 'as φιλο-so-and-so is ambiguous, it is clear that we do not always apply the name φιλοτιμοῦ (on the reading, Bywater, Contr. p. 40) to the same thing.' In other words, compounds with φιλο-sometimes have a good sense, sometimes a bad one. Mr Stewart instances φιλομαθής and φιλαυρώς. On φιλοτιμοῦντος cf. 1099 a, 9 n., 1118 b, 22 n., and for φέρων ἐνομάτηται τι ὑπηρέτειαν, 1099 a, 34 n.
μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, ψέγωντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δει. ἁνωνύμου δὲ οὐδὲς τῆς μεσότητος, οἷς ἐρήμοις ἐπίκεν ἀμφιβολεῖ τὰ ἀκρα. ἐν οἷς δὲ ἐστίν ύπερβολή καὶ ἠλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὅργονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ 5 ἡ ἁμφότερον. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἄν. ἐπαινεῖται δὲ οὖν ἡ ζῆσι αὐτῆς, μεσότητος οὖσα περὶ τιμῆς ἁνωνύμους. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀμφιτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀμφιτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερα πνεύμα. ἐοικε δὲ τούτοις εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικείσαι δὲ ἐντάθη 25 οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπομάζασθαι τὸν μέσον.

V. Πρᾶγμάτως δὲ ἐστὶ μεσότητος περὶ ὁργάς· ἁνωνύμου δὲ υπότος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδόν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραγμάτα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἠλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἁνωνύμοι οὖσαν. δὴ ύπερβολή ὑπερβολὴς τις λέγοντι ἀν. 2

1125 b, 26. EΕ. 1231 b, 5 τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ πρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πραγμάτος καὶ χαλεπότητος· καὶ γέρω τὸν πρόπον περὶ λύπη τῆς ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γενομένης ὀρώμας ἄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτῃ ἐκείνη τοῖς διεγράφαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὁργῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἄρσι

τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ. On this test see 1118 b, 23 n. It is put here to vary the expression. The more accurate μᾶλλον ἢ δὲ follows in the next clause.

δὲ ἐρήμως· ἀμφιβολεῖν. In the sense of 'lay claim to' ἀμφιβολεῖν takes the genitive like ἀντικείσαι (e.g. Pol. 1283 a, 11 ἀμφιβολοῦν τῶν ἄρχων, Ἰακώβ 3, § ποθεσθήσεται τῆς κληρονομίας). The best commentary is the parallel passage 1107 b, 31 ὥσπερ οὐδεκάζεται οἱ ἄρχοι τῆς μεσημερίας. We are not to understand δικής with ἐρήμως, for the allusion is to the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπικείσασθαι, and in that connexion ἐρήμως means 'unclaimed.' Cf. Ἀθην. θει. 43, 4 καὶ τὰς λόγους τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἀναγεννήσεων, δους μηθένα λάθη μηθέν ἐρήμων γενόμενον, Ἴσοκρ. Αἰγίν. § 3 τῶν οἰκῶν ἐρήμων ποιῆσαι, and especially Ἰακώβ 3 § 61 ὡς ἐρήμως τῶν κλήρων ἐπικείσθαι.

§ 6. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς. Cf. 1108 b, 19—35.

ἀντικείσαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔχων ἀνεπεργέναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἑαυτός. As it is, they are only opposed to one another.

V. § 1. Πράγματι, 'good temper,' 'patience.'

φέρομαι, 'we apply the name Patience to the mean.' See 1119 a, 34 n.

ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. But see EΕ. 1231 b, 8 διεγράφαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὁργῳ (ΕΕ. 1126 a, 13) καὶ χαλεπῷ (ΕΕ. 1126 a, 16) καὶ ἀρσικῷ· τὸν ἄνθρωπον (ΕΕ. 1126 a, 8) καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον (cf. Ἡλίθιον ΕΕ. 1126 a, 5).
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δὲ ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ 30 διαφέροντα. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνου, ἐπινειται: πρᾶος δὴ οὕτως ἄν εἴη, εἰπέρ ἡ πράσινη ἐπινευται. Βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀπάραξος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ύπὸ τοῦ τάφου, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξει οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ 35 τοσοῦτον χρόνου χαλεπάνειν. ἀμαρτάνεις δὲ δοκεὶ μᾶλλον 1126 ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλλεφησί’ οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλ’ ζων συνεχωμονικός. ὡς ἐλλεφησί’, εἰτ’ ἀφρησία τὸς ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἀπειδρυτον, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ ἠλθίναι δοκοῦντο εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μὴν ὅτε μὴν’ 5 δεῖ δεῖ’ δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τοῦ οὐκ εἶναι ἀμαρτικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον 7 ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περισσάν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ὡς

(πάντα γὰρ τὰ θωἀντα τῆς αὐτῆς ἦτοι διαθέωσις) τὸν ἀνδραποδῶδη καὶ τὸν ἀνύθητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσαι τοὺς μηδ’ ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ κινωμένοις τὸν θυμὸν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακιζόμενους εἰρήνης καὶ ταπεινοῦ πρὸς τὰς ἀλγορίας. ἦτοι γὰρ ἀρτικείμενον τὸ μὲν ταχύ τὸ μᾶλις, τοῦ δ’ ἡμεία τὸ σφόδρα, τοῦ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ἀλόγον λυπεῖσθαι ταῦτα τὴν λύπην ἤν καλοῦμεν θυμὸν. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμενεῖ, καὶ ἐναπὸ παρὰ ἡπερβολὴ καὶ ἠλλεφης (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτος ἦτοι, ὁ καὶ βάττων καὶ μᾶλλον πάγχων καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον καὶ ὅτι’ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποῖοι’ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν, ὁ δ’ ἀνδραπο- δῶδης τοιοῦτον), δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶ τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς αἰνωτήτος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτήματι ἀμφότεραι αἰ ἐξεῖς ἠκαίνη, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐπεικεῖσθαι ἡ μάχη τούτων ἐξεῖς: οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὐδὲ ἄπορεῖ οὔτε οὐλ’ οὐδὲ ὀργίζεται οὔτε οὐκ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὡς’ ἐπὶ καὶ πράσινη ἡ βελτίωτη ἐξεῖς περὶ ταῦτα τὰ ψάλη ἑπτά, εἶπ’ τῆς ἡ πράσινης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πρῶτος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδῶδους.

§ 3. ἐφ’ οἷς neut., οἷς masc. Βούλεται… ἐιναι, ‘we mean by patient one who is imperturbable and not led on by feeling.’

ἐπὶ τοῦτον neut., cf. above ἐφ’ οἷς.

§ 5. εἰτ’ ἀφρησία. Eudemos and MM. call it ἄναλγεια, on which see 1130 b, 32 n. Probably the usage by which ἄναλγης meant rather ‘coarse’ or ‘stupid’ prevented Aristotle from giving it this more restricted sense. Cf. 1115 b, 26 n.

ἐφ’ οἷς, neuter. Cf. 1115 b, 31 n.

§ 6. αἰσθάνεσθαι, like sentire, ‘to have a sense of one’s position,’ to realise what is going on whether pleasant or otherwise. Hence ἀναλόγης, cf. 1104 a, 24 n.
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υπερβολή κατά πάντα μὲν γίνεται—καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ τὸ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς οὐ δεί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάπτων, καὶ πλείω χρόνον,—οὐ μὴν ἀπαντᾷ γε τῷ αὐτῷ ύπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναντ’ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακῶν καὶ εαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσιν, καὶ ὁδόκησιν ἣ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὄργιλοι ταχέως μὲν δρομίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεὶ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς οὐ δεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ 15 δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· δ’ καὶ βεβληστὼν ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ’ αὐτοῖς τούτῳ, ὅτι οἱ κατέχοντο τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ’ ἀνταποδιδόσασιν ἢ φανερὸν εἰς διὰ τὴν δύστητα, εἰτ’ ἀπαύονται. υπερβολη δ’ εἴσον εἰκόνι ἢ ἀκράχολου ὀξείς καὶ πρὸς τὰν ὄργιλον καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ ὑπὲρ καὶ τούνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ 20 δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὄργιλον δρομίζονται· κατέχοντο γὰρ τῶν θυμῶν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παῦει τὴν ὀργήν, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποίεσθαι. τούτου δὲ μὴ γενομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲς συμπείθεται αὐτοῖς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέφι 25 τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖται. εἴσοδ’ οἳ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρώτατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τούς ἐφ’ οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνουται καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἀνεῦ τιμωρίας καὶ κολάσεως. τῇ προφυτίδι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ 30 γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται—ἀνθρωπικότερον γὰρ τὸ τιμορεῖσθαι—καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιβάσθαι οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. δ’ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

1126 a, 13. ΕΕ. 1221 b, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι κατονομαζότατα τῷ διαφέροντι κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνον ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τί τῶν ποιοῦντον τὰ πάθη. λέγω δ’ οἷον δεξίουμοι μὴ τῷ βάπτων πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπός δὲ καὶ θυμαδής τῷ μᾶλλον πικρός δὲ τῷ φυλακτικός εἶναι τὸς ὀργής, πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιποντικὸς ταῖς κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.

§ 8. ἢ φανερὸς εἰς, se, antepodeō-dwértes, 'in an open way.'
§ 10. ἢ γὰρ τιμωρία κ. τ. λ. Cf. 1117 a, 6 π. तो βάρος. “The pæron has as it were a load of indigestible anger in him.” Stewart.

δεῖται. For the reading see By-
δέρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λειχομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ὁ ὅρισθαι τὸ πώς καὶ τίς καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖος καὶ πόσον γιμνότειν, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὅρθως ποιεῖ τις ἡ ἁμαρτιών, ἡ μᾶλλον ἀριστερὰν ὑπὸ σέβεσθαι τοῖς διόρθωσθαι, ὅτι ἐστὶ· ἐπὶ 35 οἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ἢττον, ἐνώπιον γὰρ τοὺς ἀλλείποντας ἐν καὶ πρᾶτοις φαμέν, καὶ τοῖς χαλεπαίνοντας ἂν—1126 ἡς δυνάμενοις ἀρχέες. ὁ δὲ πώς καὶ ἀρμακτέκτον, οὐ μᾶλλον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τύποις καὶ τῇ ἀισθήσει ἢ κρίσει. ἀλλὰ τὸ γε τοσοῦτον ἢ μέν ἡ μέση ἕξεις ἐπανειληθεί, καθ’ ἵνα οἴς δει οἴρης 5 αἱ ἐφ’ οἷς δει καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀριστερὰς καὶ ἀλλείπεις ἔκτειναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρῶν μὲν ἡρέμων, ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ ἕξεις ἄνθεκτειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ 15 οἷς εἰρήσθωσαν.

Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζήν καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα ἢ μὲν ἐπανειλημμένης καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀντιτιθέμεναι, ἀλλ’ οἴμεν οἱ τοῖς εὐθυγράφουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ’ ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτως ἡ ἐναντία ἀντιτιθέμεναι καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ’ ὁτιῦν φρον. 15 δύσχεροι καὶ δυσόρθες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ

εἰρήμεναι ἔξεις ἡκταῖ πάσιν οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τοὺτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἑκατέρῳ ἀποδέχεται ἡ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέχοται αὐτῇ· καὶ ὁ ἐκεῖν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἔξειν οὐν εὐβολόμεθα λέγειν τῶν ἑπτῆς φιλών· τὸ στέργειν προσαλβάντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἰσομείῳ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλίῳ ἐξαιρεῖται ἀποδέχεσθαι ἐκαστὰ ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. ὁμιλοῖ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτούς καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συμμένους καὶ ἄκυρὴς αὐτὸ τοιήσει, πλὴρη καὶ εἰ ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συμμένων καὶ ἄθυμων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὐτῷ λυπεῖν. καθὸ δὲν οὐκ ἐχρήσται ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλεῖν, ἀναφέρον δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχαστεῖν τοῦ μὲν λυπεῖν ἡ συναπάντεια· ἐντὸς γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ἔχουσας· τούτων δὲ δοκεῖ μὲν αὐτῷ ἑστὶ μὴ καλὸν· ή βλαβερὸν συνήθειν, διαφέρειν, καὶ προαιρέσθαι λυπεῖν· κάτι που ὁμοίως δὲ ἀναφροσύνης φέρει, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν· ή βλάβην· ή δ' ἐναντίως μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφέρουν δ' ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς ἐν ἄξιωμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχόνται, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ ἶττων γνωρίμως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰς,

κειάς. δὲ μὲν γὰρ εἰρήπως ἄπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κύλει, δ' δὲ πρὸς ἄπαντας ἀντικρούς ἀπεχθηκτικός· δ' ὡς μὴ [τῇ] πρὸς ἀπαστήνυν μητ' ἀκολουθήσων μητ' ἀντιπροσώπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανόμενον βιώσατον, φίλος.

1126 π. 36. ΕΕ. 1233 b, 34 σκοπήντος δὲ μεσοτής αὐθαίρειας καὶ ἀφεξείας· δ' μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἔτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αὐθαίρης,

§ 4. φιλία. The Greeks had no word for 'amiability.' Aristotle is careful to note the difference between φιλία in that sense and the ἐρήθι πρὸς ἔτερον discussed in Books VIII and IX. With the addition of affection (τὸ στέργειν προσαλβάν) the amiable man becomes the friend. Without it he is not so, for his amiability does not depend on feeling for another, but on his own character (τῷ τοιχῶν ἔτω). § 8. διαφόρως. The usual reading is διαφέρως. It is true that Aristotle often uses this word incorrectly in the sense of 'differently'; but here Κ' has διαφερότως διαφόρως δ', which may perhaps justify us in substituting the more Attic adverb.
ἐκάστους ἀπονέμων τὸ πρότερον, καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν αἱρομένους
tὸ συνηδόνειν, ὄπειν δ’ εὐλαβοῦμενος, τοὺς δ’ ἀποβαίνοντος,
ἐὰν δὲ μεῖξα, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέ-
ροντι. καὶ ὡδοῦς δ’ ἑνεκά τῆς εἰσαπθῆς μεγάλης μικρά 5
λυπήσαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιούτος ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄνωμαται
cαθ’ τὸ συνηδόνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἴδιου εἶναι στοχαζόμενος
μὴ διὰ τὸ ἄλλο ἀρέσκον, ὃ δ’ ὅπως ὀφθεῖν τις αὐτῷ γίνεται
eἰς χρήματα καὶ ὡσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ: δ’ ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχε-
ραίνων εἰρήνη ὑπὸ δύσκολος καὶ δύσερης. ἀντικείμεθα δὲ τὸ
φαίνεται τὰ ἀκρὰ ἑαυτοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀνώμυνην εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχέδον ἔστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας
μεσότης: ἀνώμυνης δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς. οὐ χείρισθ’ δὲ καὶ τὰς
τοιαύτας ἐπεκλείν’ μᾶλλον τὸ γὰρ ἄν εἰδείησιν τὰ περὶ τὸ 15
ὑθὸς, καθ’ ἑκατὸν διελθοῦντο, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρε-
τάς πιστεύοιμαι ἃν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἢχον συνιδόντες. ἐν
δὴ τῷ συζύγῳ οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἴδιον καὶ λύπην ὀμιλοῦντες εἰρή-
ται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων ἐλπισμῶν
ομιλίας ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεις καὶ τῷ προστοιχίματι. δοκεῖ 20
δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδοξῶν εἶναι καὶ μῆ
δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἑαυτῶν ἀρεσκός, δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ
δὲ μῆ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄξιους οὕτως ἢχον σεμνὸς.

1127 α, 12. EE. 1233 b, 38 ὁ δὲ ἄληθες καὶ ἀπλοῦς, δὲν

§ 9. τοὺς δὲ συνηδόνοντος ὁ μὲν... δὲ δ... For the construction cf.
1110 b, 22.

κόλαξ. The κόλαξ is the Parasite of the New Comedy. Athenaeus vi, 235 c sqq. has a learned dissertation on
the words. The word παράστας was originally σεμνὸν καὶ λεπρόν, being the name of certain persons associated
with the priests in the sacrificial meal. Accordingly of ἀρχαίοις παιγνομένοι κόλακαι ἐκάλουν. Eupolis
wrote a comedy entitled Κόλακες, satirising Kallias the son of Hippo-
nikos and his train of parasites. The first to use the word παράστας in its
later sense was Ἀραπός εἰς Ἱμεναίῳ (Kock 11, 218).

Β. Α.


VII. § 1. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἐκεῖ περὶ
tάσι μιλεῖς καὶ τὸ συζύγῳ καὶ λόγοι καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν (1126 b, 11).

ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης, the mean between ἀλαζονεία and its
opposite.' It is unnecessary to insert καὶ (τῇς) εἰρωνείας with Imelmann
and recent editors. It is idiomatic Greek
to omit one of the extremes with μέσος and μεταξό, cf. Aristophanes,
Birds, 187 ἐν μεσῷ διάπουσε ἅρ ἐστιν
γῆ (καὶ οὐρανοῦ).

οὖ χείριστο κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1126 b, 11 π.

§ 2. ὁ ἀλαζὼν. The original
meaning of ἀλαζὼν was ‘vagrant’
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υπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἡ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαυσιν ἀρνεῖται τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡ ἐλάστω τοιοῦ, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέντα κατός τις ὁν ἀληθευτικός κἀν τῷ βιβρ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ 25 ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὕτω μείζων όντε ἐλάττω. ἐστι δὲ τούτων ἐκαστὰ καὶ ἕνεκα τῶν ποιεῖν καὶ μορφῶν. ἐκαστὸς δὲ οὗτος ἐστι, τοιαύτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτως ἕξι, ἐὰν μὴ τῶν ἔνεκα πράττῃς, καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τῇ μὲν πεφούδωσι φαίλλον καὶ σφάκτων, τῷ δὲ ἀληθῆς καλὸν καὶ 30 ἐπανευτοῦ. οὗτο δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικῶς μέσος ὁν ἐπανευτός, οἱ δὲ πεφούδωμοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν σφάκτοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἐκατέρων δὲ ἐπόμενον, πρὸς τὸν δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθευσόντων λέγουμεν, ὅποθ' ὥσα ἂν ἄδικον ἢ δικαιούσῃν συντείνει (ἀλλ' 1127 b γὰρ ἐν εἰπ' ταύτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μὲν ἀδικοῦν τοιούτων διαφέροντο καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βιβρ ἀληθεύει τῷ τῆς ἔξω τοιούτω εἶναι. δόξῃ δὲ ὅ τι τοιοῦτος ἑπισκεφτός εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ δὲ φιλαληθὴς, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύσων, ἀληθεύσω ταῦτα ἀνθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ ἐρωντο καὶ ἀλαζῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω καθ’ αὐτῶν πεφούδωμοι μὴ ἀγετών ἐρων, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ βιβτίω ἀλαζῶν, ὁ δ’ ὅς ἐξελε, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθ’ ὁμορρο πεπισκεφτός καὶ δόξῳ ὁ μὲν φιλαληθής, ὁ δὲ φιλαφευτής.

(ἀλάθαι), cf. πλάνοι. Hence the meaning 'charlatan,' 'quack' (Italian ciarlato, 'a mountebank doctor'). In Plato and Aristophanes the word still means 'impostor' quite generally and is associated with μοίησις. Sokrates is an ἀλαζὼν as well as an ἐρών. For the specialised sense here given to the word cf. Xen. Kyri. 2, 12 quoted below b, 15 n. In the New Comedy the ἀλαζῶν is the Miles Gloriosus. The original adapted by Plautus had this title.

§ 3. ὁ ἐρων. The ἐρων is properly the 'aly' man. Cf. Philemon, fr. 89 Kock:

Ὅς ἄρτι ἀλώτης ὁ μὲν ἐρων τῇ φώςει, ἢ δ’ ἀνθέκαστος.

The word occurs first in Aristophanes, Clouds, 449.

§ 4. ἀνθέκαστος, not 'the man who is always himself,' but ὁ ἄρτι ἐκαστος λέγων, 'the man who calls each thing itself,' i.e. by its proper name.' So ὁ τῶν σκάφων σκάφος λέγων, 'the man who calls a spade a spade.' The opposite is given in Antiphanes fr. 52 Kock, ἀβρα μὴ μουδέν. See last note.

κάν. Cf. 1127 b, 2 καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βιβρ. The reading κάν is suggested by Professor Bywater. The mss. have καλ.

§ 7. τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι. Cf. 1126 b, 24. We are not discussing truthfulness as an ἀρετή πρὸς ἑρων.
that point of view it comes
the head of his house.

... άποκλίνει. So Coraes for
ποταμει. The Paraphrast has

ποταμει τως υποπολαθ. The

writers έπαιχθες and φορτικως are

noty found together in the

ποταμει. The sentiment is thoroughly

and accounts for the use of

ποταμει, μέτρως and σπουδαιος in the

ποταμει of άγαθος. Cf. 1157 a, 34 π.

... ος ο άλαζων. This seems to

adscript; for in the mss. it

after οι άγαθος φεκτως where it

not make sense. I take it that

ταιος who μηδενος ένεκα προσ-

αι is not classed as an άλαζων at

and that the object of the awk-

tenent en έν την δυνάμει κ.τ.λ.

tenate this. But there may be

further dislocation; for Aspasios

ος έν την δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. after

πα 1127 b, 22. Bywater, Contr.

2. ος έν την δυνάμει κ.τ.λ.

άτης who μηδενος ένεκα προσ-

αι has only the ‘potency’ of an

him; he only becomes one

of deliberate purpose uses

πινει as means to an end.

expression, cf. Top. 125 a,

30 δρόμω δε και ει την δυνάμει

η φεκτως εις δυναμαί έν την δυνάμει

θηκε, ολοι των σοφιτων ως διάλογων, η

κλέπτη των δυνάμεων λάθρα τα άλλη-

τρια κλέπτην. οδης γαρ των ερη-

μέων την δυνάμει ερημα τοιούτων το-

ούτως λεγεται: διναιαται μεν γαρ και δ

θης και ο σπουδαιος τα φαιλα δροι,

αλλ` ουκ εισ ουτοιει παντες γαρ οι

φαιλοι κατα προσαρθεις λεγονται.

This is just the difference between

the dialektikos and the σοφιτης. Cf.

Met. 1104 b, 32 πηλ μεν γαρ τω αετω

γενος στηρισεται η σοφιτης και η δια-

λεκτικη τη φιλοσοφια, άλλα διαφερε

την μεν την τραχη την δυναμων, την

d την βλαύ την προσαρθη.

κατα την εξιν, opp. κατα την δυ-

μων.

... ωσπερ και σοφιτης κ.τ.λ. We

may best understand the point by

asking whether we call the man who

'spins yarns’ a liar. In the same

way ‘innocent vanity’ is not άλαζων.

 Cf. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 12 ο μεν γαρ

αλαζων έμαγε δοκει δοκει κειθερα ειτη

tοις προσποιωμενοις και πλεονωτεροις

ειναι η ελαι και άνδρευτεροι και τακτη-

σεις ο μη ικανοι εισον υπανθρωποις,

και τατωρα φανεροι γεγονομενοι οτι τα\n

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[Δ. VII. 13]

ορεγόμενος ἢ κέρδος. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαξονεύομενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐκ' οὓς ἔπαινος ἡ εὐδαιμονίας, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὅν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ διά
κω λαθεῖν ἢτοὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν λατρὸν. διὰ τούτῳ οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαξονεύονται ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δὲ εἰρωνεῖς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλατιαῖον λέγοντες χαριστέρων μὲν τὰ ἢτοὶ φαίνονται· οὖ γάρ κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὄγκηρον 25 μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἐνδοξά ἀπαρφοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίησε. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] Βαυκασανούργου λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταθροντότεροι εἰσίν· καὶ ἐνδοξά ἀλαξονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἦ τῶν Δακώνων ἐσθῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν Ἑλλήνης ἀλαξονικὸν οἱ δὲ ἰτό

λαβεῖ τι ἕνεκα καὶ κέρδος παύειν, οἱ δὲ μηχανεύομενοι γέλια τοῦ τυφλοῦ μητέρι ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν κέρδη μητερί ἐπὶ σμίκροι τῶν αὐτών μήτε ἐπὶ βλάβη μημένια, πῶς οὖν οὗτοι αὐτοὶ ἂν καὶ ἐχάριτες δικαιότεροι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλαξονίες;

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδους, sc. τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται, 'they pretend to things from which their neighbours derive benefit.' Τότε καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἢτοὶ μὴ ὄντα is added as if προσποιοῦνται τοιαύτα ἐξελθεῖν had preceded; for ἔστω must be masculine singular if μάντιν σοφὸν λατρὸν is to have any construction. 'They assume characters the unreality of which may escape detection.'

§ 14. οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης. Τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς ἑκάστης ὁμολογίας ἐν Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ ὑπερβολῷ, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν βαθικῶν, ἢ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ὑποθεμάτων Ἰακώβων, οἷον ἂν ἦ γαρ κερδοσύνη, καὶ ἠμφατότερον ἐν τῷ σεληνοσχημάτισι (Sc. β Κοτκ 1, 482) μένοντα. Κλείστηκεν μέντοι ὁ γλώσσαγορφος τὸ σεμνὸν ἐπε

βοῦκες.

ἡ ἡτῶν Δακώνων ἐσθῆς. Σχολ. Ἀνάφθει ὅτι ἄρτοι ἒστιν ἐπαρχοῖς Ἐσθητοῖς (Δακ. τοι. 2 § 4). διὰ τῶν καὶ σκάπων τούτων άπεραι οἱ κυμαθεῖς, ὡς Πλάτων ἢ Πρέσβειος (Κοτκ 1, 634),—Χαλείας ομοίως μετανειπεῖν ἄπερ οἱ διὰ

κλιμακισάμενα τῶν ὑποθρύσην στρατηγίαν ὑπερβολῆς ἐπετίθεμαν.

I do not know why the editors think this refers to Laconising Athenians, not to the Spartans themselves.
§ 17. χειρών γάρ, sc. τοῦ εἰρωνοῦ. For this test see 1105 a, 6 n.

VIII. § 1. ἀναπαύοντος. For Aristotle's theory of Rest, see below 1176 b, 34. It is ἀνέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς (Pol. 1337 b, 42), 'relaxation of the soul,' and is necessary for the worker (δὲ γάρ τοὺς δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύοντος ib. 38). It must be carefully distinguished from σχολή (διαγωγή) which is an end in itself, not a means to further exer-

καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ κ. τ. λ. Besides Play, Aristotle recognises Sleep and Drink (μεθή) as forms of ἀνάπαυσις (Pol. 1339 a, 17). For the importance of μεθή cf. the Second Book of Plato's Laws.

διαγωγής μετὰ παιδίας. The word διαγωγή is here used in its wide popular sense of passing time, not in the narrow sense (equivalent to σχολή) which it often has, and in which it is contrasted with ἀνάπαυσις.

λέγειν καὶ ἀκοῦειν. This distinction is elaborated in the Eudamian Ethics (1234 a, 14 sqq. p. 198). The man who can make a joke (the μέθος between the φωτικαὶ and the ψυχοῖ) and the man who can tale a joke even at his own expense are both described.

ἐν τοιούτων...τοιούτων, 'whether those in whose company he speaks are like himself, and whether those by whom he is spoken to are like himself.'

§ 3. πάντως, 'at any cost.' Cf. 1124 b, 9 n.

ἄγροικ. All mss. but K̄ have ἄγροι, which, however, means 'sa-
vage' and is out of place here. In
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1128 b, 10. ΕΕ. 1233 b, 16 σχέδιον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστο τῶν περὶ τὸ ἕδρον ἔστιν τοῖς ὑπὲρβολοῖς τὰ μὲν ἐπερβολαί τὰ δὲ ἐλευθερὰ τὰ δὲ μεσοτητές εἰσὶν παθητικά. ὅπως δὲ φθειρὸς καὶ ἐπιχαίρεκας καθ' ἐκ γὰρ ἐξεῖς λέγονται, δὲ μὲν φθειρὸς τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπί τοῖς καὶ ἕτερον εἰπροποτοῦν ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιχαίρεκαν πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ ἡπτά ἀνάκυκλον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δόλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαρὲν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν κακοπαθεῖαν. μέσος δὲ τούτων δὲ ἐμπεστικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν κακοπαθεῖαν καὶ εἰπροποτοῦν, καρέμων δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις διὸ καὶ θεω οὖνται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. αἰδώς δὲ μεσοτητὸς ἀναιρεχθήσεις καὶ καταπλῆξεως. δὲ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμίας φροντισίτων δοξῆς ἀναιρεχθήσεως, διὸ

IX. § 1. Περὶ δὲ αἰδώς κ.τ.λ. Ιν 1108 a, 30 sqq. we were told of two μεσοτητές which were ἐν τοῖς παθητικαί τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἕδρον, viz. αἰδώς καὶ νέμεσις. Here we are told that αἰδώς is not an ἐρετή, because it is the feeling itself, not a ἐξεις or habitual attitude towards the feeling. Nothing is said of νέμεσις at all. The two seem to be μεσοτητές in the feelings of fear and anger which come by nature.

ὁρίζεται. Plato, Laws 646 e φοβομενοὶ δὲ γε πολλάκις ὄξωσεν, ἣγορα ὑποειράθεσα κακοὶ πράττοντες ἡ λέγοντες τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν. ὅ δὲ καὶ καλούμενον τῶν φόβων ημεῖς γε, ὡμῶν δὲ καὶ πάντως, αἰσχύνη. (Aristotle does not distinguish αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη at all in this discussion, see next note.) In Top. 126 a, 6 he criticises this definition of shame. Shame, he says, is ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, λεύν ἐν τῷ ψυχικῷ. So in the Rhetoric (1383 b, 13) we have an amended definition which leaves out fear, ἐστὶν δὲ αἰσχύνη λέγεται τῷ παραχτὶ περὶ ταῖς ἔστε αἰδώς φαίνεται φόβου τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παράτοτος ὑποκύπτων ἢ μεταλλουσιον, or more short- 1001128 b, 10. ΕΕ. 1233 b, 16 σχέδιον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστο τῶν περὶ τὸ ἕδρον ἔστιν τοῖς ὑπὲρβολοῖς τὰ μὲν ἐπερβολαί τὰ δὲ ἐλευθεραί τὰ δὲ μεσοτητές εἰσιν παθητικά. ὅπως δὲ φθειρὸς καὶ ἐπιχαίρεκας καθ' ἐκ γὰρ ἐξεῖς λέγονται, δὲ μὲν φθειρὸς τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπί τοῖς καὶ ἕτερον εἰπροποτοῦν ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιχαίρεκαν πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ ἡπτά ἀνάκυκλον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δόλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαρὲν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν κακοπαθεῖαν. μέσος δὲ τούτων δὲ ἐμπεστικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν κακοπαθεῖαν καὶ εἰπροποτοῦν, καρέμων δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις διὸ καὶ θεω οὖνται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. αἰδώς δὲ μεσοτητὸς ἀναιρεχθήσεις καὶ καταπλῆξεως. δὲ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμίας φροντισίτων δοξῆς ἀναιρεχθήσεως, διὸ
πάση δ' ἡμικλα τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτως αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ξάνθας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὡς τῆς αἰδώςς δὲ κοιλύσατο καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς αν ἐπαυσέειν ὅτι αἰσχυντῆς· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν 20 ἄτων πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπεικεῖς ἔστιν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἰςπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὖ γὰρ 5 πρακτέοι τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστι τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρά τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὐδὲτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, 6 ὡστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέοι)· φαύλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν τοιοῦτον οἷον 25 πράττειν τὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὡστ' εἰ πράξαι τὶ τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνησθαι, καὶ διὰ τοὺτ' οὐσθαὶ ἐπεικεῖ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκῶν δ' ὅ 7 ἐπεικείς οὐδέτερο πράξαι τὰ φαύλα. εἰ δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς εξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπεικεῖς· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνων ἂν· οὐκ ἐστὶν δ' ὅ 30 δὲ τούτο περὶ τὰς ἁρετὰς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναίσχυντα φαύλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεύον ἡ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μάλλον τὸν τὰ 8 τοιαῦτα πράττειν αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπεικεῖς. οὐκ ἐστὶ δ' οὖν ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἁρετή, ἀλλὰ τὶς μικτή· δειχθῆσαι δὲ περὶ αὑτῆς ἐν τοῖς ύστεροιν. μὴν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν. 35

πάσης ὄρμοις καταπλης, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαύλομένων ἐπεικῶν αἰδήμων.

Ε.Ε. 1234 α, 24 πάσαι δ' αὖτα ἂι μειοσθῆς εἶναι μὲν. οὐκ εἶσθι δ' ἁρεταὶ, οὐδ' ἂι ἐναικία καθ' ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ· ταύτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστίν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαφέρον· ἐκατόν γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστιν· διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἁρετάς· ἐστὶ γὰρ, ὅπερ λεχθῆται ἐν τοῖς ύστεροιν, ἐκάστη ποὺς ἁρετή καὶ φύση καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως· ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνοι εἰς δόξαις συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέωσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδώς εἰς συφροσύνην, διό καὶ ὅριζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τῆς συφροσύνης· ὁ δ' ἂληθής καὶ ψευδής ὁ μὲν ἐμφρόν, ὁ δ' ἄφρον. 35

§ 3. αἰδήμονας. The regular Attic word for this was αἰσχυντῆς, which is used in exactly the same sense below. Cf. Plato, Charm. 138 c καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυντῆς αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀλήθείας ἐπεφέρειν. (Cf. also 160 c.) So Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1389 a, 29 that the young are αἰσχυντῆς but not the old. It is characteristic of Xenophon's diction that αἰδήμαν is a favourite word with him.

§ 6. καὶ τῷ εἶναι. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 42, and for the construction cf. 1107 a, 3; 1127 b, 15.

§ 7. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 'conditionally good,' and the hypothesis is that we have done something bad.

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ύστεροιν, in Book VII.
BOOK V.

JUSTICE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Justice receives a much more elaborate treatment than any other form of goodness. This is not only because of its great importance, but also because of the greater complexity of the problems to which it gives rise. The object of the whole discussion is, of course, to show that the principle of the Mean applies to Justice as well as to other forms of goodness; but justice differs from the forms of goodness we have studied hitherto in being essentially relative (πρὸς ἑαυτὸν). It thus involves four terms and not three only; for there are at least two persons and at least two things which are just for those persons. The mean which Justice aims at is at first an unknown α which has to be found by some application of the Rule of Three.

Aristotle begins at once by limiting the sense of the word justice. In Greek δικαίωμα meant not merely "to be unjust," but also "to be guilty" of any offence whatsoever against the law, and the word δικαιοσύνη could therefore be used as equivalent to "righteousness," that is to say, the whole of goodness regarded as relative to others. In the Republic, Plato had given it a wider meaning still, and had made it include the relations between the different "parts" of the individual soul, a view which Aristotle discusses later on (1138 b, 5 sqq.). It was therefore necessary at the outset to distinguish "particular" from "universal" justice; but the distinction is of little interest to us, seeing that the English word "justice" is never used naturally in the wider sense which Aristotle is anxious to distinguish and set aside. We have only to consider justice in the special sense in which it refers to the fair apportionment of "external goods."
§ 2. The first form of justice in this sense which Aristotle treats of is Distributive Justice. He has to show that the principle of the Mean applies to this, and he does so by showing that the formula of justice may be expressed as a proportion of the form $A : B :: C : D$ or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$. This is what the Greeks called a “geometrical” proportion. The name of the second kind is usually mistranslated “Corrective Justice,” and this mistranslation has led to much confusion in the interpretation of the argument. Really this form of justice regulates obligationes ex contractu quite as much as obligationes ex delicto. The true meaning of διόρθωσις is to “adjust” whether by correction (ἐπιστροφή) or otherwise, and the scholastic term iustitia directiva is really far more accurate. There would be no harm in calling the form of justice which adjusts the damages and penalties imposed by a court of law iustitia correctiva, and that which regulates the exchange of commodities and the like might then be called by S. Thomas’s name iustitia commutativa. But this would obscure the fact that the two are applications of the same principle, that, namely, of “arithmetical proportion.”

We are not in the habit of calling an equation of the form $A - B = C - D$ a proportion at all, but it was one of the recognised Pythagorean μεσότηται, and in Aristotle’s day it was commonly called an ἀναλογία, though that word was properly confined to the γεωμετρική μεσότητα. It will be convenient for us to speak of “arithmetical proportion” too.
Περί δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκέπτεόν, περί πολὲς τε τυχεχάνουσιν οὖσα πρᾶξειν, καὶ ποιὰ μεσότης ἐστίν ἢ 5 δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνος μέσον. ἢ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῶν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προερχομένοις. ὃ ὅροιμεν ὅπε ἐπὶ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξὶν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ’ ἡς πρακτικὸν τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ’ ἡς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βουλονται τὰ δίκαια τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόποις καὶ 10 περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ’ ἡς ἀδικούσι καὶ βουλονται τὰ ἀδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῶν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ 4 τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων

I. § 1. περὶ πολές...πράξεις, καὶ ποιὰ μεσότης. The two regular questions περὶ πολές μεσότης and ποιὰ μεσότης; cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον, i.e. that of starting with τὰ ἐνδοχα and arguing dialectically from them. For μέθοδος, see 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 3. ἀφ’ ἡς πρακτικὸν κ.τ.λ. This ἐνδοχα comes from Plato, Gorgias 460 b (referred to by Fritzsche). Τὶ ὄντων ἢ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὸς τεκτονικὸς ἢ ὅ;—Ναὶ.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅ τὰ μονικαὶ μονικά;—Ναὶ.—Καὶ ὅ τὰ λατρικὰ λατρικὸς κ.τ.λ.;—Πάντως γε.—Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὅ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὰς δίκαιοι;—Πάντως δὴνον.—Ὁ δὲ δίκαιον δίκαια ποῦ πράττει;—Ναὶ.—Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τῶν δίκαιων βοηθεῖται δίκαια πράττεις;—Φαίνεται γε.
καὶ εἴπ τῶν ἔξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξεις δὲ ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πράπτεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ 15 τὰ ὑγεία μόνον λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγεινὰς βαδίζειν, ὅταν χρῆ ἄρα ἡ ὑγεία ὑπάρχῃ. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἐξίσῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐνάντια τῷ γὰρ ἡ ἐνεξίζε η ὑφαινερά, καὶ ἡ κακεψία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεκτικῶν ἡ ἐνεξίζε 20 καὶ ἐκ τών ἐνεκτικῶν τὰ ἐνεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνεξίζε πυκνότητα σαρκὸς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς κακεψίας εἶναι μανόντη σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ἐνεκτικῶν τὸ πνευμάτου πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολου-

ἔξεις determines βούλησις (and therefore προαίρεσις) by determining the φαντάμενον ἀγαθόν. So in Top. 145 b, 34, the definition of δικαιωμένη as δύναμις τοῦ ταύτου διανεμητική is criticised; δικαιοτάτων μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς διανεμητικούς τὸ ταύτου διανεμεῖ τοῖς δυνάμεως. For δύναμις and προαίρεσις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

δύναμις μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is true, of course, only of ἀι μέτα λόγου δυνάμεως (cf. 1103 a, 26 n.). Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard justice as an art, it will be the art of doing unjust things as well as just, exactly as νίκος ἂν διὸ εἶναι φυλάξεσθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν εὖ τὸ διευθήσεσθαι εὐμορφίας (Rep. 333 a).

ἡ ἐναντία. It is needless to read ἡ αὐτὴ, though it would be more logical. The double ἐναντία is idiomatic, cf. below a, 18.

αὐτὰ τῆς ὑγείας, the typical ἔξεις. ἔξεις

ὄντως, here in the sense of τὸ σημαντικόν ὑγείας, τὸ ἄνω τῆς ἔξεως, cf. Top. 106 b, 36 τὸ ὑγεινῶς ἢ πνευμάτως ἢ φυλακτικῶς (i.e. πρὸς τὴν ἔξω) ἢ σημαντικῶς (i.e. ἀνὰ τῆς ἔξως) ῥηθήσεται.

§ 6. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For σκέψις ἐπὶ τού τῶν ἐναντίων as applied to ἔξεις, cf. Top. 147 a, 17.

ἄντω τῶν ὑποκειμένων. I cannot believe that this means anything else than the things in which the ἔξεις are found. As a ποιήτης, δικαιοσύνη ἐν ὑποκειμένοις λέγεται τῷ δικαίῳ (Bonitz, Ind. 260 b, 41). If this is so, the ὑποκειμένον will be σύστροχα, and σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν συστρώχων is a recognised dialectical method. Further, this is in accordance with the actual procedure which Aristotle follows; for what he actually does is to consider the ἄδικος, i.e. the ὑποκειμένον of the ἐναντία ἔξεις. If I am right, τῶν ἐνεκτικῶν must = τῶν ἐξ ἐκτόςων as below 1176 a, 15 and often.

τὸ πνευμάτων. The ambiguity of the word ἐνεκτικόν seems to have caused a transition to another class of σύστροχα, for τὸ πνευμάτων are not properly ὑποκειμένα. But it matters little; for τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω are identical with τὰ ἄνω τῆς ἔξεως and these are such as τὰ ἐκτός perform. The mention of them here will not seem irrelevant if we remember that our aim is not merely to know justice but to produce it.

§ 6. ακολουθεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Top. 106 a, 9 περὶ δὲ πολλάκις ἡ μοναχός τῆς ἐδεί λέγεται, ἐκ τῶν ἁθετητῶν. πρώτῳ μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναινίων συνεχεῖς εἰ πολλάκις λέγεται, ἐκάστῃ τῇ ἐδεί ἐκάστη τῇ ὑδίμαν διαφορά.
206 ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ [Ε. Ι. 6

θετὶ δ’ ὤσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν βάτερα πλεονάχοι λέγηται, 25 καὶ βάτερα πλεονάχοι λέγεσθαι, οἶοι εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. ἔοικε δὲ πλεονάχοι λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιο- σύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμονομίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὀστερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δὴν ἐπῆλθαν, (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολὺ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἴδεαν ὁ οὐ τῇ καλεῖται 30 εἰς δὲ ὁμονομίας ἢ τῇ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐχένα τῶν ζωῶν καὶ ἡ τὰς θύρας κλείοντον, εἰς ἴδεαν δὴ ὁ ἀδικος ποσαχος λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὴ ὃ τὸ παράνομος ἀδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὅστε δὴ ὁ δικαιος δὴ καὶ [ὁ] δικέαιος ἐσται ὃ τῇ νόμωμοι καὶ ὁ ἴσος, τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀρα τὸ νόμωμοι καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ

1129 δ’ ἀδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεον-9

ἐὰν βάτερα κ. τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater, Contr.p. 43 and Stewart’s note in loc. I have followed Stewart in keeping the βάτερα of Kib Ll. Bywater reads βάτερα from the Vetus Versio and omits καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. But (1) the idiomatic βάτερα is more likely to have been lost in the Versio than invented by the scribes, and (2) we really want the two pairs, the δικεῖα and the ὀστεῖα. ‘If one pair of terms is ambiguous, the other pair will be so too.’ I do not think it necessary to insert καὶ ἡ δικαιοτής after τὸ δίκαιον with Stewart. Aristotle does not care for minute symmetry in such clauses. Cf. 1108 a, 16 oμ’ ἐπιστῶν ὁμ’ ἄρα ἀλλὰ ἕκαστα, quoted by Bywater, Contr. p. 29.

§ 7. τὴν ὁμονομίαν. The word is here used in the widest sense, in which any two things which share the same name are called ὁμονομα, not in the restricted sense explained in 1096 b, 27 n. As a matter of fact they are ὀστεῖα (cf. 1130 a, 33).

λανθάνει, sc. ἡ ὁμονομα. Cf. Phys. 249 a, 23 ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν ὁμονομαῖοι αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσα, αἱ δὲ ἐχουσα τὰ ὁμοτύπητα, αἱ δ’ ἐφ’ οὗ γένει ἡ ἀνάλογη, δι’ οὗ διοκοῦσιν ὁμονομαία ἐτίμησιν. So Top. 139 b, 28 λανθασθείσῃ τὴν ὁμονομαίαν, An. Post. 97 b, 30 αἱ ὁμονομαία λανθάνουσι. In the present case the ὁμονομαία is σύνεγγυς γένει and therefore properly a συνωμομαία.

ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ κ. τ.λ. The γὰρ introduces the reason for the choice of the instance which follows. Cf. 1104 a, 13. κατὰ τὴν ἴδεαν, ‘in outward appearance.’

§ 8. καὶ ἄνισος, ‘unfair, i.e. unequal.’ This is added because the popular word πλεονέκτης does not bring out the fact that the ἄδικος not only takes more than his share of good things, but less than his share of bad things. Cf. 1129 b, 10. (Bywater, Contr. p. 43).

tὸ παράνομον. Of course the English word ‘unjust’ has not this wider sense, but it was quite familiar to Athenian ears. ‘To be guilty’ of any offence whatsoever was in the language of the courts ἀδίκειν. The ὁμονομαία is, therefore, a mere accident of the Greek language, and we should not erect the distinction between “universal and particular injustice” into a part of Aristotle’s system. He is only clearing the ground as usual by narrowing the application of the word.
νέκτης ο ἁδικός, περὶ τὰ γαθὰ ἐσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐνυχία καὶ ἀνυχία, ὁ ἐστὶ μὲν ἄπλως ἂν ἁγαθά, τινὶ δ’ οὐκ ἂν. οἱ δ’ ἀνθρωποι ταῦτα εἶχονται καὶ διώκονται· δεῖ δ’ οὐ, ἀλλ’ εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἄπλως ἁγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἁγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἁγαθὰ. οἱ δ’ ἁδικοὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐλαστον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄπλως κακῶν. ἀλλ’ ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἁγαθὸν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ’ ἁγαθοῦ ἤστιν ἢ πλεονεξία, διὰ τούτῳ δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἐστὶ δ’ ἁνίσιος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινῶν. ὅπει δ’ ὁ παράνομος ἁδικός ἢν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ότι πάντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐστὶ πῶς δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ, ὡρισμένα ἦντο τίς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμα ἐστι, καὶ ἐκαστὸν τοῦ· τῶν δίκαιων εἶναι φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν περὶ ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῆς συμφέροντος πάσιν ἢ τοῖς ἄριστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ’ ἅρτην ἢ κατ’ ἄλλου τινὰ τρόπων τοιούτων. ἅπετε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ πονητικά καὶ φυλακτικά εὐθαμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ

§ 9. περὶ ὅσα κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τὰ ἐκτὸν ἁγαθά. Cf. 1099 b, 8 n. For ἄπλως ἁγαθά, cf. Top. 113 b, 33 ἢ μηδὲνος προστίθημιν δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἥ ἠλθὼν ἢ ἐλλ. τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἄπλως ἐρημίζεται. See also Pol. 1332 a, 21 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαρέχεται κατὰ τῶν ἡθῶν ἐλέγχων, ὅτι τοιοῦτο ἐστιν ὁ ἀπαφαγός ἢ διὰ τὴν ἅρτην ἁγαθά ἐστι τὰ ἄπλως ἁγαθά. § 11. ἐστι, Vermehren’s conjecture for ms. ἐστι. περιέχει καὶ κοινῶν. The word ἁνίσιος includes the man who τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται τῶν ἄπλως ἁγαθῶν and also the man who τὸ ἐλαστον ἐρείθαι τῶν ἄπλως κακῶν. It is "common" to both.

§ 12. ἦν. Cf. 1113 b, 13 n. πως δίκαια, i.e. in the wide sense in which τὸ δίκαιον includes the practice of all goodness so far as it is enjoined by law.

Aristotle only means that the laws deal with all departments of life, but we are looking for the particular department to which Justice belongs. The verb ἀγορεύοντα belongs to Attic legal style, and is never used in Aristotle except of ὅσον. στοχαζόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This refers to the distinction between ὅσον ποιεῖται and παρεβαθεῖν, for which see below 1160 a, 31 sqq. I think Rassow is right in his view that the ὅσον ποιεῖται στοχάζεται τοῦ κοινῆς συμφέροντος πάσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, while the παρεβαθεῖσι στοχάζεται τοῦ συμφέροντος κυρίοις, whether one (tyranny), few (oligarchy), or many (democracy). I therefore retain κατ’ ἅρτην, though omitted by K, and I understand it of ἀρσενοκρατία, while κατ’ ἄλλο τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον refers to τυμοκρατία and the like.

ἐνα μὲν τρόπον, i.e. in the wide sense. The μὲν is answered by δι’ ὃ in 1130 a, 14.
πολιτικὴ κοινωνία. προστάται δ’ ο νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν’-
20 δρεῖον ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τᾶξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ὑπήπτειν τὰ ὀπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοι-
χεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράγμα, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ καθισχεῖν, ὁμολογὸς δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μαχητικὰς τὰ μὲν κελεύον τὰ δ’ ἀπαγορεύον, ὁρθὸς
25 μὲν οἱ κείμενοι ὁρθός, χεῖρον δ’ ο ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὐτὴ 15
μὲν οὐν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ’ οὐν ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατώτατη τῶν
ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ “οὐθ’ ἐσπερος οὐθ’ ἐφος”
οὕτω θαμαστός· καὶ παρομαισάμοιον φαμεν “ἐν δὲ δικαιο-
30 σύνη συλλέβηδον πᾶσ’ ἀρετὴ ἐν,” καὶ τελεία μᾶλλα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῇς
tελείαις ἀρετῆς χρήσις ἐστιν. τελεία δ’ ἐστιν, ὅτι ο
ἐχον αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρησάθαι,
ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον καθ’ αὐτῶν πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκεῖοις
τῇ ἁρετή δύνανται χρησάθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον ἀδυνα-

§ 14. προστάται δ’ ο νόμος κ.τ.λ.
The argument is intended to show that δικαιοσύνη as a separate form of
goodness must have some other meaning than legality. That is shown to
extend to all forms of goodness so far as they are πρὸς ἔτερον.
§ 15. οὐθ’ ἐσπερος κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (p. 210, 9 Heylbut) τοῦτο ἐξ
Εὐρυτίκου σοφὸς (Σσοφής Usser, or is it
a marginal exclamation?) Μελανίππης
λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (fr. 386 Nauck)—
dικαιοσύνης τὸ χρῆσαι πρὸςων.
This is explained and confirmed by
Plotinos Enn. i, 6 ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς
dικαιοσύνης πρὸςων καὶ οὐτὲ ἔσπερος
οὐτὲ ἐφος οὖν καλὰ, ἵδι. τ. ς δικαιο-
σύνης... ὡς ἐφος καλὰ τὸ πρὸςων
καὶ οὐτὲ ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ. Bywater, Her-
mes v, 336.

καὶ τελεία κ.τ.λ. We shall not
feel any difficulty about this passage if
we remember that it is purely literary,
and that we must not look for technical
precision in it. Justice (=Righ-
teousness) is 'complete' because it
is all goodness, 'complete' goodness.
It is 'complete' because it is the use
(not merely the possession) of good-
ness. It is 'complete' because it is
πρὸς ἔτερον.

χρήσις. The implied antithesis is
1328 a, 38 εὐδαιμονία is defined ἀρετῆς
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἐξεῖν τὸ τοῦ Βλαντὸς ὅτι ἄρχη 1130 τίς

δεῖξαν πρός ἔτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἦν ὁ ἄρχων.

τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλὸτριον ἄγαθον δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ
cūn̄a μονή τῶν ἄρετῶν, ὅτι πρός ἔτερον ἔστιν ἀλλο

cvmpfrwnta πράττει, ἡ ἄρχοντε ἡ κοινωνίᾳ. κάκε

εἰς ὅνον οὐ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος

κρῆση, ἀριστός δ’ οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἄρετῇ ἀλλ

τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπὸν. αὐτῆ μὲν οὖν ἡ
tūn ὑπὸ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἀλλὰ δὴ ἄρετὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν

πρὸς καίρια μέρος κακίας ἀλλὰ ὁλὴ κακία. τὸ δὲ διαφέρει τὸ

ἡ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτῆ, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων

ἐν γάρ ἡ αὐτῆ, τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν

τὸν ἐπεδιάφησεν ἡ δὲ τοιάδε ἔχει ἄπλωσι, ἄρετη.

rorsmμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἄρετῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐστῑ

τὸ τοῦ Βλαντὸς. In L’ the

s árkh, but why should Bias

speak Doric? This is one

γρώμων which Sophokles has

ο ποίησις. Cf. Antig. v. 175

ev των τερμίνων. We may bring

force of ἡδύ by paraphrasing

come to the ruler, a relation

is at once implied. 1 Cf. 

14. 1177 a, 6. This is cor-

to the idiomatic use of οὕσω

σε. See Ind. s. νν.

ἄλλοτριον ἄγαθον. This is

e definitions given by Thrasy-

υας the First Book of the Re-

Cf. 343 c, ‘Righteousness

are really ἄλλοτριον ἄγαθον,

ood for the stronger and the

εἰς τὸν πειθόμενον τε καὶ

στὸς βιβλίον,’

οντὶ ἡ κοινωνίᾳ. The first

he case in a παρῆκτεσιν, the

ἀρίθμη τολείες. Jackson.

καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν κ. τ. λ. Since

man is he who acts badly,

πρὸς αὐτὸν, but also πρὸς

best man is he who acts well

not only with regard to himself,

but also with regard to others.

§ 20. τὸ δ’ εἶναι κ. τ. λ. For the

phrase cf. 1141 b, 24. The full ex-

pression would be οὐ ταῖντον ἐστὶ τὸ

ἐναδότη καὶ τὸ εἶναι δικαιοσύνη, cf.

Top. 133 b, 23 ἀλλὰ λέγεται τὸ ἔτερον

ἑαυτῷ τὸ εἶναι οὐ ταῖντον γὰρ

ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ έναι
cai λεγων ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπως

λεγων. Simplicius in Phys. (p. 735, 

12 Diels) speaks of τὸ εἶναι συνωτών

οὐ τὸν Περιπάτου λέγωμεν καὶ τὸ

eidos oμηαον. Cf. Phys. 303 a, 18,

ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διατητα ἐν πρὸς δύο

καὶ δύο πρὸς ἐν, καὶ τὸ ἀντίστατο καὶ τὸ

κατατάσεις ταυτα γάρ ἐν μὲν ἐστιν,

ὁ μέντα λόγος οὐχ εἰς, with Met. 1066 a, 

32 where we have the same examples

but the last clause runs ἀλὰ τὸ εἶναι

οὐχ ἐν. (Ramsauer.)

ἄπλωσι, closely with τοιάδε ἔχει,

without qualification." Translate

"regarded simply as a state of this

kind, it is the same as goodness."
15 γάρ τις, ὥς φαμεν, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν κατὰ μὲν γάρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθήριας ἡ ἐνεργοῦν ἀδίκει μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ βίωσας τὴν ἀστίδα διὰ δεῖλαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ ὁ λιθάσας χρήσας δὲ ἀνελευθερεῖν. ὁταν δὲ 20 πλεονεκτῆ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕδε κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πνοηρίαν δὲ γε τινα (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδίκιαν. ἐστιν ἀρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδίκια ὡς μέρος τῆς ὁλης. καὶ ἄδικον τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἄδικου τοῦ παρὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὅτι ἐι τὸ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίας ἕνα καὶ καταφές καὶ 25 προσαλμβάνους, ὅτι προστιθέει καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιστράμ, οὕτως μὲν ἀκολασσός δόξεις ἐστὶν μᾶλλον ἡ πλεονεκτής, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκολασσός δ' οὐ. δήλου ἄρα διὰ διὰ τὸ κερδαίας. ὅτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορά ἐπὶ τινα μοχθήριαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσον, 30 ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλειπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δεῖλαν, εἰ δ' ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἡ ἐπ' ἀδίκιαν. ὀστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶ τις ἀδίκιαν

particles δέ γε are used with their idiomatic force.

τὴν ἐν μέρει δικ., ‘particular justice,’ i.e. that justice which is a part of goodness and not ὡς ἀρχή. The phrases ἐν μέρει κατὰ μέρος below are equivalent. The force of the preposition here is modal (Ind. Ar. 245 b, 27 sqq.) and may be best brought out by ‘as, ’ justice as a part of goodness.’ So we have ὡς μέρος τῆς ὁλης below a, 22.

§ 2. κατὰ μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. In the case of particular vices we say that a man ἀδίκει even although he gains no unfair advantage for himself, and in this use of the word ἀδίκει = ὡς κακία πρὸς ἐγερομ. But, on the other hand, there are cases where a man gains an unfair advantage and therefore ἀδίκει, but where his ἀδίκει is neither identical

with any particular vice nor yet with ὡς κακία. Yct it is κακία (for we blame it), and it is ἀδίκα (for in one sense of the word, ἀδίκος = πλεονεκτής. cf. above 1129 a, 32).

οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας. We have the same argument about ἄκρασια below 1146 b, 4.

§ 3. ἐστὶν ἀρ' ἄλλη. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 43.

ἀς μέρος, equivalent to ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος above.


§ 5. ἀκολασία, in the wider sense = παράκομα.

ἐμοίχευσον. Cf. 1110 a, 14 π.
§ 6. συνώνυμος. This is more technical than the ὑμνώμων of 1129 a, 27, and for the reason given. The definition is in the same genus, and συνώνυμον τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος (Top. 123 a, 28).

τὴν δύναμιν, i.e. τὸ ἐναυτ. above 1130 a, 12.

ταῦτα πάντα. They are, of course, περὶ δικαίωσιν καὶ ἀρετῆς (1129 b, 3), i.e. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἁγαθά.

§ 7. Ὑπερι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. A striking example of the cumbrous transitions and recapitulations which disfigure the Ethics. We may attribute these to Nikomachos if we please. Introd. § 5.

§ 9. τὸ παράνομον. For the reading see Stewart’s note.

§ 10. τὰ...πρᾶττόμενα. I agree with Professor Stewart in preferring the πρᾶττόμενα of L to the προστατόμενα of K. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 44. The νόμμα is called δικαια τῷ ἁφ’ ἐνοῦ ἐνεαὐ καὶ τῷ κοινωνικῷ ἐναυ, i.e. τῷ πρὸς ἐν ἐναὐ, cf. 1096 b, 27 n. They are related to justice exactly as τὰ ἐδεκ-
προστάτευε ἐνὶ καὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος.

25 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἄλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὁσα νεο-11 μοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ’ ἐκαστον παιδείας, καθ’ ἤν ἀπλῶς ἀνήρ ἀγάθος ἐστιν, πάτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ ἐτέρα, ὡστερόν διοικητέων ὁ γὰρ ἤσως ταύτων ἀνδρὶ τ’ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτη παντὶ. 30 τῶς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἴδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἡ χρημάτων ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ὁσα μεριστά τοῖς κοινωνοῦσα τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνυσον ἔχειν καὶ ἵσον ἐτερον ἐτέρου), εἰ
tiēa τοῦ ὥσια (1129 ι, 20), πρὸ τὰ ἄγλεια ἄν τοῦ ὥσια. This does not mean, however, that general and special justice are related in that way.

§ 11. τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, 'the education which is to make a good citizen.' For the expression cf. Pol. 1310 a, 14 τὸ παιδεεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας...εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικοί, εἰ δ’ δημοκριτικοί, δημοκριτικοί.

ἀπλῶς, i.e. without any such qualification as 'a citizen of a democracy or an oligarchy.'

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 'it is not perhaps the same thing for a man to be a good man and to be a good citizen of any state' (lit. 'any citizen'). For the question here raised see Newman’s Politics, Introd. pp. 234 sqq. The main point is that the goodness in virtue of which a man is a good citizen is relative to the constitution (πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν) and cannot therefore in all cases be identical with the goodness of a good man. Pol. 1276 b, 34 ἐνδεχεται πολείτην ὡστα σπουδαίοις μὴ κεκτήσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ’ ἤν σπουδαίοις ἀνήρ. This is because the state is not the κατ’ ἀρετήν πολιτεία, the true ἀριστοκρατία. In it the good man and the good citizen coincide. Cf. Pol. 1293 b, 5 ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (ἀριστοκρατίας) ἀπλῶς οὗτος ἀνήρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγάθος ἐστιν, οι δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄγαθοι

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν. Yet even here the good man in its fullest sense and the good citizen we completely identified only in the ruler; for he alone has occasion to exercise φρόνησις.

ἀνδρὶ...ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. This use of εἶναι with a predicative dative is a favourite way of expressing the category of oσεία or, in other words, the definition of a thing (δήγορο). Cf. the account given of the similar phrase τ’ ἢ εἶναι οὗ τὸ αὐτὸ 1130 a, 13. As a πολίτης, ἀγαθὸς has always the same meaning; but, since it is a relative term also (πρὸς τ’, it will have different definitions when it is predicated in the category of oσεία.

παντὶ. Jackson illustrates this use from Pol. 1277 a, 13 ἀλλ’ ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς (in any state) ἢ ἄρθη ἀρετὴ πολίτων τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπουδαίου; § 12. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος κ.τ.λ. We now come to the two divisions of Justice in the particular sense, the only sense which the word has in English.

ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς. Citizenship meant to a Greek the right to share in the goods of the state, and only in the second place the corresponding duty of contributing to them. The citizen was a shareholder, not a taxpayer.
ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι. A wide word which includes all business transactions and is not at all confined to ‘contracts’ (συνθήκαι). The έκοσία are contracts, but the ἐκοσία are obligations ex delicto.

Διορθωτικον. Much confusion has been caused by the current translation ‘Corrective Justice.’ The institutio directiva of the schoolmen is really more accurate; for διορθωτικόν is a word of far wider meaning than ἐπανορθωτικόν and signifies ‘to adjust,’ whether before or after the transaction. Cf. Lobeck on Phrynichus p. 250 “Ορθῶν et ergere et dirigere notat; signate dicitur illud ἐνδυνατας hoc διορθωτικόν. Utrique affine est ἐπανορθωτικόν quod locum habet in iis quae ad pristinum statum, unde luxata erant, reducuntur; omnibus autem subtem notio mutationis in melius; quamobrem usum promiscuum habent.”

§ 13. έκοσία. Jackson maintains that the form of justice applicable to these is only the “rectification of wrong arising out of such transactions.” But this will not do; for, if a wrong has arisen, the συναλλαγμα at once becomes έκοσία. And we shall see that all the examples given refer to the preliminary adjustment of terms, and not to the rectification of wrong.

πράσινοι ὑπνη ἐμπτίον δεντίτιον, δανει- σμός μινυτία, ἐγγύη πιγνὺς, ἁρτίσις commodatum (loan for use as distinct from loan for consumption), παρα- καταθήκη depositum, μοῦσος locatio conducio.

τῶν δ’ ἐκοσίων κ.τ.λ. These correspond roughly to the obligations ex delicto. The distinction between λαθραία and βλαία is like that between furtum (κλοπή) and rapina (ἀγαθή). Cf. also Plato, Laws 864 c.

III. § 1. 'Επει δ’ δ’ τ’ ἐδικος κ.τ.λ. We now begin the discussion of Distributive Justice.

§ 3. άνευ λόγου. Cf. 1142 b, 2 n. The view is universally held apart from any ground. Cf. Pol. 1282 b, 18 δοκει δὲ πᾶσιν ἵνα τι τὸ δίκαιον ἐλεῖ.
δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἵσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τε καὶ ποιήν, καὶ ἣ μὲν μέσον, τινὸν (ταύτα δὲ ἐστὶ πλεον καὶ ἐλαττων), ἡ δὲ ἵσον, δυνών, ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, ποιήσε&eigr;ν ἄναγκη ἂν τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέταρτον. οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ὀσίς, τὰ πρώταμα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἴσοτης, οἷς καὶ ἐν ὀσίς: ὥσ ταὐτώ ἐν ὄσιν, ὧσ ταὐτώ κάκειν ἐχεῖ· εἶ γὰρ μὴ ἵσιν οὐκ ἐστὶ ἔξω, ἀλλὰ ἐντέθην αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ μὴ ἴση ἴσον ἡ μὴ ἵσον ἴσα ἔχουσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ ἀξίαν 25 τούτῳ δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὡμολογούσι πάντες κατὰ ἀξίαν τινα δείν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὔ τιν ἀντίθεμα λέγοντες πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλὰ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἑλευθερῶν, οἱ δὲ ὀλυναρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δὲ ἰσότητας.
μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, 'abstract'

Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 82, 10 (Hiller) λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν συνεχὴς ἀνάλογα, ἡ δὲ διήθη-

μένη, συνεχὴς μὲν ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις τρισὶ βροις, διήθησε δὲ ἡ ἐν ἐλαχί-
στοις τέσσαρειν. For instance the ἀνα-

λογία 8, 4, 2 is 'continuous,' while
6, 3, 4, 2 is 'discrete.' Theon points
out, just as Aristotle does, that a
continuous proportion may be re-

garded as discrete, ἐστι τῷ τρισὶ τῷ
καὶ ἡ συνεχῆ ἐν τέσσαρει βροις,

δὲ λαμβανομένου τοῦ μέσου. Other
terms were in use for 'continuous'
and 'discrete,' e.g. συνημμένη and
dιεξυγμένη.

ἡ τοῦ Α, sc. γραμμῆς, 'the line Α.'
The ellipse of γραμμῆς is regular, but
the usual phrase is η Α or ἡ ἐφ' ἦς
(sc. 1132 b, 6 sqq.). I suspect

that τοῦ has crept in from the reading

ἡ τοῦ πρῶτον etc. found in K4, and
this, as we can see from Michael of
Epheus, originated in the absurd
idea that ἡ τοῦ πρῶτον σχέσις was

intended. In the absence of a system
of numeration based on the zero,

arithmetical questions must be treated

geometrically. Jackson's defence of

ἡ τοῦ πρῶτον (sc. δρο) γραμμῆς

in the sense of 'the line which we

take for our first term' is not quite

convincing, but the sense would be the

same.
§ 10. διήρηται γάρ κ.τ.λ. This is quoted in Pol. 1 380 a, 17 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν πρὸτον ἑπὶ τὸν πρῶτος καὶ οὖς, καθότεν ἐφηται πρῶτος ἐν τοῖς ἑτοῖμοι. The πράγματα are here expressed by δ instead of ὡς ὁ αὐτὸν, as the verb lends itself to this. 'There is a similar division into persons and things,' i.e. the line which represents A+C is 'similarly divided' to that which represents B+D.

§ 11. ὡς ὁ πρῶτος ὅρως κ.τ.λ. In Mathematics ὅρως is the 'term' of a proportion, and the word was transferred by Aristotle from Mathematics to Logic. It is evident from 1133 a, 6 that it was customary to arrange the 'terms' in a square, a fact which may explain the word ὅρως and the symbol ::. I have read α, β, γ, δ as ordinals here with Jackson, since we are now dealing with ὅρους, not γραμματία.

ἐναλλάξ, alterandos, i.e. Δ:Γ:Β:Δ. Cf. An. Post. 74 a, 18 τὸ ἀνάλογον ὅτι ἐναλλάξ. Euclid, ν, def. 13 ἐναλλάξ λόγων ἂν Λήψον τὸ ἡγομένον πρὸς τὸ ἡγομένον, καὶ τοῦ ἐπομένου πρὸς τὸ ἐπόμενον.

τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, sc. ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον (b, 14), i.e. compenendo, A+Γ:Β+Δ::Α:Β. Euclid calls this σύνθεσις (cf. συντεθεί here). Cf. ν, def. 15 σύνθεσις λόγων ἂν Λήψον τὸ ἡγομένον μετὰ τοῦ ἐπομένου ὡς ἐνός πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπόμενον.

§ 12. σύνθεσις. The 'conjunction' of the terms. The word refers merely to the drawing of lines in the graphic formula, thus—

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\Delta & B \\
\hline
\Gamma & \Delta
\end{array}
\]

Cf. the note on η κατὰ διδακτηρία σύνθεσι below (1133 a, 6).

§ 13. καλοῦσι...ἐκάτερον. This would be a footnote in a modern work. It breaks the connexion, for it seems to make the next sentence say that geometrical proportion cannot be continuous, which is absurd.

γεωμετρικήν. Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 9 (Hiller) ἁναλογίαν δὲ ὅ μὴ ὀρατόλογος φησιν εἶναι προτομείση τρις (1) ἀρματικήν, (2) γεωμετρικήν, (3) ἀρματικήν. In the first each mean exceeds and is exceeded by the same number; in the second by the same ratio, e.g. 2, 4, 8, 16 form an ἀρματική ἁναλογία while 2, 4, 8, 16 form a γεωμετρικὴ ἁναλογία. The 'harmonic proportion' does not concern us here. Properly speaking, the name ἁναλογία should be confined to geometrical proportion, and so it was originally. But
we see that by Aristotle's time it was already extended to series in arithmetical progression (cf. 1106 a, 35 n.), and later it was used for all manner of series. See Gow, Greek Mathematics, p. 92, n. 1.

§ 14. αὐτή ἡ ἀναλογία, sc. ἡ τοῦ διανεμητικοῦ δικαίου, not ἡ γεωμετρική.

We cannot have the continuous proportion—

\[ A : B :: B : C \]

for the person (ὅ) and the thing (δ) cannot be an identical term, which is necessary for continuous proportion. Cf. 1131 a, 33 and Phys. 261 a, 19 τριῶν γὰρ ὄστων, ἀρχής μὲν τελεσθείς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρος ἦταν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀμφότερον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔπει χῦν. The phrase ἀριθμὸς ἐν expresses the complete identity of a particular thing with itself (cf. Met. 999 b, 33. τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐν τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει αὐθεν διαφέρει, as opposed to unity of species, unity of genus and analogical unity.

§ 15. ἐν ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ λόγοι, cf. 1129 b, 8.

IV. § 1. Τὸ λοιπὸν ἑν. These and the following words imply that there is but one other kind of justice, viz. τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον, and that it is applicable, not only to ἀκοῦσια συναλλάγματα (which are treated first), but also to ἀκοῦσια συναλλάγματα (for which see 1132 b, 30 sqq.). The notes will show how I avoid making a third ἐλλογον ('Catalactic or Commutative Justice') with Professor Ritchie (Classical Review, vol. viii. pp. 185 sqq.).
pros alla tê eisenechênta: kai to ádikov to antikeimenon to dikaiow tou tw tw para to anakalov estin. to ð' evz tois svanallamases dikaiow esti mea ùsa ù, kai to ádikov aniso, all' ou kata tw analogan ekeinein all' kata tw anarhmatikh. oudèn gar diapheréi e' epiteikeina phailon apisteuerein h phailos epiteikhe, oudèi e' emoluxesun epiteikhe h phailos: all' pros tov blaboun tw diaforan mouv blab- 

tê eisenechênta. This word is properly used of the eisoforòi or property-tax raised from the wealthier citizens in time of war. But here it cannot be intended as anything more than an illustration; for it implies that the principle of kar' deixan is understood of wealth. In Pol. 1380a, 28 the argument òv gar eina dikaiow ison metèchein twv ekatow mev tov eisenechênta mian mian to dònti to lekton tâv is dismissed as ò twv diliargikov logos.

§ 3. Kata tw anarhmatikh, sc. analogia. Cf. 1106 a, 35 ù. An arithmetical proportion—we do not usually call it a proportion—is one in which the first term exceeds the second by the same number (or length) that the third exceeds the fourth. Its formula is \( a : b : c : d \), not \( a : c \). The ison ti involved in such a proportion arises from the fact that, if four quantities are in 'arithmetical proportion,' the sum of the means is equal to the sum of the extremes, \( a + d = b + c \), whereas in geometrical proportion the equation is \( \frac{a}{d} = \frac{b}{c} \).

oudèn gar diapheré k.t.l. The persons (odia) are regarded as equal, but the things (en ois, tw pråyimata) are usually unequal. So Demosthenes, Meid. § 46, speaking of the extension of the graph phôrèes to slaves, says òv gar déitw ð' páschon ð' tein deiv skopwv (ð' iorbdetpi) all' tw pråygm' outhei ti to gynômeno. It is the business of tw diophorikov dikaiow to make the same difference between the persons as exists between the things, either (1) before they enter into a svanallagia at all (en tw dikoulois), or (2) before the svanallagia is dissolved by process of law (ð' twv dikoulois). The dòntosan consists in the process of adding to A or subtracting from B till an arithmikos analoga is established.

epiteikhe...phailos. This is a different illustration of the principle of tw dianeumikov dikaiow from that implied by tw eisenechênta above. It is taken from arxitektria, not from diliargia, and kata' deixan this time means kar' arxitektria.

tov blaboun tw tw diaforan. This is usually supposed to mean simply 'the amount of the damage' or 'the difference produced by the hurt'; but surely Aristotle is not to be credited with the childish doctrine that a court of law simply awards compensation. The Athenians were too well accustomed to discussing the question òt h phôrèi outhei h arxitektria by their elaborate process of rímiou and prosìmiou, not to be aware that the wrong done by the one party may be much greater or much less than the damage suffered by the other, and Plato has preserved in the Laws such formulas as twv blabov... èkteinan (843 d), tov blabou arxitektrin (843 c) and tov blabov 'oìn òmiwv trîmèn (767 c, 915 a) to be applied in different circumstances. The diafora
to which the judge really looks in assessing the penalty is that between the 

δῶμαι (δίδωμι) and the βλέψις (δίδων), and Aristotle is only following Greek idiom in omitting one of the terms (cf. 1137 a, 13 b.). Cf. Plato, Laws 860 b 2 πρὸς δὲν ὁδῇ ταύτα βελε-

τενόνου, πρὸς τε δῶμαι καὶ βλέπειν. Justice is not done either by transferring the gain of the wrong-doer to the injured party, or by making the wrong-doer compensate the injured party for his loss. We must assess the penalty κατ’ (άληθυπητίαν) ἀνα-

λώγων, κατ’ ἀντίθεσιν (1132 b, 33). 

δῶμαι and βλέπειν are both perfect in sense.

εἰ βλέπειν. For the idiomatic omission of ὁ μὲν, cf. below ἡ καὶ κτεῖναι, and Vahlen on Poet. 1447 b, 14.

§ 4. πληγῇ...πατάξῃ, 'has been wounded,' 'has wounded,' not 'has been beaten,' 'has beaten,' which would be πληγᾶς ἐμβάλλει...πληγᾶς ἀδρα.

κτεῖναι. The archaic κτεῖναι (Attic prose has only ἀποκτεῖναι) is regularly used as a legal term, and so occurs in Plato, Euthyphron 4 b κτεῖναι ἑκεῖνῳ ὁ κτεῖναι κ.τ.λ. and often in the Laws. ἀπόθαναι is of course its passive.

τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις, lit. 'the being done to and the doing.' If the verbs had been used, we should have had τοιοῦ, not πάρτειν, but πράξις has to do duty as the noun of τοιοῦ, since πάρτειν has been specialised in meaning. It has not, I think, been observed that this sentence is a highly

compressed reference to a passage in Plato's Laws, 876 d sqq., which leaves no doubt as to the meaning. The question there is how far we are to leave it to the judges προσάντων ἐκάτω τῶν ἀναριμμάτων τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πάθους καὶ τὴν πράξεως, and this is illustrated by the various degrees of wounding and killing as here, and a law is given for the γραφή τραυ-

ματός. We have first the case of the man who wounds intending to kill, a case where the wrong done (δῶμαι) far exceeds the wrong suffered (βλέ-

πος). The guilty man is not to be punished for murder, but he is not to be let off with the penalty of wounding. He is sentenced to βλέ-

πος κτεῖναι τῷ βιασθείτω, and also to be banished. Then come cases such as that of a child wounding his parents, where the δῶμαι includes ἀπόθανε and the penalty is death. The whole passage will repay study.

εἰς ἀνάσα. The πάθος and the πράξις are of course just the same thing looked at from different points of view, and yet they are represented by a line divided into unequal segments. The common view of the passage can afford no explanation of this; it would require an undivided line simply transferred from one side to the other, and thus making the two sides unequal. But nothing is said of this.

τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἱσάξεται, sc. τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν πράξιν, 'to equate the wrong suffered and the wrong done by the penalty he imposes.' I think Michael
ARISTOTELUS

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Εἰσεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ἀνόμα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τὸ πατάξαυτα, καὶ ἡ ξημαία τὸ παθώντι, ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ξημαία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὡστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος τὸ ἱσον 15 μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ξημαία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἐλάττων ἐναντίον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἐλάττων κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ξημαία. ὃν ἂν μέσον τὸ ἱσον, τὸ λέγομεν εἶναι δικαίους. ὡστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικός δικαίος ἢ ἐὰν τὸ μέσον ξημαίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφίσβητος, ἢ 20 ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστήν καταφεύγοντως τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστήν ἤλθα ἤλθαν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ δικαίον, ὅ ἄρ ἡ δικαστή βουλέται εἶναι οἷον

was right in taking τῇ γνώμῃ here as instrumental dative, though the accepted interpretation seems to be that of Münchener and Jackson, πειράται τῇ γνώμῃ ἣσθαι τὸ κέρδος δίκαιον ἢ δικαίον. The unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (ἡ γνώμη) by taking from the former and giving to the latter. In any case the meaning will be the same, and it will not be that the judge forces A to make good the loss of B. What the judge has to do is τῷ ἱσῳ τοῦ καθὼς ἢ ἠπειρομένῳ, and that means that, if the wrong done by A is greater than the damage suffered by B, A will have a severer penalty than merely τίνης τῷ ἱσοῖς. How much severer, we shall see presently.

§ 5. ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους, κ. τ. τῶν ἄσκοπων. We find κατηγορεῖν, λέγειν ἐπὶ τοῖς in the same sense as ἐπὶ τοῖς. The words γνώμη and κέρδος, 'loss' and 'profit' are properly used of ἄσκοπος ἀναλλάγματα. They are therefore not appropriate (ἀποκέντρων) to all kinds of ἄσκοπων, though they are to some (τις), e.g. theft and fraud.

§ 6. ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ. The words γνώμη and κέρδος can be applied as soon as the damage and the wrong have been assessed.

Δότε κ.τ.λ. We have now got a more and a less, namely the profit of the wrong-doer and the loss of his victim. We know that the just is the equal, and the equal is the mean between the more and the less. Therefore the just sentence will be that which imposes upon the wrong-doer, not the exact equivalent of the damage he has inflicted, but the arithmetical mean between the damage he has inflicted and the wrong he has committed. Cf. Plato's case of the man who wounds intending to kill.

ἐπανορθωτικῶν. The narrower term is correct when we are speaking of ἄσκοπα ἀναλλάγματα. We now see how corrective justice in ἄσκοπα ἀναλλάγματα is a μέσος, and that is the object of the discussion.

§ 7. διὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ. An argument from popular language for the benefit of those who are not impressed by mathematical formulae. A good judge is μέσος—(this really meant 'impartial,' but it will serve as a λογικὴ πράξις) —but a good judge is living justice, therefore justice is a μέσον. Q.E.D.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1133 b, 14. 1160 b, 18. 1161 a, 38. 1171 a, 12. This is a Platonic way of expressing the ideal which anything aims at. Cf. Phd. 74 d.
δικαιον ἐμψυχον καὶ ἐγγόησι δικασθῇ μέσον, καὶ καλούσιν ἐννοι μετεδοῦν, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσιν, τοῦ δικαιον τευχουσιν. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δικαιον, ἐπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς. ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς ἐπανοικεῖ, καὶ ὠσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἀνίσα τετμη-25 μένης, ὁ τὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισεῖας ὑπέρεχει, τούτῳ ἀφεῖλε καὶ τὸ ἐλάττον τμῆματι προσεῖθεν. ὅταν δὲ δίσκα διαφερεθῇ τὸ ὅπλον, τόσος φασίν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦν ἀλάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δὲ ἴσον μέσον ἐστι τῆς μέλξονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ 30 ἀναφέρεται δικαιον, ὅτι δίσκα ἐστίν, ὠσπερ ἄν εἰ τις εἴπα τὸ δικαίου καὶ ὁ δικαστῆς δικασθῇ. ἑπάν γὰρ ἐν τού ἴσον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ βατέρου, πρός βατέρου δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τού- τους ὑπερέχει βατέρου· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρεθῇ μὲ, μη ἑπροσεῖθη δὲ, ἐνὶ ἀν μένον ὑπερέχει. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ, καὶ τὸ μέσον, 1132 b

§ 8. ἐπισπευσιν, "restores equality."

Ἀστυρ γραμμῆς. Cf. 1131 b, 8 π. The diaphora τοῦ βλάβου is ὅ...ὑπερέχει ἀν ραξίς τοῦ πάθους οἱ vices versa. Observe that it is the excess of the larger segment over the half, and not its excess over the lesser segment, which is subtracted from the one and added to the other.

δίσκα, i.e. ἐκ λευκό. So in Phys. 139 b, 18 we read that Zeno's second argument (the Achilles) differs from his first ἐν τῷ τῆς διαμερίσματι μὴ δίσκα (= μὴ δι-χοτομεῖ) τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον μέγεθος.

§ 9. τῆς μέλξονος, sc. γραμμής.

Ὅτι δίσκα ἐστίν. This is a Pythagorean fancy if we can trust Alexander. But it sounds more like Kratylos.

§ 10. ἑτᾶν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We now get the mathematical proof of the formula, which may best be stated as follows. It is to be shown that, however the wrong and the damage may be apportioned, the just sentence will be that A shall pay and B shall receive the arithmetical mean of the difference between them. Let the whole πάθος καὶ πράξεις (C + D) = το, of which C (δίσκα estimated as κέρ-βος) = 7, while D (βλάβος estimated as ημια) = 3. The parties come before the judge as A + 7 and B - 3. The problem is to restore equality by equating ημια καὶ κέρβος. This implies the formula

(A + 7) - (B - 3) = (C + 5) - (D - 5).

Therefore 5 is the μέσον (= δικαίον) required. However the το may be divided, A will always have as his ὑπερεχῆ twice the arithmetical mean.

Τοῦ μέσου ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Fully expressed this would be τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ ὑπερέχει βατέρου, καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ
ΛΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

α’' ο’ αφηρέθη, ένλ. τούτω ἀρα γνωριόμεν τί τε ἀφελέων δει ἀπό τοῦ πλεόν ἐχοῦντος, καὶ τί προσβείναι τῷ ἐλαττον ἐχοντι, ψ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσβείαι 5 δει τῷ ἐλαττον ἐχοντι, δ’ υπερέχεται, ἀφελέων ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ίσαί αἱ ἐφ’ οὖν ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλληλαίως, ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ 12 ἀφηρήθησθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ’ ψ ΠΓ, ὡστε δὴ ἡ ΔΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ ἑς τῆς ἀρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. [ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἀνηρούντω γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐπολεί τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ πᾶσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτο.] ἐν 13 λυθε δὲ τὰ ὄνομα ταῦτα, ἡ τε ξημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίας ἄλληλης, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεὸν ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὐτῶν κερδαίνει λέγεται, τὸ δ’ ἐλαττὸν τῶν εὗ ἄρχης ξημιοῦσθαι,

α’’ ο’ αφηρέθη, ένλ. ὑπερέχει. For the ellipse of τοῦ (which Zell would insert) before ἀφ’ οὖν, cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 45 and 1117 a, 30 n.

§ 11. τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, sc. τοῦ ἀφ’ οὖν ἀφηρέθη. ψ’ δ’ υπερέχεται sc. τὸ μέσον.

§ 12. αἱ ἐφ’ οὖν ΑΑ κ.τ.λ. sc. γραμμαὶ. τὸ ΑΕ, τὸ ἐφ’ ψ ΓΔ, sc. τοιαῦτα. The figure is

| A | Ε | A |
| B | B | Γ |
| Δ | Γ | Ζ |

Now, in whatever proportions the τάσοι καὶ τράβηξει ΑΑ is divided, the line BB will always be the arithmetical mean between ΑΕ and ΔΓ, and will therefore represent τὸ διάκονον. Mr. Jackson says "In the following figure ΓΔ = ΓΖ = ΑΕ. It is strange that this is not expressly mentioned in the text." But Aristotle had doubtless a διαγραφή to refer to, and in that case it might seem superfluous to write down that ΑΕ = ΓΖ. And it is wrong to say that ΓΔ = ΑΕ, for the whole argument implies that ΔΓ = EA, a very different thing. Aristotle is not putting in an elaborate way the obvious fact that, if the gain and the loss are equal, the judge must take the gain from the one party and give it back to the other. He is discussing the more interesting case where the gain and the loss are unequal, and showing that however we split up, say the number 10, the same principle will apply. For instance we may get such equations as 17−10=10−5, or 16−10=10−4, or 15−10=10−5, or 14−10=10−6 etc. In all these cases 10 represents justice.

ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. This seems to have been interpolated here from 1133 a, 13−16. But it is a very valuable interpolation; for it shows that whoever noted the sentence as a parallel passage here took the right view of τὸ ἀριστευσθεῖν in its relation to τὸ διάκονον. See the notes on 1132 b, 31 sqq.

§ 13. Ἀφηρέθη. Cf. 1133 a, 20. 1142 a, 8. 1143 a, 16. 1166 a, 2. Note in passing that, if the words ξημία καὶ κέρδος have been transferred in this way from ἀκόσμα to ἄκοσμα συναλλάγματα, we have a strong presumption that these two fall under the same kind of justice.


Δίδωκαν. The judge does not restore equality in ἐκούσα συναλλαγμα, they must be adjusted beforehand. Even if the purchaser makes a bad bargain, the law says causal exceptio. Of course if the vendor is fraudulent, it is an ἐκούσα συναλλαγμα and not a contract at all.

§ 14. ἦταν...γίνεται, sc. αὐτοὶ, 'when the parties have got exactly what they gave,' <τὰ> δὲ αὐτῶν sc. γενόμενα. Rassow's insertion of τὰ is much simpler than any of the interpretations which have been proposed. Nothing is commoner than the omission of τὰ after αὐτὰ by haplography. τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἀντιποικία, i.e. τῶν ἐν τῶν ἰδιότηται συναλλαγμα, ἐν ὁμοιώμασιν ex delicto. We are coming to the ἔκοινα in the next chapter, and we shall see that the same holds good of them.

V. § 1. τὸ ἀντιποικία, 'the inverse' or 'reciprocal.' It is confusing to start from Euclid's definition of τὸ ἀντιποικία, for that refers solely to geometrical proportion. If we can speak of an arithmetical proportion at all, we can surely have an 'inverse' or 'reciprocal' arithmetical proportion of the form

\[ a - b = d - c. \]

There seems to be an instance of this usage in Theon of Smyrna p. 87, 11 (Hilger) τὸ δὲ ἀντιποικία αὐτὸ
toιοῦτον ὅσον ἐν τῷ μεγέθους ἄφηλη τῆς ἔλξης ἐν τῷ κακῶ χρόνῳ, τοσοῦτον τῷ τῶν προστὶθεν, καὶ διὸν ἐν τῷ μεγέθῃ τῆς χρόνος προστὶθη, τοσοῦτον τῷ τῶν διαιρετάτον, which certainly appears to refer to addition and subtraction only. The phrase τὸ ἀντιποικία ἀλλὰ would mean literally 'that which has had done to it the opposite of something else,' and would very well apply to a quantity from which the same sum was subtracted as had been added to another.

ἀπλῶς is the emphatic word and is repeated. Aristotle, as we shall see, has no objection to τὸ ἀντιποικία, if we add κατ' ἀναλογίαν. To omit this qualification is to neglect the διαφορά τοῦ βράχου, i.e. to assume that the κέρας and the γῆμα are equal.

ὁ Πθαγόρας. According to Alexander's commentary on Met. 985 b, 26 the Pythagoreans regarded τὸ ἀντιποικία and τὸ ἐλαῖον (quadrature) as the proprium of Justice, whence some gave the number of Justice as 4 (the first even square), some as 9 (the first odd square).

§ 2. οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμικόν. This is obvious; for distributive justice is κατ' ἀναλογία and is therefore determined by a (geometrical) proportion.

οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν, for the
25 κόν—καίτων βούλονται γε τούτο λέγειν καί τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον.

ἐκε πάθοι τὰ τ’ ὑπεξέ, δίκη κ Ἰδεα γένοστ

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οὖν εἰ ἁρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ 4 δεῖ ἀντιπληγήσαι, καὶ εἰ ἁρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγήσαι

τοὺς μόνους δεῖ ἄλλα καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἐτί τὸ ἔκοψιον καὶ τὸ 5 ἀκοῦσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἄλλα ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινολογίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ ταιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεποθός κατ’ ἀναλογίαν καὶ μη κατ’ ἰσότητα. τὸ τάντοποιεῖν γὰρ

§ 3. καίτων βούλονται γε, ἢ ἡμεῖς. For this formulation of the lex talionis, ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,’ cf. Hesiod fr. 212 Mark. The case is well stated in MM. 1194 a, 37 ὥσ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἰ τις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξοφύν τινα, ἀντικαταθείη μόνον ἄλλα παθεῖται ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ γὰρ ἔξε, πρότερον καὶ ἰδίκητα, ἀπείκει δὲ κατ’ ἀμφότερα, ὅτε τὰ ἀνάλογα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεποθόν πελεῖ ὁ ἐπτόσεις δίκαιον ἔστην.

οὖν εἰ κ.τ.λ. There is no inconsistency between this and 1132 a, 5 χρύσην ὠς ἰδικ. The inequality does not lie between the officer and the private, but between the blow given and the blow received. If an officer strikes a private, that is not merely a blow, but may also be an act of discipline; if a private strikes an officer, that is not merely a blow, but also an act of mutiny. Cf. Probr. 952 b, 28 ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἱροῦσι κακῶς ἵπτῃ, μεγάλα τὰ ἐνέπτυ, ἐν γὰρ τὴν ἱδιότηταν, οὐδέν. καὶ καλὸν: οὔτε γὰρ τότε ὁ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξαιρετάταιν τὸν κακογροῦντα, ἄλλα καὶ εἰς τὴν τόλμη ὁμορίζεται. The case of Demosthenes v. Meidias is in point here. The judge must therefore ‘measure’ the πάθος καὶ πράξει before he can treat the parties as equal, and strike the balance of debit and credit between them. The amount of damnum (βάρβος) being the same, the amount of iniuria (ἀδικία) is quite different. Accordingly we do not apply the principle of the arithmetical mean ‘simply’ (ἀπόσυς), but ‘proportionally.’

§ 5. ἐτί τὸ ἔκοψιον κ.τ.λ. In ἀκοῦσια συναλλάσσουσα the ἀδικοῦσα ἀδικεῖται ἄκων, but the ἀδικοῦν ἀδικεῖ either ἄκων ὧν ἄκων. Here we see a clear case where the damage suffered may remain the same, while the wrong committed is quite different. Cf. Dem. Meid. § 43 οἷον...δὲ μὲν ἀκών βάρβος, ἀπολοῦν, ἀν δ’ ἄκων, ἀπολοῦσα τὸ βάρβος καλείσθαι ἐκτείνει.

§ 6. ἐν...ταῖς κοινολογίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαίς. These are precisely the same as τὰ ἔκοσια συναλλάσσουσα described above (1132 a, 2 sqq.) and they therefore belong to τὸ διαρθυντικὸ δίκαιον in the widest sense (1131 a, 11 n.). We shall therefore find that they are regulated by the arithmetical mean, and this must therefore work out as a case of τὸ ἀντιπεποθόν, not ἄνειδον indeed, but κατ’ ἀναλογίαν.

κατ’ ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ. In the case of τὰ ἔκοσια, we must not assume that ἀδικία and βάρβος are equal, and
in the case of έκολος we must not assume that the things to be exchanged are of equal value.

συμμέναι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1261 a, 30 διότερ τό των τό ἀντιπεισθάνων ἐσχά τἀ πόλεις, ὅπερ εἴ των θριακὸς ἐχθρὶς πρὸς τὸν. τὸ κακὸς ἡν τοῦ ἀντιπωσίας. I am not sure that Muretus was right in bracketing εἴ μῆς ἀντιπωσίας. It is redundant, of course; but the future indicative clause, δουλεά ἐστίν εἴ μῆς ἀντιπωσίας, 'if I am not to retaliate,' is rather too idiomatic for an interpolator. For the omission of the subject of ἀντιπωσίας, cf. 1110 3, 14 n.

§ 7. ἐμποδούν ποιούνται. Zell notes that according to Pausanias there were temples of the Charites in the αγώνες at Sparta, Orchomenos and Olympia.

ἀρξαί, 'to take the initiative.' Cf. 1185 b, 26.

§ 8. ή κατὰ διάμετρον σύγκοινος, 'diagonal conjunction.' If we arrange our δροι in the same way as above (1131 b, 9 n.), and we wish to effect a πρόφορος, it is clear that we must 'conjoin,' not Α with Γ and Β with Δ as we did in the case of διαμετρικοῦ διακών (this might have been called ἐν κατὰ πλέοντα σύγκοινος), but Α with Δ and Β with Γ. Thus

Now the condition of such a σύγκοινος being just ('equal') is that the terms should form an ἀφανείαν ἀνάλογια, for it is only in that case that the sum of the extremes will be equal to the sum of the means. The meaning of 'diagonal conjunction' is well illustrated by Jackson from EE 1243 b, 15, where we are told that in unequal friendships (φιλία καθ' ὑπεραιρέος) the ὑπεραιρέον is apt to expect to get more services from his friend than he gives in proportion to his own superiority (on the principle of τὸ διαμετρικὸν διακών), whereas the ὑπεραιρέον has greater share to render the ἀναλόγον καθ' ἐν κατὰ διάμετρον σύνεχεσις, i.e. he says the rule is not Α = Α + Γ

but Α + Δ = B + Γ.

Cf. below 1163 b, 33.

ἐφ' θ', sc. ἐφ' θ'. Mr Jackson says "ἐφ' θ' κ.τ.λ. are lines, not...points." But the line Δ is ηθ' = Γ (Stewart). The δροι are neither lines nor points, but dots.

ἀπὸ οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the problem is,' τοῦ... ἐργοῦ, τοῦ... αὐτοῦ. This is the reading both of Rb and Lb, and
I do not think it impossible. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 45) reads τὸ...ἐργον (50 M3), τὸ...ἐργον on the authority of the Vetus Versio. This is certainly nearer, but the authority of the Versio is not high upon a point of this kind.

Εἰς οὖν πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. Before we can say that Λ+Δ=Β+Γ we must make a διόρθωσις of the terms. In this διόρθωσις there are two stages. First (πρῶτον), we must equate Γ and Δ. Say Γ=ξΔ. This is τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἵππον, the stage which the Pythagorean formula ignores. Secondly (εἴτε), we must bring the terms Α and Β into inverse arithmetical ratio of 1 and Χ. This will give us Α+(Χ−1)−Β=Γ−Δ (τὸ ἀντιπεπτονός). After this διόρθωσις *diagonal conjunction* becomes possible (ἐσται τὸ λεγόμενον) thus:

Δ+*(Χ−1)+Δ=Β+Γ.

οὔτε συμμέναι, sc. τὸ συνάλλαγμα.

The parties enter into a συνάλλαγμα or ‘business relation’ (συνάλλατται) as soon as the one offers a house for shoes and the other shoes for a house. If, however, it is found impossible to effect the διόρθωσις or adjustment of terms, οὐκ ἐμένοις τὸ συναλλάγμα. Having failed to come to terms, they break off negotiations (διαλύονται τὸ συνάλλαγμα). It is not correct to say, as Mr Jackson does, that “one of the two parties will be obliged to have recourse to corrective justice in order to obtain his rights”; for this is a case in which ἰδειαν δεδώκεν ὁ ἰδιοκτήτης (1132 b, 15). Surely an action will not lie against a man with whom one has made a bad bargain unless force or fraud were used, in which case the συνάλλαγμα, being βίας σ' ἄργος, would be by definition ἀκόλουθον (βίας or λαθραίον).

§ 9 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. The case of a builder and a shoemaker is comparatively simple; for we may say roughly that a house is worth, say 125 pairs of shoes, and then

\[ x - 1 = 124. \]

But the same principle applies to more complicated cases, like that of a doctor and a farmer, whose ἔργα are not definite units, but things like ύπερειχθεῖσα and ἔργα. What meaning can we assign to 1Γ=ΞΔ in that case? It seems as if Γ and Δ were incommensurable.

ἀνηρῳδήτο γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. There can, I think, be no doubt that, in this context, τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχων must refer to the two terms Α and Β which are ἀντιπεπτονθῆται τὸ Χ. The use of τὸ ποιοῦν in this sense will not seem very strange if we remember that the case primarily in view is that of the doctor who produces health and his ‘patient.’ In the language of modern economics τὸ ποιοῦν is Supply and τὸ πάσχων is Demand. What Aristotle really means, then, is that there would be an end of all commerce unless Supply and Demand can be made identical in every respect. The insertion of δὲ is due to Rassow.
καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἵσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἵσασθήναι.

καὶ εἰς τὸ πάντα συμβλητά δεῖ πῶς εἶναι, διὸ ἐστὶν ἅλλα. ἐφ' ὁ τὸ νόμομεν ἑξῆλθε, καὶ γίνεται πῶς μέσον πάντα γὰρ 20 μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν, τόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδημάτα ἱσούμενα ἢ τροφή. 

δεῖ τούτων ὄπερ ἀκοδόμοι πρὸς σκυτότομοι, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἷκαν ἢ τροφήν. 

εἶ γὰρ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐκ ἔσται ἅλλα ὁδὸς κοινωνία. 

τούτο δ' εἰ μὴ ἰσα ἐν τοῖς, οὐκ ἔσται. 

dei ἐν i n τοίς πάντα 25 μετρεῖται, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. 

τούτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεία, ἢ πάντα συνέχει—εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δεύτερο ἢ μὴ ὀρισκός, ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἅλλα ὁδὸς ἢ αὐτῇ—οἷον δ' 

πάσα ἄττα δῇ κ.τ.λ. If the value of shoes is fixed in money, it becomes comparable, not only with the value of a house, but also with that of τροφή.

δεῖ τούτων κ.τ.λ., what is wanted, 

then, is that the proportion

\[ A + (x - 1)B = \Gamma - \Delta \]

should be generalised in such a way that it will represent not one equation only, but a whole series. We know already that 'x shoes' (τοσαδὶ ὑπο-

dήματα) = 1 house. But, unless this 

can be extended, so that we can 

also equate shoes with τροφή etc., commerce is impossible.

ὅπερ, sc. διαφέρει. Identity of difference, not of ratio, as above 1132 b, 14.

§ 11. ἡ χρεία. Aristotle derives 

this idea from Plato (Rep. 369). A 

modern economist would say rather 

that Normal Value is determined by 

Cost of Production (which some editors 

import into the argument here); but 

Aristotle is thinking of the more 

ultimate fact that, but for χρεία, 

the thing would have no value at all, 

whatever the cost of production might 

be, and infers from this that 'x shoes' 

= 1 house because the shoemaker's 

'need' of the builder exceeds the 

builder's 'need' of the shoemaker 

by \( x - 1 \).

ἡ οὖχ ἡ αὐτῇ, e.g. if the need of
the builder for the services of the shoemaker were not so great, the rate of exchange would not be the same. Aristotle does not seem to see that Cost of Production narrows this variation to a comparatively slight fluctuation.

υπάλλαγμα, 'a pledge, security.' This is one of the non-Attic terms which Aristotle may have brought from Stageira. Phrynichos even says υπάλλαγμα ἄμαθὸς τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἄχρηνων. The meaning is precisely the same as in 1133 b, 11 τὸ νόμισμα τοῦ ἑργοῦ τῆς κ.τ.λ.

κατὰ συνθήκην...οὐ φύσει ἄλλα νόμιμα. In Pol. 1357 b, 10 Aristotle quotes this view in an extreme form, probably derived from the Cynics, οὐκ εἶναι δέκα τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμισι παρατίθεσθαι, φύσει δὲ οὖν, δι’ ἐμαθέμαν τῶν χρημάτων ('adopting a new currency') οὖν εἶναι δέκα χρήσιμον τρίς οὖν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκτιμάμες ἅπασαν τοπικά πολλάκις ἀποκρίθη γνασιαία τροφή. κατὰ δὲ ἄστατον τούτον εἶναι δέκα νόμισμα οὐ κατὰ τῶν λιμὸν ἀπολείται. καθάπερ καὶ τῶν Μίδης βουθαλαγησοὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπλοταίαν τὴν εὐχήν τῶν αὐτῶν γενομένων τῶν παραπαθησίων χρησίμων. It is true that there is an element of συνθήκη or νόμος in currency—we may have a gold or a silver standard—but it has an intrinsic (φύσει) value also determined by its Cost of Production.

§ 12. Εστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. After the digression on currency, we are reminded of the two stages of the δήσωσις. The inverse arithmetical ratio will only be applicable (ἐστι) after the equation has been made in money value (ὅταν ἐσωτηρίζῃ). We can then work out the new problem of exchanging shoes and τροφή, as easily as that of exchanging them with a definite ἔργον like a house.

δέπερ, sc. διαφέρει. Cf. 1133 a, 21. The διαφόροι is ἑπαρχία ή ἐλεφαῖα ή χρεία.

 eius σχήμα δὲ ἀναλογίας κ.τ.λ. The translation certainly is 'We must not bring them into the figure of proportion after they have exchanged, but when they still have their own products, otherwise one of the extremes will have both excesses.' This can only have any real meaning if we understand it of the generalisation of the equation to other cases than that first stated. The ἔργον of the εὐκτοπόμος must not be equated with that of the γεωργός in the form it received from its exchange with that of the ἀποδόμος, otherwise the γεωργός will have not only his excess over the cobbler, but the excess of the builder over the cobbler as well. The σχήμα ἀναλογίας then is

oldi υπόθημα τροφή
Having equated *τοσαία ὑπόθαμα* to *τροφή*, we can now apply the *ἀντιπεποθῆς* by 'diagonal conjunction' in the same way as we did before.

§ 13. ἃ ἡ γραμματική *κ.τ.λ.*. These constant equations would be very troublesome, and we therefore look for some common *παραλλαγή*, which will enable us to measure each commodity once for all.

*ἀντιθέτως* ὅταν *κ.τ.λ.*. This must surely be an instance of failure to effect an exchange (*όχι ἀλλάσατον*), and it must lead up to the view of money as *ἐγγυτήρ* τῆς *μελλόντος ἀλλαγής*. The meaning must therefore be 'no exchange takes place when the producer (πεί) wants something which the consumer (άντι) has not got.' I have therefore written *όχι* for *ἔχει* (Lb), or *οἴχι* (Kb).

*διδόντες...ἐξαγωγή*, 'offering the privilege of exporting corn.' The phrase *διδόναι ἐξαγωγή* is technical in the sense of to permit exportation of a home product. Cf. Ioskr. Trapez. § 57 where we read that Satyros, King of Bosporos, and his father treated the Athenians as 'the most favoured nation' and, πολλάκις ἢδη διὰ σπάνα στόσα τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπόρων ναὸς κείλετο ἐκπεμπότης, ἕναν ἐξαγωγῆν ἱδονήν, Theophr. Char. xxiii καὶ διδομένη αὐτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ἔδωκεν ἀπολουσι ('duty-free'). Bywater (Contr., p. 46) also compares CIG 3523 (= Cauer 126) and Dittenberger, Syll. 62 δ 1 and 354, d. The plural participle referring to the same subject as a singular indefinite pronoun is quite a common construction. Cf. 1135 b, 31.


*πάσχα...το ἀντιθέτως*, 'the same thing, indeed, happens to money,' i.e. there is not always the same demand for it. I think that the context sufficiently justifies this interpretation; for in 1133 a, 28 the two cases have been already distinguished, ἡ ὁμολογία ἀλλαγή (failure to exchange, when wine is wanted and corn offered), ἡ ὁμολογία ἀντιθέτως (unfavourable exchange). See, however, Bywater, Contr., p. 46. *τετεμιῳδιά*, 'to have a price put on them,' not, we may be sure, by the 'haggling of the market.' Aristotle no doubt is thinking of a tariff prescribed by the magistrates.
§ 15. Εἰς ὑποθέσεως, i.e. κατὰ συνθῆκην.

οἰκία ο κ.τ.λ. The sum of 10 minae is taken as the common measure of houses and beds, which are not directly commensurable. We know, however, that a house is worth five minae and a bed worth one, so we can say that \( a = \frac{\beta}{2} \) and \( \gamma = \frac{\beta}{10} \) from which it follows that \( a = 5\gamma \). The diagram is given thus by the Par.—

\[ \text{Diagram}
\]

The 10 minae take the place of ‘x shoes’ in the earlier diagram.

\( \eta \) ἵσταν, ‘worth five minas or =5 minas.’ For the use of ήσταν in the sense of the sign =, cf. 1133 a, 22.

οὖτος, i.e. five beds for a house.

§ 17. Τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now come to the question πῶς μετέχει ἡ δικαιοσύνη; That δικαιοσύνη, the ἐνέργεια, is a μέσον, we have sufficiently shown; but what are we to say of the ἔξω?

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. The difference arises from the fact that δικαιοσύνη is an ἄρετη πρὸς ἑτέρων. We have no longer to find simply a μέσον πρὸς ἑμᾶς, but an unknown x which involves a proportion, whether geometrical or arithmetical. Justice is τὸ μέσον because, whether in distribution or in adjusting penalties and prices, it seeks to find this x, while Injustice seeks to secure for oneself \( x+n \) of good things and \( x-n \) of bad, and to secure for others either \( x+n \) or \( x-n \) of good things or bad, as the case may be.

καθ’ ἵν, sc. ἔσω.
to mean 'contrary to the general principle' embodied in the law, the logon of Pol. 1286 a, 17. But surely this would not be sprung upon us without anything in the context to suggest it. For the confusion of vnomos and logos in the MSS., see 1138 a, 10 n. In later times logon was supposed to mean 'reason.'

§ 7. μεθε...δοτες. All this comes from Plato, Rep. 545 e sqq.

§ 8. τὸ δησποτικὸν...τὸ πατρικὸν. Justice between master and slaves or between father and children resembles the δίκαιον of the state. But it is not the same; for these δικασίαι do not fall under the head of ἓν ὁδίκα. There cannot be ἕδικα ἀπλῶς to parts of oneself, but only ἕδικα καθ' ὁμοιότητα. The word παρεπειρατικόν properly means 'hereditary,' but Aristotle gives it a new application.

Ἦς ἄν ἡ πειδοκοπὸν κ.τ.λ., 'till it attains a certain age and has been separated.' L² inserts μὴ before χω-

mēthē, the scribe supposing ἡως ἄν to mean 'as long as.'

ἀστερ μέρος. Cf. Pol. 1254 a, 9 τὸ δὲ κτήμα λέγεται ἄστερ καὶ τὸ μέρος.

§ 9. πρὸς ἄντα. Ramsauer's reading for ms. πρὸς αὐτὸν seems clearly right.

ἤν, ἦναν, as we saw above a, 24 sqq.

ἰσότητα τοῦ ἀρχον καὶ ἀρχιστηθαία. This is not quite how the equality was formulated above, but it comes to the same thing; for, in the Third Book of the Politics, Aristotle shows that the citizen is necessarily ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχον καὶ ἀρχιστηθαί (1283 b, 42).


τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον. In Pol. 1252 b, 8 the τὴν μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς are thus given.
αριστοτέλος. VII. τοῦ δὲ πολεμικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἔστι τὸ δὲ νομικὸν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουν δύναμιν, 20 καὶ οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὡς ἢ ἐρήμης μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ἀπὸ δὲ θύματι, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μῦα λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἰγά θύειν ἄλλα μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἐτε ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καὶ γὰρ ἔκαστα νυμφοθεούσι, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισµαταῦθ. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνὶς εἶναί πάντα 25 τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ εἰς Πέρσας καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινοῦμεν ὁρῶν. τούτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχουν, ἀλλὰ ἔστιν ὡς ἑαυτοῖς παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἵσως συνεφύσι, παρὰ ἦμιν δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητῶν μέντοι 30 πάν, ἀλλὰ δομῶς ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δὲ οὐ φύσει. ποιον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους ἔχειν, καὶ ποιον οὐκ ἄλλα νομικὸν καὶ συνήθη, ἐπίσης ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δηλοῦν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμῷ φύσει γὰρ ἤ δεξιὰ κριττοῦν, καὶ τούτου ἐνδέχεσθαι πάντας ἄμφως τούς 35 εἴους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνήθηκαν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν § 1136α δικαίου δομοῦ ἔστι τοῖς μέτροις οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἦσαν τὰ ἀριστοτέλεια, καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ τὸ δικαίον τοῦτο ἔχει δύναμιν. τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ εἰς Πέρσας καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινοῦμεν ὁρῶν. τούτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχουν, ἀλλὰ ἔστιν ὡς ἑαυτοῖς παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἵσως συνεφύσι, παρὰ ἦμιν δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητῶν μέντοι 30 πάν, ἀλλὰ δομῶς ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δὲ οὐ φύσει. ποιον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους ἔχειν, καὶ ποιον οὐκ ἄλλα νομικὸν καὶ συνήθη, ἐπίσης ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δηλοῦν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμῷ φύσει γὰρ ἤ δεξιὰ κριττοῦν, καὶ τούτου ἐνδέχεσθαι πάντας ἄμφως τούς εἴους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνήθηκαν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν § 1136α δικαίου δομοῦ ἔστι τοῖς μέτροις οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἦσαν τὰ πολλά.
οίνηρα καὶ σιτιρρά μέτρα, ἂλλ' οὐ μὲν ὄνομαται, μείζω, οὐ δὲ σωλοσωμ, ἐλάττων. ὁμοιός δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἂλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταύτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂι πολλ' 6 τείναι, ἄλλα μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν 5 δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἐκαστόν ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἐκαστά ἔχει τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραπτόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δὲ 7 ἐκαστον ἐν' καθόλου γὰρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γὰρ ἔστι τῇ φύσιν ἡ τάξει: αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο, ὅταν πραγμα, ἄδικον χρήμα ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραγμα πραιτρίναι, οὔτω, ἄλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοιός δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγμα τὸν κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανορθώμα τὸν δικαίματος. καθ' ἐκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποιά τε εἴη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποία τυρχχεῖν ὡπτα, ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. VIII. ὄντων δὲ τῶν 15 δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἄδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ἂταν ἐκών τίς αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δὲ ἄκων, οὐτ' ἄδικει οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς ἂγαρ συμβεβήκη 2 βηκε δικαίως εἶναι ἂδικες, πράττουσιν. ἄδικημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγμα δορίσται τῷ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον· ὅταν γὰρ ἡ ἐκούσιον ἢ, ψέγεται, ἁμα δὲ καὶ ἄδικημα τότ' ἐστιν· ὅστ' ἐσταὶ τι ἄδικον μὲν ἄδικημα δ' οὕτω, ἢ μή τὸ ἐκούσιον 3 προσήκει. λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὁστερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὅ ἂν τις τῶν ἢ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδός καὶ μή ἄγων πράττῃ μήτε ἐν μῆτε οὖ μήτε οὐ <ἐνεκε>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνα καὶ 25 τίνας ἐνεκε, κακεῖνον ἐκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μονε δι' ἑξίαν (ὁστερ εί τις λαβὼν τὴν χείρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἐπέροι, οὔν ἐκών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ), ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἀνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παράντων τις

§ 5. οὐ μὲν ὄνομαται κ.τ.λ., i.e. wholesale and retail measures differ.
§ 7. τὸ κοινὸν, sc. τῷ διανοητικῷ καὶ τῷ διανοητικῷ. Aristotle had used διανοητική above to get a neat antithesis to δικαίωμα. But he admits that this is stretching the meaning of the word considerably.
VIII. οἷς ἂγαρ κ.τ.λ., 'they perform acts of which justice or injustice are accidents,' the regular way of explaining the term κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς.
§ 3. καὶ πρότερον, τ.τ.τ.α., i sqq. μή κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς represents μή δι' ἄνθρωπον. He strikes some one who συμβεβηκής πατρί εἶναι, but not καθ' αὐτόν.
30 γινώσκειν, ὅτε δὲ πατήρ ἄγνωσίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον δια-
ρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἐγεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξειν διήν. τὸ δὴ ἄγνωσιμον, ἡ μὴ ἀγνώσιμον μὲν μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δ’ ὁ δὲ, ἡ ἑβδαμον, ἀκούοντος. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰς-
1135 ὑπὲρ τοὺς καὶ πρᾶξειν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὥστε ὑπὸ ἔκωσι ὁ ἄκουσιν ὡς ἐν ἔκωσιν ἕστιν, οἷον τὸ γηράν ἢ ἀποθυμήριοι. έστι δ’ ὁμοίως 4 ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός-
καὶ γὰρ ἄν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοθὲν τις ἄκω καὶ διὰ 5 φόβου, διὰ οὕτω δικαιά πράξειν οὕτω δικαιοπράγμασιν φατέοι-
άλλ’ ἡ κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκασμέ-
μενον καὶ ἄκων τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδοθὴν κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός φατέοιν αἰτίων καὶ τὰ ἄκω καὶ πράξειν. τῶν 5 δὲ ἐκούσιν ταῖς μὲν προέλαμποι πράξειν τὰ δ’ οὐ προέλα-
μενοι, προέλαμποι μὲν ὑπὸ προβολευμένοι, ἀπομείνεται δὲ δ’ αὐτά ἀποβολεύεται. τριῶν δὲ οὐδὸν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς 6 κοιναίς, τὰ μὲν μετ’ ἄγνωσις ἀμαρτήματα ἐστίν, ὅταν μὴ ὁ μὴ ὁ μὴ ὁ ὁ ἐγεκα ὑπέλαβα πράξει; ἡ γὰρ οὐ βιάζει οὐ οὐ τότε ὁ οὐ τότε οὐ οὐ τότε ἡ ἐγεκα φήσθη.
15 ἀλλ’ ἀνυέβη οὐχ οὐ ἐγεκα φήσθη, οἷον οἷον ὕπαροι ἀλλ’ ἐνα κενήθη, οὐ χ’ οὐν, οἰχ’ φ’. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλογισμὸς

μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δ’ οὐ. This is the same class of things as is referred to as 1113 b, 26. It is explained in the next sentence, πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. οὕτω ἄκωσι. This has been suspected, but it seems to me quite correct. We cannot rightly call ἄκωσι ὑπάρχοντα involuntary any more than voluntary. They are altogether outside that classification, for they happen φύσει and not βλά. It would be absurd to say that we grow old intentionally.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as well as τὸ καθ’ αὐτῷ.

§ 5. τὰ δ’ οὐ προελαμβάνοι. For τὸ ἐκόσιον is a wider term than τὸ προαρτόν. See above 1112 a, 14. ἐκόσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προ-
αρτόν), τὸ δ’ ἐκόσιον οὐ πάνω προ-
αρτόν. ἀλλ’ ἀρὰ γε τὸ προαρτον-
μένοι; § 6. μετ’ ἄγνωσις, sc. τὸν καθ’ ἐκάσταν.

ἀμαρτήματα is here used in its widest sense including ἀνυέβη. In legal terminology, ἀνυέβη ἀτόχημα ἀθάνατος ἀμαρτήματα ἐπὶ ἀδίκημα ἀπὸ ἀνυέβη, ἀδίκημα ἀπὸ ἀτόχημα. Cf. Menander fr. 436 Kock—
ἀνυέβη ἀτόχημα ἀδίκημα ἀπὸ ἀδίκημα ἀνυέβη, τὸ μὲν διὰ τόχημα γεγένηται, τὸ δ’ ἀθάν. The distinction was a commonplace of the δικαστήρια.

§ 7. παραλογισμὸς. Cf. Rhet. 1374 b, 68 arei ἀτόχημα μὲν δὲ ἀνυέβη ἀνυέβη ἀτόχημα ἀπὸ ἀνυέβη, ἀθάνατος ἀνυέβη, ἀτόχημα δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνυέβη ἀτόχημα ἀπὸ τὸ ἀτόχημα τὸ ἐστίν. The paralogism is what is contrary to reasonable ex-
stance it is not intentionally killing a man suddenly on the street, if you shoot in an act from a man suddenly ag.

Mr. Jackson n'ts dhvola. But he means simply 'the act,' as often in the

νόεω δὲ. It does not make an act not call a man an act comes from a

The ἀναγκαῖα h'ta ὁματικά, τά τιν τῶν ἁρμόδιων, 36; the ὕψικτα that, διὰ κοινά ὑπάρχ. (1149 b, 9), though not φανερώ
the legal phrase, 'malice.'

of γὰρ ἄρχει, sc. τῆς ἀταία, 'is not the aggressor.'

§ 10. οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. The issue of fact is not raised, but only that of justification.

ἐπὶ φανομένη γάρ ἵστων. οὗ γὰρ ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι ἀμφισβητούσιν, οὐ ανάγκη τοῦ ἑτερον εἶναι τοι ἡ διὰ λήψην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν ἀλλ' ὑμολογοῦντες ἑκατον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρος δικαιον ἀμφισβητή-

ἄναγκη τοῦ ἑτερον εἶναι μοχθηρὸν. Cf. Rhet. 1417 b, 27 μὴ λασσάτω στὰ ὅπως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβη-

τήσει μάχη (sc. ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ γενέσθαι) τοῦ ἑτερον εἶναι ποσιρὸν: οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἄγνωστα αὕτη ὡσπερ ἐν στὶν περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι (the present case).

ἄν μὴ διὰ λήψην κ.τ.λ., 'unless in cases where the wrong has been done from forgetfulness.' For instance a man may forget to pay a bill, and in that case is not μοχθηρός. There is no difficulty about the plural, cf. 1133 b, 9 n.

περὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δὲ connecting a
τοῦτοιν (ὅ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοιαν), ὡστε ὁ μὲν οἶλεται ἄδικος, ὁ δ' ὕππος ἀκοινοfic sūγγυρομοιουκὰ τὰ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας ὑπέρ τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τοῦ ἀνόλογου ἦ τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδίκος ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνόλογον ἢ τὰ ἀνόλογα ὑπὲρ τὸ ἱσον, ὑμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίως, ὅταν προελάμφη αὐτή συνήκημα· δικαιοπραγηγὸν δὲ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν 5 πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκοινομένων τὰ μέν ἐστὶν τὰ συνήκημα· διὰ τὸ ἂν ὁμοιόμοιον τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τοῦ ἀνόλογου ἁμαρτάνοντος, συνήκημα· διὰ δὲ μὴ διὰ ἀνόλομα, ἂλλ' ἀνόλομος μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε πάθος μητ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ ἄδικος.
πάν όντως ἣ ἐκεῖνως, [ὁσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πάν ἐκούσιον,] ἡ
tὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμολογὸς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιο-
σθαι' τὸ γάρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πάν ἐκούσιον· ὡστ' εὐλογὸν ἀντικείσαι ὁμολογὸς καὶ κα' ἐκάτερον, τὸ τ' ἀδικεῖσαι καὶ δε-20
καίοντας ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἐκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐν δόξῃ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιούσθαι, εἰ πάν ἐκούσιον· ἐνοι γὰρ δικαιούνται 30
όχι ἐκόντες. ἔτειτα καὶ τὸ διαπορίζειν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ
tὸ ἀδίκιον πεπονθῶς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἡ ὁσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράτ-
τειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκός γὰρ ἐν-
δέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφιτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμολογὸς
dὲ ἦλθον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων τὸ τάδικα
πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδίκα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσαι· ὁμολο-
dὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιούσθαι· ἀδικών-
τος γὰρ ἀδικεῖσαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ δικαιούσθαι μὴ δικαιο-
πράγματος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδίκειν τῷ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα
tινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ φ' καὶ ὃς, ὃ δ' ἀκρα-
tῆς ἐκόνων βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτῶν, ἐκών τ' ἄν ἀδίκοιτο καὶ ἐν-
δέχεται αὐτὸς αὐτῶν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπο-
ρουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἀδικεῖν. ἤτι ἐκών ἄν τῆς
d' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλων βλάπτετο εἰκόνας, ὡστ' εἰν' ἄν ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσαι. ἣ ὅπως ὁ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, άλλα προσθετέον τῷ
βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ φ' καὶ ὃς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου

The alternative is whether (1) τὸ ἀδι-
κεῖσαι is in every case necessarily
one or the other, or whether (2) it is
sometimes the one and sometimes the
other.

§ 2. δικαιούσθαι, 'having justice
done to one.' Aristotle requires an
opposite to ἀδικεῖσαι and uses δικαιο-
σθαι in a sense of his own. So above
(1135 a, 12) he used δικαίωμα as
the opposite of ἀδίκημα.

εὐλογὸν, opp. ἄτοπον (a, 21), marks
a dialectical argument.

§ 3. ἑπταν answering to πράτων
μὲν a, 11. The reading is Bywater’s
correction of ms. έτει. See Contr.
p. 47. The second φωπλα is 'Can we
say that every man who suffers a
wrong is wronged?'

η'/ ἀμφιτέρων, sc. ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχαν
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν. We have seen
already that ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν it is
possible to commit an ἀδίκημα κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, e.g. when we act δι'
ἀγωνα. Is it also possible κατὰ
συμβεβηκός ἀδικεῖσαι?

§ 4. ἀπλῶς, opp. to ἡ προσθετέον
below (b, 3). If we say that a wrong
is 'simply' damnum knowingly in-
flicted, we shall have to say that
the ἀκρασία, who knowingly suffers
damnum at the hands of another
or his own, ἀδικεῖσαι. We must,
however, regard iniuria as well as
damnum, and velonli non fit iniuria.

§ 5. προσθετέον, i.q. προσδιοριστέον.
5 βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τὰ δικαὶ πάσχει, δ' ἀδικεῖται ἐ' οὔθεις ἐκῶν; οὔθεις γὰρ βούλεται, οὔδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ πάρα τὴν βούλησιν πράττει. οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὔθεις ὑπηρετεῖ εἰναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατίας οὐχ ἂν ἄλλως δὲν πράττει πράττει. ὃ δὲ τὰ αὐτὸν διδοῦσι, ὡστε "Ομηρός φησι, 10 ὁ δὲ τὸν Γλαύκον τὸν Διομήδη "χρύσας χαλκεῖν, ἐκατομβοῖ μὲν ἐνεαβοῖοι," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται ἐπ' αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικούντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὡς οὖν ἐκούσοις, 8 ὤθησαν.

15 Ἐπὶ δ' οὖν προελθόμεθα δούλας ἐστίν εἰς τίνα, πότερον ποτ' ἂδικεῖ ὁ νεῖμας παρὰ τὴν ἄξιας τὸ πλέον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἂδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρῶτον ἀλλ' ἂν ἔχων καὶ διαμέρεστος ἂδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὗ καί ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἰ τινὰ πλέον αὐτοῦ ἐτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἐκὼν, ὁδὸς αὐτὸς 20 αὐτὸν ἂδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτρων ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐνεπεικάς ἐλαττωτικὸς ἐστιν. ἣ οὐδὲ τούτο ἐπάλωσιν; ἐπέρου γὰρ ἄραθος, εἰ ἐτυχεῖ, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἰον δόξης ἤ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἐπὶ λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἂδικεῖν ὠφελοῦ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὡστε οὐκ ἂδικεῖται διὰ γε τούτο, 25 ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἄλλα, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διακέ-10 μον ἂδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὗ καί τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἄει· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἂδικον ἑπάρχει ἂδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἐκόμου τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἂρξῃ τὴν πράξεως, ἤ ἔστειν εἰ τὸ διαμέρωσι ἀλλ' ὕπερ ἐν τῷ λαμβανόμεθα. ἦτο εἶτε πολλαχοῖς τὸ ποιοῦν· 30 λέγεται, καὶ ἔστειν ὡς τὰ ἅγια κτείνει καὶ τὰ χειρὶ καὶ ὁ ὀικέτης ἐπιθαύματος, οὐκ ἂδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἂδικα. ἦτο εἰ μὲν ἄγνοιαν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἂδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικόν ὅ-11

§ 8. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We may consent to damnum; but, if it is essential to minitio that it should be para τὴν βούλησιν, we cannot consent to that. For none 'wishes' anything but to φανερον ἀγάθον.
§ 7. Ὄμηρος. II, vi, 236.
§ 8. ἂν προελθόμεθα. This has no reference. Aristotle forgets that he has not enumeratet the ἀποθαν. He now mentions the third and fourth.
§ 9. ἐλαττωτικός, ὑπερ. πλεονεκτηκόν.
§ 11. κτείνεις, the legal word.
§ 12. ἄγνοιαν, sc. τὰ καθ' ἐκατη. The case supposed is one in which material facts were not before the court.
καλον ούδ’ ἀδικος ή κρίσις ἐστίν, ἐστι δ’ οὖς ἀδικος’· ἔτερον γὰρ τὸ γομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γνωσικων ἐκκρε- νυν αδικος, πλευνεκτεί καὶ αὐτός ή χάριτος ή τιμωρίας. 1137 a
13 ὀσπερ οὖν κἂν εἶ τις μερίσατο τοῦ ἄδικηματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ τὰ ταυτά κρινᾶς αδικος πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκείνην τὸν
14 ἄγρον κρίνας οὐκ ἄγρον ἀλλ’ ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ’ ἀνθρωποὶ ἐφ’ ἐαντοὺς οἰοσται εἶναι τὸ ἀδίκειν· διὸ καὶ τὸ 5 δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἐστιν· συγγενεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦνα τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὁδί ἔχοντας
15 ταυτά ποιεῖν οὐτε ῥάδιον οὐτ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκα οὐδὲν οἰοσται σοφὸν εἶναι, ιο 10 ὅτι περὶ δὲν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπόν συνιέναι (ἀλλ’ οὗ ταυτ’ ἔστι τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκόν·) ἀλλὰ τῶς πραττόμενα καὶ τῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τούτῳ δὴ πλέον ἔργον η τὰ ἁγαίνει εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κάκει μέλε καὶ αἰών καὶ ἑλλέβορον καὶ καὶ τομῆν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς 15 δεῖ νεάμεν πρὸς υγείαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ἄσον λατρόν εἶναι. δ’ εὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δίκαιου οἰοσται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἤτον τὸ ἀδίκειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἤτον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναι’ ἄν ἔκαστον θέλῃ τοῦτον καὶ γὰρ συγγενεσθαι γυναίκε καὶ παταξεῖ καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος τὴν 20

πλευνετὰ καὶ αὐτός. The unjust judge δίκαιος, for he takes more than his share of the δικαίῳ ἄγαθο. It is not essential that he should literally share the spoils of the δίκαιον. Even if he were to decide the case on those terms (ἐπ’ ἐκείνη), it is not the land in dispute but a money equivalent that he would receive. So the equivalent need not be more than the gratitude of the one party (χάρις) or the pleasure of punishing the other (τιμωρία). These are enough to constitute πλευνεῖα.

§ 14. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὁδί κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to be ἄδικος, though it is easy to commit an ἄδικον.

§ 15. ἀλλ’ οὐ κ.τ.λ., ‘though these things are not just except accidentally.’ For a parenthesis introduced by διὰδικαίου χαθεῖ, followed by a main clause introduced by ἀλλὰ διαρκεῖ, Bywater (Contr. p. 48) compares 1139 b, 2. 1150 b, 6 sqq.

§ 16. δ’ αὐτὸ δι’ τοῦτο, i.e. because they ignore the fact that it is easy to do an unjust act, but not to be unjust. Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard Justice as a mere external accomplishment or τέχνη, the just man will be the best thief (Rep. 334 ν).
Αςπίδα αφείνα εις στρατείς ήδ’ ὑποτεραούν τρέχειν. ἄλλα τὸ δειλαὐνειν καὶ δικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταὐτὰ τοιεῖν ἐστὶ, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἄλλα τὸ ὁδὴ ἔχουσα ταῦτα τοιεῖν, ὁσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῖν καὶ τὸ οὐγὰνειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ 25 τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστὶν, ἄλλα τὸ ὁδὴ. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἶς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐλλειψιν’ τόσο μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰσος τοὺς θεοὺς, τοῖς δ’ οὐδὲν μόριον αφήλεμον, τοῖς ἀνίατοις κακοῖς, ἄλλα πάντα 30 βλάπτει, τοὺς δὲ μέγχρι τοῦ τοῦτο δ’ αὐθρώπων ἐστιν.

X. Περὶ δὲ ἑπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἑπιεικούς, πῶς ἔχει ἢ μὲν ἑπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ’ ἑπιεικεῖς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενον ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οwhereIn γὰρ ὡς ταῦταν ἀπλῶς οὐθ’ ὡς ἔτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένους’ καὶ ὧτ’ μὲν τὸ ἑπιεικὲς 35 κές ἑπανομένει καὶ ἀνάδρομα τοιούτου, ὡστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ Ἀλλα ἐπανομένεις μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἑπιεικέστερον ὃτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες’ ὡτ’ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσιν φαίνεται ἀτοπον εἰ τὸ ἑπιεικές παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ὧν ἑπιεικέστερον ἔστιν’ ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ στοιχεῖον, ἢ τὸ ἑπιεικὲς [οἱ 5 δίκαιον] εἰ ἄλλος ἢ ἐν ἀμφοτεροποιίᾳ, ταὐτὸν ἔστιν. ἢ μὲν 2 φθαρίσσων σχεδοῦν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περί τὸ ἑπιεικὲς, ἔχει δ’ ἀπαντά τρόπον τινὰ ὄρθος καὶ οὐδέν ὑπεναντίον

§ 17. τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἰ. c. τῶν ἐστίν, things which are good in themselves, though they may be bad in relation to something else. Cf. 1130 b, 3.

ἔχουσι δ’ ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ., ‘but admit of excess or defect in them.’ Of course ἔχουσι is the adative of the participle, which is connected with the finite verb by δὲ. Cf. 1116 a, 8.

τοῦτο δ’. This is the reading implied by the Vetus Version, and I have followed Stewart in preferring it. The mss. have δ’ τοῦτ’, which leaves ἐστιν without a subject. Others read δ’ for διὰ.

X. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἑπιεικείας κ.τ.λ.

The questions of legal casuistry we have been discussing lead up naturally to the question of “equity.”

ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘so much so that in praising things we even transfer the word ἑπιεικείας to other things than δίκαιον, and use it as equivalent to ἀγαθόν.’ Attic avoids the strong terms ἀγαθός and κακός and prefers the milder terms ἑπιεικής, μέτριος and φαιλος or ὁ τοῦτον. Aristotle often uses ἑπιεικής in this sense. Cf. 1108 b, 10.

[οὐ δίκαιον]. These words are not translated in the Vetus Version and seem better away, as Giphonius saw.
§ 2. Δικαίον τινός, 'better than a species of justice.' It is itself a species of δίκαιον, not another γένος.


§ 5. εὖθες, 'from its very nature.' This use of εὖθες is derived from such phrases as εὖθες ἐκ γενετῆς, εὖθες φοίην ὑπάρχει. Cf. 1140 b, 17.

§ 6. ὧν τῶν πράκτων 

§ 7. δικαίου τινός κ.τ.λ.

Rhet. 1374 b, 11 (ἐπιστής) τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην ἀκοπτεῖ καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ('the letter') ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ νομοθέτου. We see from the word παρὰ that Aristotle is thinking of the lawyer's ἀποδημία in Plato, Polit. 294 a sqq., and that in turn is suggested by the story of Solon.

§ 8. ψηφίσματος δεῖ. A ἄρκυνα is an executive, not a legislative, act. The ἀκοπτεῖ was an executive, not a legislative, body. Allowing for differences, we may think of an Order in Council.
ο κανών έστιν, οσπερ και τής Λεσβιας οίκοδομίας ο μολιβδίνος κανών· πρός γαρ το σχήμα του λήθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ο κανών, καὶ το ψήφισμα πρός τα πράγματα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ δὴ δικαίον καὶ τεινὸς βίλας τοῦ δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ο ἐπιεικῆς τῆς 35 ἐστίν· ο γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ἐκ 1138 ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ἀλλὰ ἐπαντωτικός, καίστερ ἐχθαν τῶν νόμων βοηθὸν, ἐπιεικῆς ἔστι, καὶ ἡ ἔξεις αὐτὴ ἐπεικεία, δικαιοσύνη τις οὐσα καὶ οὐκ ἔτερα τις ἔξω.

XI. Πότερον ε' ἐνδέχεται ἐαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ή οὐ, φανερόν 5 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πάσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, ὄνομ οὗ κελεὺς ὀποκτηνύων ἐκεῖνον ὁ νόμος, δ' δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἐπὶ δὴν τὸν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ ἀντιβλάπτην ἑκὼν, ἀδικεῖ, ἐκὼν δ' ἐκ ἑαυτὸς καὶ ὃ καὶ ὁ δ' ἐκ ἰργήν ἐαυτῶν 10 σφάττων ἑκὼν τούτο ὁρᾶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐαυτὸν νόμον, ὁ οὐκ ἐ.
The L reading παρά δὲν λόγος seems to me meaning
this context. Κb has παρά τον λόγον and the Vetus Versio τόν λόγον, whence we may infer the reading of Mn, though doubt
conjecture, is right. For the
on of λόγος and τόμοις in MSS.
we 1134 a, 25.

ὁ πόλεις άπωσις. Cf. Alciphron Ktesiphon § 344 εἷς τιν αὐτὸν
ησύχασε, τὴν χείρα τὴν τοῦτον
χαρίν τοῦ σκύματος θάνταμην.
Clear from this that the ἄδικον
nerg in bringing blood-guiltiness
) on the state, not in depriving
lte of a citizen. Hence ἄπωσις
appropriate punishment, not

ἐκαθ' ὁ κ.τ.λ., in the special
to which we have limited ἄδικον,
at as it has to do with τῆς παθεχείας
πλωτὸς ἄγαθος. Here ἄδικον
is ἄδικος μόνον (there is no ἑταρροφοῦ
to any other kind of badness 1130 a, 28), but not ἄδικος φαύλος (i.e. his
κακία is not ἄλογο κακία πρὸς ἑπερον, but
the ἐν μέρει κακία).

οὔτω πονηρός, 'bad in the same
sense,' i.e. as having a particular form
of badness.

ἄμα γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. If A and B are
ἀρθρισθαί ἐν, there can be no ἄδικα, for
ἐγώ and Δ (τὰ πράγματα) cannot be added to Ἀ = B and subtracted from
it at the same time.

§ 5. Ἐτοί δὲ κ.τ.λ. Not only is an
act of injustice voluntary and deli-
erate, but doing wrong is prior to
having wrong done to one—if wrong
has first been done to one, there is no
ἄδικα—but, if a man could wrong
himself, the agent and patient being
identical, the wrong done would be
simultaneous with the wrong suffered.
30 δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου * * * καὶ ὀστερὸν ὑγεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικῷ δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ· ἄλλα δὲ μὲν ἄλλοι καὶ ἄλλα δὲ νόσον προσπαθείματος· κατὰ τὸν γάρ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψευδότος, καὶ κακίας ἐν τῇ χειρὶ καὶ ἀπλότης ἐν τῇ γνώσει· οὐ γὰρ ἄπαν τὸ ἐκαρποῦν μετὰ ἀδικίας, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνωτερον καὶ ἄνωτερον. καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢττοναν φαίλειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ἑκάστῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου ληφθῆναι ἡ ἀποθανεῖν.

Κατὰ μεταφοράν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἐστὶν ὁδὸν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα τὸν αὐτόν τις, οὗ πάντις δὲ δίκαιον τόδε ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοὺς λόγους διεστῆκε τὸ λόγον ἔχων μέρος τῆς ἰατρικῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀλογοῦν· εἰς 10 δὲ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεί εἶναι ἄδικα πρὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐν τούτοις ἐστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὁστερὸν οὖν ἀρχινοῦν καὶ ἀρχιποίησι εἰσὶ πρὸς ἠλλὰ δίκαια τι καὶ τούτων.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἰδιωκτῶν τῶν τρόπων τούτων.

§ 7. καὶ ὀστερὸν κ.τ.λ. These words seem to have no grammatical connexion as they stand. Some phrase like τῷ δὲ δικαιοπραγῶν μέσον (Rassow) may have been lost by homoeoteleuton.

§ 8. τῇ τέχνῃ, as usual τῷ κατά, ἀλλὰ δὲ μὲν ἄλλον προσπαθείματος, in which case the agent is not ἄδικον.

§ 9. κατὰ μεταφοράν δὲ κ.τ.λ. We can now dispose finally of the account of δικαιοσύνη in Plato's Republic. It is based on a metaphor, and (2) it only refers to the relation between "parts of the soul," (3) it is not true πολυτικὸν δίκαιον, which implies equality.

τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. For this Platonic phrase, cf. e.g. Crito 47 e τῶν τῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ τῶν τῶν ἀντικαθίστων τοὺς τῶν ἑκάστων. ἐν τούτοις...τοὺς λόγους, i.e. in the writings of Plato and his followers.
BOOK VI.

GOODNESS OF INTELLECT.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our account of goodness cannot be complete until we have described Goodness of Intellect as well as Goodness of Character. We know that Happiness is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it may be that this will prove to be some kind of intellectual goodness. But there is a still more pressing need for such a discussion, since the nature of goodness of character cannot be made perfectly clear without it. We have assumed all along that the mean state in which goodness is to be found was determined by the "right rule" (ὁρθός λόγος), and we said also that this meant it was determined "by what the wise man would determine it by." Now Wisdom is certainly a form of intellectual goodness, and we must therefore discuss that if we are to make our previous inquiries thoroughly intelligible. The case is just like that of health. We may define that roughly as a mean, and we may say truly enough that we can feel when we are healthy and when we are not (ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις). This will even enable us to look after our own health to some extent; for we can always warm ourselves by exercise if we find we are too cold. But such an account of health will not be enough for us if we intend to become doctors. In that case we must have the form of health in our souls. Now the object of the present course is not to give empirical rules for action, but to train lawgivers; for we know that the fairest and grandest aim of practical science is to produce Happiness for a state. The lawgiver, then, must have the "right rule," the form of goodness, in his soul; and we cannot fulfill the task we set before us at the
beginning of the course if we do not address ourselves to the solution of this problem.

§ 2. We may convince ourselves by a process of dialectical reasoning that the forms of intellectual goodness are two in number, namely Practical and Theoretical Wisdom (φρόνησις and σοφία). This might have been deduced at once from the doctrine that all thought is either theoretical or practical (Introd. § 11); but it is more in accordance with our method to work it out from current philosophical views, and especially those of the Academy. In any case we find that there are these two forms of intellectual goodness; and if we compare them and ask how they are related to each other, we shall come very near the final answer to the question with which we started.

§ 3. All forms of thought, practical and theoretical alike, perform their functions through syllogism; but there is a fundamental difference between the syllogism of action and that of knowledge. This is due to the fact that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is always an action, and an action is necessarily particular, it is this action and not another. Now we know that there can be no demonstration of the particular, and therefore the thought which enters into the practical syllogism must be of a different character altogether from that which is operative in demonstration. Practical Wisdom, the virtue of that form of thought, must be capable, not only of apprehending the things that are good for man, the "right rule" (δικαίος λόγος) to apply in each department of life; it must also enable us to see that the particular act under consideration is in the circumstances a case of that general rule. In theoretical science, it is to sense we must go for the particulars; but we can hardly call our perception of the character of a particular act by the name of sense. It is not unlike the intuition by which we apprehend mathematical relations; but even that is not the same. It is better to call it "practical thought," and to leave the explanation of its true nature to the physicist or the "first Philosopher." We all know quite well what is meant by it. And we now see how it is that the Mean is determined. The wise man, the lawgiver, has the form of goodness, the "right rule" in his soul, and he has also the power of seeing how that form is to be embodied in a particular act. And he has the form of goodness in his soul just because he knows the end of human life; for the form is
always determined by the end. The test, then, of whether a
certain state of the soul is goodness or not is just the degree in
which it is subservient to the supreme end of all human activity.

What, then, is that supreme end? We know that it is an
activity according to the best form of goodness, and it looks as
if we had already stated what that is. For it is clear that
Theoretical Wisdom is something far higher than Practical.
Practical Wisdom has to do with what is good for Man; but Man
is far from being the highest thing in the world. We shall come
back to this in Book X; meanwhile it is enough to point out
that Practical Wisdom is, as it were, the handmaid of Theoretical
Wisdom, and that all its commands are subservient to the realiza-
tion of the highest kind of activity by the highest thing in man.
I. § 1. ου τοιοι ἔχουσιν, 'as the rule says.' Cf. 1115 b, 13 n.

δηλαμεν. This sense of διαφέρων (διαφέρεσθαι) τι or περί τινος is often found in Herodotus (Stein on vii, 16, 7) and seems to be derived from such phrases as διαφέρω διαφοράς, dirimere controversias. The oldest example is probably Heracliteos fr. 2 διαφέρων κατά φόσον καὶ φάται δεικνύει. It cannot therefore come from διαφέρω in its special Platonic or Aristotelian sense, as Bonitz seems to suggest (Ind. 180 a, 32).

tais ειρήμεναις ἔχουσι, sc. ταῖς ἥθηκαί ἀρεταῖς.

tων ἄλλων, e.g. health and strength, cf. 1104 a, 11.

σκοποὺς. Cf. 1004 a, 24 n. Here the metaphor changes at once from 'hitting the mark' to 'tuning a lyre,' from which we may infer that the literal meaning of σκοπᾶς was already lost sight of. This is only natural, since the correlative verb τυχάνειν was constantly used without any feeling for the metaphor. There is no justification for Grant's view that the non-metaphorical use is a mark of Eudemian authorship (see Stewart's note); for it is found already in Plato, e.g. Gorg. 507 d οὗτος ἔμοι εἶναι δι' ὅσον εἴναι πρὸς τὸ διδάσκαι δυνάμει.

ο ἄλλων ἔχων, i.e. the man who has in his soul the λόγος (λόγος τῆς ὀστίλας, eldos, formal cause) of goodness, as the doctor has the λόγος of health. Cf. 1138 b, 31 and note. The definition of ἕθη ἀρετή has already suggested that this is the φύσιμος.

ἐπιτείνα...ἀνίσησιν. The true pitch (ἀρμονία) is a mediator between τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ βαρύν, and the μονεμέρης has its λόγος in his soul. The process of ἐπιτείνασιν is described 1109 a, 24 sqq.

ἔρος τῶν μεσοτήτων. This is also supposed to be a 'Eudemian' touch on the ground (1) that the word ἔρως in the sense of 'standard,' 'determining principle,' is not found in the undisputed books of EN, and (2) that it is found in EE 1223 b, 7 (quoted on p. 105) and 1249 a, 21 (quoted on p. 251). But (1) though the word
ος μεταξις φαμεν ειναι της υπερβολης και της αλλειψεως,
ουσας κατα τον ορθον λογον. έστι δε το μεν ειπειν ουτως 25
αλθεις μεν, ουθεν δε σαφες· καὶ γαρ εν ταϊς αλλαις επι-
μελειαις, περι ουσας έστιν έπιστημη, τοιτ ολθεις μεν ειπειν,

1138 b, 23. EE. 1249 a, 21 ετει δ' εστι τις δροι και το
ιατρικ, προς δεν αναφερον κρινει το γνειαν σωματι και μη,
και προς δεν μεχρι του ποτον έκαστον και ει (λ. ειναι) γυαλινων, ει δε έλατον ή
πλεον, ουκετι· ουτω και το σπουδαιο περι των πραξεων και αιρετικων των
φυσεων μεν αναβων ουκ επαινετων δε δει τινα ειναι δροι καται της εξεως

is not found in EN, it is distinctly implied in the definition of ἄρετη as ἐν μεσότητι...ὑπερβολή μηρὰ και, ὡς ἐν ὑφράσεως ὑπόσεως, and (2) the passages from EE can be most naturally explained as reproductions of the present passage. Indeed it seems incredible that Eudemus should have written 1249 a, 21 seq. if he also wrote the passage before us as part of the same work. Further, there is no difficulty in supposing that Aristotle should have used the word δροι in the sense here given to it. It meant originally 'land-mark,' and its metaphoric use is as old as Bakchylides, fr. 10 εις δροι, μα βροτοι εστιν εύνο-
χειας δοξας, | θυμων ει τους θεον ἀνεσθη δια-
τελεν δυνατων βιων. So Demosthenes says (De Cor. § 290) την δ' ἀειορθαλαν και το μηθανει χειν δειοτην αυτω, α
τοις πρωτοις Βδλευσιν δροι των αγαθων ἤσαν και κανων, ἀνατροφότες. In the more precise sense of 'standard,' 'regulative principle,' it is used by Plato (Rep. 531 a δροι παλτελαν διαγραφηθει ναβεμαιντοι πληθος χρημά-
των) and Aristotle (Pol. 1294 a, 10 αφοτοκοραται δροι ἀρετη, διαγραφηθης δε
πλούτων, et passim). Note that the δροι and the σκοτος are the same thing and identical with whatever we may ultimately find to be man's chief end.

§ 2. Άλθεις μεν, ουθεν δε σαφες. This has been supposed to be a
criticism of Aristotle by Eudemus; but, as Eudemus repeats the remark on the last page of his own Ethics 1249 b, 5 (quoted p. 252), it would seem as if he had applied the same criticism to himself. In this case too, it appears incredible that one writer should have written both passages as part of the same work. It is true that Eudemus is fond of the phrase, cf. 1216 b, 32 (p. 40), 1217 a, 19 (p. 14), 1220 a, 17, and that it oc-
curs nowhere else in EN. But (1) it is a thoroughly Aristotelian way of speaking, cf. de An. 413 a, 11 εκ των ἀσαφων μεν φανερωτέρων δε γηγενεται το σαφες κατα τον
λογον γνωριμιατων. And (2) there is no occasion for the alleged criticism, since the theory of the Mean is avowedly given as a provisional sketch of τους (EN 1104 a, 1 seq., 1114 b, 27), and in Book X Aristotle explains what the δροι στο σκοτον is much more fully than Eudemus ever does. We there learn that it is the θεωρητικος βιος on which the φρονης keeps his eye, and the meaning of this is thoroughly worked out, while Eudem
does dismisses in half a page his corresponding doctrine that the δροι της καλοκα-γαβας (i.e. της ολης αρετης) is των θεων θερατευει και διαφέρει.

Ησπερείαιας. The word is used both of Medicine and Politics.
οὸς ὁ ἄρρητος, καὶ ὁ ὁ ὁρθὸς ὁ λόγος: τότε δὲ μὸνον ἔχων ἄν 30 τοῖς ὁποῖοι ἦν εἰδήσει πλέον, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή πλέον, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἰ τις εἴπειν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ λατρεία κελεύει καὶ ὅσα ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δὲ καὶ περὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς εἴξεις μὴ μὸνον ἀλήθεια εἶναι τοὺς εἰρημένους, ἀλλ' καὶ διωμυσίμους τὸς ἔστων ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος καὶ τοῦτον τὸς ὁρὸς.

35 Τάς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρέσκει διεξάγειν ταῖς μὲν εἰναι
1139 τοῦ ἠθεοῦ ἔφαμεν ταῖς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περί μὲν οὖν τῶν

καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ ὀλγάσιος καὶ τῶν εὐμυθμάτων. εν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλεύθη τὸ "ὡς ὁ λόγος." τούτο δὲ ἦσθι ὀστερὰ ἐν εἰ τις τὸν περὶ τὴν τρόφυν εἴπειν "ὡς ἡ λατρεία καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης." τούτο δὲ ἀλήθεις μὲν, οὐ σαφῆς δὲ.
γόνιμον, sc. καὶ ἄλλον ἔχειν. no difference whether we
things themselves or their e necessary or contingent.
, 34 n., 34 n.,
. τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον τευκρόν phukos.
a clear reference to the
of Plato, Rep. 476 ε, sqq.
ially 477 β ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐνὶ ἐφέκε. The principle is laid
γὰρ ἐπὶ ἡττητι̣κῇ ἐπὶ ἡττητι̣κῇ καὶ τὸ ἀντίκεντρον τὺμ ἀντίκεντρον καὶ τῷ ἀρνύμενῳ τῶν συζήτων παρέμεναι. The distinction,
that between ἐπιστήμη and
ἑαν’ ὑμοίοτητα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle did not hold the similia
theory of knowledge in this
naked form; the argument still proceeds on Platonic lines.
§ 6. λεγέτωσα. The imperative marks the dialectical character of the argument. Cf. ὑποκείσθω above.

λογιστικῶν. We expect δοξαιστεῖκος,
and so this ‘part’ is called below
1140 b, 26. In Plato the name λογιστικῶν is given to the highest of the three parts of the soul, and includes τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν instead of being opposed to it. Aristotle never uses the word elsewhere except in discussing Platonic psychology, and then he always uses it in the Platonic sense, as opposed to τὸ ἐπιθυμικόν and τὸ θυμωνικόν. He does, however, speak of λογιστικὴ φαντασία (cf. App. A), and this has led to the use of the word here.

τὸ γὰρ... λογιστεῖα κ.τ.λ. As usual Aristotle appeals to the language of common life to justify him in giving a narrower sense to the word than Plato had done. The phrases λογιστεῖα τὰ ονομάζοντα, λογισμὸς τῶν ονομάζοντας were of everyday occurrence.

οὐδὲς αἷς κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1112 a, 21.
This completes the proof that τὰ λογιστικῶν has to do with τὰ ἐπιθυμία.
τῶν μη ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ᾠδὴ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐστὶν ἵνα τί μέρος τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. Ἀπόταξιν ἀρ' ἔκατέρου τοῦ τοι‑
τον τίς ή βελτίωσθ' ἐξις; αὕτη γὰρ ἄρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ή δ' ἄρετὴ πρὸς το ἔργον το οἰκείον.

II. Τρία δ' ἐστιν ἐν τῇ γνώσει τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἄλλοις, ἀλλοθείνης νοῦς ὑπολογίζει, τούτων δ' ἡ ἀλλοθείνης οὐδεμίας ἀρχή

§ 7. βελτίωσθ' ἐξις...ἀρετ'...πρὸς

Π. § 1. Τρία δ' ἐκ τῶν. Aristotle approaches the question of the oikêia ἔργων of the two 'parts' from the other side, that of the distinction between theoretical and practical (Intro. § 11), and bases it now upon his own psychology. There are two specifically human ends, namely πράξεις and γνώσεις, or, as he here says, πράξεις and ἀλλοθεία. If we wish to find the oikêion ἔργων of any 'part' of the human soul, we must find what it contributes to either of these. That this must be the connexion of thought is made clear, I think, by the difficulties into which we get if we take πράξεως καὶ ἄλλοθείας as equivalent to πρακτική ἄλλοθείας (see Stewart's note). It seems much more likely that Aristotle should here oppose πράξεις to ἀλλοθεία. Though, as we shall see, πράξεις also implies ἀλλοθεία, ἀλλοθεία is not the τέλος in practical matters (τὸ τέλος ἀν γνώσεως ἄλλα πράξεις). If Aristotle had written here πράξεως καὶ γνώσεως there would have been less misunderstanding.

κύρια. The adjective κύριος corresponds to the substantive ἀρχή, especially in the sense of efficient cause. Cf. 1147 a, 26.

ἀλλοθείας. There can be no γνώσεις without αλλοθείας (de An. 432 a, 7 μὴ αἰθανόμενοι μὴθεν ὤνθεν ἐν μίας) nor without νοῦ (An. Post. 87 b, 28 sqq.; δ' αἰσθησεως νοὸς ἐστιν ἐπιτήδευσα), Therefore νοῦς and αλλοθείας are κύρια τῆς (θεωρητικῆς) ἄλλοθείας, κύρια τῆς γνώσεως. The position of the word νοῦς between αλλοθείας and δρέζει indicates that it is to be taken with both.

§ 2. τοῦτων δ' ἡ αλλοθείας κτλ. We turn now to consider our more immediate object, the κύρια πράξεως, i.e. νοῦς and δρέζεις. Cf. de An. 433 a, 7 φαίνεται δ' γε διό ταῦτα καυστα, ἡ δρέζεις ἡ νοῦς. de Mot. An. 170 b, 13 ταύτα δ' τάσπε τα (κατὰ τόν καυστα) ἀνέγερται εἰς νοῦς καὶ δρέζεις.

οὐδεμίας ἀρχή πράξεως. This is not fully explained here and must be supplemented from the de Anima and the de Motu Animalium, for which see App. Aand B. The lower animals have τόν κατὰ τότον κίνησις, but this can be explained by αλλοθείαις and δρέζεις alone. There can be no δρέζεις without a φασία, but φασία may be either αλλοθείας οὐκ οὐκον τέκνη (μεταγενεστέρου). It is only the latter of these that implies νοῦς, and we do not call κίνησις by the name of πράξεις unless it arises from an δρέζεις moved by νος, i.e. by a λογιστική φασία.

ἐστι δ' ὅπερ κτλ. To find the oikêion ἔργων το λογιστικῶν (i.e. νοὺς so far as it is a κύριον πράξεως), we now analyse the contributions of νοῦς and δρέζεις to πράξεις. Now the characteristical activities of νοῦς are affirmation and negation, while those of δρέζεις are pursuit and avoidance, and these are evidently 'analogous'


Thus, their relation is as a proportion.

νοῦς. There is no distinction between δίδασκα and νοῦς.

επική χ. τ. ά. As Ramsauer the middle term of this argument is δοκίμασι προαιρεσις. We want άρχη δοκίμασις ἐξίδο προαιρεσις (6b, 36), and that προαιρεσις ἀναλογικά (1113 a, 10). It is that a good προαιρεσις (and a good ἀρχή) implies (1) an ἀξίωμα, i.e. βουλευτικά τάγματα, and λόγος ἀληθής, or true judgment, in a certain class of persons a class of acts is good. The use of νοῦς here is strictly ana-

to its function in creating

Logical. In the latter case is explicit the universal latent

and thus produces a λόγος, which in turn becomes an ἀρχή or-

in the former it makes ex-

e the universal latent in ἁρχη, as produces a rule of conduct

λόγος, which in turn becomes

βουλευτικος, the major premise

critical syllogism.

μὲν οὖν κ. τ. ά. Practical

has for its function the conversion of ἁρχης into a λόγος or rule of conduct. This is

truth and the oikeion ἔργον of

to λογιστικόν which we are seeking.

§ 3. τής δε θεωρητικής κ. τ. ά. Introd. § 11. In both its aspects the

olyeion ἔργον of διάλειμα is truth.

§ 4. πράξεως...ἀρχή προαιρεσις, 1113 a, 6 n.

ἀλλ' οὖς οὖν ἑνεκά. The final cause

of πράξεως is τὸ ὁρκοτέρον, i.e. τὸ φαινό-

μενον ἀναλογον.

προαιρέσεως δὲ κ. τ. ά. The ἁρχη

προαιρεσις is ἁρχη (as καυσίμου καινοῦ) and a λόγος ἑνεκά του (as καινοῦ ἀκίνητον). For the different way in which these 'move,' cf. App. A.

λόγος ὡς ἑνεκά των. This is a

general rule of conduct, such as θυρί

ἀνθρώπων συμφέρει τα ἐνότα (1147 a, 5), the λόγος which tells us what sort of thing we must do if we are to attain the object of ἁρχης, and which therefore forms the major premise of the practical syllogism. It is the fact of its being ἑνεκά του that brings such words as δεις, συμφέρεις into it (cf. 1149 b, 18 δειν τοῦτο ἑνεκά πράττεται). The prime mover of πράξεως, then, is always something distinctly formulated by thought; for the ὁρκοτέρον can only become an efficient cause τῷ φαινόμενῳ ἡ φαινατηθήσα (De An. 433 b, 12), and if it is only in φαινατηθήσα we have no πράξεως. We must not infer from this, however, that thought constitutes the
end. Thought simply universalises and formulates the material furnished by ἄρχει in the same way as it universalises and formulates the material furnished by αὐτής. In itself it is indifferent to right or wrong, and we shall see that it can universalise wrong ἄρχει as well as right, and formulate false λόγοι as well as true.

οὗτ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. Two words for the same thing.

οὗτ ἄνευ θεωρήσις...ἐξεσ. This secures that the ἄρχει which thought has to universalise into rules of conduct are right, and thus that ὅ τὸ φαινόμενον ἄγαθον shall be the same as the true good, i.e. ὅ τὸ φῶτει ἄγαθον.

§ 8. διάνοια ἄρ. ἄρχει, 'thought by itself,' 'thought alone,' i.e. without ἄρχει.

ὥ ἐνεκ τούτου, cf. λόγοι ὥ ἐνεκ τούτου above.

ἄρτη, sc. ἡ ἐνεκ τοῦ διάσωμ. This completes the proof that διάσωμ aὐτή ὀδηγέω κακῶν. We have seen that this is true of πρακτική διάσωμ, and it is also true of πνευματική διάσωμα. There too the ἄρχει ὥ ἐνεκ τοῦ διάσωμ, and that implies ἄρχει as well as νοῦτ.

The end of the builder or the doctor is the realisation of the form, whether of a house or of health, existing in his soul. The formal becomes the final cause, and that can be effected by ἄρχει alone. It is not necessary to prove that the third kind of thought, πνευματική διάσωμ, ὀδηγέω κακῶν by itself; for its objects are either ἀκίνητα or have their ἄρχει κυριότερα in themselves. Cf. Introd. § 10.

οὗ τέλος ἀπλώς. The process of production (τὸ ποιητῶν) is not an end in the unqualified sense in which πράξις is so. It is relative (πρὸς τι) and it is the production of something (τινός). By τὸ ποιητῶν here we must not understand the thing produced (ὁ ἔργων). It is used in the same way as τὸ πράξις and means the thing done, not the thing made, the building and not the house. We may say either τοιεῖν τὸν ποιητήν οὐ τοιεῖν τὸν ποιητήν (ἐργον).

Here τὸ ποιητῆρι corresponds to the internal accusative.

ἐλλά πρὸς τι κ.π.λ. Ττ. 'though it is etc.,' For the structure cf. 1137b, 11 b.

ἐλλά τὸ πράξις, sc. τέλος ἀπλώς. The end of the πράξις is the ἐνέργεια itself, not an external ἔργον.

ἡ τοιαύτη ἄρχη ἀνθρώπος. 'This sort of efficient cause is Man.' For the others see 1112a, 31. Aristotle sometimes calls this efficient cause νοῦ or διάσωμ (see the note referred to). In those cases we must understand the qualification ἐνεκ τούτου. The language here brings out well the absolute interdependence of νοῦς and ἄρχει in προαίρεσις.
This seems detached fragment loosely as usual to the end of a It appears to be part of a Practical Thought deals for which doctrine I. § 12. αποφαίνεται by a favourite γνώμη, see also Pindar, Ol. ii. 17; Soph. Aias. 378, 401; Plato, Protag. 374 b, 3 a. τούτων μορφών, see τον ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸν λογιστήν. As equivalent to διάνωσιν, so is to διανωση. εἰς συν. κτλ., for ἡ ἀρχή πρὸ τοῦ προείσχον 1139 a, 17.

I. ἄνθευ, cf. 1155 b, 2 n. ἅ, the regular formula in in a dialectical πράγματος, in recent case a λογικὴ πράσσειν 1105 b, 20) used also in An. b. 30—89 b, 9. We must his as a mere preliminary formation of states with a prima to be regarded as diazotral, and not as Aristotle's own list. We shall find that he reduces them to two, φιλόσοφος and σοφία (so Prantl). For a similar preliminary list afterwards reduced to two, cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 17 (App. B). ὑπολείψειν...δέχεται. Here these are introduced as coordinate, quite in accordance with the tentative character of the present discussion. Later we shall see that ὑπολείψειν is the genus of which ἐπιστήμη, δέξα, and φιλόσοφος are species.

§ 2. Ἐπιστήμη κτλ. It is natural to start with the familiar pair ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη, which look as if they might be the two ἀρέτα we are seeking for.

εἰ δὲ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι. We are now going to fix the precise meaning of these vague popular terms. The name of ἐπιστήμη is given to many things καθ' ἴδιοτητα (1115 a, 19 n.) which are not ἐπιστήμη at all τῷ ἀκριβείᾳ λόγῳ, e.g. It is given to θυτικῇ itself. This passage is referred to in Met. 1081 b, 25 ἐρημέεται ἐν ὑπάρχῃ τις ἄθροισιν τῆς ἄθροισιν, τις ἤθος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τῶν ὀργῶν. This, so far as it goes, is evidence of the Aristotelian character of Book vi.
πάντως γάρ κ.τ.λ. Αs usual in discussing a δίσ, the first question is περί τούτων; cf. ι 111 5, p. 5.

ἐξω τοῦ θεωρείν, ‘when removed from actual observation.’ The verb 

θεωρείν expresses the ένεργεια of knowledge (cf. 1146 b, 31 n.). A triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether any one actually knows Eucl. 1, 32 or not. We cannot say the same of ἄλλο τό ἐπί τό πόλος, the 

facts of nature and of human life.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀρα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 

21 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀδύνατον ἄλλον ἔχειν οὐ 

ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη, ἀρκεῖν ἀναγκαίον ἄκ 

εσεῖ τὸ ἐπιστήμην τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδοκι 

μία ἐπιστήμην.

ἀδύνατα. On the ἁδυναμία see ι 112 a, 

21 n.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης...ἀπλώς, ‘necessary in an 

unqualified sense’ as opposed to ἐξ ὑποθέσεων ἀναγκαία, cf. An. Post.

73 a, 21 quoted above. That the 

angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles is necessary ἀπλώς, 

that a saw should be of iron if it is to 

cut is necessary ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (Phys. 

200 a, 12). The results of 

πολυτική are only ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαία, but 

πολυτική is not τὸ ἀκριβές λόγος, an 

ἐπιστήμη. Note that the ὑποθέσεις in 

this phrase is the Q.E.F., the problem 

to be solved.

ἀγώνυμα καὶ ἀφθαρσία, not subject 

to γένεσις and φόροι, ‘coming into 

being’ and ‘ceasing to be.’ Cf. Part.

Ἀν. 639 b, 23 ὡπάρχει δὲ τὸ μὲν (ὅσ

κ. αναγκαῖον) ἄλλος τοῖς ἄδιδοι, τὸ δ’ εἰ 

ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσις πάνω ὑπὲρ ἐν τοῖς τεχνικοῖς, οἷον οἷς κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. διδακτή. Met. 981 b, 7 

διδ. τοῦ σημείου τοῦ ἐξουσία τὸ διδακτήν 

ἐκεῖνον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν 

τέχνην τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐκείνης μᾶλλον 

ἐπιστήμην εἶναι δύναται γάρ, ὅτι 

δυνατὸν δὲν ἔχειν. This introduces 

us to the second question, τις 


71 a, 1 τὸ πάνα διδασκαλία καὶ τὰ ἀκρι 

βαθεῖα διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϊσχορίά αὐτῆς 

γίνεται γνώσεως.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ, sc. διδασκαλία, ὑπὸ ἐπι 

στήμα. Aristotle never admits that 

ἐπιστήμη can be got δὲ ἐπαγωγῇ, for 

it is always apodeictic. For the 

present statement cf. An. Post. 71 a, 

5 ἀριθμοὶ οὐκ ὡς (ὁ δ’ ἐπαγωγῆ καὶ οὐ διὰ 

συλλογημάτων λόγοι) ἀλλὰ προϊσχορία 

ἠκούσται τῇ διδασ 

καλίᾳ, οὐ μόνον μαθηταὶ ἐν πάρ 

σωτηρίᾳ, οὐ δὲ δεικτοὺς ἐν καθ 

διὰ τοῦ ὑπόλοιπον εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἐκα 

τον.

ἀρχή ἐστι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1393 a, 

26 ὅ δ’ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή. This must be 

a proof that ὁ δ’ ἐπαγωγῆ διδασκαλία 

is ἐκ προϊσχορίων just as much as η 

συλλογημάτων, so the reading of L’, 

ἀρχή ἐστι, cannot be right. To say 

that ἐπαγωγή ‘is of the ἀρχή and the 

universal’ is true, but not to the 

point here. The ἀρχή must be iden-
with the προζάρχοντα γράςιν, so we see from the next sentence. Not every kind of πίστις is ἐπιστήμη.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. He will have something which as a matter of fact is knowledge (ἐν καθ' αὑτώ), but he will not have it as knowledge (καθ' αὑτό). Cf. An. Post. 71 b, 28 τὸ γάρ ἐπιστάσθη ὅτι ἄνδειξε ἢ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ ἔσχον ἄνδειξε ἢ ἢ, ib. 99 b, 20 ὅσον ἐνδεχόμεν ἐπιστάσθη δὲ ἄνδειξιν μὴ γνώσκοιν τὰ πρῶτα ἄρχα τῶν ἀμέσων.

IV. § 1. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης κ. τ. λ. The positive result of this discussion is that, though (1) ἐπιστήμη is περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and so far fulfills the requirements of the ἔρευ τῆς ἐπιστημοσκοι, yet (2) it always implies a προζάρχοντα γράςιν upon which all its necessity depends, and therefore cannot be the ἔρευν itself.

τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχόμενου κ. τ. λ. We might suppose that τέχνη was the ἔρευ of the λογιστικῶν, but we are met by the distinction between πιστής and πράξις. A little dialectic will show that τέχνη has to do only with the former, and therefore will not cover the whole ground of τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Observe that the distinction is taken from ἐξωτερικὸς λόγοι. Cf. Introd. § 12.

17—2
§ 2. *μετά λόγου ἔξις*. This is the correct Aristotelian designation for what popular philosophy calls ἔξις τοῦ λόγου ἔξωσις. As we are coming to a dialectical κατασκευή of the definition in due form, it is necessary to substitute the true genus. It was not necessary to define ἔπειταωμ, as we could refer to the Analytics for a sufficient explanation, but it is necessary to define τέχνη.

On the distinction between μετά λόγου and κατά λόγου see 1144 b, 26.

*έτερον ἐστι*. The τέτοιο here is *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν πτῶσεων καὶ συστάξεων*, which is applied to the πρόβλημα of ταύτων ἢ ἕτερων in Top. 151 b, 30. Assuming, on the basis of ἐξωτερικόν λόγον, that πράξις and πόρος are γένει ἕτερα (cf. 1140 b, 3), it follows that ἔξις πρακτική and ἔξις ποιητική are γένει ἕτερα, for the ἔννοια and the ἔξις are ὑστοσαχεῖα.

διὸ οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. ‘Therefore neither is contained in the other.’ This follows from the fact that they have ἀντιδιηγημέναι διαφοραί. They are co-ordinate γένη falling under the higher genus from which they are differentiated. For the phraseology, see next note.

§ 3. *ἐνετέρα δ' ἢ κ.τ.λ.* Building is an ἔδος both of τέχνης and of ἔξις μετά λόγου ποιητικῆς. The same ἔδος cannot be in two γένη neither of which is contained in the other (see last note). Therefore τέχνη and ἔξις μετά λόγου ποιητικῆς are the same γένος. For the principle here applied cf. Top. 144 a, 12 ὅπερ ἐνέχεσθαι ταύτων ἐν δόο γένεων ἐστίν μὴ περιεχομενον ἄλληλα. So 1403, 1. 144 b, 14. 152 a, 16.

*δετρ...τικαν.* The pronoun οὗτος is used to mark predication ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, and when ταῦτα is added as here, it marks that the γένος is predicated of the species or of the individual (cf. 1153 b, 6 and Bonitz, Ind. 553 b, 36 sqq.). It is necessary to mark that the γένος and the διαφορά are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, for otherwise we should have no definition. Cf. An. Post. 97 a, 23 ἅμα δὲ τὸ κατασκευαζόμενον ἔχει τῶν διαφόρων γενομένων συμβασίαν τὴν λογικον. (1) τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορούμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, (2) καὶ ταῦτα τάξει τὴ πρώτη ἢ καταχρον. καὶ (3) ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Here we see that (1) ἔξις μετά λόγου ποιητική is predicated of αἰθετική ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, and that (2) it is first, for ἐκ πάνω λέγεται τῆς αἰθετικῆς.

καὶ οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is added to secure the third requirement for the κατασκευή of a definition, viz. ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα. Cf. Top. 154 a, 37 ὅτι γὰρ κατὰ ταύτα ὅθ᾽ ὅλους (i.e. τέχνην) κατηγορεῖται τῶν δρῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ πρὶν ταύτων ἀντιστρέφειν, εἰ μὲλετε πιθανὸν εἶναι ὅτι ἀπόδοθαι δρόμος.

*μετά λόγου ἀληθινόν.* The qualification ἀληθινὸς may be added because ἀληθινόν is the ἐργον of ὁ διάνοια, whether theoretical or practical (1130 a, 29).

§ 4. *περὶ γένεων.* An. Post. 100 b, 6 τὸ καθόλου...τέχνης ἀρχῆ καὶ ἐπι-
we must first discover its precise meaning. In Plato the word φρονίση is exactly equivalent to σοφία, but Xenocrates had already marked a difference between the two. Cf. Clem. Strom. p. 441, 20 Pott. ἐπεὶ καὶ Χειμαρτῆς ἐν τῷ περὶ φρονήσεως τὴν σοφίαν ἑπιστήμην τῶν πρῶτων αἰτίων καὶ τῆς νοητῆς ὁδοίας εἶχαν φεύγειν, τὴν φρονίσην ἰχθυόμενον διϋπήρη τὴν μὲν πρακτικήν, τὴν δὲ θεωρητικήν: ἦν δὲ σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν ἀνθρωπίνῃ διάπερ ἡ μὲν σοφία φρονίσης ὡς ἢ μὴ πᾶσα φρονίσης σοφία. We see here that φρονίση, though still regarded as both theoretical and practical, is made something specifically human. Aristotle also makes φρονίση something human, but he confines it to the practical, a restriction which he justifies as usual by an appeal to the use of the word in current language.

οὕτως ἄν λάβοιμεν, 'the way to get a definition of φρονίσης is——.' For the use of λάβειν in the dialectical sense (opp. σπούδαω) with περί, cf. 1142 a, 32 n. The method is σκέφτηκε ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔξω, cf. 1123 a, 35 n.
αριστοτέλος [ζ. ν. 1]

δύνασθαι καλὸς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
συμφέροντα, ὥστε κατὰ μέρος, ὅλον ποία πρὸς ὤγειειαν, πρὸς
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποία πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἔν ἐν ὅλως. σημεῖον δὲ ὅτι καὶ
τοὺς περὶ τὰ φρόνιμοι λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τί σπου-
δαίον εὖ λογίσαται, ὅτι ἡ ἕστη τέχνη. ὅτε καὶ ὅλως ἐν
εἰ ἡ φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικὸς. βουλεύεται δὲ οὖθει περὶ τῶν
ἀναπτῶν ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὖθε τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
πράξει. ὅτι ἐκτέρα ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως, ὅτι δὲ
ἀρχὴ ἐνδεχόμεναι ἄλλος ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπὸ-
35 δειξεῖ—πάντα γὰρ ἐνδεχέσται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν—καὶ οὐκ
1140 ἐστὶ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἦ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἢ ἐν ἐν
ἡ φρόνιμος ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ ἐνδε-
χέσται τὸ πρακτῶν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δὲ ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ
γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιῆσεως. λειταπέρα ἢ αὐτὴν ἐξαι-
5 ἐξιν ἀλήθη μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπω ἀγαθά

καλὸς βουλεύσασθαι, cf. the definition in Rhet. 1366 b, 20 φρόνιμος
δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ διακοσίας καθ᾽ ἐν βουλεύσασθαι δύναται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ συμβαίνοντων.
ἀλως, οἰρ. κατὰ μέρος.
§ 2. σημεῖον δὲ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. This is the argument from πρόθεσις and ἀφα-

 dedesia (cf. 1054 b, 26 n.). If the various φρόνιμοι περὶ τι are all βουλευτικοὶ περὶ
τι, we may generalise this and say
that βουλευτικὸς (ἀνλῶς) will be φρόνιμος (ἀνλῶς). The words ἦσαν
καὶ ἀλως mark the argument as an
ἐπαγωγή.
ἀν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη, ὅτι where πράξει
and not ποιῆσε is concerned.
§ 3. βουλεύεται δ᾽ οὖθει κ.τ.λ. We pass to the first question asked with
regard to every ἤστε, viz. περὶ ποῖα:
ὅτι ἐκτέρα κ.τ.λ. The argument is
that φρόνιμος is deliberative (i.e. not
τῶν ἦ ἀνάγκης), ἐπιστήμη is demonstra-
tive (i.e. τῶν ἦ ἀνάγκης), therefore
φρόνιμος is not ἐπιστήμη.
πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If the ἀρχὴ is
contingent, so is everything that
follows from it. This is added to
anticipate the objection that, though
the ἀρχὴ may be contingent, yet,
when once it is determined, what
follows may be necessary, and there-
fore capable of demonstration. This,
however, is not what Aristotle means
by necessary. It only gives us ὡς ἦ
ἐπιστήμων ἀνάγκης, while the object
of knowledge must be ἦ ἀνάγκη ἀνα-
lῶς. Cf. 1139 b, 23 n.
καὶ οὐκ ἑστει. As this is a new
protais dependent on ἐκτερ, we might
expect μὴ instead of οὐκ. But the
use of ὡς after ἦ (ἐκτέρ) in a causal
sense is well attested in classical
Attic (Kühner § 513, 3), and in
post-classical Greek becomes the rule
(Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1807 sqq).
There is therefore no need to continue
the parenthesis down to διὸν with
Ramsauer and Stewart.
§ 4. ἐξιν ἀλήθη μετὰ λόγου. There
is no difficulty in the substitution of
this phrase for ἐξιν μετὰ λόγου ἀλήθη
above. The ἐξιν in which the soul
ἀληθεύει (1139 b, 12) may be called
ἀληθῆ just as well as the ἐξιν.
κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἐτεροῦ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ ἕξεως οὐκ ἀν ἐστὶν γὰρ αὐτήν ἣ ἐπιμαχία τέλος. διὰ ο Περικλέα καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου φρονιμοῦς οἴκου θαῦμα εἶναι, τὰ αὐτοὺς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν εἰς τοιούτους ἤγουμεν τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ιοτικοὺς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορευόμενῳ ὁνόματι, ὡς σφιχτούσα τὴν φρόνησιν, σφιχτεῖ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ύπόληψιν, οὔ γὰρ ἀπασχοληθέν τι διαφθείρει διαστρέφει τὸ ἄδικόν καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον ὀρθὸς ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πράκτορα

αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχη τῶν πράκτων τὸ οὖ ἐνεκα τὰ πράττειν τῶν δὲ διεφθαρμένων δὲ ἡδονὴν ἡ λυπήν εὐθὺς χαίνεται ἄρχη, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἐνεκαν οὐδὲ διὰ τούτοϋ ἑσθοῖν πάντα καὶ πράττειν ἐκεῖν οὐ τὸ κακία φθαρτική. οὕτων ἀνάγηκε τὴν φρόνησιν ζεῖν εἰς τὰ μετά λόγου zo ή περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν

§ 6. ἔνθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. From Plato, Κνάτ. 411 ε αὐθαίρετον δὲ συνηθεῖα οὕτω ἐνεκαίνεται, φρόνησις.

οὐ τόθεν ἔχει. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ἀρχὴ τῶν πράκτων. Introd. § 22. οὐ μὴν ἀρχὴν ἄρχη, sc. τὸ οὖ ἐνεκα. Ης φαντασία is warped (δεσποταμία) by pleasure, so that his φαντασίαν ἀγαθὸν is not the true good.

φθαρτικὴ ἄρχη. Cff. 1151 a, 15 οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἄρχην.

οὕτων ἀνάγηκε κ.τ.λ. We now get the complete definition by genus (ἐξισ μετὰ λόγον ἀληθῆς) and differentia (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ πρακτικῆς).

§ 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the first of the ἔζεις we are considering to which we are able to give the name of ἀρτηρία. Incidentally this section gives the reason for refusing that name to τέχνην. It is really the addition of the words περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ that shows φρόνησις to be an ἀρτηρία, for all ἀρτηρία is relative to the οἰκείον ἔργον, and it is clear that

τα ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. These are necessary to complete the sentence; for all ἔζεις are relative, so διάφορο must be relative when ροῖς is relative. Cf. Top. 145 a, γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ αὐτ ὑποθέσει πρὸς ἐπι ἡ ἐφίαλτος (in the sense) 'θεωρητική γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὸν ποιητικὸν ἑλείσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τί σημαίνει: θεωρητικὸς καὶ ποιητικῶς καὶ πρακτικῶς μὴν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This remark is to justify the way in which the notion of φρόνησις has been made.

As the end of πρᾶξις is the or Man, this is the proper quality. We cannot determine the notion of τέχνη in so simple a way.

διὰ τὸ ὅτι, since φρόνησις is not human good.

κακλά, as opposed to σοφόλικος like and Ἀνακαζόμενος. Cf. 1141 b. 4, εἰσορμοῦσιν...πολιτικοῦσι. These instances of φρόνιμοι κατὰ μέρος.
VI. 'Επειδή δ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπό-
tήχνη is not in the same way relative to the ὁλεθρον ἕργον of Man.

τήχνη...ἀρτηρί. We learn from 1141 a, 12 sqq. that σωφρία in its original sense is the ἀρτηρί τήχνη, and that it connotes δικαίωσις. In other words, we may say that τήχνη admits of τελείωσis just as ἐπιστήμη does, and therefore neither is an ἀρτηρί in the full sense (see p. 69 sqq.). On the other hand, φρόνημα requires no such τελείωσis, for it implies its own ἀρχαὶ as we have just seen. It is therefore a complete ἀρτηρί.

ὁ ἐκόνων ἀμαρτάνων ἀληθετέρερος.

This is a Socratic paradox (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 20) which was used in various forms by Plato, but most explicitly in the 'Hippias Major,' to show that goodness was no mere art or external accomplishment. The reason why the ἐκόνων ἀμαρτάνων is ἀληθετέρερερος is that he has the δόμαμα, while the ἐκόνων ἀμαρτάνων has not, and τάσσ δόμαμα τῶν ἀληθετέρερα καὶ γὰρ αἰ τῶν φαίλων δυνάμεις ἀρτηρί, διὸ καὶ τῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν συνιδαίων ἐχειν ἐκέκτιμα ἅπασα δυνάται γὰρ εἶναι τὰ φαίλα πράσσειν (Top. 126 a, 35). Now the φρόνημα necessarily has a good πραξισις, and so he cannot go wrong intentionally, but this is not so with the σκοτώμα. He may have ἐν μετὰ λόγῳ ἄρθρη ποιητική οἰκεία, and yet deliberately build a bad house.

On the relation of δόμαμα to προ-

αληθετέρερος, cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 8. τοῦ δοσκοτικοῦ. The substitution of the name δοσκοτικοῦ for λογιστικοῦ makes a more Platonic antithesis to τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. The term itself is not, however, Platonic, nor does Aristotle ever refer to it elsewhere. We have to pass lightly over the fact that the Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμῃ and δίδακτι δοσκοτικοῦ does not correspond to the Aristotelian distinction between δοκήσεως and πρακτικῆς διάσως. We are able to ignore the difference only because the φρόνημα γνώμης do not at present enter into the inquiry.

ἄστη...ἐτη. Cf. 1100 b, 17 τῶν γὰρ (sc. τῶν μαθετῶν καὶ συνιδαίων καταζήσι εἰ ἄστη τῶν μαθημάτων) ἄρισται ἄρισται τῷ μὲν γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν (sc. τὰς ἐπιστήμης λέγων ἄστη τῆς ἐνεργείας) λέγειν. From this it seems to follow that here too the point is that the ἐνεργεία of φρόνημα is more continuous than that of other δόμαμα μετὰ λόγον (ἐπιστήμης and τήχνης) just because it is πρακτική. We shall see later (cf. 1175 a, 4 sqq.) that a continuous ἐνεργεία is impossible to man, and τήχνη depends upon external conditions.

VI. § 1. 'Επει δ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. We have seen that ἐπιστήμη always implies a προσφέρουσα γνώσ
and cannot therefore be the complete ἀρρητή of τὸ ἐπιστήμων. We have now to consider what is lacking to ἐπιστήμη in this respect. We shall then be able to discover the ἀρρητή which is coordinate with φύσις.

περὶ τῶν καθόλου...ἐνδολῆψις. This point was not specially mentioned in the account of ἐπιστήμη given above, and it is no doubt brought in now because it is of importance in the contrast between φύσις and ἐπιστήμη. Cf. 1141 b, 14 sqq. For the doctrine cf. Met. 1059 b, 25 ἡ γὰρ λόγος καὶ πάσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐνδοχαίων, 1060 b, 20 ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐναι τῶν καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτο. An ἐνδολῆψις that this triangle has its angles equal to two right angles is not ἐπιστήμη, we only have that when we know it of the triangle as a whole. Knowledge does not descend to particulars, there is no knowledge of 'a this' (τόδε τι), but only of 'a such' (τοῖον τι).

μετὰ λόγου γὰρ. This puts shortly the proof given above 1139 b, 25 sqq. All ἐπιστήμη implies a ground (λόγος) and therefore an ultimate ground; for otherwise we should have a process ad infinitum (Introd. § 22). Now the ultimate ground cannot have a ground, and therefore (ἐπιστήμη being μετὰ λόγου) it cannot be the object of ἐπιστήμη. It must be the 'starting-point' (ἀρχή) of ἐπιστήμη οἱ ἀποθεοί.

§ 2. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note that τέχνη is tacitly dropped from the ἐνδοχως which we are using as a major premiss. This may be accidental, or it may be due to the fact that σοφία is the ἀρρητή τέχνης.

νοῦν ἐναι τῶν ἄρχων. In An. Post. 100 b, 5 the same result is reached by a similar dialectical process. 'Εστι δὲ τῶν περὶ τῆς διάγων ἔξων ἀληθεύομεν, αἰ γὰρ Ἀρχαῖος εἶσαι, αἰ δὲ ἐπιδέχομαι τὸ πέρας, οἷον ἄρχα καὶ λόγιος, ἀρχῆς δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀρκετότερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἰ δὲ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεως γιγαντιαίως, ἐπιστήμης δὲ ἄρσα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἄρχων ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἄν εἰ, εἰτε δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρκετότερον ἐπιδέχεται εἰναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦς, νοῦς ἄν εἰ τῶν ἄρχων, ἐν τοῖς τούτοις ἀκούσας καὶ δὴ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ ἄλλη ἀποθεούς, αἰτίαν οὖν ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμης. Το understand the meaning of the doctrine νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἄρχων, we must remem-
ber that ρέοι and αἰνοῦσις are both 'immediate' (ἀνεν λόγον). We cannot give a ground for the 'principle of contradiction' any more than we can give a ground for our perception of this triangle. This immediate cognition Aristotle described in a metaphor taken from sense as a 'contact' (θετέον). No error (ψεύδος) is possible about the ἀφαί, we either apprehend them or we do not, in which case we have, not ψεύδος or ἀδιάν, but ἀγνώμονα. Cf. Met. 1051 b, 24 with Bonitz's note, Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. trans. vol. i, p. 197.

VII. § 1. Τήν δὲ σοφίαν κ.τ.λ. A consideration of the use of the word σοφία in current language will show that it connotes ἀκρίβεια or 'finish,' and that therefore it will be a better name for the complete ἀρτή that we are seeking.

Ἐν τῷ ταῖς τέχναις, followed, after the parenthesis ἐνταῦθα, μὲν κ.τ.λ., per anacoluthum by εἰσὶ δὲ instead of καὶ εἰσὶ. The first use of the word σοφία in current language is of the skill of the cunning workman. This is a correct observation. The word σοφία occurs only once in Homer, and then it is used of a carpenter (II. xiv. 412). The method here is just like that by which we discovered the meaning of φρόνησις, cf. 1140 a, 24 ά. We ask to whom we give the name σοφία, and we find in the first place that we give it to δημοφύειοι and τεχνίται in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια.

§ 2. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὰς κ.τ.λ. Just as we found that current language recognizes φρόνημα ἀνώτερ as well as φρόνημα περὶ τό, so we find that it recognizes σοφία ἀνώτερ as well as σοφία λεονογία and ἀνθρώπως. Here as there we are entitled to use the τόπος of πρώτης κ.τ.λ., and we may infer that they are called σοφοὶ in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια also.

Much light is thrown upon this passage by the discussion of ἀναδίκα concerning the σοφία in Met. 982 a, 4 sqq. These are (1) ἐπιστήμων κύρια τῶν σοφῶν, (2) τὸν τά χαλέπι γενόμενον τῶν σοφῶν, (3) τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ διδασκαλίως ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι, (4) τὸ δὲιν ἐπιστήμων κύρια τῶν σοφῶν ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμων.

From the examination of these which follows (982 b, 25) we learn that ἀκριβέστερα δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἶναι: αἱ γὰρ ἐπιστήμων ἀκριβέστερα τῶν ἐκ προθέσεως λαμβανόμενων, ἢν ἀρματική γεωμετρία (cf. 1078 a, 9 καὶ δεδή ἐν περὶ προθέσεως τό λόγον καὶ ἀλλαγές). To conclude (θ. b, 8) εἰς ἀπάντων ἂν τῶν ἕρμηνεων ἐπὶ τήν ανθήν ἐπιστήμης πέπεσε τὰ γεωμετρικά σώματα: δὲ γάρ ταύτῃ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀπώλεται σωματικώς. We may, then, from the fact that when σοφία is predicated of τεχνίται it connotes ἀκρίβεια, infer that when it is predicated ἀνώτερ it connotes the same thing, and that means that it is (1) knowledge of the most primary and simple things, (2) dependent on the immediate first principles of all knowledge; for such knowledge alone can have perfect ἀκρίβεια. It alone can be free from irrelevant δῆ.
ἀστερ" Ὀμηρος. That the Homeric authorship of the ‘Margites’ was taken quite seriously by Aristotle is clear from Poet. 1448 b, 18 sqq. The end of the second verse, πᾶσιν ἕμαρταν τεχνη, is preserved by Clem. Strom. i, 281 a. The quotation is humorously made for the sound rather than the sense. Aristotle seems to have been suddenly reminded of it by his own words οὕτω ἀλλο τι σοφοφες, and he did not shrink from enlivening his lecture by a joke at the expense of his own favourite pursuits. Of course the quotation also illustrates the primitive meaning of σοφος.

§ 3. δει ἄρα κ.τ.λ. The argument is that the σοφος must be in a true state as to the ἁρχαι, for otherwise his knowledge would not be ἁρμηνευτικα, and there would be nothing in common between the σοφος περι τι and the σοφος ἀλας.

κεφαλη ἕχουσα. Cf. Rhet. 1415 b, 8 ὡς ἀστερ κεφαλὴ σώμα κεφαλῆς (sc. ὃ λέγει). This comes from Plato, Gorg. 505 d ἐπιθέταις κεφαλῆς ἦν μὴ ἄνω κεφαλῆς περιλα (sc. ὃ λέγει). Phileb.

66 ὡς ἀστερ κεφαλὴν ἄσφαλτην τοῖς εἰρήμενοις. Τίμ. 69 a ἀρετήν ἦν κεφαλὴν τῇ...ἐπιθέταις τοῖς προφθεν.

τῶν τιμωτάτων. This is added because the διαφορα of σοφος must be made relative as well as its genus ἐξη (cf. 1140 b, 5 π.). The section beginning at ἄστον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. justifies our making it relative in this particular way. By τὰ τιμωτάτα Aristole means as usual God, the πρῶτοι αἰῶνες and the like. Cf. Met. 1026 a, 21 τῶν τιμωτάτων (sc. ἐπιθέταις) δει περὶ τὰ τιμωτάτα γένος εἶναι. For the meaning of τιμος, cf. 1101 b, 11 π.

§ 4. εἰ δι τ.κ.τ.λ. I follow Zell in taking this as a long protasis going down to προφικτικι. The argument is that, while the φρονεις we have been studying is relative to Man, there are other φρονεις relative to each species of living beings. Now we have no right to assume that Man is the highest thing in the world.

τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἑκαστα κ.τ.λ. ‘For that which sees the good (τὸ ἐδ) of (περί) a given class of beings (ἑκαστα),
they would call "wise" (e.g. φρόνιμος περὶ ἔκτως, πρὸβατα) and would entrust that class (ἀντὶ) to him, (as groom or shepherd). I still think (see Classical Review vol. 111, p. 373) that περὶ αὐτὸ and περὶ ἐκαστὰ are alternative readings, of which the latter deserves the preference. The words περὶ ἐκαστὰ τὸ εἶ will then be equivalent to τὸ ἐκάστων ἀγαθῶν in accordance with the regular paraphrase of the genitive by περὶ c. acc. Bywater, however, reads τὰ for τὰ at the beginning of the sentence and construes τὸ εὖ θεωρεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκαστὰ, 'particulars concerning itself' (Contr. p. 50). He also reads with K's φησὶν and ἐπιτρέψει, which may well be right. It is worth while noting that this is simply the old Socratic problem of the ἐπιστάσης, for which cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 20 b ἐὰν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν διδασκειν ἢ μᾶλλον ἐγκαθίσθην, ἐξερχόμεν ἄν ἀντίκεν ἐπιστάσης λαβέται καὶ μεθῷσασθαι...οὕν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, τίνα αὐτὸν ἐν μὲν ἐχει ἐπιστάσης λαβεῖν;

τῶν θηρίων ἐναι. Not only the ἐπιστάσης, but even the beasts themselves are called φρόνιμοι if they have the capacity of foresight, e.g. ants, bees etc. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 2 (quoted in the Introductory Note to Book viii), Hist. An. 488 b, 15 τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ ἄλλα, οὐ μέν ἐκαστὰ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖται ἢ ἄλλα ποιεῖται καὶ ἐπιστάσης καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει. Cf. Plato, Pol. 363 d et τὸν φρόνιμον ἐστὶ τὶ θηρῖν ἐκεῖν.
6 ‘He de φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐστὶ βουλεύσασθαι: τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μᾶλιστα τούτ’ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦ φαμεν, τὸ εἰ βουλεύσασθαι, βουλεύεται δ’ οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ’ ὄσον μὴ τέλος τι ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτῶν ἄγαθόν. ο’ δ’ ἅπλος εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρέστου ἀνθρώπινῳ πρακτικώτως κατά τὸν λογισμόν.

7 Οὐδε̉ ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ὅλλα δεὶ καὶ 15 τὰ καθ’ ἐκκατα γνωρίζειν’ πρακτικὴ γὰρ, ἡ δ’ πράξει περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκκατα. διὸ καὶ έννοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ εν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι’ εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κούφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ἕμεινα, ποιὰ δὲ κούφα

We must not suppose, however, that it is φρόνησις which makes us aim at the φαινόμενον ἁγάθον (that is the sphere of ἥρμη), nor that it makes our φαινόμενον ἁγάθον the true good (that is the function of ἰδίον). What ἐκκαθὸν φρόνησις does is, given the true good as an ἐργενεῖ τοῖς γνωρίζειν, equates with free rules for its attainment. This is the aspect in which it resembles science; for πᾶσα ἐκκαθαι τῶν καθόλου (Met. 1059 b, 16 et passim).

περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκκατα. Cf. 1110 b, 6 αἰ γὰρ πράξει ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἐκκατα. The sphere (περὶ) or matter (ἐν) of πράξει is always the particular; for we cannot perform any act that is not a particular act. Hence our deliberative analysis cannot be complete till we have carried it as far as the particular. In science this is impossible; for particulars are the objects of ἔμπειραι alone.

diὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. For the opposition of ἐμπείραι καὶ τέχνην see p. 67.

ἐπεί, 1110 a, 14 π.
κόψα καλ. It does not seem necessary to bracket these words with Trendelenburg. The case given is the analysis of τδ νομος in the sense of τδ ποιητικα και φυσικα νομιμα, and its terms are (1) digestible, (2) light, (3) poultry. The empirical practitioner may be supposed to know steps 1 and 3, and his treatment will therefore be more successful than that of the theorist who knows only steps 1, 2, but stops short of the particular 3. What the ἐστικερος does not know is the middle term connecting κόψα and νομος.

η ταύτην μᾶλλον, sc. τὴν περὶ τά καθ' ἐκκαθα. καλ. ένταθαι, ‘in this case’ as well as in that of diet, there is a master art (i.e. πολειτική) which it will be better to know for, it will teach us the aitia. Aristotle returns to this point at 1180 b, 13 sqq. On ἄρχητεινος (sc. τέχνη) see Introd. § 13.

VIII. § 1. τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὖ ταὐτόν. Cf. 1130 a, 12 n. Here the meaning is that ἐπὶ πόλει φρόνιμος σε πολειτική is a special application of φρόνιμος generally. There is also φρόνιμος concerned with the family (οἰκονομία) and the individual.

§ 2. ὡς ἄρχητεινος, corresponding to the master-science of physiology in the case of medicine.

ὡς καθ' ἐκκαθα. The words καθ' ἐκκαθα are treated as a single in-declinable adjective. Cf. 1097 3, 13 n. I have followed Mr Stewart’s suggestion in bracketing τά. Cf. 1110 b, 3 ἢ καθ' ἐκκαθα ἄργνοια.

τὸ κοινὸν...δομα. In Aristotle’s terminology πολειτική includes νομοθετική, but he is here speaking of ordinary language. The cheirotechnic art has usurped the name which belongs equally to the architectonic. πολειτικά καὶ βουλευτικα, while νομοθετική is concerned with τὸ καθόλου and therefore not πολειτικά.

τὸ γάρ ψφισμα κ.τ.λ. The νόμος corresponds to the major premise of the political syllogism and the ψφισμα to the minor. We must always remember that the Athenian ἔκκλησια was not a legislature, and that its ψφισματα were executive acts applicable to particular cases. Cf. 1137 b, 29. 1152 a, 20. Now the restriction of the name πολειτικός to the ‘practical politician,’ the βιοτέρος or σεμπολεμείς in the ἔκκλησια, is only one effect of the general tendency of the Athenian democracy to put ψφισματα in the place of the νόμος. Demosthenes complains of this in his speech against Leptines § 91 καὶ γὰρ τοι τάτα μὲν τέως τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἐν ομολογίᾳ, τῶν μὲν ὑπάρχοντες νόμαι ἄχρηστον, καθὼς δ' οὐκ έπίθεσα, whereas now ψφισματων οὔτω οὖν διαφέρονται οἱ νόμαι, ἀλλὰ συνεργαί οἱ νόμαι, καθ' οὖν τὰ ψφισματα δεϊ γράφονται, τῶν...
Δ' ἐσχάτων. Διό πολιτεύομαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν· γαρ πράττον τόνοι ὅστερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ ἓν φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι η περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνα· καὶ 30 αὕτη το θεών ὅνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν ὁμία ἢ δὲ νομοθεσία ἢ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ βουλευτική ἢ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἢ εἰς εἰς ἔσχατα νομίζει τό αὐτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν, δοκεῖ ὁ τό περὶ αὐτῶν εἴδως καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος 1142· οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐρυπίδης—

ἐκείνων, 'the other species.' The pronoun refers vaguely to all forms of φρόνησις which have to do with more than the individual, whether the family (οἰκονομία), or the state (νομοθεσία καὶ πολιτικά).

βουλευτικὴ...δικαστικὴ. Cf. Pol. 1397 b, 40. We should say 'executive and judicial,' the functions of the ἐκλεγόμενος καὶ δικαστήρια. The 'legislative function' was not exercised by the δῆμος, but by the νομοθετή.

§ 5. εἰδός μὲν ὡς κ.τ.λ. Το κ.τ.λ. To know one’s own good is a species of φρόνησις just as ὀικονομία καὶ πολιτικὴ are, but it is so differentiated from the other species that it is taken for a different genus and incorrectly called by the καὶ δυναμός. There is no difficulty in γνῶσις, which is simply the noun of εἰδέναι. The variant φρόνιμος is probably a conjecture.

ἔχει διαφοράν πολλήν. There are degrees in the differentiation of ἔσχατος within a γένος. The greatest διαφορά in a given γένος makes the εἴδως into ἕσχατον.

τό περὶ αὐτῶν, i.e. τό αὐτοῦ. I read τό with K, the reading τά doubtless originated from a misunderstanding of the periphrasis περὶ κ.τ.λ.
sostom (Or. 59), from whom we learn that the words are spoken by Odysseus in the Prologue to the ‘Philoktetes.’ It ran thus—

πῶς δ’ ἀν φρονοῦν, ὃς παρὴν ἀπραγμόνως εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐρυθρημένον στρατοῦ ἰσον μετασχεῖν... τοὺς γὰρ περισσότεροι καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον...

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸς ἀγάθον, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δειν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι: καίτοι ἵσος οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸν εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας μίας οὐδ’ ἀνευ πολιτείας. ἐτὶ δὲ τὰ αὐτὸν πῶς δεὶ διακεῖσθαι, ἀνήλθον καὶ σκέπτεσθαι.

Σημεῖον δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διὸτι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν ἡμέναι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ’ οὖν δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αὐτικὸν δ’ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστα ἔστιν ἢ φρόνησις, ὡς γίνεται νομίμη ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ’ ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν πληθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεκαὶ δὲ τούτ’ ἂν τις σκέψατο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ’

Ethics on the functions of the family and the state in producing goodness.

§ 5. τοῦ ἐρήμου, καὶ τῆς τῆς φρόνεσις τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστα εἶναι. This is plainly the meaning, though the reference is a little obscure. That does not justify us, however, in bracketing the highly characteristic passage 1141 b, 23—2, 11. This is a lecture, not a treatise.

διὸ, only here in the Ethics =δν, though common enough elsewhere in Aristotle, especially after σημεῖον.

δοκεῖ. For the change of number cf. 1141 b, 18.

καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστα, as well as τῶν καθόλου. Young men may know the general principles of conduct, but they do not know the facts of life, and cannot therefore complete the deliberative analysis. They may know that men should not drink too much; they do not see that ‘This is too much for me.’

§ 6. ἐπεκαὶ καὶ κτλ. We may widen the question and ask not only why a boy may be a mathematician though he cannot be φρόνιμος, but also why he cannot be a σοφός (philosopher) or even a φυσικός.
οφθαλμος ὑπό φυσικός ὑπήρχε νῦν, ἵνα τὰ μὲν δὲ ἀφαιρέσεως ἔστων, δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύοντον οὐκ ἀλλὰ λέγοντον, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἔστων οὐκ ἀδέχουν; ἦτο τοιοῦτον ἥ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἥ περὶ ἐκαστοῦν. ἤ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὑδατά ἀν, ἵνα τοῦτο βαρύσταθμον, διὸ δὲ ἄρα ὑποθέσεις οὐκ ἔχουσι, φανερῶς τοῦ γὰρ ἑσχάτου ἐστίν, ὅσπερ εἰρητικά.

νοσικός. Cf. Met. 1005 b, 1 ροφής τις καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ, ἀλλ' 

τη. The object of φυσική is

which has its ἀρχή κινήσεως

that of the πρῶτη φιλοσοφία

γ' δ', 'Reality as such.'

φανερὸς 'abstract.' Cf. Met.

'28 δ' μαθηματικὸν περὶ τά ἐξ

τεων τὸν θεωρόν τουτεστάτα: περι-

ἀρα πάντα τὰ αἰσθήτα θεωρεῖ,

ποιεῖ καὶ κοινότητα κ.τ.λ., μονω

εῖτε τό πολὺ καὶ συνεχεῖ.

The mathematician strips τὰ αἰσθητὰ

their sensible ἐναντιώμενα and

them as mere quanta. It is

saying away' which is called

abstractus. The opposite

παράστας, cf. De Caelo

15 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγέ- 

μαθηματικόν, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ

τεων (motion is 'added to' ex-

β. Aristotle means here that

hematics so much is 'taken

that a minimum of experience

φθαρεῖ; he does not mean to say

ἢ ἀρχαὶ of mathematics are in-

ent of experience, ἐναὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ

ὑπὸ λεγόμενα ὡστε δὲ ἐνα-

τονῳ φύσιμα ποιέιν (An. Post. 81 b).

δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. The

mentionable first principles of

being ἐξ προσθέσεως as com-

Mathematics, require a

megaleγαργεῖ φανερώς before they can be ap-

καταθέσουν, 'have no conviction'

Cf. 1147 a, 18 τὸ δὲ λέγειν

γονος τοῦ ἀντὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης

καὶ οἱ πρώτοι μανθα-

A.
§ 9. τὸ νῦ, in the special sense in which νῦν ἔστι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

tῶν ἄρχων, i. q. τῶν ἀκμῶν ἀρχῶν. Cf. 1143 a, 36 τῶν πρῶτων ἄρχων. ... νῦν ἔστι καὶ οὐ λόγος. These are the definitions (ἔρχον = ἄρμανθος) which are the starting-point of every science.

λόγος, i. q. αὐλαλογισμὸς, ἀπάδευξις. It is impossible λόγον ἀποδοθέναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

οἷς ἢ τῶν ἔδην, sc. αἰσθήματων. Αὐτὰ ἀισθήματα is one ὃ μὴ ἀναδεχόμεθα ἄρα ἀισθήματα αἰσθάνεσθαι, c. g. colour, sound, taste; τὰ κατὰ αἰσθήματα are κίνησις, ἀρθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος. These are αἰσθήματα, but are not perceived by one special αἰσθήματος. On propria and communitas sensibilis see De An. 418 α, 7 sqq., and on the 'intuitive' element in φύσεις Introd. § 23.

οἷς αἰσθάνομαι κ. τ. λ., i.e. like the perception of the fact that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle. Introd. §§ 21, 23. Bywater brackets in τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς because the words seem to imply that there is no mathematical ἔθεσιν except a triangle. See Contr. p. 51. We must bear in mind the ἀναλογία ὑπὲρ διαγραμμα νομισμάτων of 1112 b, 20. The case supposed is that of the geometrical who breaks up his figure till he comes to something—say a triangle—which enables him to start the construction or proof at which he aims. It is in this way, for instance, that the properties of parallelograms are discovered.

στῆται γὰρ κάκει, 'for on that side too there will be a stop.' We reach the limit of analysis just as much when we descend to particulars as when we ascend to the ἄρχοι or πρῶτοι ἄρχοι. It is as impossible to give a reason why a triangle cannot be divided any further as it is to give a reason for the axioms. For the impersonal use of στήσεται (opp. εἶπεν πρῶτοι πρότειναι 1094 a, 20 n.) cf. e. g. Phys. 242 a, 19 οὐ δὴ ἀνέφεραν πρῶτοι αὐτὰ στησάμενα ταῖς.

ἀλλ' αὕτη κ. τ. λ. Mathematical intuition (αὐτή) is more properly called αἰσθήσεις than φύσεις can be. It really is αἰσθήσεις, though not τῶν ἔδην, while φύσεις is of course intellectual, not sensible. I have no hesitation in preferring the reading of Kδ, ἦ, to that of Lσ, ἦ. Still better, I think, would be ἦ ἦ.

ἐκινήσεις, sc. τῆς φυσῆς ευευσ. Mathematical and practical intuition belong to the same genus, but they are specifically different, their differentiate being αἰσθήσεις and διανοησις.

—IX. § 1. ζητέω τι, a species of ὅλη γητέων. It is necessary to put βολεύωs into its genus, in order that we may have the needful πρότασεις for the following piece of dialectic. We shall see that the qualities now to be discussed are the natural basis of φύσεις. They are δοξάζεσθαι and come by nature.

λαβεῖν ... περὶ. Cf. 1140 a, 24. Here the sense is made more explicit by the addition of τι ἔστιν, cf. 1123 a.
We shall see from the sequel Aristotle's reason for discussing this is that Plato, and doubters following him, had made certain statements about it which must be discussed if they are to be explained. It is therefore on strictly logical lines.

φοινικεία. Plato had a. Cf. Rep. 428 b ἡ εὑβουλία ὑπὲρ ἐπιστήμης τίς ἐστιν. Alc. 144.b, Πειθεστέες καὶ πολυσώφες πάντα ἐπιστήμης.-Εὐβουλίων ἄγγειλον ἰδίᾳ. The most obvious Platonic allusion is the "euthyphroan" doctrine. We may perhaps infer that somewhere in his "Academy" from Plato: Def. ἀγνώσια εὐθυφρόν προσφέρει, καθ’ ἐκείνον στοχαστικός ἐστιν ἐκδότης ἐστι. On ἀγνώσια as a species of ἐπιστήμη see cf. 1142 b, 6.

ἀνέων·λάγους. The ἐπιστήμη ἀνεων λαγού can hardly account for his success, he has a very large basis of knowledge for what he does. In such a case it seems quite correct to say that ἀνέων λαγοῦ, though it comes from the same thing. Rather, it is opposed to μετὰ λαγοῦ. See a.v. λαγοῦ.
Δόξα εστίν. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδ’ ἀνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. διανοιαν ἀρα λέπτεται· αὐτή γὰρ ὁπως φῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἄλλα φῶς τις ἄδην, ὁ δὲ βουλεύμενος, ἐκτετεῖν εὖ εάντε καὶ κακὸς βουλεύται, ζητεῖ τί καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ’ ἥρθος τις ἄστω ἢ εὐβουλία βουλής· διὸ ἡ βουλή ἐξετάζεται πρῶτον τί καὶ περί τί. ἐπει δ’ ἡ ἥρθος ἑπεξεργάζεται, ἐξετάζεται ὅτι οὐ πάσας· ὁ γὰρ ἄρατη καὶ ὁ φαύλος ο προτείθεται δεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογίσμου τεύξεται, ὅστε ὁρθῶς ἐσται

mined one way or the other, but the object of βουλή is still ἀδάστως, for ἡ βουλεύμενος has not yet determined which course to adopt.

οὐθ’ ἄνω λόγου, even though it is not the rigidity of either knowledge or belief, it is μετὰ λόγου, i.e. it proceeds upon grounds and can give a reason for what it does.

διανοία ἀρα λέπτεται, sc. αὐτήν ἅρθοστα ἐστι. This implies an exhaustive division of ἰδέας μετὰ λόγου into ἐπιστήμη, δέξα, and διάνοια. Such a division is to be found only in Plato, and we have seen that we are here criticising him. For the definition of διάνοια in this sense cf. Theaet. 189 c (δὲ διανοιαθαύμα καλος) λόγον ἄν αὐθεν πρὸς αὐθεν ἡ ψυχή διέξερθηται περὶ ἅν ὄν σκοπόν. Soph. 263 c ἐ ὅ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐθεν διάλογον ἀνευ φωτι σις γεννομένον ποὺς’ αὐθα ἡμι ἐπιστήμην, διάνοια. All the difficulties of this section disappear if the reference to Plato is borne in mind. The older commentators took the sentence to mean ‘it falls short of thought,’ while modern editors suppose Aristotle to be using διάνοια here in the unparalleled sense of the ‘discursive faculty.’ In Aristotle διάνοια includes all intellect, theoretical and practical, intuitive and discursive, but here the terminology is not his own. See next note for the relation of διά νοια to δόξα in Plato.

φῶς τις ἐν ἄδην. This is also from Plato. Cf. Soph. 263 c Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὐτ ἱσμεν ἐνοῦ—Τὸ ποῦν—Φῶς τε καὶ ἄδαστον. ἱσμεν. ὡς οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῆ κατα δάναν ἔγγυθαι μετὰ συγχ. πληθ. δέξα ἐξαίρετο ὅτι προετήσθη αὐθή; Hence δέξα is called διανοια ἐπιστήμην τε ια. 264 b. Note the idiomatic ὁ περι and ἂν. Ind. s.vv.

ζητεῖ τιν. Here again we make use of the premiss to βουλεύθηκα δρτείν τι (1142 a, 31).

§ 2. ἥρθος...βουλής. There is no contradiction; for the Platonic διάνοια includes the Aristotelian βουλή.

ζητητικά. Aristotle may have trusted his memory to fill in at lecture the usual statements that no one deliberates about what is necessary or due to chance, etc. At any rate, he goes on to discuss ἄδαστον and not βουλή.

πλευκανόμενως, sc. λέγεται. Cf. 1135 b, 14 π.

ὁ γὰρ ἄρατης κ.τ.λ. The first requirement is that the end should be right. We do not call the bad man βουλησόμενος, though he gains his end by deliberation (φαύλος here is equivalent to ἀδάστος). Nor do we call the morally weak man (the ἄρατης) by that name. As we shall see, the ἄρατης, though against his better knowledge, aims at the pleasure of the moment, and the ἀδάστος does so on principle.

ὁ προτείθεται δεῖν. This reading is implied by the Vetus. Versio, while the mss. have the meaningless ἱσιν.
It is true, as Bywater points out (Contr. p. 51), that δέω strictly speaking implies ἴσος, but (1) we can hardly credit the author of the Versio with the emendation διόν for δέων, and (2) the pleonasm of δέων is extremely common with verba imperandi, and is still easier with verba proponendi. Jackson quotes Plato, Soph. 211 a δέω ἀρχη προδομάμα διὸν ἤκελθεν. The absence of τοῦτο is idiomatic, cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

§ 5. ἄλλα ἐστι καὶ κ. τ. λ. The second requirement is that the means shall be right as well as the end.

§ 6. ἐστι ἐστι κ. τ. λ. The third requirement is that the time should be right.

η κατὰ τὸ ἄφθιμον κ. τ. λ. This sums up the three requirements of ὴρθοτητι, (1) end (ὁδ), (2) means (ὁδ), (3) time (ὁτε).

§ 7. ἐστί ἐστι κ. τ. λ. A fourth requirement is that it must be directed to the end, not merely to an end, to ἐποιήσεια, not merely to e.g. health or strength. Cf. 1140 a, 27.

κατορθοῦσα. 1098 b, 29 n.

οὐ ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἐποιήσασθαι, καὶ τὸν ἐποιήσασθαί πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This avoids the contradiction of making φρόνησις a true conception of the end of Man. Others read πρὸς τὸ τέλος. It is not φρόνησις but δρέξις which makes us aim at the good, and it is not φρόνησις but ἡδος which makes our good the true good. But, on the other hand, τὸ ὄρκετον can only become an efficient cause τῷ διαφέρειται ἢ φαντασθήσῃ (App. A), and neither δρέξις nor
X. "Εστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ’ ἀνθρώπους καὶ εὐσυνετάς, οὐθ’ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστημήν ἢ δόξα—πάντες γὰρ ἄν ἦσαν συνετοί—οὔτε τις μέλα τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἱστορικὴ περὶ ὑγιείνων, ἡ γεω-
μετρία, περὶ μεγεθῆ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἅγιων καὶ 5 ἀκατανόητον ἡ σύνεσις ἔστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γνωμομενῶν ὁποιοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ δὲν ἀπορήσειν ἃν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἔστιν, τῇ γὰρ δὲν πράττειν ἢ μὴν, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἔστιν; ἢ δὲ σύνεσις το κριτικῆς μόνον. ταῦτῳ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συ-
στοι καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ’ οὗτο τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρονήσιν; οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ σύνεσις; ἀλλ’ ὡσπέρ τὸ μανθάνει λέγεται συννέεται, ὅταν χρησὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως εὖ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνει περὶ τούτων περὶ ὅν ἐ15 φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς: τὸ γὰρ

ὅθεν could give us an ἄλληθρη ὑπο-
λήψεις of τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος
such as the rule προτὶ ἀνθρώπων
συμφέρον τὰ ἔξη. That is the
function of the πρακτικὸν νοῦς, and
φρονήσις is the ἔργον which enables it
to discharge it. In Mot. An. 700 b,
25 τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος is distinctly
called an object of thought (δια-
κοντοῦ).

X. §1. σύνεσις. This term was also
somewhat loosely used by Plato. Cf.
Phileb. 10 d νοῦς, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν,
tέχνην καὶ πάντα αὗ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ,
and Aristotle himself had enumerated
it provisionally along with σοφία and
tέχνη as a διακοντικὴ ἔργο (1103 a,
5). It is therefore important to show
how it is really related to ἐπιστήμην
and φρόνησις. The word was very
popular in the 4th century, as may be
seen from Demosthenes and Aischines.
πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This must surely
refer to δόξη alone. Everyone has at
least δόξα.

οὔτε περὶ...δοτοΣ, 'not any or
every γεγομένου.' It has nothing to
do with τὰ φῶςει or κατὰ τόξον γεγο-
μένα, nor even with such human
affairs as are beyond our reach.

§ 2. ἐπιτακτικὴ...κριτικὴ. Aris-
totle here uses the Platonic διακοντα.
Cf. Pol. 160 b ἀρ νομασία τῆς
γνωστικῆς εὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος,
tὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διακονοῦντος προφεύσιν,
ἀομασίαν ἃ δοκεῖν διέρθησαί τι. The
fact of its being a κριτικὴ δοκιμή
shows that it belongs to νοῦς. Cf.

§ 3. ἄνευ τοῦ μαθημάτων κ.τ.λ.
The point is the distinction of the
two meanings of μαθημάτων, (1) 'to
understand,' (2) 'to learn.' Cf. Top.
165 b, 32 τὸ γὰρ μαθημάτων ὁμόνως,
(1) τὸ συνεϊναι χρωμένου τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ,
(2) τὸ λαμβάνειν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ἄλλου λέγοντος. This is the main
point and marks σύνεσιν as subordinate
to φρόνησις. The πολιτικὸς need only
be συνετὸς, the κομβοθῆς must be
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καλώς ταύτων. καὶ ἐντεύθεν ἐλήλουσε τοῦνομα ἢς, καὶ ὡς εὐσυνετοί, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν λέγομεν ταῦταν ἐμαθανεῖν συνείναι πολλάκις.

1. Ἦ δὲ καλονομείη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγρώμοιας καὶ φαμέν γνώμη, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. 20 ὅπως δὲ τῶν γαρ ἐπιεικῆ μᾶλλονα φαμέν εἶναι συγγρημαν, καὶ ἐπιεικὴς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἐνα συγγρήματι. συγγρήμα παρὰ ἡγιᾷ ἐστὶ κρίτικη τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθήν· 25 ἢ τοῦ ἄληθος.

οἱ δὲ πάσαι αἱ ἔξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτα τείνουσαι, εἰς γαρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἡδη σοφίμως καὶ συνετοῖς. πάσαι γαρ αἱ δινάμεις αὐταὶ

As Stewart well says, is the distinctive ἐπερθή of the
§ 1. γνώμη. Plato had used it too in a way which suggested was equivalent to ἐπικήνη. 476 δ' ὀκὺν τοῦν μὲν τὴν ὧν ἡγιασάγοντος γνώμην ἔναν αἰμαὶ εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δὲ δὲν ὡς 610 ὑπόν; Aristotle as usual wishes it to the sense it had in actual
In that sense it corresponds feeling, when we call anyone of fine feeling' or say someants feeling. Cf. the use of εὐλογόμων and ἀργόμον
ης, 'harsh.' The συγγρήματος συγγρήματος, 'gives him on our side.' It is probable meaning of the word is con
with its use in the heliastic ὅμη τῇ ἐνακτή κρίσις in cases 45 for law. "If σύνεσιν
ly the κρίσις in the ἐκκλησία, especially that in the
"Stewart.

§ 2. πάσαι αἱ ἔξεις. We see from what follows that this means νοῦς,
διεξεῖς, ἐπιφέρεις, i.e. all the practical ἔξεις which apprehend their object immediately. Ἐπικήνησις is not included;
for that is μετὰ λόγου.

εὐλόγως, 1096 a, 2 n.

ἐν ταῦτα τείνουσα. Cf. 1096 b, 27 πρὸς ὑπὸ συνετοῖς and the note there. All these ἔξεις are πρὸς ὑπὸ λεγόμενα, sc. πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν.

λέγομεν ... ἐπιφέροντες. The construction is a little mixed; for some of the objects are governed by λέγομεν
and some by ἐπιφέροντες. For ἐπιφέρεις cf. φέρειν 1119 a, 34 n. The phrase νοῦν ἡδη is explained by ἢ δὲ ἡ ἡλικία νοοῦ ἦσα (1143 b, 8).

δινάμεις. They were called ἔξεις above, but δινάμεις is the more correct term; for φωτικά διείκει εἰς ταῦτα (1143 b, 6) and no ὀρθὴ φὼνει παρα
γέγραται. They are πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα as all εὐφορία is to its formed έξει (cf. 1144 b, 4). As a διαστοιχημένη δρέτη, φρόνημα is gained mainly by teaching (1103 a, 15 π.)—such teaching as we find in the ‘Ethics’—but the teaching requires as a foundation (1) ἡ δική δρέτη and (2) εὐφορία.


τὰ γὰρ ἑποκριτῇ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the sphere of γνώμη is really as wide as that of φρόνημα.

§ 3. καὶ γάρ τὸν φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. Here we see another difference between these διάκρισις and φρόνημα. They are restricted to the particular, φρόνιμον has to do with the universal besides.

§ 4. καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The difficulties which have been raised about this passage are mainly imaginary. The chief point to remember is that νοῦς in its restricted sense (not when it is equivalent to διάκρισις) is a δόξαμα which apprehends its object immediately (τῷ θεῖῳ) like ἀπάνθημα, not mediately like ἀπόδειξις or βοηθεία.

Now, both in theory and in practice we must assume such a faculty. We have seen that in theory it is called νοῦς, and everyone knows that a man who can see the right thing to do is said νοῦς ἔχειν. We need not discuss now whether this is strictly speaking the same νοῦς. It is in any case an element in φρόνημα and bears the same name as the other.

τῶν ἑσχάτων ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα, for τὰ πρῶτα are ἑσχάτα viewed from beneath, they are the ultimates of demonstrative analysis.

ὁ κατά τὰς ἀπόδειξες, that described 1140 b, 31 sqq.

ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς. Cf. 1147 a, 28 ἐν δὲ ταῖς παντικαῖς. These two phrases must surely have the same explanation, and there can be little doubt that in the latter the word προτάσεις is to be ‘understood.’ As this whole passage really deals with προτάσεις also, it does not seem impossible to suppose such an ellipse, especially in so condensed a piece of writing. We can hardly suppose even Aristotle to have meant such a contradiction in adjecto as πρακτικαὶ ἀποδείξεις would involve.

τῆς ἐπιρροῆς προτάσεως, ‘the minor premiss,’ usually called ἡ δευτέρα πρότασις. Its formula in the Practical Syllogism is ἔρχεται δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τοῦτο, and this is just what the νοῦς ἔχειν sees.
ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὖν ἔνεκα αὐτῶν· ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ γὰρ 5 τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δὲ αἰτήσει, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν νοῦς. διὸ καὶ φυσικά δοκεῖ εἶναι ταύτα, καὶ φύσις σοφὸς μὲν 6 οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ’ ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημείου δ’ ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἢδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὥς τῆς φύσεως αὐτίς ὀφθής. [διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αὐτὶ ἀποδείξεις 10 καὶ περὶ τούτων.] ὡστε δὲ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπειρῶν καὶ προσβολεῖν [ἡ φρονίμαις] ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φύσει καὶ δόξαις οὐκ ἢπτον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ 7τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἢπτον ἡ φρονίμαις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνη ἐκατέρα τυχώναι εἰς οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετῆ ἐκατέρα, εἰρήνη.

XII. Διαπορήσεις δ’ ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοι

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1139 b, 28 ἐπαγγελματί τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀστικοῦ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου. The universal rules of conduct and the definition of ἐνδεικνύσεως can only be found by a dialectical process which starts from particular moral judgments. We generalise 'I ought to do this' into 'οἱ τοιοῦτοι μοι διὰ ταύτα.'

§ 5. ἦκεν αἰτήσεις, used in the wide sense, like ἀκολουθεῖν, and including οὖσα. So we say 'I see,' when we mean an intellectual not a sensuous perception. The sense in which ἀκολουθεῖς is used here has been explained above, 1142 a, 25 sqq. We were told there that this ἀκολουθεῖς ἀντικατά τῆς νός, here that it is οὖσα. But Aristotle is only examining the subject dialectically from every side, and we are left with a very clear and definite idea of a certain aspect of φρονίματι, however vague the terminology may be. And the vagueness is not in Aristotle’s own mind, but in the popular language from which he feels bound to start.

§ 6. ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀκολουθεῖν. This puts the acquisition of σοφίας, γνώμης καὶ νοῦς (not φρονίμαις) on the same level as τὸ τολμῶθαι ἄθρωπον, which is the example given of τὸ ὦς ἐπὶ τὸ τολμ. γνώμαιντα in the sphere of φύσις (An. Post. 32 b, 6).

διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. These words break the argument here, nor do they come in well very after αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν οὖσα above, where Rassow and Bywaters would place them. In that position they would commit us to the strange doctrine that ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστα αἱ ἀποδείξεις.

ὡστε δὲ προσέχειν κ.τ.λ. This goes closely with ταῖς ἡλικίαις... ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ φρονίμαις. These words are suspicious. The φρονίμαι can always put his advice in syllogistic form, and no one can become φρονίμαι merely by getting old. Perhaps, however, the word is used in its popular sense.

§ 7. τὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This recapitulation strongly favours the view that there are only two διαφορμαλικαὶ ἀρχαὶ, σοφία and φρονίμαις.

—XII. § 1. Διαπορήσεις δ’ ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. The ἀρχαὶ concerning σοφία
and φρονήσεις are (1) What is the use of σοφία since it can produce nothing, and of φρονήσεις regarded as the power of apprehending τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς? 
(2) What is the use of φρονήσεις even if we regard it as the power of apprehending τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν? 
(3) How are we to reconcile the imperative character of φρονήσεως with its inferiority to σοφία?

ἐὰν ἐγὼ εἶμι ἄρετα. The whole ἀρετὰ turns on this; for ἐγώ inevitably give rise to τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξεστ. 
If we have the ἐγώ, intellectual knowledge of the ἐνεργείᾳ which will follow from it is superfluous. They will follow whether we know them or not.

διὰ μὴ τῶν ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is added to make it clear that τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά καὶ ἀγαθά are to be taken in a sense analogous to that of τὰ ὑγιεῖα καὶ εὐεξία καὶ ἔγερσα (τφ. ἄφ' ἐνος εἶναι 1096 b, 27 n.), as when we speak of a ‘healthy complexion,’ or a ‘healthy tread’ (ὑγιεῖας βαδίσεως). We do not take them in the sense of τὰ πονητήκατὰ καὶ φυλακτίζως till the next ἀρετή.

§ 2. τούτων χάριν, sc. τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξεστ.

τοῦ γνώσεως, equivalent to τῶν πονητικῶν καὶ φυλακτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐποικεκτικῶν, the sense in which ἐγείρει καὶ εὐεξίᾳ are used of wholesome diet and exercise.

τοῖς δὲ ποῖσι πονηδαιός τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσίων. Argyropoulos read τοῖς μὲν οἴσι, which gives a clearer sense. The healthy man does not need to know what produces health, the unhealthy man consults his doctor.

§ 3. χέριον τῆς σοφίας οὖσα, as was shown above, 11.41 a, 26 seqq.

ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα, i.e. ἡ πρὸς γένος. Of course σοφία can have no imperative character; for its objects are


τοῦτον λεκτέων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡπόρθηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.

4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ’ αὐτάς ἀναγκαῖοι αἰρετάς 1144a αὐτάς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ’ οὕσας ἐκατέρων ἐκατέρω τοῦ μορίου,

5 καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μὴδέν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπεται καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἑαυτικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ ἑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία ἑιδαμοιμιν’ μέρος γὰρ ὑπά τις δὴς ἀρετῆς 5

6 τοῦ ἐκείνου ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργείῳ ἐιδαμοιμιν’. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρονήσει καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τῶν σκοπῶν ποιεῖ ὀρθῶν, ἡ δὲ φρονήσει τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἦσαν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρησκευ. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ πρᾶτεν 7 τεν ἡ μὴ πρᾶτεν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθείν εἶναι πρακτικότερον δεῖ τὴν φρονήσει τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρόν ἄνωθεν ἀρκετόν, ἄλλων αὐτὴν. ὡστε γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον

διήγησα. The τόπος here is εἰ τοῦ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δ’ ὑπ’ τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ συνεχείς τὴν ὑπάρχη λαλῶν τοιούτου (sc. αἰρετῶν) δ’ ποιεῖ τοῖς ἀν. (Τοπ. iii, 5.)

§ 4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first λόγος. The τόπος is τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν.

§ 5. ἔπεται καλ. The second λόγος. Σοφία is not the efficient but the formal cause of ἐιδαμοιμιον. The λόγος of health as it exists in the soul of the doctor is ἑαυτική and an efficient cause, when realised in the body of his patient it is a formal cause.

ὡς ἡ ψυχή, sc. τὸ ἑιδαμοιμιόν τοῦ τοῦ ἑκείνης, ἴδρυται, ‘by being possessed.’

I think we may understand τῷ ἐνεργείῳ αὐτῶν ἔνεργεια τῶν ἑκείνων.

§ 6. ἐπι. The third λόγος. The function of Man (which we know to be practical τῷ μὲν τῶν λόγων ἑκείνων) cannot be discharged by ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ alone. Note the positive result which is emerging from these three λόγοι. We begin to see (1) that the ἀναγκαῖος ἀρετὴ is necessary to the τελείως of Man, (2) that σοφία is the ἀρετὴ ἀρετῆς, and therefore that ἐιδαμοιμιον will be above all ἐνεργεία κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, and (3) that φρονήσεις is ancillary to σοφία. All this will be worked out later.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. While ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ can ensure the rightness of the end (for the βούλησεις of the good man is τῷ καθ’ ἄλλῃς βουλήσεις), yet this is not enough. Goodness cannot do without Wisdom, which ensures the rightness of τὸ τέλος τῶν σκοπῶν.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ. The four μορία (we are using popular language) are τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν (goodness σοφία), τὸ λογισμικόν (goodness φρονήσεις), τὸ ἀριστείακον (goodness ἠθικὴ ἀρετή), and τὸ βουλήσεις. The point of its being mentioned here is that, as it is not an ἔργον of Man, its function is not the ἔργον of Man. Cf. 1097 b, 34.

§ 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. The fourth and most complete λόγος, involving the other three.

μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκετῶν. Cf. 1139 b, 14.

λέγομεν. 1134 a, 17 sqq.
15 τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιούντας ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ διὰ ἀγνοιαν ἢ διὰ ἔπερον τι καὶ μὴ δι’ αὐτά (καλοὶ πράττονται ἢ δὲ καὶ δόσα χρῆ τοῦ σπουδαίου), οὕτως, ὥστε ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν ἔχουν πράττειν ἐκεῖστα ὅστε εἶναι ἁγιόν, λέγω δ’ αὐτόν διὰ προαιρέσειν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν 20 πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαιρέσειν ὅρθρῃ ποιεῖ ἡ ἁρετίς, δ’ τὸ δ’ ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέριγκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἁρετίς ἄλλ’ ἐτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτῶν δ’ ἐπιτιθέσαι συ- 25 φέστορον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δ’ ἡ δύναμις ἢν καλοῦσα δει- νότητα: αὐτὴ δ’ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὡστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὕποτεθέντα τοὺς συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταύτα πράττειν καὶ τυχόν- νευν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἢ καλὸς, ἐπαινετὶ ἐστὶν, ἐὰν δὲ φαύλος, πανοργία. διὸ καὶ τῶν φραγμὸς δεινοῦ καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι. ἐστι δὴ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύ- 30 ναμις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. δὴ εὖς τι 30 ὅμοιο τοῦτο γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἁρετίς, ὅς ἐχρηητὴ τε καὶ ἐστὶ δήλου: ὃς γὰρ συλλογομοῦν τῶν πρα- κτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες εἰσίν, ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦτο τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἀριστεύ, ὄτι ἀριστεύτω δυν’ (ἐστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν).
XIII.

§ 1. Σκεπτόμεν δὴ κ.τ.λ.

We now see the purpose of the discussion of δεινότητα. Just as the δόσιμος of δεινότητα cannot become the εἰς of φρόνησις without ἴδια ἄρετὸς, so—and this is the main point for our present purpose, the λόγος of the ἀπόρων,—the δόσιμος of φυσικῆς ἄρετὸς cannot become the εἰς of ἴδια ἄρετὴ without φρόνησις. Observe that, with characteristic carelessness, the terms of the ἀναλογία are given in the wrong order.

ἡ φυσικὴ ἄρετὴ. The locus classicus on this subject is Η.Δ. 588 a, 18 sqq. ἔστω γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλεονασμοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύων ἡ ἄρετὴ τῶν δύο τῆς ψυχῆς τρόπων, ἀπὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐχαρίαν ἐφεξῆς τάδε διάφορα καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἠμετρήτης καὶ ἄγροτης, καὶ προστήτης καὶ χαλεπής, καὶ ἀδίκα καὶ διπλα, καὶ φάσος καὶ θάρσος, καὶ θύμοι καὶ πανουργία, καὶ τὰ τῆς διάκονης συνέσεως ἐνεκεῖν ἐν πολλαῖς ἰσχύων ἰσότητας, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐδέχομεν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν μᾶλλον καὶ ἄκρω τις διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ δὲ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἰσχυος (ἐνά γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων υπάρχει μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώποι, ἐνά δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἰσχυος ἰσχύος μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογῳ διαφέρει, ὅτι γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ χάριν καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ἰσχυος ἐστὶ τις ἐπέρα τοιαύτῃ φυσικῇ δύναμι· φανερώτερον δὲ ἐστὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ταύτων ἥλιεισι βλέψεως· ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἑστερον ἐξελέοντον ἐστὶν ἑκατερῶν όμοίας ἔνας ἐκεῖν ἐκείνης καὶ στέρωται, διαφέρει δὲ οὕτως ὡς εἰσεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ τῶν προκειμένων ψυχής κατὰ τὴν χρόνου τοιοῦτον, ὅστ' οὐκέν ἀλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταύτα τὰ δὲ παραλήπτημα τὰ δὲ ἀνάλογον υπάρχει τοῖς ἰσχυοὺς ἰσότηται.

σφυροκοικία. The termination conveniently marks the φυσικὴ δύναμις.

§ 2. ὅμως οὕσα, ὁποίῳ ἂν ἦν τῷ ὅψῳ ἦν χαλεπὸς.
οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρόνησις. Αbove (1144 a, 29) we found that φρόνησις οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. We may express the relation of the two by saying that ἀρετή without φρόνησις is blind, φρόνησις without ἀρετή is empty. Our naturally good tendencies cannot become goodness unless φρόνησις is present to show us both the general rules of conduct which must be obeyed if we are to attain the good, and also what particular acts come under these rules. It was this fact which made Sokrates identify goodness and knowledge.

§ 4. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πάντες. In Met. 992 a, 33 and 1069 a, 96 we read that γέγονεν τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία, and that οἱ νῦν τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ὀνόματι τιθέσαι. These passages show that οἱ νῦν are certainly not the Peripatetics, but the contemporary Academy. We have been told already (1103 b, 31) that the doctrine of κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον is κοινὸν (note ad loc.) and we may infer that it belonged to the Academy.

προστίθεσιν, 'after naming the έξις and that to which it is relative, add the qualification κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.'

§ 5. δὲ...μεταβαίναι, 'we must take a little step in advance' (cf. 1097 a, 24 n.). The Platonist κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον implies a merely external standard; we say that the ἀρετὴ are μετὰ λόγον, and that goodness is inseparably bound up with wisdom.

ὁρθὸς δὲ λόγος...ἡ φρόνησις. It is true that the ὀρθὸς λόγος is not an ἀρετή nor identical with φρόνησις, but yet this way of speaking is quite Aristotelian. The ὀρθὸς λόγος of health is ἀτριχή, and so the ὀρθὸς λόγος of action may be regarded as the form of goodness existing in the soul of the φρόνησις, and identical with the φρόνησις of the man who 'has the λόγος.' Cf. 1138 b, 31 n.

ἡμέρας δὲ, opp. to οἱ νῦν above.
οἷς οὖν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἁνεο φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ
μον ἁνε τῆς θυσίας ἁρετῆς· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος
την λύνει ἁν, ὁ διαλεξθείη τις ἀν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἁλ-
τὸν αἱ ἁρεταὶ· γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυήστατος πρὸς ἀπα-
ἀστε τὴν μὲν ἠδη τὴν δ’ ὀστῶ εἰληφότας ἔσται· τούτῳ
κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἁρεταὶ ἐνδέχεται, καθ’ ὁ
ἐπὶ τὸν λέγεται ἁγαθὸς, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἀμα γὰρ τῆς
1145 α
νῆσει μιὰ ὡς ἐπάπτειν ἑπάρπασαν. δῆλον δὲ, κἂν
ἡ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἁν αὑτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου
ἐναι, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἔσται ἡ προσέρεσις ὀρθὴ ἁνε
νῆσεως οὐδ’ ἁνε ἁρετῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ 5
πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττεν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία
τη τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίωνος μορίου, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ
ὑπερείς ἡ ἰατρική· ὃ ἔρχεται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ’ ὁρά
γενναία ἐκείνης ὅπως ἐνεκα ἐπιστάττει ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνη.
ὅμοιον κἂν εἰ τῆς τῆς πολιτικῆς φασὶ ἀρχεῖν τῶν
θεῶν οὐ
ἐπιστάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.
BOOK VII.

WEAKNESS AND BADNESS OF WILL.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We have seen that the efficient cause of human action is Will (προαίρεσις) and that Will is the union of an intellectual and an appetitive element. We have seen further that Practical Truth, which gives the standard and measure of all goodness, is the harmony of a true judgment with a right appetition. We know that our task as lawgivers, who aim at creating happiness for the state, will be to produce in the citizens a good will which shall be in harmony with the principles embodied in our laws. But our task will not be complete until we have studied the obstacles in the way of this, and the ἐκτάσεις (Phys. 246a, 17; cf. pp. 70, 71) which thus arise. And this is not quite so simple a matter as might be supposed. We have to deal not only or mainly with the fact of practical falsehood in harmony with a wrong appetition, though that must be considered too. We have a much more serious difficulty to face, namely the fact that the action may be bad, though the will is good. It is the case that the Good Will may be overmastered by Desire, and this fact, to which we give the name of "Weakness" (ἀκρασία) or want of self-control, will require careful consideration as well as the more simple case of actual badness (κακία, ἄκμασία). We must also take into account the possibility of "portents" (ῥήματα) of goodness or badness. The occurrence of a superhumanly good person in our state would alter all its arrangements, as he and he alone would be its ideal ruler. Further, the statesman must know something of the failures of nature, her incomplete (ἀτελεῖς) or mutilated products (πηρώσεις) which are more brutes than men, just as the others are rather divine than human.

The result of our inquiry will be that desire for pleasure is the cause of moral weakness. Are we to say, then, that all pleasure is bad? This θέλεις has actually been maintained, so the refutation of it, though a digression, will not be misplaced.
Μετὰ δὲ τάττα λεκτέων, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἄρχην, 15 τῶν περὶ τὰ ἦθη φευγτῶν τρία ἐστίν εἰδη, κακία ἄκρα-
θηριότης. τὰ δὲ ἔναντι τοὺς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν ἄρετὴν τὸ δ’ ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριό-
α μάλιστ’ ἂν ἀρμόττων λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἄρετὴν, ἡμέν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὡσπερ ὁΜηρός περὶ Ἠκτόρος 20 ὑποίκη λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἄγαθὸς

οδὸς ἀβέβεν.

ἄνθρωποι γε θυετού πάς ἔμεναι ἄλλα θεία.

ἑι, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἄνθρωπων γίνονται θεοὶ δὲ ἄρετῆς
μορφῆς, τοιαύτη τις ἐν εἰς δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριότητι

§ 1. ἄλλην... ἄρχην. Arist.

οften speaks of ‘making a fresh

(ἄλλην ἄρχην ἄρχεσθαι, ποι-

μি, λαβεῖν Bon. Ind. 111 b, 32) to

clearly that a new division of

subject is being approached.

πρὶ τὰ ἦθη, i.e. τῶν ἦθων. Cf.

Α. ν. περὶ.

ὡτικὴν...καὶ θείαν. The idea of

human goodness and wisdom

nated among the mystics of the

century B.C. (Early Greek Philo-

§ 33). Plato in his later

is, especially the Statesman, had

ulated on the possibility of a

ler, and Aristotle held (Pol.

b, 16) that εἰ μὲν τοῖς εἴση

τὸν διαφέρετοι άπερα τῶν ἄλλων

τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἕρωω ἡγούμεθα

B. A.

§ 2. ἐξ ἄνθρωπων...θεία. This idea

was quite foreign to the primitive and

laristic of the Hellenes, and

also had its origin in the 6th century

mysticism. Rohde’s ‘Psyche’ contains

the best account of these beliefs.
ἈΝΤΙΤΘΕΜΕΝΗ. The use of this present participle (omitted in Bon. Ind.) where we should look for ἀντικεκλημένη can be paralleled from Plato Soph. 257 b τῷ καλῷ ἀντιτθεμένῳ. It may be explained on the same principle as ὁ καλόμενος (= κεκλημένον) and the like.

ᾆστερ οὐδὲ...οὕτως οὐδὲ... For the repetition of οὐδὲ in both clauses of the comparison, cf. the note on καί below. The idea that Man is intermediate between Beast and God is another survival of 6th century mysticism which strongly influenced both Plato and Aristotle. Cf. the well known passage Pol. 1253 a, 27 ὁ δὲ μᾶς ἀνθρώπων κοινωνεί τι μηδὲν θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος δὲ οὐτάρκειαν ὀδύνα μέρος πάλιν, ὥστε η δοξα ἢ θεός.

τιμιμέτερον ἁρπαζε. The best commentary is 1101 b, 18 sqq.

ἐτέρων τι γένος κακίας, 'a different genus from badness.' Note the hyperbaton; κακίας is governed by ἐτέρων, not by γένος.

§ 3. ἐτέρω...καί...οὕτω καί... The repetition of καί in both clauses of a comparison is frequent in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 357 b, 24). For οὕτως after ἐτέρ cf. Bon. Ind. 546 b, 22.

καθάπερ οἱ Δάκωνες. This is from Plato, Meno 99 δ καί αἰ γε γνώσεις ἄθροι, καὶ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθόν ἄδρας θείους καλοῦσι: καὶ οἱ Δάκωνες ὅτα ἡγομαζόμενοι ἄγαθον ἄδρα, θείου (σείσις Casaubon) ἄνθρωπος, φαινομένος Bywater inserts of before ὅταν and Susemihl (after Coraes) adds ὅταν from Plato after φαινομένος. Both correc
tions are of the probable kind, but Aristotle is very abrupt in his way of quoting. It is characteristic that the old Homeric way of speaking should survive on the lips of women and in aristocratic Sparta. In democratic Athens θείος was ironical. Cf. Blass in Müller's Handbuch 1, p. 184.

διὰ νόσους καὶ παθάσει. For the meaning of παθάσει (‘stunted growth’ or ‘arrested development’) in Aristotel's biology cf. 1099 b, 18 n. Bestiality is found in human beings who are either ‘morbid’ (διὰ νόσους) or ἀναπεσόμενος (ἀγελαῖ), Nature’s failures.

καὶ τοὺς...καὶ...καί. This is merely an illustrative remark; it does not give another species of bestiality.

ἐπιδυσφημον. This seems to be a διὰ ἐπιστροφῆς. The verb ἐπιστροφῆς means ‘to give a bad name to’, to use the opposite of a ‘euphemism’ (εὐφήμης has this sense already in Dem. F. L. §§ 48, 50), and the ἐπι...has the same force as in ἐπισκέψεως. The meaning is that we sometimes call the extreme (ἐπιβολής) of human badness by a worse name than is really appropriate to it, the opposite exaggeration to the use of θείος for ἁμαρτανόμενον (cf. δὲ ἁμαρτήσας ἐπιβολής).
ηθική νικομαξεια

τοιαύτης ουσιον ποιητέων τινα μνειαν, περί δε κακίας
tαῖ χρεων τοις πρώτοις. περί δε ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυ-
νετέος, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρπερίας. ουτε γὰρ
περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξω τῇ ἀρετῇ, καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἐκά
ως αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέων, οὔτε ὧς ἐτερον γένος. δει δ',
tερ ἐπὶ τῶν άλλων, τιθέντα τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρό-
διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλως μὲν πάντα τὰ
ξα περὶ ταύτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μη, τὰ πλείον καὶ 5
μέτατα· ε ἦ τα χρησίματα τα τα δυσχερή καὶ κατα-
τητα τὰ ἑνδοξα, δεδεγμένων ἵνα εἰπῇ ἰκανῶς.
Δοκεὶ δὴ ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρπερία τῶν σπουδαίων
ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἢ δ', ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν
λων καὶ ἑσκηνίων, καὶ ἢ αὐτῶς ἐγκρατής καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς

1. ἐρημαὶ πρότερον, i.e. in the
2. ἔξων... ἐτερον γένος. When
3. αὐτῶν is qualified by an ad-
4. τέτοιον κατά, otherwise
5. ἀκρασία καὶ καρπερία, ἀκρασία καὶ ἀρετή, which are all
6. ηθική νικομαξεια

8. δει δ', ὡσπερ κ.τ.λ. A
9. ἐκτακτικά τῆς διαλεγματικῆς
10. τάτα τά πάθη. The word πάθος
11. δ. Δοκεὶ δὴ κ.τ.λ. A string
12. ή τε ἐγκράτεια... τῶν σπουδαίων
13. ηθική νικομαξεια

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λογισμοῦ, 416 α ἀκραία εἶς μιαστική παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λογισμὸν πρὸς τὰ δικοῦτα ἥδια εἶναι. We are here, then, on Academic ground. Cf. also Isokr. peri ant. § 221 ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὰς ἀκραίας οὐκ ἐμένου τοῖς λογισμοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀμελήσατε τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐπὶ τὰς ἱδραίας ἄρματος.

ἐκστατικὸς in this sense comes from ἐξιστάθησθαι used as we find it in Thuc. ii, 51 ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμὶ (sc. τῇ γνώμῃ) καὶ οὐκ ἔξεσθαι. So Rhet. ad Alex. 1429 a, 16 τά κοινά τῶν ἀνθρώπων κάθεται, δε’ ὅτι ἐξιστάθησθαι τοῖς λογισμοῖς.

εἰδὸς ὅτι φαίλα. This is really implied in the phrases αὐτὸν κρατεῖν, κράτων εἰναι (ἵπτάθηκα, ἤτων εἰναί) for they imply a struggle in which our ‘better knowledge’ is victorious or vanquished. It is then the proper etymological sense of the word.

καὶ τὸν σῶφρονα κ.τ.λ. In the σωφρόνοι and the ἀκλαστοὶ there is properly speaking no struggle; the one is bad as the other is good, without an effort. But common language often used the word promiscuously (στυγκεχυμένος). Even Plato does so, cf. e.g. Rep. 430 ε κόμμος ποι ὁ τὸ σωφρόνου ἔστι καὶ δοξάζω τινος καὶ λυπῶν ἀκρατείας.

πάντα σωφρόνα, ‘in all respects σωφρόνοι,’ ‘in full possession of σωφρόσυνη’ for ἀκρατεία might be regarded as partial σωφρόσυνη.

§ 7. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. We get a hint of the Ἀριστ. from the addition of the words καὶ δεινοὶ (cf. 1144 a, 17).

ἐν ἀκρατεῖς κ.τ.λ. We find ἀκρατεῖς τὶμοι in Plato, Laws 869 a and Isokrates, Demon. § 21, speaks of ἀκράτεια...κέρδους, ὑγιήν. In fact, ἀκρατεία may be used wherever ἤτων εἰναι, e. g., ‘to have a weakness for,’ ‘to be incapable of resisting’ may be used. Cf. e.g. ἤτων τῶν γελῶν 1128 a, 34.

II. § 1. Ἀπορῆσε δ’ ἄν τι κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορεῖα relates to the ἔνδοξον δὲ ἀκρατής εἰδὼς ὁ φαίλα πράττει.

ὑπολαμβάνων. This word is substituted for εἰδὼς because it will cover φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμην and δόξα, all of which are discussed in the present passage.

ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first form of ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήμη.
μένον φροντίδες εὑρέθη (Tob. 104 b, 23).

For the phraseology cf. Phys. 253 b, 29 τὸ φάναι συνεχῶς ἀλλοιοθετήσαν θαν ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφιβασθεῖν. 254 a, 8 μᾶχεται τοῖς φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφιβασθεῖν, Met. 1091 a, 6 μᾶχεται...τοῖς εὐλογοῖς.

Deōn can hardly stand for deōn esti, cf. 1107 a, 32 n. Bonitz, therefore, deletes καί, taking deōn as accusative absolute, while Bywater suggests the transposition of γίνεται from the next clause where it is not really wanted. I suspect, however, that Aristotle really meant to say deōn ἦσαν κ.τ.λ., ὅτι ἄλλως ἔλεγεν, or something of the sort, but that the sentence was never finished owing to the parenthesis ὅτι...φανερῶς.

tis ὁ τρόποι τοῦ δικεία, equivalent to ποῖος ἄνθρωπου ἄρα ἀνθρώπου. Cf. Gen. An. 740 b, 22 τῶν ἐν τρόπων ὁμίλος τὸ ὅπη καὶ ὅτε. Sokrates went wrong, then, because he spoke ἔτους ἔπεις (cf. Bon. Ind. 77 b, 5).

οὐκ οὐκαί γαρ, se. δεῖ πράττειν αὐτοῖς καὶ πράττειν. The logic of the sentence requires οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, but the phrase οὐκαί δεῖ was so common in the discussion of this subject that it easily slips in, even in an elliptical form. Cf. also 1132 a, § 3, εἰσὶ δὲ τινες κ.τ.λ. The notes will show that these are Plato's followers rather than Plato himself.
to the δόξαν βλέπων. The aorist participle has its full temporal force. It would not be admitted that a man could act παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν βλέπων.

§ 6. ἑσυχαίρα ὑπόληψις... ἡμελαιά. It is certainly not an adequate account of Plato’s distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα to say that the one is ‘strong’ and the other ‘mild.’ The present discussion will therefore be unintelligible unless we suppose that the Academy had already come to make this purely psychological distinction between them. But there is, fortunately, sufficient evidence to justify us in saying that the Academy did now regard ἐπιστήμη as differing from δόξα mainly in the strength of the πίσις which it implies, and its consequent power of resistance. Cf. [Plato] Def. 414 b ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις ψυχῆς ἀμετάπτωτος ύπὸ λόγου,—δόξα ὑπόληψις μετάπτωτος ύπὸ λόγου, definitions of which the authenticity is guaranteed by Ar. Top. 159 b, 32 διὸν ἐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀμετάπτωτας ἐρήμης, 130 b, 16 (et passim) οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἓν ὑπόληψις ἀμετάπτωτος ύπὸ λόγου. Now in Top. 136 b, 15 Aristotle criticises a definition of πίσις as σφοδρότης ὑπόληψεως and, since ἡμελαιά is the opposite of σφόδρα, a ὑπόληψις εὐμετάπτωτος (i.e. deficient in πίσις) will be an ἡμελαιά ὑπόληψις.

ἡ ἀντιτεινόνσα, a Platonic word, cf. 1103 b, 18 n. and the Academic definition of the ἐγκρατής given above 1145 b, 10 n.

ἐν τοῖς διατάξεσιν. This confirms the view that the Academy distinguished δόξα from ἐπιστήμη by the absence of πίσις, which is defined as [Plat.] Def. 412 a ὑπόληψις ἐκῆ τοῦ ἀόρατος ἔχουσιν ὡς αὐτή φαινεται.

ἐν αὐτίς, sc. τῇ δόξᾳ καί τῇ ὑπόληψει.

τῇ δὲ μοχθηρᾷ. This word usually διαλέχει as opposed to ἀδοξία, hence the addition of the words ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. φρόνησις ἀρα κ.τ.λ. This must depend on the διάλειψις which is given in De An. 427 b, 24 ἐντὰ δὲ οἷα αὐτή ἐν τῇ ὑπόληψει διαφοραὶ, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τάκτικα τοῦτοι. We have seen φρόνησις called a ὑπόληψις above, 1142 b, 33. This leads us to the ἀπώρα ὑπογεγραμμένη by the contradictory δοκοῦσα that the φρόνησις cannot be ἀκρατής and that some φρόνησις are ἀκρατεῖς.

ἰεροχώρατον. Cf. EE. 1146 b, 34 ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου διὸ αὐτὸν ἰεροχώρατον φρόνησις.
δηδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχουν ἀρετάς.

6 Ἐτι οἱ μὲν εἰ τῷ ἑπτάμια ἔχειν ἱσχύρας καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἐσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατής οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων. οὕτω γάρ τὸ ἀγαν σώφρων οὐστε ὁ τὰς ἔχειν ἄλλα μὴ δεῖ τε οἷον γὰρ χρησται αἱ ἑπτάμιαι, φαύλη ἡ καλλίουσα ἐξεις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, οὕτως ἡ ἑγκράτεια οὐ πάσα στοματική εἰ δι' ἀσθενείας καὶ μὴ φαύλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνῶν, οὐδ' 15 εἰ φαύλαι καὶ ἀσθενείς, οὐδὲν μέγα.

7 Ἐτι οἱ πάσης δόξης ἐμμενετικὸς ποιεῖ ἡ ἑγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ φευδεῖ καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκοστικός, ἔσται τις στοματική ἀκρασία, οἷον οὐκ ὁ Σοφοκλέως Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτη. ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμενον οἷος 20 ἐπείδη ἤτο τοῦ Ὀδυσσέα διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι φευδόμενος.

8 Ἐτι ο ὁ σοφίτικος λόγος [φευδόμενος] ἀπορία—διὰ γὰρ

δηδεικται πρότερον, 1141 b, 14 sqq. 1142 a, 23 sqq. 1144 b, 20 sqq.

§ 6. Ἐτι οὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία raised by the contradiction between the ἐθάνατος that ἐγκράτεια is good, and that the ἐγκράτεια is the σώφρων.

ἐν τῷ ἑσθι. Cf. Pol. 1355 b, 21 ὁ γὰρ δειροτρίτον οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτίσθαι τοῖς διάλεκτοις, ὅθεν makes a master a master is not owning slaves.

τὸ ἀγαν, sc. ἑπτάμιαι. This is substituted for τὸ ἑσθία ἔχειν, probably from a reminiscence of τὸ Χλώρεια, μὴδὲν ἀγαν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν δεί γε, sc. ἑπτάμιαι ἔχειν φαύλας καὶ ἱσχύρας τὴν ἑγκράτεια. Otherwise ἑγκράτεια would not be τῶν στοματικῶν καὶ ἐπαινετῶν (1145 b, 9).

οὐ πάσα. This is all that is required for the ἀνασκευή of a universal affirmative ἀπορίας.

§ 7. Ἐτι οἱ πάσης κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία arises from the contradiction between ἡ ἑγκράτεια τῶν στοματικῶν and ὁ ἑγκρατής ἐμμενετικός τῷ λογαριῷ and of their respective ἀντιθέτεις.

ἐκοστικός, sc. ποιεῖ.

ἐσται τις. This is all that is required for the ἀνασκευή of the universal affirmative ἀπορίας, ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ φευδών.

ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτη. "But Odysseus knew that Philoctetes would not listen to him, and would be too proud to return after such treatment. Therefore he had recourse to guile, and persuaded Neoptolemus to second him by false pretences. The interest of the drama lies in the gradual effect produced upon the heart of the boy by the sufferings of Philoctetes, by his frank belief in the fictitious tale, by his open-hearted friendship, and by his unbounded trust in one who is deceiving him; until at length, in spite of the strongest motives, it becomes a moral impossibility for Neoptolemus to persevere in his attempt." L. Campbell.

§ 8. Ἐτι κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία results from an artificial contradiction between the views that the ἀκρασία acts εἰδώς (or ὑπολογίζοντα) ὁτι φαύλα and the view that ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ φευδών.
ψευδόμενος was rightly bracketed by Coraes as a mere dittography of ψευδόμενος above. There can be no reference to the Mentions of Euboullides (Ritter and Preller § 233). "What follows this is a digression suggested by the word ἄφορα." Baywater, Contr. p. 53.

παράβολα... ἠλέγχειν. We must take παράβολα as internal accusative. They desire to frame σοφιστικοὶ θεγχοὶ of a paradoxical kind, i.e. opposed to τὸ ἠδοξά. Ἀπό θεγχος is a συλλογισμὸς αντιφάσεως, i.e. a syllogistic proof of the contradictory, in the present case the contradictory of our ἠδοξα. Note the word βούλεσθαι, it is the προσώπος and not the ὕδωρ that makes the sophist. Cf. 1137 b, 14 η.

ὅταν ἐπιτύχωμεν, 'when they succeed,' does not seem very pointed. Should we not read ἐπιτύχωμεν? The proper word for a dialectical 'encounter' is ἄντεχειν, cf. Top. 101 a, 27 (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ κριτιμοῖ) πρὸς τὰς ἄντεχεις.

Δέδωται γὰρ κ. τ. λ. Cf. Met. 995 a, 31 γὰρ ἄπορεῖ (ἡ διάνοια), ταῦτα παραπλησίων πέτονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις: ἀδίκωτον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων προσθεών ἐστὶ τὸ πρόθεσθαι. This is still a note explaining the meaning of ἄφορα and λεία.

§ 9. ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας ἄρετη. In the Topics (150 b, 27 sqq.) Aristotle discusses at length this type of definition, which he calls τὸ ἐξ ἀντιπρότερος ὑπὸ τὸ ἐκτατοποθητήθην τῷ. The example there given is that of ἀνθρεια as τόμμα μετὰ διανοιγμὸν ὀρθά. It is worth noting that there are two or three definitions of this type in the Platonic "Οροί. So 411, ἐν ἑρατοτήτῃ ἄπλουσι ἀπλαστὰ μετ' ἐκπορισμοῦ, ἢδ. ἀφλοκρατία... ἀποκρατία...

ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ κ. τ. λ., sc. δὲ τὴν ἀφροσύνην.

§ 10. "Ετὶ κ. τ. λ. This ἄφορα arises from the contradiction between the identification of the ἄκρατη with the ἀκαλλαστος and the view that the ἄκρατη acts διὰ πάθος, παρὰ τὸν ἁλασμὸν.

τῶν πεπεισθαί, 'from conviction' (πίστει), τῆς παρομῆς. This proverb does not seem to be found elsewhere, but its application is obvious. You cannot cure the ἄκρατη by giving him
conviction, for he has it al-

III. § 1. Πρώτον μὲν...έστι....

This section gives the two divisions of the following discussion. The first is the discussion of the question πότερον εἰδότες ἢ αὑτοῖς, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες (cf. 1145 b, 29 τοῦ τῶν ἁπάσων). This extends from 1146 b, 24 to 1147 b, 19. The second is the discussion of the question ποῖα τῶν ἄκρατων...ἀρχηκαὶ, with a number of kindred questions (ὅσα συγγενή). This extends from 1147 b, 20 to 1151 a, 36. It is important to observe that the twofold character of this division is clearly marked by the language, see next note.

§ 2. έστι δ' ἀρχή κ.τ.λ. This has been regarded as a duplicate of the preceding section, and it has been said that it outlines a discussion which does not exist. This view overlooks the fact of the twofold division made in the last section and the natural reference of this section to
15 τής σκέψεως, πότερον ο ἡγκρατής καὶ ο ἀκρατής εἰσὶ τῷ περὶ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταῦτα εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἡγκρατής, ὢν ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅς, ὡς ἀλλ’ εἶ ἀμφότεροι ἔσται εἰ περὶ πάντα ὡς ἀκρασία καὶ ἡγκράτεια ὡς ὃν. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἀπάντη ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλός ἀκρασιῶς τῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅπερ ὁ ἀκίλλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταύτα ἀπλὸς ἔχειν (ταύτην γὰρ ἤν ἦν τῇ ἀκολοχίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅπερ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντη συναιροῦμεν, νομιζόντων ἄδειν τὸ παρὸν ἡ ὁδός διάκειν, ὃ δ’ οὐκ οἶον ὁλεῖται μὲν, διὰκεῖ δὲ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δοξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι 25 παρὶ ἦν ἀκρατεύονται, οὔτε διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν δοξάζοντων οὐ διστάζονται, ἀλλ’ οἶονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἥρεμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον.
is from the mildness of their action that they act etc.'

ν διότι τ.τ.λ. 'we shall find pealing to experience' that ἐπιστήμη is no better than ἔγνωμα in respect τῆς σφοδρότητας ὑπολήψεως.' It is urgent to notice that διότι here 'will surpass.'

οτῷ Ἐράκλειτος. One negation is enough for the ἀνακεννήσις ἡ δόξα ἡ ἱματα ἐστὶ.

The Academy will not say Herakleitos had ἐπιστήμην, and had 'conviction' (νίκτις σφοδρότητος) in the highest degree. In oracular style of Herakleitos, Early Greek Philosophy.

'Ἀλλ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ. These words excite the first of four distinct λόγοι to each other by ἐν as usual. First three are dialectical and upon the theory of 'potential edge' which was first worked out in the Theaetetus. The Plato is the real λόγος and is of a psychological character. We may not expect to find the three first consistent with each other or the fourth. Aristotle is only interested in the first instance to show how they may keep to μην and yet account for ἀκρασία by his own principles. If we compare the successive definitions of Knowledge in the Theaetetus, we shall see how fundamental and essential a thing to ἕλθεν ἡ ἔννοια is in Greek philosophy.

ἔχων...χρόμων. The distinction between knowledge potential and actual originates in Greek philosophy,

η ἔλεγμα ἐπιστήμην. For the opposition of χρόμων (=ἐνδορίεων) to ἔχων, cf. 1098 b, 33 n. We very commonly find τὸ θεωροῦν described as the ἐνδορίεων ἐπιστήμην, as in the present passage. Cf. Phys. 255 b, 2 ὅ γάρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωροῦν ὑπὸ ὑμᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμην. Met. 1048 ι, 32 λέγομεν ὑπὸ ὑμᾶς ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν ἐν τῷ θεωροῦν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμην, ἔννοιαν ἡ ἔλεγμα ἐπιστήμην, ἔννοιαν ἐν τῷ θεωροῦν.

τοῦ ἐπιστημοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 6. Ἐν τ.τ.λ. The second λόγος goes a little deeper. A man may know the major premis actually and the minor premise only potentially. For the two kinds of προτάσεις see 1143 b, 5 n. It is no valid objection to Aristotle's argument here to say that in the case supposed the act would be ἄθορπον. We are only considering whether it is possible to act παρά τῷ ἐπιστημοντα, not whether we are responsible for it if we do.
πρακτά γάρ κ.τ.λ. The particular makes its first appearance in the minor premiss; acts are necessarily particular, and therefore there can be no act unless the minor premis is actual.

diaφphere...τὸ καθόλου. By τὸ καθόλου (not ἣ καθόλου) is meant the universal which forms the middle term. The general rule παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ἔξοδα contains two universals and therefore requires two minor premisses to connect it with a particular agent and a particular act. The first of these takes as middle term the universal which is predicated of the agent (ἐφ’ αὐτός). This minor premis is obvious and does not detain us, cf. de Mot. An. 701 a. 25 ἂν πρὸς τὸν ἐμπειρίαν ἐκινήσῃ, ὅτι τὴν ἐκτόνα πρότασιν τὴν δήλων ἐνδόμα ἐρωτῆται ἐκεῖν ἐνδίδειν ὅτι ἐδοξάζειν ἐν πλεῖστοις ὁποῖοι ἐνδυσώμεθα. But the other universal (τὸ ἐν τοῖς πρόγομασι) is of a different character. Εἰστὶς ἠμᾶς takes us no further than ἐξοδοὶ τῷ τούτῳ, and this can yield only the conclusion ἐμοὶ συμφέρει τὸ τούτῳ, not an act. We are in that case left in the position of the doctor who only knows that light food is digestible without knowing what food is light (1141 b. 19 n.). This is a case, then, when a man acts wrongly, though he has ἐπιστήμη of what is right. Of course Aristotle himself would say such an act was ἀκόφως and not ἀκρασία, but that is not the question at present. We are only showing how it is possible to act παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, and ἐξοδοὶ τῷ τούτῳ is ἐπιστήμη while τὸ βῆμα τοῦτῳ is not. Even if the man does 'use' the minor premis, that will not be enough to make him act rightly.

ὅ ἐκ τ.κ.τ.λ., 'or (the universal may be predicated of the thing, e.g.) ἐξοδοὶ τῷ τούτῳ.' This is, of course, a minor premis. The conjunction ὅ introduces the other species of καθόλου.

eἰδώλω, ὥς τὸν ἀκρασίαν. § 7. "Εἰτε τῷ ἐξορν. κ.τ.λ. The third locus, which goes a little deeper by recognising two kinds of potential knowledge. When we say a man has knowledge potentially we may mean either that he 'has' it but does not 'use' it, or merely that he is capable of having it (ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐπιστήμης) but does not actually 'have' it at the time. This distinction is best brought out in Gen. An. 735 a. 9 ἐγκορμίζομαι εἰς καὶ πορρωτέρῳ (τῷ ἑνεργείᾳ) αὐτῷ ἐνδεχόμενοι εἶναι δυνάμεις, ὡς ἐφ’ ἐκείνῳ γεωμετρία ἐγκορμίζομαι πορρωτέρω, καὶ οὖσα τοῦ θεωροῦντος. The case considered in this section is parallel to that of 'the sleeping geometre' (cf. ὅτι ὢν τὸν καθέδροντα), that considered in the two preceding sections was that of
the geometer εγγηγορω μη μη θεωρων δε. Cf. also above 1008 b, 33.

καλ το σωμα μειστασιν. Cf. Mot. An. 701 b, 29 εται γενεται αλλωσι περι την καρδιαν,...πολλη τοιετο του σωματος διαφοροι διαθήκαι και ουχατριν και φοσκαι και τρόμου και των τοιων εναρτων. This brings us to the verge of Aristotle's own physiological Λογια. See the whole passage in App. B.

§ 8. ουδεν σημειον, sc. του εξεων (in the sense previously given to the word). Τα απ' της εξεως are generally speaking σημεια της εξεως, but the εξεων may be a more δογμα. The geometry may be talking in his sleep. The ἀποδειξεων here mentioned are probably to be understood as geometrical; for Aristotle cannot mean us to take the word with 'Εμπειροδεικτες. The ουτη 'Εμπειροδεικτες are just about the last thing Aristotle would call ἀποδειξεων.

καλ οι πρωτον μανθανοντες κ.τ.λ. This is another way in which Aristotle more than once describes merely potential knowledge. Cf. Phys. 255 a, 33 εται διναμει αλλως διερθανων επιστημων και δι της εξεως και μη θεωρων...οι γαρ εξεοι επιστημων μη θεωρων δε διναμει εντιν επιστημων που. Αλλ' αυτα αυτα και πρωτον μαθευμεν. De An. 429 b, 8 διναμει που (sc. επιστημων), ου μην οικος και πρωτον μαθευμεν ο εφευρε. Thurott's conjecture μαθαντερα for μαθαντες seems to me certain. We can hardly identify οι πρωτον μαθαντες with οι μανθανοντες την μαθευ μην...τουτο...δευτα. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 9. "Ετι καλ ουδε κ.τ.λ. The fourth and real λογια. We now drop 'potential knowledge' altogether, and the explanation is in perfect harmony with that given in the de Mot. An. (cf. App. B). It should be observed, however, that the three previous λογια, though provisional, have gradually prepared us for this one.

φυσικος. This word alone implies that the preceding λογια are διαλεκτωτεραι. To consider a thing φυσικος is to consider it in the light of its οικεια δεξια, i.e. of φυσικοι πραταιεσ (Top. 104 b, 21), in the
present case, of course, from a psychological point of view. Hence φωνεῖσθαι is regularly opposed to λογεῖον (= διαλεκτικόν). Cf. Phys. 204 b, 4 λογεῖον μέν οὖν σημειωμένον έκ τῶν τοιών δόξεων ἐν οἷς εἶναι (το άτερος...). Οἱ φωνεῖσθαι δέ μάλλον θεωροῦντο ἐκ τώνδε. Gen. Contr. 316 a, 10 δοσον διαφέρουσαν οἱ φωνεῖσθαί καὶ λογεῖον ἐστιν, ἡμαῖραι.

η...καθόλου, sc. πρότασις. The major premmiss is not επιστήμη, but the other form of ὑπόλογης called δόξα, which is περί τα ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἐχει, and may be true or false. We have seen already, however, that this does not imply that it is a mere ἤρμηνευτ ὑπολογη.

η δ' έτέρα, sc. πρότασις, cf. 1143 b, 3 nor in a real practical syllogism, the minor premmiss cannot be of the form έξον το τοιών, which is all that επιστήμη could give us. It must be of the form έξον τό ὑπολογη, and that is a matter for αἰτίατον.

ενδα μέν, i.e. εν ταις θεωρητηικαι προτάσεωι.

εν ταις ποιητικαι. The simplest way of taking this is to supply προτάσει as above (προτάσει are the subject of the sentence) and to translate 'In the case of practical premises,' cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 33 αι δε προτάσει αι ποιητικαι κ.τ.λ. There might, of course, be θεωρητικαι προτάσσει, the major a δόξα such as 'The east wind brings rain,' and the minor an αἰτίατον, 'The wind is in the east.' The conclusion is 'It will rain.' Or we may have 'It is bad for a man to get wet,' 'It is raining,' the conclusion of which is that I put on my cloak.

eπι παντός γλυκός κ.τ.λ. This is an illustration of a case where there is no impediment or conflict. We have a practical major premmiss παντός γλυκός γεγένηθαι δε. As a δόξα, this may be true or false, but it is a universal imperative, just as much as παντί ἀνθρώπῳ συνερετε τά ξηρά. We have to ask, then, (1) whence it derives its universality, (2) whence it derives its epistemic form. Its universality must be due, as universality always is, to the action of νοει. It is νοει that generalises particular desires for sweet wine into the universal proposition (καθόλου δόξα, λογε) πῶν γλυκό ζήσει. It makes explicit the universal implicit in particular δόξα exactly in the same way as it makes explicit the universal implicit in particular αἰτίατον. But this is not all. The verb δει means ἠγαθον ἐμει, and the epistemic character of the proposition can only be due to its presentation by νοει (or φανερας) to μολυσμεν as its δρεκτερ. This further implies that the person who has such a major premmiss is one whose φανερας ἠγαθος is το την. In other words, this is the major premmiss of ἀκόλοθωσα. If this καθόλου δόξα is in the soul, and a minor premmiss τοιτι δε ζει is supplied by αἰτίατον, the act of tasting necessarily follows as a conclusion. We see, then, that a bad act may be produced by a practical syllogism as well as a good one. The problem of ἀκόλοθωσα therefore assumes this form: 'Is it possible for a syllogism the conclusion of which is a bad act to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premmiss or
I principle which that act.

δόταν εν κ. τ. λ. The answer
the problem proposed at the end of
note is that it is impossible if
or premiss of the bad act and
or premiss which it violates
radiatory. No one can have
all at one and the same time
positions παντός γλυκός γει
and ω συμφέρει τά γλυκά.
the latter is present, the
lack of the bad act will depend
whether it can result from some
major premiss. Now the pre-
n παν γλυκό ἡδονή is not per se
atory to ω συμφέρει τά γλυκά,
may quite well coexist. The
estion, then, is whether the
can follow from παν γλυκό
well as from παντός γλυκός
δέ.
δέ ενεργεί, in the sense ex-
by the third λόγος. The
is really that of ἐπίθυμα, as
see.
S' ἐπίθυμα ἐνοικά, 'and
sire (for pleasure) is present
ime, 'not λεπτάρας or δρέξι
It all depends, then, on the
δρέξι at the moment.
λέγει φεύγειν. The sylla-
συμφέρει τά γλυκά, τούτω δέ
συμφέρει τούτω may even be
but, in the absence of
is to which it can present
thing happens. For διάθεσ
κείνη.
πυθμαί αύξει. The presence
of ἐπίθυμα is enough to replace the
absence of the epistatic element in
παν γλυκό ἡδονή. The way in
which this happens is explained in de Mot.
Αν. τοι α, 31 (App. B) ἀπτ' ἐρωτή-
σεως γὰρ ἢ νοούσας ἢ τῆς ὁρίζων
γίνεται ἐνεργεία. In itself (καθ' αὐτὸ)
παν γλυκό ἡδονή, τούτω δέ γλυκό,
tούτω ἡδονή is quite compatible with the other
syllogism; but for ἐπίθυμα it has a
different meaning. The object of
ἐπίθυμα is just ἡδονή and so it moves
it at once. As it is put in the de
Mot. An. (loc. cit.), "Ποτέν μοι, says
desire. Τούτω δέ ποτέν, says άλοιπώς
or φαντασία or νοῦς. Εἴθει πίειν."
two. These cannot be contradictory in themselves (καθ' αὐτόν), but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός, i.e. συμβαίνει τῷ ἰδίῳ ἐπιθυμήτῳ εἶναι.

§ 11. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο. We have seen already that the lower animals are incapable of goodness or badness just because they have not νοῦς (i 139a, 20). They cannot get beyond an image in the soul of something once felt as sweet (φαντασία) or an association of something now perceived with such an image (μνήμη). Memory is not an intellectual act, but belongs to the same 'part' of the soul as Imagination (φαντασία), i.e. the πρῶτος ἀληθικόν, δεδομένον. Under these two it follows (καὶ δὲ χρόνοι αἰσθήματα), καὶ οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ἔχοντες ἡ φύσις (de Mem. 449 b, 1-450 a, 23). The ὥρκτον can only move the lower animals τῷ φαντασθῆναι, not τῷ νοσήμαθε.

§ 12. Πῶς δὲ λέγεται κ.τ.λ. This is put in the popular form as the word ἀγνωσία shows. The meaning must be 'How does ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἰδίου give place to βολήσας τάγαθον?' For an explanation we are referred to 'the physiologists' and their account of drunkenness and sleep. The drunken man who recites Empedokles gets sober; the sleeping geometer wakes. This is how Aristotle dismisses a question which is φανταστικόν and goes beyond πολιτική. To us, of course, it is just the fundamental question; for the answer to it must explain why the ordinary man who is neither good nor bad sometimes does right and sometimes wrong. Now, if we take Aristotle's hint and go to the de Somno for an explanation, we find that the alternation of sleeping and waking is due to the fact that no animal is able συνεχώς ἐκπορευόμενος Physiologically speaking, what happens is that the warm ἀνάπαυσιν from food rises into the head, which it therefore makes heavy. It is then cooled in the brain, whence it returns to the heart. The consequent cooling of the heart produces unconsciousness; for the heart is the πρῶτος ἀληθικόν. So too μέθη arises τῶν ἄνω θεραπευτῶν (Probl. 843 a, 1). The analysis of pleasure will show us that ἐπιθυμία too has a physiological basis. It is caused by the pain produced by ἐνέδεια and it ceases with the pleasure produced by ἀναπληρώσει, both these being σωματικά. Cf. also Phys. 247 b, 13 sqq.

§ 13. Ἐστι δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δὲξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
is e.g. τοῦτοι γλυκοὶ (1147 a, 19), and this differentiates the meaning of the minor premiss from a scientific syllogism such as ήπιόν τὸ τούδε (1147 a, 6).

ἡ νῦν ἦν. For the imperfect cf. Ind. s.v. ἦν.

τὸν ἐρχόμενον δρόμον, i.e. the τὸδε or τοῦτο which is ἐν τοῖς καθ' εκατα ὁποιονὶς ἢμαῖς ἡμεῖς. This is not καθόλου and therefore not ἐπιστήμων, for there can be no ἐπιστήμη of τ' ἐκατ' ἔκαστα.

§ 14. τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης, ἑπιστήμη ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμη, in the proper sense,* all the terms of which are necessarily καθόλου.

καθόλου. The text is sufficiently guaranteed by ἕκαστος 1145 b, 23, which also settles the meaning here. Stewart's very ingenious περιγραφή τὸ πάθος is quite unnecessary if the interpretation given above is correct. There can be no κύριος ἐπιστήμη where the major premiss is given by δόξα and the minor by αἴσθησις.

αἱ ἐπιστήμης, sc. ἑπιστήμη. This is a new name for the ἑπιστήμη τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα by which we apprehend the minor premiss ἔγιν δὲ τούδε καὶ τόδε τούδε. The phrase is probably used with some reference to the ἐπιστήμων αἴσθησις of Spen-sippos (cf. Ritter and Pfeiffer § 296). That was a doctrine intended to bridge over the gulf between the particular and the universal, much of the same nature as Aristotle's own doctrine that, though we only perceive a particular, yet it is only the universal element in it, the form, that really enters into perception.

—IV. § 1. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ κ. τ. λ. We now come to the second division περὶ πολίν τὸν ἀκρατή θετεῖν (1146 b, 9).

§ 2. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστι κ. τ. λ., 'whereas—.' The apodosis is not reached till 1147 b, 31 τοῦτο μὲν ὄν κ. τ. λ. This is not meant to be a complete classification of the objects of desire, as we can see at once from the omission of pleasures intrinsically bad. It is only a preliminary statement as to two classes of pleasures, which is sufficient for the purpose immediately in hand, namely the ascertainment of the proper objects of ἀρετή in its literal sense.
τά μὲν ἀναγκαία τῶν ποιοῦντων ἔσοδα, τὰ δ’ αἰρέτα μὲν 25 καθ’ αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ’ ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαία μὲν τὰ σωματικά—λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄφροδιτων χρεῖαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἡ τὴν ἀκόλουθαι ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνῃ—τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαία μὲν οὐχὶ, αἰρέτα δὲ καθ’ αὐτὰ—λέγω δ’ 30 ὁ λόγος τιμήν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν ἄγαθων καὶ ἡδέων—τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ [τὸ] χρημάτων ἀκρατείς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ’ οὖν, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὁσπέρ “Ἀνθρωπος” ὁ τὰ Ὁλύμπια νικῶν’
general trustworthiness of which
and by its agreement with Pau-
and other authorities, the name
winner of the boxing-match at a
in the year 456 B.C. was
was. It was doubtless on
the of a similar list that Alex-
 Aphrodisianus made his state-
that "Anthrosos was a τύπ.:"
meaning, then, is ‘just as we
the Olympic victor was both
we and ανθρωπος.’ The
if Κβ is much more idiomatic
ενικηκάς.
ός λόγος. The definition of
is ή νομος μόνον κοινον, ὁ δὲ
νομος λόγος τῆς συστάσεως έτερος,
ὁ δὲ ανθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμ-
τοφόρον γνῶσις μόνον κοινον,
καὶ τὸ διάλογον λόγος τῆς συστά-
σεως ὃς ἄνδρος τί έστω ἐκατέρωι τὸ ψυχικόν εῖναι, ἰδιον
τὸ λόγον ἀποδώσει. In the
the case if we give the λόγος
ponding to the κοινον ὅνομον,
namely τί έστω αὐτῷ ἀν-
εῖναι, it will not be quite
the λόγος corresponding to
διάλογον, namely τί έστω αὐτῷ
τῷ εἶναι. In the former case,
we adopt the Platonic method
of, the λόγος will be \( \xiον \)

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pleasures belonging to the sense of touch, and stand exactly on the same footing as the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction. To look at the matter φωσκιτέρων, this is because ὕψφαν καὶ ξηρὰν καὶ θερμὰν καὶ ψύχραν ὅλη τῶν συνθέσεως σωμάτων ουσίαν (Parm. An. 636 a, 16). We find also that τὸ θερμόν has the most intimate connexion with τροφή, since digestion depends upon it. The pains of hunger, thirst, warmth and cold are therefore exactly the four we should expect to find mentioned. Another sure sign that ἄλησι and ψύχη are pleasures of this class is that they are of those ὄν τὰ λουτα ἃ ἦν κοινωνία. Even oysters and molluscs live at the mouths of rivers; for they seek ἀμα τῆς ἀλεάς καὶ τοῦ τρόφου (Gen. An. 701 b, 7), and fish change about from the deep sea to the shore φερόμενον τὰς οὐρεσιὰς (observe the phrase) τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ τῆς ἀλεάς. Lastly, it is only if we suppose that some warmth may be the object of ἀκόλογο, that we can see any point in the exception of θερμασία produced by gymnastics (1118 b, 6). We may remember, too, that Philoxenos was κάμανος οὐκ ἄλησις.

παρὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. contrary to the λόγος ὃ ἐπέκα τοῦ ἣ ἡ διάνοια has affirmed in harmony with βουλήσεως.

κατὰ πρόσθεσιν...ἀπλώς. Cf. Ind. εἰς.

καθάπερ ὄργης. Cf. Thuc. iii, 81, 2 ἀνωτέραν φόρον...ἀτέλεια ἐθάλασσα ἀκρατη οὐκ ὄργης οὐδὲ, κρίνετο ἐν τῷ λικνίου.

§ 4. σημεῖον ἐκ τ. τ. Τ. We cannot say that this is inconsistent with the account of μαλακία given later, as if merely states a fact of language which Aristotle regarded as significant. And it surely is a fact that the word μαλακία is not used of the ἀκρατής θυμόν. See Stewart's note.

παρὰ τούτον...τίθεμαι. The phrase ἰδίον ἐν γένοις έπεκαίνεται is frequent, especially in the Topics.

οἱ μὲν προαιροῦται. The question has been raised how the ἀκόλογο can have προαιροῦσιν since his aim is the pleasure of the moment. The answer is that προαιροῦσις is not necessarily a συνενειακος προαιροῦσις, and the object of βουλήσις is τὸ φαινόμενον ἄγαθον, which is only the true good to the good man. The difference between the ἀκρατής and the ἀκέλαστος is just this, that to the former pleasure appears in its true character, simply as the object of ἐπιθυμία, while to the latter the pursuit of pleasure presents itself as τὸ ἄγαθον, the object of βουλήσις. The major premiss παρὰ...καὶ εἰσί... ἐκάσῃ, which is that of the ἀκέλαστος, is equivalent to τὸ
όν ἄν εἶτομεν δόσις μὴ ἔπιθυμον ἢ ἤρέμα διώκει τὰς ἁθλάς καὶ φέουμεν μετρίᾳ λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον δόσις διὰ ὑψιμεῖν σφόδρα. Τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνον ποιήσεις, εἰ προσ-το ἐπιθυμία νεκρική καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐν-λύτη γιαχρά; ἔτει δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἱδο-μί μὲν εἰσὶν <τῶν> τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων—τῶν ἱδέων οὐκ φύειει αἱρέτα, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς, καθὸ σαφῶς διειλομένοι πρὸ τοῦρον—οὗν χρήματα καὶ 25 καὶ νῆση καὶ τιμή, πρὸς ἀπαντὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φύεῖν νυντεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ πώς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ δοὺς μὲν παρὰ ἁγάθεν, not to πάρ γλυκό

Δίλλον κ.τ.λ. Stewart is plainly taking ἀλλως with ἄν εἴτομεν with ἀκελαστοῖς. There is no
mention of degrees of ἀκελασία. Tr. would rather give the name of
error to the man who etc. By δόσις κ.τ.λ. is meant some
whom we are in doubt whether θραγῆ or ἀκελαστοῖς, and whom
side to be only ἀκρατῆς. It is impossible to mistake the
ad psychology of making the
ros a man of mild desires.

Is pleasure has become the

of ἀθλήσεως, the ἀθλήσιον

, and he pursues it as a ‘cool

πρόκειται

. The

only smitten τῶν λεπηρῶν

προβολάς (1148 a, 7); for they

are strong enough to produce

the opposite. The ἀκελαστοῖς shuns all

principle.

ἐν αἰγχρά, i.e. a ὑπερβολῇ such

its the ἀκρατῆς.

ἔτει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This section

here duplicate of 1147 b, 23

see note), but the necessary

action to the discussion of the

r, incidentally recapitulating

and putting in a clearer light what

has been said already. We now

have for the first time a complete
classification of desires into (1) those

of things τῷ γένει καλῶν, φύειει

αἱρέτα, (2) of τὰ ἐναντία
tòtoνων, i.e. those of

things τῷ γένει ἀλεχρά, φύοντας

φενεύτα, not previously mentioned, (3) of τὰ

μεταξῆς, i.e. τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (τὰ σωματικά).

These last are properly described as

‘intermediate’ between τὰ καλὰ and

τὰ ἀλεχρά, for they are ἐξ ὑποθέσεως

ἀναγκαῖα, the pleasures of τὸ ἔργον,

not of τὸ εὖ ἔργον. They are therefore

indifferent in themselves, but become
good when sought τῷ καλῷ ἔνοχα.

For the punctuation see Stewart’s

note. The apodosis to the long

prothesis is not reached till 1148 b, 2

μονηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., being delayed

by the enormous parenthesis 1148 a,

28 διὸ δοὺς...b, 2 μωράλην.

οὗν χρήματα κ.τ.λ. These are

φύειν αἱρέτα, ἐχοντα δ’ ὑπερβολῆν.

τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν, ‘for doing

so in a certain way, i.e. in excess.’

διὸ δοὺς κ.τ.λ. There is no verb for

this nominative, the construction being

forgotten owing to the parenthesis

within a parenthesis καὶ γὰρ ταύτα...

σπουδαίων. The thought requires

us to supply μεχρίθηκον ὅσον εἶται, the

place of which is taken by the re-
sumptive apodosis μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.

Ωσπερ ἡ Νιόβη, an instance of ὑπέρβολη περὶ τέκνα.

Ωσπερ Σάτυρος, an instance of ὑπέρβολη περὶ γονεῖς, Aspasios (158, 16 Heybut) says Σάτυρος...δι οὐδὲ δὴν ἔχειν ἀποθανόντοι τοῦ πατρός. The Anonymus (p. 436, 25) says οὗτος γὰρ ἔρων τῶν κόρης καὶ πρὸς τὴν μοιχείαν εὑρὼν τὸν άγατον πατέρα Σάτυρος συνεργοῦσα, τοσοῦτον ἐκτὸς τὸν ἀγατὸν πατέρα ἔφθασε, ωστε καὶ τοῦ πατρός τελευτάσκει ταύτων κατεχόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἑώρη ἀπεκτάρρησε.

(This sounds like a reminiscence from the New Comedy.) Heliodoros on the other hand has ὁ Σάτυρος ὃς θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενον τὸν πατέρα, as if his text did not contain περὶ. It seems just possible that this may be right. As Stewart reminds us, the kings of Bosporos during the 4th century were called Satyros. I would add that Σάτυρος ὃς φιλοτάτωρ looks very like a royal title, and if the reference were to the defacement of a dead king by his son, the parallel to the case of η Νιόβη would be striking. For ἐπικαλέσθαι, see E.E. 1245 b, 33 ἐπικαλέσθαι τῶν Δικανὸς.

μοχθηρία, i.e. ἀκρατεία, κακία.

φαύλαι δὲ κ.τ.λ., cf. 1147 b, 25 ἔχουσα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

§ 8. τῶν φεκτῶν. There seems to be a slight inconsistency between this and 1148 a, 18 φέγγοντο...τῷ τοῦ κ.τ.λ. ὑπέρβαλλειν. The explanation is to be found above 1148 a, 3. We may say that τὸ ὑπέρβαλλειν παρὰ τὸν ὁρῶν λόγον τῶν ἐν αὐτὸις in such matters φέγγεται ἡ ἀμαρτία but not ἡ κακία. It is thus not really τῶν φεκτῶν.

προσεπιθέσεις κ.τ.λ., 'they call it ἀκρασία with the additional qualification περὶ ἐκαστοῦ, in a given thing.' Here again περὶ ἐκαστοῦ is virtually = ἐκαστὸν.

οἶον κακῶν λατρῶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 177 b, 13 ἀρ' ἔστων ἀγάθων ὡσ' σκυλεῖ ὁ μοχθηρὸς εἶναι; εἴ π' ἄν τὰ ἀγάθα τὰ σκυλεῖ μοχθηρὸς ὡστ' ἐστιν ἀγάθως σκυλεῖν μοχθηρός.
κακών. ὁσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν ἄλλα τὸ ἀνάλογον ὁμολογ. οὐτοὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι τὸ κακεῖ ὑπολεπτέον μάνην ἄκρασιαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἢτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταύτα τῇ σοφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκλασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν. διὰ καὶ προστίθεντες ἄκρασιν ὁσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

V. Ἐσπερ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐνα μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ 15 μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένει καὶ ξώιν καὶ ἄνθρωπων, τὰ δ’ οὖν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρόσεις τὰ δὲ δὲ ἐδή γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρᾶς φύσεως, ἐστι καὶ περὶ τούτων 2 ἐκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεὺν ἔξεις. λέγομεν δὲ τὰς θηριόδεις, οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπων ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυνόσας ἀνασχέζουσαν τὰ 20 παιδία κατεσθίεις, ἢ οἷος χαίρεις φασιν ἐνίου τῶν ἄπιθηριομένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὁμοίοις τοὺς δὲ ἄνθρωπων κράςαν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζεις ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐνο- 3 χίλιαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαιρι λεγόμενον. αὐτάς μὲν θηριόδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μακιάν ἐνίους, ὁσπερ ὁ 25

ἀστεροῦν οὖν οὖν...οὖντο κακία. Cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

ἐκάστην, sc. τήν τοῦ ιεροῦ καὶ τήν τοῦ υποκρατοῦ κακίαν.

το ἀνάλογον ὁμολογ. The ἀνάλογον is e.g. as the ἀκρατία is to the ἀκόλουθος so is the ἀκρατία ἄθροι to the ὁργῆς, the ἀκρατία τιμῆς to the φιλότιμος (in the bad sense), the ἀκρατία κέρδους to the ἀλεξέθερος.

V. § 1. ἡδέα φύσει, the φύσει alērτa of 1148 a, 24. We now see why these were added to the list.

τὰ δ’ οὖν ἐστιν, i.e. the ἐναστά τούτων του μὲν διὰ πηρόσεις κ.τ.λ. The division is not very clear; but the chief distinction is clearly between ‘bestial’ people, who have unnatural desires ‘by nature,’ or ‘habit,’ and ‘morbid’ people who have unnatural desires from disease, mental or bodily.

παραπλησίας, sc. unnatural.

§ 2. τὴν ἄνθρωπον, ‘the female.’ It seems very doubtful, as Fritzche says, whether this can be the Lamia of folk-lore.

τὸν...περὶ τὸν Πόντον. Cf. Pol. 1138 b, 19 πολλα δ’ ἐστι τῶν ἔθνων ἅ πρὸς τὸ κτελεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄνθρωπο- φαγιάν ἐξαρχεῖ λέγει, καθαρσὴν περὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοὶ τοι Καὶ Ἡταλοι κ.τ.λ. Herod. iv, 18, 106 ἀνθρωφίας ἀλλὰ ἀρμοτατα πάντων ἄνθρωπων ἔξουσι ἡθεῖα, ὡθεῖ δὲντο τοιούτως ὡθεῖ νῦν ὁδύων χρησίμως.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαιρος. This must surely refer to the bull. See 1149 a, 14 n.

§ 3. αὐτὰς μὲν...αἲ δὲ... We pass here from the strictly ‘bestial’ to the ‘morbid.’ The instances given seem to be familiar. They probably come from the collections made by the school.
αἱ δὲ νοσηματωδεῖς ἢ ἦν θῆν. This seems to be a third class which may arise either from disease, or habit, which is a second nature.

τρικόλαν τάσεις. Victorius says 'hic virto virgines non paucae affines sunt, quae inde nullo pacto absterreri possunt.' Aristotle is possibly alluding to the morbid appetites connected with puberty and pregnancy.

§ 4. ἄγοι μὲν οὐν κ.τ.λ. These are cases of τῆρωσις. What follows is quite in accordance with Aristotle's view of the distinction between the sexes. Cf. Gen. An. 737 a, 27 τὸ θηλὺν ὥσπερ ἄρρητ ἄρρητ εἰς πεπεμβομένων, 775 ά, 15 δεὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅσπερ ἀνατεῖριαν εἶναι τὴν θηλύτητα φυσικήν.

§ 5. ἀκρασία. We expect καὶ ἐγκρασεῖα to correspond with κρατεῖα, but Aristotle does not care for formal symmetry.

τοῦ πάθους, ἰ.ε. θυμοῦ, sc. ἀρετὴ λεκτῶν, ἀκρατὴ δ᾽ ἀρκάδος οὐ λεκτόν, 'We must call him ἀκρατὴς of the feeling, not ἀκρατὴς simpliciter.'

πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is the case where we apply the word θηρότης to excess of badness (ἐπιδουρισμόντος). Cf. 1145 a, 33.

§ 6. καὶ θηρότης μόν. Cf. Pol. 1323 a, 29 δεδείγα τὰς παρασκευασμένοις μιᾶς. The φοβοδέης has the kind of fear we find in certain beasts. Soph. fr. 58 ἀπαντα γὰρ τῷ θεῷ φοβοθύμενον φοβεῖ.

ὁ δὲ τῇ γαληνί κ.τ.λ. This is 'morbid,' not 'natural' like the fear of the φοβοδέης. The reference is to morbid 'antipathies' to certain animals. Stewart quotes a fragment of Plutarch, ἐν τῷ καὶ ἀνθρείας ἄντε ἡμοῖ φοβοθύμενοι φαύλα ἔρχεται, οἷον γαληνί ἡ ἀλητρινόν αὐτ' οὖσαν τὴν φαυνήσει αἰτίαν.
τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιθέσις, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τοῦτον δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ἔχειν ἐνοτε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δὲ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ αρετή] καταίχειν ἐπιθυμίων σαιδίων φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφρον ἄτοπον ἱδώνη.· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον 15 . ὡσπερ οὐν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἢ μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπον ἀπλῶς τι μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ ματώδης, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δὴν οὐ τι καὶ τία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολογιάν μόνη.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄκρασια καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἐστὶ μόνον περὶ ἀκολογία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀλλο εἶδος ἄκρασιας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφοράν οἷον ἀπλῶς, δήλων. VI. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦπτον αἰγραῖν τί τοῦ θυμοῦ ή ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων, θεωρήσωμεν. έοικε 25 ἢ θυμὸς ἀκούειτο μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακολουθεῖ δὲ, καθάπερ γεῖτι τῶν διακών, οἰ πρὶν ἀκούσαν πάντω ἡ λεγόμενον ὑπεν, εἶτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύκλοι,

πόρρω βαρβάρων, e.g. the Cf. 1146 b, 28.
τοῦτον δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ. γεν. still discussing περὶ ποῦ δὲ εἰ.

πάλαισι] κατείχεν. I have followed πάλαισι on the ground that ow no such stories about him. same that a copyist did not stand the use of κατείχεν without pressed subject and took the name from 1148 b, 24.

ἀπὸν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the g cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 56. conclusion is that the ἄκρασις is (1) περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ μοχθηρῷ χωλαστήρῳ, and therefore (2) only τι καὶ ἀνθρωπον. This gives us a form of ἄκρασις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν. ἢ θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης. is only ἄκρασις καὶ δμοϊοστάσια. ἢ μοχθηρία... ἢ δὲ... For the ἴδιον use of the article cf. 1117 a.

The predicate of the second clause is κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μοχθηρία λέγεται. For the partitive genitive in the singular cf. 1141 b, 24. μ.

§ 3. περὶ τὰ ἄλλα. sc. (1) περὶ τὰ φύλα παρατεθήκε (2) περὶ τὰ θηριώδη καὶ νοσηματώδη.

VI. § 1. δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This section contrasts ἄκρασια in the strict sense (ἳ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων) with ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ. The latter requires special consideration; for, while it is only called ἄκρασια καὶ δμοϊοστάσια, yet θυμὸς is a form of ἄρεξ coordinate with ἐπιθυμία, and therefore we must note the points of likeness and unlikeliness. Four reasons are given to show that ἄκρασια θυμοῦ is the less disgraceful.

παρακολουθεῖσθαι. This word (omitted in Bon. Ind.) is explained in de Som- nolo 438 b, 31 τὸ γὰρ παρακολούθησιν ἢ παρακολούθησιν ἀνάλογον εἰ τι καὶ ἀκούσωσι, οὐ μέντοι τούτο θετεῖ.
πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἀν μόνων ψοφήσῃ, ἑλακτούντως
30 οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁμίᾳ πρὸς τὴν
tιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὅμοιος ἡ ὀλ-
γωρία ἐξῆλθονε, ὁ δ' ὁπέστερ συνολισμόν, τοι ἐὰν τῷ τοιοῦτο πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εἰδύς; ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν
35 μόνων εἶπη ὅτι ἦν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἰσθήσεως, ὁμίᾳ πρὸς τὴν
ἀπώλειαν. ὁ δ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ
d' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχρῶν οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατής
tοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

ἀν μόνων ψοφήσῃ, 'if there is only
a knock at the door,' si forte cre-
merint. It seems plain that ψοφεῖν
is here used impersonally and that it
is used in the sense which properly
belongs to καταγράφειν.
οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσων. We
see, then, that its παρακολούθει consists
in its hearing something real, namely
a judgment that so-and-so is an insult,
but not what it thinks it hears, namely
an order.
ὅ μὲν γὰρ λόγος...ἔθηλωσον. Cf.
Propb. 949 b, 13 διὰ τι ἀκρατεῖς λέγει-
tαι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μόνων, οὕτως τῇ
ἀκρασίᾳ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργήν: ἢ ὁ ἤπειρος
ἐν αὐτῇ ἀκρατεῖς μὲν ἔστιν ὁ παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τι
πράττων, καὶ ἄκρασι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀγωγή, εἰς
dei de aι μὲν ἐπιθυμίας ὡς ἐπίταγμα εἰς τῷ παρὰ τοῦ λόγου, αὐτῇ ὁ
ἀγωγὸς μετά τοῦ λόγου, οὐχ ὡς κελεύοντος τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄγωγον τῶν
πραγμάτων ἢ τῆς αἰτίας.
ἡ ἡ φαντασία. Cf. Rhet. 1378 a,
31 έστω δ' ὁργὴ ἄρετα μετὰ λόγους
tιμωρεῖαι φαντασμάτη διὰ φαντασμάτων
ὁλογραφεῖν. Like all other ἀρκετά,
tιμωρεῖαι cannot only move τῷ νοητῷ ἢ
φαντασθηρίαν. The difference between
it and τῷ ἄθροι is that it implies also a
φαντασία of the αἴρει which must be
some form of ὀλγωρία (καταφρόνησις, ἐπικρατεῖσθαι, ὡμός described Rhet.
1378 b, 14 sqq.). Now it is just here
that the dependence of θυμὸς on τῷ
λογιστικῶν comes in. 'Ολγωρία is
defined as ἐνεργῆ ἄθροι πρὸ τῷ νο-
ητῷ ἄθροι φαντασμάτων, and that is
μερικῶν ἄθροι which is not good and
does not contribute much or nothing to
what is good (Rhet. 1378 b, 13). All this
θυμὸς must get from οὐ. The pre-
misse πᾶν γλυκὸ ἡθοῦ is merely a gen-
eralisation of particular desires for sweet
things; the premises 'such conduct is
εὐθανασία is mere generalisation from
particular feelings of resentment, but
the result of deliberation. But such a
premise is not enough to justify anger.
It may be that the man is beneath
contempt, or that for some other reason
the ἄθροι λόγος would prescribe the
exercise of πράξεως, and this is a
matter for further deliberation. What
we may call ἀκρασία θυμοῦ consists
in not waiting for this; for the φα-
thασία of ὀλγωρία is sufficient to
move θυμοῦ, and θυμὸς can move the
body. Still the φαντασία which moves θυμὸς
is the result of deliberation, though
incomplete.
ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἰσθήσεως. There is
no contradiction in saying that a
λόγος may furnish the motive of ἐπι-
thαμα. The example already given,
pᾶν γλυκὸ ἡθοῦ, shows this. But it is
not the λόγος, i.e. ἀρθρός λόγος, which
is the sense in which the word is used
elsewhere in this passage.
§ 2. Ετι ταῖς φυσικαῖς κτ.λ. The second reason.

ἐπεί καὶ κτ.λ. Even among desires the most universal are the most excusable. For the distinction between κοιναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι and θαυμα καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖσαι, cf. 1118 b, 8 sqq.

τῶν τῆς ὑπερθελῆς, sc. τῶν ἀναγκαίων. The words καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων merely explain this. I do not think that they refer to τά φάσεις ἀληθείας.

ὁπερ ο ἀπολογοῦμεν κτ.λ. The writer of MM. seems to have taken this illustration seriously; for he adds that the plea 'It runs in the family' was admitted, καὶ ἀπορουγεῖν δόῃ δοκεῖν γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς φασικὴν εἶναι τῆν ἀμαρτίαν.

καὶ ο ἐλκομένος κτ.λ. Zell says that the same story occurs in a German Volkslied and refers to 'Des Knaben Wunderhorn' vol. ii, p. 269. Clearly, then, Aristotle is drawing on folk-lore for his illustrations, the stuff of which Mährchen and Fabliaux are made.

§ 3. Ετι ἀδικωτεροι κτ.λ. The third reason.

δολοπλόκον γὰρ κτ.λ. The author of this lyrical fragment is unknown. Zell compares Sappho's Ποικιλόθρον ἢ ἄθανατ' Ἀφροδίτην παῖ δῶς δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαι σε. The quotations are given in the usual scrappy and abrupt way.

κεστὸν ἴμαντα. Πλ. xiv, 214—

καὶ ἀπὸ στίθεσαι ἐλάσσο τοῦτο κεστὸν ἴμαντα, ποικιλον, ἐντά δὲ οἱ θελήματα πάντα τέτυκτο: ἐντὰ ἐν μὲν φιλίτης, ἐν δ᾽ ἱμαρον, ἐν δ᾽ ἀριστοτέ<ref>πάρφαισε, ἢ τ᾽ ἐκλεψε νῦν τίκα περ φρονέσθων.</ref> περὶ τῶν θυμῶν, i.e. τοῦ θυμοῦ. Cf. Ind. s.v. περί.

καὶ κακὰ πως. This is the point to which the whole discussion is meant to lead up. It is not κακὰ ἀπλῶς because it is ἄθεο προσώπου.
2ο κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυποῦμενος, ὃς ὀργῇ ποιῶν ἄπασὶν λυποῦμενοι, ὃς ὑβρίζων μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οΐς ὑργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον δίκαιος, ταύτα αὐτοκεῖται, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς ὑβρίζειν. ἦ γὰρ ἐν ὑπνοῖς ὑβρίζειν. τοῖς 5 τοῖς αἰσχρῶις ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασίας τῆς περὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, καὶ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι ἔγκρατεία καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡ ἡδονάς σωματικάς, δῆλον: αὐτῶι δὲ τούτων τοῖς διαφοράς ληραίον, ὡσπερ γὰρ εἷρηται κατ᾽ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπωις εἰς καὶ φυσικῶις καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγάλει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πτωχῶις καὶ νοσίμων μαται. τούτων δὲ περὶ τῆς πρώτης σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκρασίας μόνον ἐκεῖνος διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρίων οὐντες σωφροναὶ οὐντες ἀκρασίας λέγομεν ἄλλης ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ eἰ τῷ δήλῳ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζωῶν ὑβρίζει καὶ συν. 6 οὖν ὁις κ.τ.λ. The fourth reason. The argument requires that ὑβρίζειν should be an instance of ἀκρασία μὲν ἐπιθυμίας, but it is absurd to suppose that ὑβρίζειν here means μεριδεῖα, as the old commentators do. The explanation is to be found in Rhet. 1380 a, 34 καὶ τοῖς ἐν δὲ ὑργίζοντας ἢ δέν ὑργίζονται ἢ ἐρωτοῦν ὑργίζονται o οὐ τῷ ὕπνῳ ὑπέρθεται πράξις, οὐσίας οὐρα ὑργίζομεν ὑπέρθεται. ἢ μὲν ὑπέρ ὕπνωι τῶν ὑπέρθεται, τῇ ὑργίζεσθαι λέγσαν. Now ὑβρίζει, 'unprovoked insult,' is a species of ὑπέρθεται, the others being καταφθορὴ, ἀνωπνευσμα, καὶ, if we substitute ὑπερθέται for ὑπέρθεται in the above sentence, we get the same statement as that in the text. That ὑβρίζει arises from ἐπιθυμία appears from another passage (Rhet. 1378 b, 23) ἐτεὶ γὰρ ὑβρίζει τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐργὰ ὑπέρ οἰοὶ αἰέξον ἐτεὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἄλλα διὰς ὧθεν. The ὑβρίζει, then, is the pleasure of humiliating another, and therefore the ὑβρίζει ἐπιθυμία. It is true, of course, as Aristotle says (Rhet. 1378 b, 1) that all anger is accompanied by the pleasure of hope; but men do not get angry for the sake of that.
νόθες καὶ τῷ παμφάγῳ εἶναι—οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν λογισμὸν—ἀλλὰ ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥστεπερ οἱ μαί—35 τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλαττῶν δὲ θηρίωτης κακίας, φοβε-1150α

μιμορία. The verb συνιστορεῖν 'to lay waste' in Herodotus is probably thinking of the which is described as ἱκανοτάτῳ ἱκανῷ in Part. An. 651 a, 4. παμφάγον εἶναι, especially the which is ἐξετασμένον πρὸς τόσον τῶν ἱκανῶν. Hist. An. 596 a.

οὐ τῷ ἕξει...λογισμόν. This ab- arenthesis adds, as by an after- it, a reason for the statement of the more brutal Sous. It breaks the sentence extraordinary way, but it is theistic of the lecture-style. Itle cannot mean to speak only exceptionally brutal under dis- tant. ἐξέστηκε κ.τ.λ. This goes with εἰ τι δεῖς διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. Negative sense of διαφέρει justifies the meaning that except- y lascivious, destructive and orous γῆν are παμφάγον or λ. For the phrase ἑξιστάμενον φώνει, see this sense, cf. Hist. An. 19 γεναιῶν τῷ μὴ ἑξιστάμενον κάτω φώνει, Rhet. 1390 b, 28 ταῦ τὸ εὔφωνε γῆν εἰς μακρόκερα. Aristotle is thinking, then, of those that have 'run wild' or de- tert. He cannot mean to say ll brutes ἑξιστάμενον φώνει, as rt says. Ἐλαττῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This sen- is little more than a series of ὤς, and we must supply the g links as best we may. In the late, Ἐλαττῶν seems to mean μὲ κακὸν as the old commentators 'Brutality is a less evil than ss,' though in a man it is more ὣς than in a beast; for in a (the words ὅπως ἐν τῷ ἄν-
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ [Η. VII. 4
μὲν ἀκρατεῖ τὸ έγκρατής, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερέων ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δὲ ἐγκράτεια
ἐν τῇ κρατεῖν, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔγκρατείαν τοῦ ὁκαίου· διὸ καὶ αἰρετότερον ἐγκράτειαν
tοιαύτα παραπέμπει. ὡς ἐκείνοι προς ὁ ζελτόλαι καὶ τοιούτων ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνασται, οὕτως μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφών· καὶ ὧν ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὅσπερ τὸ ἰμάτιον, ἡ μὴ πούτησις τῆς ἀφὸς τοῦ αἵματος λυπητη, καὶ μιμούμενος τοῦ ὄρους ὁ θεός οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλοις εἶναι, ἄλλοις δὲ εἶναι ὁμοίως· ὡς ἐκεῖνοι καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἢ Ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀντιπαθείαν, καὶ ἀκρασίαν. ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐν εὐχαρίῳ καὶ ἀναβάλλουσιν ἤδων ἠττᾶται καὶ λυπών, λαμπρότων—ἄλλα συνηγομονικά εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτης Φιλοκτῆτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχεῖος πεπληγμένοις ἢ ὁ

to pain on the part of the ἀκρασία. But surely pains due to the desire for excessive pleasures are not the only
pains. There is a pain of hunger as well as a pain which arises from the unfulfilled desire of eating to excess.
It is with this pain, accordingly, that κρατεῖα and μαλακία have to do.
The ἐγκράτεια is the man who gets the better of a desire for a positive excess of pleasure, the καρτερικός resists the desire for the absence of a positive pain when it is right to do so. It is
strong desire for the excess of a particular pleasant drink (πῶς γαλεῖς ἔχεις, τοιοῦτο δὲ γαλεῖς) that overcomes
the ἀκρασία, while it is ἡ νυφώνα δύναμις, as Aspasios rightly says, that proves too much for the μαλακία.
§ 5. ὁ δὲ ἐλέησις κ.τ.λ. The object of this section is to show that τρυφή is a form of μαλακία, contrary
to the general opinion which represents it as something grand (παρασικόν).

κλειν τὸ ἰμάτιον, λέει τὸ κλαστὸν

a recognised sign of τρυφή.

Plato Alc. 132 b, εἰ δὲ ἐλέησις ἀποβλέψις καὶ τρυφᾶς καὶ ἤταν ἰμάτιον, ἡ εἰρένει κ.τ.λ. Dem.

L. § 361 διὰ τῆς ἐχειοῦ πορευτεῖα

θωμάτων καθεὶς ἄχρι τῶν σφυρών. Academic gowns are sometimes worn now for similar reasons.
§ 6. ὁ μοῦσας ἐδέχεται, i.e. the
standard here too is that of εἰ πελαλ. ὁ γὰρ εἶ τις κ.τ.λ. The apodeis
does not begin till 1150 b, ἐρᾷ ἄλλ' ἔτταται.

ἄλλα συνηγομονικά. For ἄλλα
introducing a parenthesis followed by ἄλλα introducing the main statement, cf. 1137 a, 11 b. The examples which follow are not examples of μαλακία, for the pains are such that εἰ τολμᾷ
would not resist them.
eἰ ἀντιτείνων, sc. ἔτταται.

ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτῆτης. Theodectes of Phaselis, rhetor and tragedian, belonged to Aristotle's own circle, and is often referred to. Like other tragedians of his time, he came from the school of Isokrates, and his chief characteristic was the introduction of rhetorical methods into tragedy. Cf. Haigh, Tragic Drama pp. 434–5. The Aldine scholar tells us that the breakdown of Philoktetes was marked by the words Κώπατο τῷ ἔρχεται χάος. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 803.
καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δὲ ἐτερον ἀποβαίνον, ἀκόλουθος: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τούτων μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικοῖς, ὅστις ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμελήτως ἀνίατος, ὁ δὲ ἐκλείστων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σύφρον. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δὲ ἦταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν.—(τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων ὁ μὲν ἀγείρεται διὰ τὴν 25 ἡδονὴν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τὴς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέροντες ἄλληλοι, παντὶ δὲ ἂν δοξεὶς χείρων εἰναι εἰ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἡ ἡρέμα πράττω, τι αἰσχρόν, ἡ εἰ σφάδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὄργυμον τόπτω περὶ ἐφικτον εἰ τῇ ἐποίησιν αἰ, πάθει αὐ, διὸ ὁ ἀκόλουθος χειρών τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ)· τῶν δὲ λεγόμενων τῷ μὲν 30 μαλακίας εἴδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ ἀκόλουθος, ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον μαλακίας εἴδος. It is not malakia ἀνίατος, for that is not διὰ προαίρεσιν, as we shall see. Strictly it is malakia καθ' ἀμφιδῆτα.

§ 3. τῶν δὲ μὴ...τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. This passage breaks the continuity of the argument, but that is no reason for its excision. It is a reminder of what we have been told of the distinction between the ἀκόλουθος and the ἀκρατία, such a reminder as often occurs in lectures. It is suggested here by the remark ὅστις ἀνίατος, which has called to mind the ἀκρατία 1146 a, 31 which is now solved.

διαφέροντες ἄλληλας, sc. οἱ προαιρομένως καὶ οἱ μῆς. The difference is explained in παντὶ δὲ ἀν δοξεὶς κ.τ.λ. εἰ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. Cf. above, 1148 a, 17 sqq.

εἰ μὴ ὄργυμον. This suggests a sort of ἀκολούθων θυμοῦ (καθ' ἀμφιδῆτα of course) leading to ἀδρας.

τῶν δὲ λεγόμενων, above 1150 a, 19, τῷ μὲν, ἤσ. τὸ φεύγαν γάρ (μετρᾶτι) λύπας διὰ προαίρεσιν, ὁ δὲ, i.e. ὁ διὸς ἔκειν τὰς (ὑπερβάλλους) ἡδονὰς διὰ προαίρεσιν.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

25 ἀν ἢδυ ἢ οὔτε ἀν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προσετή ἄκρασιαν εἶσιν ἄκρασεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτήτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὸ τὸ ἀκολουθητικόν εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

VIII. "Εστὶ δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαθος, ὡσπερ ἐλέξθη, οἷς με-3ο ταμελητικοῖς· ἐμέμεινε γὰρ τῇ προσεταί. οὔτε ἄκρασις μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐκ ὡσπερ ἡπορήσαμεν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος ὁ δ' ἰατός· ἐσκε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οὐκ ὑδέρω καὶ φθόνει, ἡ δ' ἄκρασις τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχής ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχής· 35 πονηρία. καὶ δόλως δ' ἐτερον τὸ γένος ἄκρασιας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λατάναι, ἡ δ' ἄκρασις οὐ λατάναι.

1151 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίων οἱ ἐκστάτικοι οἱ οἱ τῶν λόγων ἔχουσε μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δὲ· ὡς ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἔττιονται, καὶ οἱ ἀπροβολεύοντες ὡσπερ ἐτερον. ὄμοιος γὰρ

Probl. 965 a, 11 διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ αὐτών ὀθέουσα γαργαλίζεσθαι· ὅτι καὶ ὃτι ἀλλο ἤτοι ἐνα προσετήσθαι, μάλλον ὃ ἐν μὴ ὁρᾶ; ὧντις ἑκοτα γαργαλίζονται ὡς ὁ λαδήν τοῦτο πάχαν. The προσετήσει are like those who are tickled unawares; if they had known the πάθος was coming it would not have affected them.

μελαγχολικοῖ, 'excitable,' 'hot-headed.' According to early medical theory excitability of this kind was produced by the heating of the 'black bile.' The word μελαγχολικος was quite common in the sense of 'to be crazy' (cf. Aristophanes, Birds 14, Ploutos 11, 366, 903). Aristotle uses it in the popular sense. The theory of the 'four temperaments,' which makes its appearance first in Galen, in time gave the word a different meaning. Here it corresponds to the 'choleric' and 'sanguine' as opposed to the 'bilious' and 'phlegmatic.' We may gather the explanation of the προσέτασε of μελαγχολικος from de Memor. 453 a, 19 τοῦτον γὰρ φαντάσματα κινεῖ μάλιστα. Now-a-days we say

'nervous,' but Aristotle had never heard of nerves.

VIII. § 1. "Εστι δ' ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ. We now pass from the first question peri ποία ἄκρασις; to the second question πῶς ἔχουσι (1115 a, 5 n.). If we take this as the subject of the present chapter, it will be found that the connexion of thought is sufficiently clear.

ἀποτέλεσθαι, 1150 a, 21. ὡσπερ ἐλέξθη, 1146 b, 31 ἐκ τῶν ἔχουσι. The connexion is quite straightforward; for the subject of the chapter is πῶς ἔχουσιν ἄκρασις τις.

οἱ ἐκστατικοί, i.e. οἱ προσετήσει, οἱ δὲ κακία καὶ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1145 b, 11 n.

οἱ...μὴ ἐμμένοντες, i.e. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς. ἔττιονται, sc. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς. οἱ...γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ἀσθενή, then, possesses the characteristics of the ἄκρασις in the most distinct form and is the typical ἄκρασις. The προσέταση is not the ἄκρασις we are studying just now.
1150b 25]  


1161 a, 11. Cf. EE. 1227 b, 12. τούτων δὲ διωματιμένων, λέγουμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαιρέσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὅρθων, οὕτως ὡστε οὐ ἐνεκα δει προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τις, τὸν λόγον. ἐστὶ δὲ τούτῳ ἐγκράτεια. αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθηρέει τὸν λόγον. ἐστὶ δὲ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἐτερόν. λεκτέων δ' ὅστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὡσεὶ γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὅρθων παράχειν ἡ ἀρετή, τούτῳ αὐτίτων. ἡ μὲν <γὰρ> ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἔσωτέων δ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια. λέγουμεν δὲ προαπορίσπαντες. ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὅρθων ἐναι, ἐν δὲ τούτω πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν διαμαρτάνειν· ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμάρτησαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνον περαίνοντα ὅρθως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ὡς τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν, διὰτε τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὅσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείμενον. οὕτω γὰρ Ιατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἂν μή, ἀλλ' εἰ προσπαίην ἂν μή, οὕτω ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἂν μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαιάσῃ ἂν μή. ὅμως δ' οὖν ἀλλὰ αὐθεντικὰ περὶ τὸν τέλος· ὅσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρήμασις αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἄρχει, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδή δὲ τὸ ὑγιαίνει, ἀνάγκη τοδέ ὑπάρχει εἰ ἦσαι ἐκεῖνο, ὅσπερ ἐκεῖ, ἐντὸς τὸ τρέγωνον δύο ὅρθω, ἀνάγκη τοδέ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν

§ 3. ἀλλ' πῇ ἵσως, cf. κακία της 1149 b, 20. By πῇ we must understand ἡ πρακτική τῶν κακῶν.

ὁσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου. Bergk-Crusius p. 47. —
Καὶ τὸς Δημοδόκου· Μιλήσιοι ἀξιόντει μὲν οὐκ εἴσοι δρώσει δ' ὅσπερ ἀξιόντει.

§ 4. ο μὲν, sc. ὁ ἄρατες.

διὸ τοῖοτος ἔσαι. It is his ἰδὼν that makes them his φανόμενον ἵσως.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν, 'it is, on the contrary, the former that—'. The corrective particles μὲν οὖν mark this as the direct answer to the ἰδὼν.

21—2
15 ἡ γάρ ἀρετῆ καὶ μορφήρια τὴν ἀρχήν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ σῷζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὖ ἄνεκα ἀρχῆ, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἰ ὑποθέσεις. οὔτε δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος δι- δασκαλικός τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ ἀρετῆ ἢ φυσική

νοῆσεως ἀρχή τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πρᾶξεως ἡ τῆς νοῆσεως τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὁρθότητος ἢ δ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ δ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢρ ὁρθὸν εἰς τὸ τέλος ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ οὖ ἄνεκα. ἐστὶ γάρ τάσσα προαίρεσις τυχὸς καὶ ἄνεκα τυχὸς. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἄνεκα τὸ μέτον ἐστὶν, οὐ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ προαιρέσθω τοὶ ἄνεκα. ἐστι μὲν η ὑποθέσεως οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῦτον ἄνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυχάναις τοῦται ἀλλής φυσικής, οὐτ’ ἄνεκα τοῦ τέλους διὰ πράξεως τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρθὸν εἰναι τῇ προαιρέσεως [οἷς] ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τούτω ή τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν τούς τις τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος ἄνεκα πράττει ἀλλ’ οὐ τὶ πράττει. ὅμως ἡ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἀναισθησεως ἄνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαιρέσεις. εἰ δ’ τοις, ἢ ἡ καὶ ἡ κακία τοὺς ἀναισθησεως μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπακτεῖν εἰς τὰ ἀσθενή, τοιούτων ποιεῖ, δηλοὶ δὲ τοις ὕποθεσεως ἄνοιξιν ἄθρωπος. ἦν’ ἀνάγεται τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκείσθεν εἰναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν’ ἀλλ’ ἄναγκη τὰ μορφήρια πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιούτων ή κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετῆ ἐπαινετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσια αὐτῷ καὶ κακὰ οὐ πράγματι οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκείσθεν.

1151 a, 17. ΕΕ. 1227 a, 8 περὶ μὲν τῶν τέλους οὕτω βούλευται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἕστιν ἀρχῆ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις.

We have only to change the acts of the ἀρετῆ and not his character. Therefore he can be cured.

Ἀστρέφ. ἡ ὑπόθεσις, sc. ἀρχαί. The second interpretation suggested by Professor Stewart, though with some doubt, seems to be certainly right. An ὑπόθεσις in mathematics is certainly the assumption of the thing to be proved or the thing to be done from which an analytical proof starts. Cf. 1118 b, 20 ἀναλογία... ὡσπερ διάγραμμα καὶ the note there. It should be added that Eudemus (loc. cit.) certainly took the words in this sense; for he gives as an example εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δὸς ἀρχαί, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐν τοῖς. We have seen already that in the phrase τῶν ὑποθέσεων τοιούτων (1144 a, 24) and εἰ ὑποθέσεως ἀναλογίαν (1150 b, 23 n.) the ὑπόθεσις is the Q. E. F. of the problem, which has to be analysed till we come to a construction which is in our power. Similarly in a theorem the ὑπόθεσις is the Q. E. D. assumed to be true and analysed till we come either to something already demonstrated or to an axiom, or to something contradictory of these ("absurd"), is
which case the contradictory of the hypothesis is proved. This method was first formulated by Plato (Cantor, Vorlesungen 1 p. 189 sq.).

οὕτω δὴ έκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Professor Stewart thinks this sentence “may be thought to point the other way,” i.e. to favour the interpretation of ὑπόθεσις as equivalent to definitions and axioms. But the word ἀρχή, ‘starting point,’ is wide enough to cover the hypothesis of an analytical proof (cf. last note), and such an hypothesis is not based upon any ‘ground’ (λόγος). The figures into which the διάγραμμα has to be analysed are given by mathematical intuition (cf. 1142 a, 28 n.).

ἀρετή ή φυσική ή θεοτή, grammar requires us to supply διδασκαλική ἑστί, but nothing more is really meant than κύρια ἑστίν. There is nothing unusual in a zeugma like this, and the sentence does not force us to believe that ἑθική ἀρετή is able διδάσκειν. As to φυσική ἀρετή cf. 1144 b, 2 sqq. People are born with a tendency to aim at the right end, the right ἀρχή naturally presents itself to them, but ὑθεμόν is required to fix ἄρετι in a certain ἱδρόν.

§ 5. οὕτω δὴ εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὅνων πεπείσθαι...δείν. This sums up admirably Aristotle’s teaching as to the relation between ἱδρόν and διάνοια. It is ἱδρόν (τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι) that makes pleasure the φαινόμενον ἔγγον τῶν ἀκολαστῶν. Then διάνοια formulates this as a λόγος ἑκάτερον τῶν, δείν τοιοῦτον ἑκάτερα πάντα πράττειν (cf. 1140 b, 18).

IX. Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατήσης ἔστω, ὅ ὅποιοῦν λόγον καὶ ὁποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμὲν ἔγγον ἡ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ ἐκ τοιοῦτον μὴ ἐγγόν προαιρέσει καὶ ὅποιον λόγον ἡ ὁ τῇ μὴ ψευδεί λόγον καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, διὸ εἶπεν ἡ ἑπορήθη πρότερον; ἡ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκός ὁποιοῦν,
καθ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὁρθῇ προαιρέσει
οἷς μὲν ἐμέμενεν ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἐμέμενε; εἰ γὰρ τις τοῦ διὰ τοῦ
ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ. ὡστε ἐστὶ μὲν ὁς ὅποιοὶμον δόξη ὁ μὲν ἐμέμενεν ὁ δ’ ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ [ὅ] τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ ἐμενετικοί τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὐδεὶς καλοῦσιν ἱσχυρογρόφωνας, οὗν δισταστοι καὶ οὐκ εἰμετάσειστοι· οὗ δ’ ὅμοιον µὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὡσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ ἱθαυματικῷ τῷ ἀπερακτῷ, εἰσὶ δ’ ὅστερα κατὰ πολλὰ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίας οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατησθ] ὡστε τι εὐπεπότατος, ὅστε ἐγκρατεις· εἰσὶ δ’ οὐκ ὑπὸ λόγου, ὑπὲρ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ἀγνωτοί πολλοί ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἱσχυρογρόφωνοι οἱ ἱσιογρόφωνοι καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀγνωτοὶ, οἱ μὲν ἱσιογρόφωνοι διὰ ἡδονῆς καὶ λυπῆς· χαίροντες γὰρ μερῶν ἔχουσι μὴ μετα-15πεπότατον, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκαρτα τὰ αὐτῶν ἡ ὡσπερ ψηλόματα· ὡστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ εἰσίασθαι ἡ τῇ ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξαισιν οὐκ ἐμέμενον οὐ δὲ 4

οἱ γὰρ τὶς κ.τ.λ. Suppose, for instance, that a man thinks he ought to work a certain number of hours every day, which is really too much for him, are we to call him ἐγκρατῆς for sticking to his resolution though the λόγος is false? The answer is in the affirmative; for the number of hours he works is merely a means to an end, and it is really the true λόγος of the end that he abides by καθ’ αὐτὸ.

§ 2. ἱσχυρογρόφωνοι. The word does not occur in earlier literature.

ἐπεὶ εὐπεπότατος κ.τ.λ. You may change the views of the ἐγκράτης, on occasion, by argument; it is desire that he cannot be changed by. On the contrary, it is just argument that has no effect on the obstinate; to desires and pleasures they are much more susceptible.

§ 3. ἱσιογρόφωνοι. Cf. Phrynichos (com.) Μαντίροστα τ. 1, Ζῷ δὲ Θυμωνί Μινδείαν ἄγγιστον, ἄδικαςτον, ἱσιογρόφωνοι.


ἄκαρτα...ἐπεὶ ψηλόματα. Cf. e.g. Dem. c. Aristocrit. § 92 ἀναψε ἐστὶ τῷ ψηλόματα προδοτικοί γὰρ ἔστην, ὅ νῦν δ’ ἐπέτευχε κελεύει τῷ βουλήτῃ ἐναὶ ψηλόματα. In Attic law ἄκαρτα means "null and void."

ὡστε μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Obstinance is rather a form of ἀκρασία than of ἐγκράτεια; for the obstinate are those who cannot resist the desire for the pleasure of victory.

§ 4. εἰς τὶς κ.τ.λ. We have seen that there are cases of τὸ ἐμέμενον which are not ἐγκράτεια, we now see that there are cases of τῷ μὴ ἐμέμενον which are not ἀκρασία.
άκρασιαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφικλέους, ο Νεο-
πτόλεμος· καίτοι δὲ ἤδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὸν· τὸ
γάρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπεὶ σθῇ ἐπὶ τοῦ 'Οδυσ-
σέως ζεῦς ὕπειδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δὲ ἤδονὴν τι πρᾶττοις οὐτ' ἀκόλουστος οὐτὲ φαύλος οὐτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δὲ αἰσχράν.

5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶ τις καὶ τοιούτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δὲ τοῖς σω-
ματικοῖς χαίρειν, καί οὐκ ἐμέμνον τὸ λόγῳ, ο [τοιούτος]
toúτοι καί τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ μέσοις ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρα-
τὸς τῆς οὐκ ἐμέμνει τὸ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὔτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἦττον τι· ὁ δὲ ἐγκρατής ἐμέμνει καὶ οὐδὲ δὲ ἔτερον με-
ταβάλλει. δεῖ δὲ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέ-
ρας τὰς ἑαυτάς ἐξες φαύλας εἶναι, ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνομαι,
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὅλοις καὶ ὅλας εἶναι 30
φανερῶν, ὡσπερ ἡ συσφυσία τῆς ἀκόλουσα δοκεῖ ἐνιαὐτὸν
6 εἶναι μόνων, οὐτὸ καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλά λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ
σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡ κολουθήτην· τὸ γὰρ ἐγκρατής
ὁ σώφρονι μοιεί, καὶ τὸς ἀκρατή τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς 35
ποιεῖ καὶ ὁ σώφρον, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχειν ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔχων 1152α
φαύλας ἐπιθυμιας, καί ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶχος οὐδὲ δὲ εἰς τὸν λόγον, ὁ δὲ οἶχος ἠδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀγαθαι.
δοιος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἐτεροὶ μὲν ὄντες,
ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ 5
οἴομενοι δείν, ὁ δὲ οὐκ οἴομενος. Χ. οὐδ' ἀμα φρόνιμον καὶ

καίτοι δὲ ἤδονήν. We know already that to the good man at ἔκχων are ἡδείᾳ καθ' αὐτά (1109 π., 7 sqq.); we shall see presently in what sense the good man may be said to act δὲ ἤδονήν.


The discussion of the question πάς ἔχων; ends as usual with an examination of the relation between the mean and the extremes (πῶς ἀντι-

κεινται;) Cf. 1108 b, 11 n.

διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι...διὰ τὸ ἦττον τι, sc. τοῦ δεύτερο τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν.

This new type of character is the man who knows that he ought to take more bodily pleasures, but whose desires are not strong enough. Of course οὐδὲ δὲ ἔτερον is the regular Attic idiom for δὲ ἔτερον.

§ 6. ἡ κολουθήτην, 'it is a natural consequence that we speak of the ἐγκράτεια of the σώφρον.' This is the λόγος of the ἄρομα raised by the fact that some use the terms συγγεγυμνόνωσι (1145 b, 16).

Χ. § 1. οὐδ' ἀμα κ.τ.λ. The
ΑΚΡΑΤΗ ἐνδεχεται εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν· ἀμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἱδής δεδεικται ὄν. ἐτὶ οὖ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικῷ· ὅ δὲ ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικὸς τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν καλῶς ἀκρατή εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνοτέ φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς δὲ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δει
νοτάτα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἐν τοῖς πράτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τῶν λόγων ἐγγὺς εἶναι, δια
φέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαιρεσιν—οὐδέ δὴ ὡς ὦ εἴδος καὶ θεών 15 ῥόν, ἀλλὰ ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἡ οἰνομένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρό
πων γὰρ τινα εἴδος καὶ θοί ποιεῖ καὶ οὔ εἴκει) πονηρὸς δὲ οὔτ
ἡ γὰρ προαιρεσις ἐπικείμενη· οὔσος ἡ ἡμιπώνυμος, καὶ οὐκ ἄθωκος· οὔ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμενεκτικὸς οὐκ ἀν
βουλεύεται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὀλος. καὶ 20 ἐσκε δὴ ὃ ἀκρατὴς πόλει δὴ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἀπαντά τὰ δεόντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίοι, χρήται δὲ οὐδέν, ἀσπερ Ἀναξαγόρδης ἐσκοπῆς
η πόλις ἐβολεύθη, ἡ νόμον οὐδέν μέλει.
ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηρὸς δὲ χρωμένη. 4 25 ἐστι δὲ ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ υπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν

Laws of the dōroda caused by some people using the word φρόνιμος of the ἀκρατῆς (1145 α, 17).

Deductions, 1144 b, 30.

§ 2. Τὰ πρακτικὰ, Ἐκάνε. τὸν δὲ δεινὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 23 sqq. This is one of Aristotle’s long parentheticals. And yet the parenthesis contains the λέων.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον, ‘in definition.’ The difference is that the one is a mere δύναμις, while the other implies προαιρέσεις. If we define the φρόνιμος in the same way as the δεινός, we lay ourselves open to the ἐννοιας, εἰ τι τῶν δὲ αὐτὸ αἱρέσεως εἰς δύναμις διήκειν (Top. 126 b, 4). For δύναμις and προαιρέσεις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 3. οὔ δε δὴ κ.τ.λ., closely with ὅ δὲ ἀκρατῆς οὐ πρακτικὸς above.

ἐκὼν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has already refused to allow that τὰ δὲ ἐπι

θυμάσια εἰσὶν ἀκρατικα. ὁ γὰρ προαιρέσεις ἐπικείμενης. Difficulties have been made about this, but really there is none; for προ
αιρέσεις does not mean only an isolated act of choice, but is often used in the sense of ξίζε προαιρετική. Now, in this sense, the προαιρέσεις of the ἀ
κρατῆς is good; but it is prevented from becoming an efficient cause of action by the fact that ἐπιθυμία is for the time stronger than βουλές.

οὔ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος. Cf. 1135 b, 30. ὃ μὲν γὰρ, Ἐκάνε. ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικός, i.e. ὁ προαιρετική.

χρήται δὲ οὐδέν. This is a standing complaint in the comic poets and Demosthenes. Cf. 1141 b, 27 n.

Ἀναξαγόρδης, fr. incert. 16.

§ 4. τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἔξους, cf. 1118 b, 23 n.
πολλῶν ἐξεως· ὦ μὲν γὰρ ἐμένει μᾶλλον ὦ δὲ ἦττον τῆς
tῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως, εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασίων ἦν οἱ
cελαμπάλακς άκραπτεύονται τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμ
μενόντων δὲ, καὶ οἱ δὲ ἐδισολοὶ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ἱπτὼν
γὰρ ἐκὼς μετακινήσατο φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος 30
χαλεπτοῦ, δι᾽ τῇ φύσει έισεκ, ἔστερ καὶ Εὐλογος λέγει
φημὴ πολυμονίου μελέτην ἔμεινα, φίλε, καὶ δὴ
tαύτην ἀνθρώποις τελεύτασαν φύσιν ἐναι.

5 τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτέρα
καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἐξες αὐτὰ πρὸς ἀλ- 35
λῆςα, εἶδηται.

XI. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολι-
tικήν φιλοσοφῶντος· οὖτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων,
πρὸς δὲ βλέποντες ἐκαστὸν τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ’ ἁγαθὸν ἀπλῶς
2 οὕτως ἔγνωμεν. ἐτί δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαλίων ἐπισκέψαθαι περὶ
αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἁρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἥσικὴν περὶ 5
λύπας καὶ ἱδονᾶς ἐθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι

τῶν φυσικῶν, ἰ. ε. τῶν φύσεων, which
Ramsauer reads.

τῇ φύσει έισεκ, cf. de Mem. 452 a,
27 ὕστερ γὰρ φύσιν ἐδω τὸ ἔθος (‘habit
is a second nature’).

XI. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.
That Eudemos regarded a discussion
of pleasure as a necessary supplement
to the discussion of ἀκρασία is proved
by EE. 1231 b, ἁριθμήτερον δὲ περὶ
tοῦ τέλους τῶν ήδονῶν ἔσται διαφέρειν
ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ οὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρα-
τείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. From this it has
been inferred that the present book is
‘Eudemian,’ but it may also be in-
ferrered that Eudemos followed Aris-
totle’s order of treatment. And the
latter inference is far more probable;
for, as we shall see, the views criticised
are distinctly those of Speusippos,
which must have lost some of their
‘actuality’ by the time of Eudemos.
The connexion of thought I take to
be this: We have found that ἀκρασία
and ἀκλοσία are bad, and that they
are due to desire for pleasure. Are
we to say, then, that pleasure is bad?

τοῦ...φιλοσοφῶντος. The discussion
opens, however, with a general
statement that the political philoso-
pher must consider pleasure and
pain. This is quite in Aristotle’s
way. He is always anxious to show
that he is keeping in view the practi-
cal end of this ἀκρασία, and discus-
sions which are necessary for other
reasons are introduced by a series of
remarks as to their practical bearing
on statesmanship. A notable instance
is the beginning of Book III (where
see notes).

ἁγαθὸν ἀπλῶς. If we say a thing is
‘good’ simpliciter, we mean good
in relation to the chief end. If we
mean ‘good’ for anything else, we
must ‘add’ what it is good for. It is
then ἁγαθὸν κατὰ πρόδεσθαι.

§ 2. ἔθεμεν. 1104 b, 8 sqq.
μεθ’ ἤδονής εἰναι φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὁνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἤδονή εἰναι ἄγαθον, οὔτε καθ’ αὐτὸ οὔτε καθ’ ἄμηβεςκος· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ταύτων ἄγαθον καὶ ἤδονήν· τοῖς δὲ ἐνιαὶ μὲν εἰναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἐτί δὲ τούτων τρίτων, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἄγαθον, ὀμοί μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἰναι τὸ ἀριστον ἤδονην. ἄλος μὲν οὖν ὁκ ἄγαθον, ὅτι πᾶσα ἤδονή γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή.

άπο τοῦ χαίρειν, ὥσις ὡς ἄν εἶται μάλα χαίρεται (Asp. 142, 7). It is quite possible that Aristotle had this etymology in his mind; for it is quite in his style (cf. 1132 a, 32, 1140 b, 11, Bon. Ind. s.v. Etymologica).

§ 3. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not the Cynic view, as is commonly said. In spite of his catchword μανείν μάλλον ἀ ἤθελεν (RP. 217 a). Antisthenes said ἤδονας τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πάντας διωκέοντο ἀλλ’ ἐχεῖ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πάνων, καὶ τὴν ἤδονήν ἄγαθον εἶναι φαύλον προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμελήσετον (Athen. 513). He would therefore admit that ἤδονη might be incidentally good. It was Speusippus who first held pleasure and pain to be two evils opposed to each other and to the good (1108 b, 13 n.). Aulus Gellius ix, 5 ‘Speusippus vetusque omnis academia voluptatem et dolorum duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se.’

toῖς δὲ ἐναὶ κ.τ.λ. This second έναὶ seems to be meant for that of Plato in the Philebus, where ‘pure’ or ‘unmixed’ pleasures (i.e. pleasures not implying pain) are distinguished from ‘mixed’ or ‘impure’ pleasures.

ei καὶ πᾶσαι κ.τ.λ. This is the conclusion to which Aristotle himself comes in Book X, and is in agreement with the conclusion of the Philebus. Cf. 1172 b, 28 sqq.

§ 4. ἄλος μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Six arguments (each introduced as usual by ἄρτι) for the first view, that no pleasure is good. The arguments cannot be those of Antisthenes; for they are Platonic in character and presuppose the Philebus. On the other hand they are not the arguments of the Philebus itself. Therefore they must be the arguments of a follower of Plato.

γένεσις... τῶν φύσων αἰσθητήν, ‘a felt process to a normal state.’ Fritzsch’s conjecture (‘rationem habet abius philosophi, Plato asseclae cuibusdam (Speusippi), qui erat hostis voluptatum et non solum res, sed verba etiam multa a Platonis Philebo in su scripta transliterat’) evidently hits the mark. So too Grant: ‘In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus are here referred to.’ Plato did not regard all pleasures as γενεσίας, but only the ‘impure’ or ‘mixed.’ On the other hand the definition is evidently based on the πληρώσας αἰσθητήν of Phileb. 51b. We find the definition given as sufficient for rhetorical purposes in Rhet. 1369 b, 33 ὡσπερ ἡμῖν εἰναι τὴν ἤδονη κίνησιν τινα τῇ φυσικῇ καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόου καὶ αἰσθητήν εἰς τὴν ἐνάρξεως φύσιν. So too Probl. 878 b, 11 ἡ τι κατὰ φύσιν ὅθεν ἄθροι ἐστιν, ἄρτι τῇ αἰσθητήν.

ei φύσιν. The use of φύσιν in the sense of ‘normal state’ also points to Speusippus. Cf. Clem. Strom. ii, 21 (RP. 288 A). Συνενθίταν... τὴν ἐναρχήν φύσιν ἦν ἐναν τελείαν ὑπ’ αὐτὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν... ὅτι δὴ καταστάσεως ἄπαντας ἀνθρώπους ὑστερέων ἔχειν.
οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενής τοῖς τέλεσιν, οὐν οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φέρει τὰς ἡδονὰς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος 15 τὸ ἄληστον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναὶ, καὶ ὁσοὶ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἶνον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδεμία γάρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοήσας τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καὶ τοῖς πάν ἀγαθῶν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία 5 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονὰς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, σο ὁτι εἰς καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ οὐνείδεζομεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβερὰ·
νοσάθη γάρ ἐνα τῶν ἱδέων. ὅτι δὲ οὖν ἀριστου ἱδονή, ὅτι οὔ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδοῦν ταύτ' ἑστιν.

25 XII. Ὄτι δ' οὖν συμβαίνει διὰ ταύτα μὴ εἶναι ἄγαθον μὴδὲ τὸ ἀριστον, ἐκ τῶν δὲ δήλων. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄγαθον δικῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπλως τὸ δὲ τώδε), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἐξεῖς ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὡστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαινόμενα δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἄπλως φαινομενα 30 τωδε δ' οὖν ἀρεται τῷ δε, ἐναι δ' οὔ τῳ τῷ ἰδίῳ ποτε καὶ ἀλήγχων χρόνων αἱρεταί, <ἄπλως> δ' οὖν: αἱ δ' οὖν ἱδοναι, ἀλλὰ φαίνομεν, ὡσαμετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἐνέκει, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμάρων των. ἢτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἄγαθου τὸ μὲν ἐπέργεια τὸ δ' ἐξείς, 2 κατὰ συμβαθηκός αἱ καθιστάσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἐξείν ἱδειαί

ἐτὶ δ' οὖν ἀριστον κ.τ.λ. An argument for the third ἐνδοξον. These two are dismissed shortly; for they do not immediately concern us at present. Our task now is to examine the thesis that all pleasure is bad per se.

XII. § 1. Ὅτι δ' οὖν συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. We have now three ἐνστάσεις to the first argument, οἴδεμαι γένεσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τέλεις. As usual, the first two are mainly dialectical, but lead up to the third, which is the real λόγος.

μηδέ τὸ ἀριστον. This is added for dialectical purposes. If the argument fails even to disprove that pleasure is the best, it fails a priori to disprove that it is good. This point is taken up 1153 b, 7 sqq., and is the real reason why the third ἐνδοξον is mentioned at all.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position that no pleasure is good because it is a γένεσις and not a τέλος is first attacked by the τότος of τὸ πλεονάχως λεγόμενον. The word 'good' is ambiguous and therefore, even if we are justified in saying 'no pleasure is good' in one sense of the word, we may be wrong if we take the other sense of it. It may be true that no pleasure is ἄπλως ἄγαθον, but it does not follow that no pleasure is ἄγαθον τῶν, and even pleasures which are not ἄγαθον τῶν may possibly be ἄγαθον ποτε. ἀκολουθήσουμεν, 'it will follow that they also are called good in an ambiguous sense.' If a term is ambiguous, it will be predicated ambiguously of every subject. 'Good' is ambiguous, so therefore will 'good ἐξείς' and 'good γένεσις' be.

αἱ δ' οἴδ' ἱδοναι κ.τ.λ. This is a different point. Certain γένεσις εἰς φύσιν ἀληθήσατο which are obviously not good are not pleasures at all, though τῷ τῶν καμάρων and ποτὲ (ἐν τοῖς νόσοις) they appear to be so. § 2. ἢτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This argument is not so dialectical as the last. It depends upon the view of the good as an ἐνέργεια as opposed to the definition of it by the Academy as αἱ ἐξείς (cf. 1093 a, 6 n.). Besides the form of κινήσεως which is merely γένεσις (κινήσεως εἰς νόσοις), there is another, namely ἐνέργεια, which implies that the ἐξείς is complete.

κατὰ συμβαθηκός κ.τ.λ. The pleasures which Speusippus takes as typical are only pleasant per accidens.
Ai Kαθιστάσαι. This term was used by Speusippus (Clem. Strom. loc. cit.) for the καθιστάσεως...δρεῖν ἔχειν and he took it from Plato, cf. Philol. 42 e. Eis de 'εγεῖ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστήσαι, ταῦταν αὐτὴν, καθιστάσως ἢν ἰδίως ἀναδειχθεῖται παρ' οὗ συμερείαν καὶ θρόμον καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. Οὗ γὰρ γενέσεως εἰσὶν οὐκετὰ μετὰ γενέσεως τάσας, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια καὶ τέλος. Οὐδὲ γνωμόνων συμερείαν θρόμον καὶ τὸ τέλος οὗ πασῶν ἐπερῶν τι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. Dio καὶ

need not discuss whether this is or is not 'inconsistent' with Book X, where the ἰδιωτή is distinguished from the ἐνέργεια which it accompanies. Aristotle is dealing here with the argument of Speusippus, and he only modifies his statement so far as is necessary for his immediate purpose.

ἐπεί καὶ ἵνα ἔτην τι...βλέπων, sc. τὴν οἰκείαν, τὴν φωσικῆν ἑπεί... 

τὸ τέλος, sc. βλέπων εἶναι.

οὐδὲ μετὰ γενεσίαν πάσαν, e.g. αἱ θεωρητικαί. Aristotle does not deny that some pleasures are accompanied by a γενεσία, though he does deny that any pleasure is a γενεσία.

χρησίμων, sc. ἱδιωτῆς. We have seen that χρησίμαι (opp. ἱδιοτή) is equivalent to ἐνέργεια (cf. 109b, 33 κ.), and that it was an Academic term.

τῶν...ἀγομένων, e.g. τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, 'the pleasures of those who are being led etc.'

τὴν τελείωσιν...τῆς φύσεως. Here again we have the terminology of Speusippus. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) Ei τελεία ἐν τοῖς καθά φύσιν ἔχουσι.
οὐ καλὸς ἦσσε τὸ αἰσθήτημα γένεις φάναι εἶναι τήν ἱδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέν τον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν, ἄντι δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητήματος ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις ταύτων εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἄγαθον: τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεις οὖν εἶναι, ἔστε δὲ ἑτέρον. τὸ δὲ εἶναι φαίλας ὅτι νοσόδην ἕνα ἱδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ἑνεκείνα ἐνα φαίλα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν. ταῦτα ὅτι φαίλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαίλα κατὰ γέ τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο βλάπτετο πρὸς ὑγείαν. ἐμποδίζει 5 δὲ οὕτω φρονήσει οὐθ' ἔξει οὐδεμιᾶ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἱδονῆς, ἀλλ'  

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέν. The reasons for altering the genus in the definition of Speusippus have been given in full. We expect, of course, that this will involve a change in the differentia; for there is no reason to suppose that the differentiae of the genus ἐνέργεια will be the same as those of the genus γένεια. No reason, however, is given for the choice of the particular differentia ἀνεμπόδιστον. The word only occurs elsewhere in Pol. 1295 a, 35 et γὰρ καλὸν ἐν τῷ ἄλοκῳ ἐστὶν τὸν εὐθαλάσσαν βίον εἰς τόν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Now, as Stewart points out, ἀνεμπόδιστον there is equivalent to τέλειον, and τέλεια and ἀρετή are often used as differentiae of ἐνέργεια. This must have been in Aristotle's mind, but the full meaning of the τέλειωσις of an ἐνέργεια is not worked out till Book X. 

δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show what a very ambiguous thing the γένεια argument is. Some, and (if Grant is right in thinking the Cyrenaics are meant) just the very thinkers from whom Plato took the view that ἱδονή is a γένεια, had asserted it to be a γένεια just because it was good. The reference of this to the Cyrenaics seems to me certain (cf. also Zeller, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 1, 176). It is in Plato's ironic way to take his argument against pleasure from the hedonist Aristippus, and it is characteristic of Aristotle to insist on the equivocal nature of the argument. According to the Cyrenaics the good was to be found only in the feeling of the moment, and feeling is motion rising into consciousness (κίνησις εἰς αἰσθήσιν ἀναδιάδοχην). Since, then, pleasure is the good it must be a κίνησις. But pain is also a κίνησις, so pleasure must be what the Cyrenaics called the λειά κίνησις and compared τῷ λείῳ κόματι, τῷ ὀφρῷ ἄκμη μ. This Plato interprets as κίνησις εἰς φόντων κίνησις εἰς οὖν, by the help of the (Megarian) distinction between γένεια and οὖν. It is therefore quite correct to say that the Cyrenaics held pleasure to be a γένεια just because it was the good. Aristotle points out that what they were trying to express was that it is an ἐνέργεια. It is worth noting that Speusippus had written against Aristippus. Cf. D. L. iv. 4 καταλέκτην δὲ παλαιότερα ὑπομνῆσαν καὶ διάλογος πλέον, εἰς δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους τῶν Κυρηναίων. 

§ 4. τὸ δὲ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. The answer to the fourth argument, preceded by a remark of even wider application. 

τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'is the same as (to say that wholesome things are bad) because (ὅτι) some wholesome things stand in the way of making money.' 

κατὰ γε τοῦτο, 'this does not prove them bad in themselves.' 

§ 5. φρονήσεις...ἔξει. These words are of course used in the sense given
triai, ἐπεί αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον σι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν, τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι δοχεῖν μυθέμαι εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀλ- γείας οὐδεμίας τέχνη ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δύναμεως. 25 καὶ ἡ μυρεψική τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὑψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἤδο- νι. τὸ δὲ τῶν σώφρων φεύγει καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον τόν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τά παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκει, καὶ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰσηγεῖται πῶς ἢγαθάκι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἢγαθάκι πᾶσαι αἱ ἤδοναι, τὰς τοιαύτας ἡ ἥρα καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἄλυπαν μοι, τὰς μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματοιαύτας γὰρ αὐτάς, καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολὰς, καθ’ ἀλλαστατος ἀκόλουθος. διὸ δὲ σώφρων φεύγει τούτας, ἐν ἤδοναι καὶ σώφρωνοι. XIII. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ 1153 ἢ κακόν, ὀμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτὸν ἢ μεν γὰρ ἄπλος ἢ δὲ τῷ τῇ ἐμποδιστικῃ ὁ δὲ φευκτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον

y the Academy. Writing in person Aristotle would have
σοφία...ἐνεργεῖα.
ρὸς δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ. The o the fifth argument. No
ing an ἐνεργεία but only a
The art of medicine makes
able to heal, but it does not
act of healing. For that
also is required. Cf. M.M.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἅλια ἐπεισήγηται
χρῆσην παραβιάσαν ἀλλὰ
For the relation of δύναμις
in art, cf. 1127 b, 14 p.
favourite τέχνα in dialectical
which is shown to be
ρδὲ εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν (cf.
κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle too remem-
passage in the Gorgias. Cf.
κ.τ.λ. τὸ δὲ τῶν σώφρων κ.τ.λ. at raised by the second; third
arguments are all solved by
σοφία, namely our distinction
pleasures good in themselves
and pleasures which are not so. It is
the excess of the latter alone to which
the statements in question really
apply.

ἐφηηται, above 1148 a, 22 sq.
XIII. § 1. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. The
main position of Speusippos is now
attacked from the τέχνα of τὸ ἐναντίον.
The position is thus stated in Aulus
Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus...voluptatem
e et dolorem duo mala esse...opposita
inter se, bonum autem esse quod
utriusque medium foret.' It is
admitted, then, that pain is an evil.

ἡ μὴν γὰρ ἄπλος κ.τ.λ. All pain
is ἄπλος κακόν, though some pain may
be ἄγαθον τοις, e.g. the pain of a
surgical operation. Even that, how-
ever, though incidentally good, is bad
τῇ ἐμποδιστικῇ (sc. ἐμποδιστικῇ), i.e. κατὰ
συμβέβηκεν.

τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ κ.τ.λ. The argument
is based on the rule given in Top.
123 b, 5 ἄγαθον γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢμα
ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, ἀπερ ἢ ἐναντίον
τῷ γένει. Now κακόν is a genus,
and it has a genus opposite to it, namely ἀγαθόν (see next note), therefore the opposite of every κακόν τι will be ἀγαθόν τι.

ἡ φευκτὸν τι καὶ κακῶν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη ὅπως τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὅσο γὰρ Σπευσίππος ἔλεγε, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λόγισις, ὅσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάστῳ καὶ τῇ ἱσόν ἐναντίον; οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅσπερ κακῶν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τάριστὸν τι οὖν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔννοια φαίλαι ἡδονᾶ, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνώπιον φαίλων

and it has a genus opposite to it, namely ἀγαθόν (see next note), therefore the opposite of every κακόν τι will be ἀγαθόν τι.

ἡ φευκτὸν τι κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to add this; for of course both pleasure and pain are opposite to ἡδονία as στίρεις and ἔκος (see next note), but that means merely that ἡ πάθη they are opposed to ἀπάθεια.

ὁ γὰρ Σπευσίππος ἔλεγε κ.τ.λ. This is true, though without the name of Speusippos, is more fully stated in Book X (1173 a, 5 sqq.).

ὅσπερ τὸ μείζον κ.τ.λ. This illustration is inapplicable because τὸ μείζον, τὸ ἐλάστον and τὸ ἐλαστὸν are not instances of ἐναντία in the strict sense. They are not contraries, aet relative opposites’ (ἀντικείμενα ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι), i.e. αὐτὰ ἄπερ εὐτικόν ἕτερον λέγεται (Cat. 6 a, 36). Thus τὸ μείζον is μείζον τοῦ ἐλαστοῦ and τὸ ἐλαστὸν ἐλαστὸν τοῦ μείζονος, and it is only in that sense that they are opposites. The opposition of the greater or less to the equal is of another kind still. Together they make up τὸ ἀνώμορον and are opposed as ἔκος and στίρεις (on the whole subject, see Met. x, 5). It is in this way that badness is opposed to badness and also to goodness (cf. 1108 b, 11 n.); but pointing to cases like this does not get us out of the difficulty; for they do not show that the same thing can have more than one opposite κατὰ γένος, i.e. ἡ φευκτὸν τι ἡ κακῶν as in the present case.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίλει κ.τ.λ. To make his λόγον complete, he would have to say that τὸ κακῶν was predicated of pleasure ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι (on ὅσπερ...τι cf. 1140 a, 7 n.), i.e. that it was its genus. For pleasure cannot be in contrary opposition to the good unless it is either (1) ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, (2) ἐν τῷ ἐναντίον γένει, (3) ἀστέρ γένος. The second possibility is alone in question here, and, so unless pleasure is a species of τὸ κακῶν it cannot be the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν. But Speusippos will not say this; for he would then have to say also that pain is ὅσπερ ἀγαθόν τι. Further Speusippos himself gives γένεια as the genus of pleasure, and the same species cannot be in two genera neither of which contains or is contained in the other (cf. 1140 a, 5 n.). To make κακῶν the genus either of pleasure or pain would be to take the ἀπάθεια for the γένος.

§ 2. Τάριστὸν τι οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 88. This is an argument a fortiori, and is strictly ad hominem. So far from the definition of ἡδονή as a γένος proving that it is not good, it fails even to prove that it is not the highest good. Indeed if we substitute, as we must, ἐνέργεια for γένεια, it will be hard to resist the inference that pleasure is the highest good. We shall find Aristotle’s own teaching about this in Book X. At present we are only getting rid of the idea, which the account given of ἀπάθεια might suggest, that all pleasure is bad.

ὅσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘just as there is nothing to prevent some form of knowledge being the highest good.’ The Platonists say that the highest
a kind of knowledge, though
mit that some kinds of ἔστ
ure bad. This is distinctly ad
w; for Aristotle would not
that any ἐπιστήμη as such is
As a δύναμις. it is of course
τινες, but the προσέρχεσις must
into account. In itself (καθ’
πιστήμη is always of the good
τοῦ ἀτόκου), and only of the bad
ἀπόθεσίς.

ὅδε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The
argument. Εὔδαιμονία is some
unimpeded activity, all plea-
unimpeded activity, therefore
da is some form of pleasure.
pose of this argument is to
that, if we substitute ἑνέργεια
in the Academic definition of
da, as we must (cf. 1098 a, 5
and also substitute ἑνέργεια for
in the definition of pleasure (cf.
13 sqq.), we shall be driven to
cision that εὔδαιμονία is ἰδιων
in clause εἴεν ἡ πασῶν...ἀνεί
τῶν is added to show that the
on is necessary even if we
εὔδαιμονία as the ἑνέργεια of
c ἔξω, i.e. as ἑνέργεια κατὰ τὴν
ἀρετὴν (1098 a, 17).

χρῆν, ‘if you like.’ Cf. 1113 a,

αὕτο τὸ τότε κ.τ.λ. The second

argument. Εὔδαιμονία is a τέλειος
ἐνέργεια, τέλειος ἑνέργεια is ἀνεπι-
δικτος ἑνέργεια, therefore εὔδαιμονία
is ἀνεπιδικτος ἑνέργεια, i.e. ἱδιων.
It is just for this reason that external
goods are necessary to happiness; for
they insure that the activity will be
unimpeded.

πάντως...οἴνοντα. Cf. 1099 a, 7 sqq.
ἐμπλέκονται. This word is only
used here in Aristotle, though συμπλε-
κων is common (1119 b, 30 n.).

εἰλόγως, cf. Ind. s. v.

τῶν τελεῶν. Cf. 1097 a, 38 sqq.

προσδείται, cf. 1099 a, 15 n.

τοῦτα, accusative, ‘that he may not
be impeded in these ways.’ Cf. for
the internal accusative Ar. ‘Wasps’
333 τις γαρ ἐστι οὐ τινὰ σ’ ἐφιγμὸν;
§ 3. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον κ.τ.λ.
We do not know who proposed this
τῆσι. Cicero (Tusc. v, 9) tells us
that Theophrastos in his work de vita
besta (i.e. peri εὐδαιμονίας) ‘multa
disputat quamobrem is qui torquetur,
qui cruciatur, beatus esse non potest.
In eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam
beatam vitam non excitare; non
usquam id dicit omnino, sed quae
dicit idem valent.’ This probably
went with the story of Pericles quoted
on 1100 b, 29 n. We may reasonably
assume that it was a Cynic paradox.
The tropos is often mentioned in Aristophanes and the Orators (e.g. τὸν τροχὸν ἀναβίβαι, ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν στρεβλούσθαι).


ὁ δρόσος αὐτῆς. On the meaning of δρόσος cf. above 1138 b, 23 n. The standard by which we determine whether τὸ εὐκτὸν ἄγαθα really constitute εὐτυχία is their relation to εὐδαιμονία.

§ 5. καὶ τὸ διάκειν κ.τ.λ. This is the argument of Eudoxos, as we shall see in Book X.

ποιμ. Aristotle himself might allow that pleasure was τὸ ἄριστον πῶς. Exactly how, we shall see in Book X.

φήμη δ’ οὕτως κ.τ.λ. Hesiod, Works and Days 763. The end of the second line is φημίζουσιν ἄθεα δοῦ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή. The phrase expresses one of Aristotle's deepest convictions. Cf. 1098 b, 28.

§ 6. φύσις... ἔστιν ἁρώστη. Observe that these are treated as equivalents, as they are in Academic terminology. ἔχει τὰ βεβοῦ. This is a Platonic idea. Cf. Laws 560 b βεβοῦ δὲ τὶ καὶ ἐστῷ καὶ ἔστω καὶ τὰς κακῶς. Cf. also below 1117 a, 4.

τῆς... καλλιρομολαί. On the metaphor here implied, cf. 1135 b, 17 n. παραβάλλεται. This verb was originally a nautical metaphor, παραβάλλειν (ἐκ τῆς καθ.) 'to heave to,' 'come alongside.' Bodily pleasures are the port for which most men steer.

§ 7. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The main point of this argument is as follows. It is admitted that the εὐδαιμονίαν βίος is pleasant; but, if pleasure is not good, it is not a necessary part of εὐδαιμονία. It is also admitted that the wise man seeks ἀληθεία, i.e. that he shuns pain. But if pleasure is not good, pain is not bad, so why should he shun it?
καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῇν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα—
γὰρ ἐνεκα δεῖ ἄν αὐτῆς, ἐστὶν οὖν ἄγαθῶν;—ἀλλὰ
πηρῶς ἐνδεχέται ζῇν. οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὐτὶ ἄγαθὸν ἡ
ἐστὶν μὴ ἡδονή; ὅπερ δὲ εἶ τὸ σπουδαῖον, εἰ μὴ καὶ
ἀι ἐνέργειαι

V. Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
ἐγονοῦν ὅτι ἐναι γε ἡδοναί αἱ ἔρεται σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ
ἄλλοι οὖν αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἂς ὁ ἀκόλουθος, διά τι
ἐναντίαι λύται μοχθηραί; κακῶς γὰρ ἄγαθον ἐναντίον.
ἐστιν γὰρ ἀναγκαία, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἄγαθον
οὐ μέχρι τοῦ ἄγαθοι; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔστων καὶ κινήσεων
ἡ ἐστὶν τὸ βελτίων ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁσῶν.
καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἐστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἄγαθῶν 15
ἄλλη, καὶ ὁ φαιλὸς τῷ διόκειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ ἐστιν,

ἐνέργεια, ἐν. ἡ ἀμεμόδιοστο.

γὰρ...ἀγαθῶν; Τὸ τὰς ὑπόθεσιν.

ηδονῆς.

ηδονῆς;

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pleasures that makes a bad man, but the pursuit of them in excess."

This important doctrine is stated very briefly here, but its real meaning comes out more and more in the sequel. The opposite of excessive bodily pleasure is not positive pain, but merely the negative pain of the absence of that excess (ἡ λύπη τοιοῦτος οὐκ ἡ δύνασθαι τὸν πίπτον), which is not pain at all to any one else. We can now solve the difficulty about the opposition between bodily pleasure and bodily pain stated above (1154 a, 10) by the help of the two ὅταν there given. In the case of the normal man the pain which is opposite to the right amount of bodily pleasure is positively bad, and the pleasure is positively good. In the case of the bad man, the excess of positive pleasure which he seeks is positively bad, and the opposite pain which he shuns is only the negation of that pleasure and therefore not positively bad.

§ 3. Ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a slight anacolouthon in this sentence. The long parenthesis (τοῦτο γὰρ...μᾶλλον) breaks the construction, which is resumed by ὅταν λεκτίον κ.τ.λ. as if εἴπερ had not preceded.

ὁμόν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The necessity of showing the cause of error is especially cogent for Aristotle in view of the conviction which he has just expressed as to the value of popular opinion (so EE 1216 b, ἐξελέγχου ἄνθρωπον τὰ πάντα τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Cf. Eucken, Methode der Ar. Forschung p. 10.

ὥστε λεκτίον κ.τ.λ. I take it that the ὅταν of which we have to discover the αἰτίων must be the view that all pleasure is bad, and I think that this is borne out by the sequel. We have done for the present with the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad, and return to the main subject of discussion, namely the ὁριαί of Speusippus that all pleasure is bad. Now we have seen already that this view is only made plausible by restricting the inquiry to bodily pleasures (1153 b, 33 sqq.) and that again is only possible because most people know no other (1153 b, 33 sqq.). Therefore, in order to explain the origin of the error, we must first show what makes most people give this preeminence to bodily pleasures. Two reasons are given for this, (1) that they are ἄρσεια of pain and therefore appear strong by contrast, (2) that, if the pain is excessive, the ἄρσεια has to be excessive too.

ἡ πρώτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first reason is simply that they remove pain, which the 'unmixed pleasures'
μὴν οὖν δή οτι ἔκρηκθε τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τῶς ὑπερβολῶς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὐσίας ἱατρείας, τῆν ἠδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὄλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδρά δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἱατρείαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαίον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἠδονὴ διὰ δύο ταύτα, ὡς περὶ εἰρήνης, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεως εἰσὶ πράξεις (ἡ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὡς περὶ θηρίων, ἢ δὲ ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δὲ ἱατρείαι εὐδείως, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἡ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνοντες τελευμανὼν κατὰ συμβεβηκός 1154 b 5 οὐν σπουδαίαι. οὐτὶ διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδρὰ εἶναι ύπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ δυναμόν χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δύνας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβείς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβερᾶς, φαύλων. οὗτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς 5

do not, seeing they do not imply a previous pain. The mere contrast with the opposite pain makes them appear stronger than they really are; for we estimate their strength by their distance from the opposite pain and not by their distance from the neutral state.

ἐκρηκθεί, cf. 1119 b, 10 n.
καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the second reason. The first merely explains why bodily pleasures seem stronger than others; this is the reason why the excess of bodily pleasures seems good. It is because they are regarded as ἱατρείας, and it is the practice of some doctors to cure one excess by its opposite. Cf. Probl. 357 a, 2 ὅταν καλὸ ἐκτυπ. τι...ἀπὸ τὰ χρήσιν ὑπερβολὰς γὰρ ἠρώταται οἷον ἡ ἠδονὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπων ἡ πεπέστη ἡ μοῖρα. This is fallacious, as we know, but it accounts for the popular error.

οὐσίας ἱατρείας, sc. τῆς ἠδονῆς.
καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον κ.τ.λ., 'from being seen in contrast with the opposite.'

καὶ οὐ σπουδαίον δὴ κ.τ.λ. We see here that the real question is how all pleasure has come to be thought bad. It is because bodily pleasures, and bodily pleasures in excess, are commonly supposed to be the only pleasures. Now (1) ὑπερβολαῖοι show a φαύλη φύσεως and are therefore bad altogether, while (2) ἱατρεῖαι show an ἐνεργὴς φύσις and are therefore bad in themselves, even though they may be regarded as good κατὰ συμβεβηκός. They are σημαίνει τινὶ ἀκραῖον δ' ὑπό. On the reading and interpretation see Bywater, Contr. p. 56.

ἐκ γενετῆς, the case of ἠδονῆς. The 'morbid' nature is here omitted.

δὲ ἔθος, the case of ἀσθένεια.

αἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Bywater loc. cit. § 5. Εἰτε διώκονται κ.τ.λ. Another reason why bodily pleasures are supposed to be the only ones, and all pleasure is therefore supposed to be bad.

ἄβδια. I see no reason for taking this metaphorically. As Aspasio suggests, a thirst acquired by eating salt fish is βλαβερά, while one acquired by bodily exercise is ἀβλαβεῖς. For 'innocuous pleasures,' cf. Plato, Rep. 357 b at ἡδονὴ δὲ τῶν ἀβλαβεῖς. Pol. 1339 b, 35 δὲ τῶν ἀβλαβῶν τῶν ἡδῶν.
χαιρούσεν, τὸ τε μηδέτερον πολλοὶς λυπηρῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἕτερον ὑπάρχει τὸ ξίφων, ὀπότε καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσιν, τὸ ὄραμα, τὸ ἀκούειν φασκοῦτες εἶναι λυπηρῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἂν συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὑς φασίν. ὦμοιως δ᾽ ἐν μὲν τῷ 11ον νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὐξημένην εἰσπέρα οἱ οὐνομένοι διάκεισθαι, καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ νεότητι, οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δεόνται διά ἱατρέων: καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ σῶμα δακρυώμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρασίν, καὶ δὲ ἐν ὁρέσει σφόδρα εἰσίν. ἐξελαίηει δὲ ἱδονὴ λύπην ἡ Ἰναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἵσχυρὰ: καὶ διὰ τὰ ταύτα ἀκόλουθον καὶ φύσιν γίνομαι. αἱ δὲ άνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀπερβολήν: αὕται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἤδειν καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδεῖ τὰ ἱατρεύοντα: ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἱατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουσιν ὑγιοὺς πράττοντος τι, διὰ τούτο ἢδον ὑποκείει εἰναὶ τοῖς φύσεις δ᾽ ἡδεῖ, ἐὰν πραξεῖς τῆς τούτου ὑποκείεται. οὐκ δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι,—opposed to αἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ, del. δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ. Cf. 1150b, 25 n.

ἐξελαίηει δὲ κ. κ. γ. Aspasios quotes from the Πολεμαῖοι τῶν Θερεφραστού ἐξελαίηει ἱδονή λύπην ἢ γε (surely τῇ ἑν τὰ ἱατρεύοντα, ὅπως ἐπεί τῶν ἔχουσιν ἱεράς ἱεράς ἡμᾶς ἄλλως τοὺς ἱεράς ἱεράς ἐχθροτετούσι χαίρομεν. This shows that Aristotle either wrote this passage or something uncommonly like it. Cf. Introd. § 4 n. 5.

§ 7. τοῦ ὑπομένουσιν ὑγιοῦς. Cf. ab. 1152 b, 35 τῇ ὑπολογίσεις φύσεις καὶ ἔξως. It is the unimpaired part which πράττει and therefore feels the pleasure; but, as the ἱατρεῖα is going on at the same time, we think that it is pleasant. αἱ τοῖς πράξεις κ. κ. γ. Things which stimulate the activity of a given ἔξω (ἢ φύσει) are pleasant by nature, e.g. music is naturally pleasant to a musical nature.
άει δ’ οὖθεν ἤδω τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μή ἀπλὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλ᾽ ένειναί τι καὶ έτερον, καθόθ ψαρτοί, ὡστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τούτῳ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ’ ἱσάζῃ, οὕτω λυπηρόν δοκεῖ οὖθ’ ἤδω τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦ ἡ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἶ, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πράξεις ἡδίστη ἔσται. 35 διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὔ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἄλλα καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονή μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρμῆ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ ποιηρίαν τινά· ὡσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ ποιητός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἢ δειμένη 30 μεταβολῆς· οὔ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὖθ’ ἐπιεικῆς.

9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκράτειας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἰρήνας, καὶ τὶ δικαστόν καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἄγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἔστι τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐρούμεν.
BOOKS VIII—IX.

FRIENDSHIP.

Introductory Note.

As usual, several good reasons are given why a discussion of φιλία should form part of a course on πολιτική, but we are left to guess why it should come between the discussion of Will and Desire and the final account of the Good for Man. That this is characteristic of the method we have seen already (cf. Book III. Introductory Note p. 108, 1152 b, 1 n.); otherwise we might be tempted to think that the proper place for the treatment of φιλία was just after that of δικαίωσις, with which it has so many points of contact, and it might be urged that a transposition of vi—vii and viii—ix would have the further advantage of bringing the two discussions of Pleasure together. The hypothesis, however, is excluded by the fact that φιλία was taken up at the same point of the course by Eudemos. This shows that the present arrangement is not due to any accident of editing, so there must be some connexion of thought, other than that given in the text, which made this the right place for the discussion. Following a hint of Teichmüller's (Neue Studien III, p. 129), we may, I think, give the following account of the matter. According to Aristotle, the growth of φιλία keeps pace with the growth of φρόνησις. The lowest animals care for their young at least at the time of birth, and the higher we rise in the scale of animal φρόνησις (cf. 1140 a, 27 n.) the wider and more permanent does φιλία become, till at last in man it appears as the feeling of union with his kind upon which the family, the state, and all other human associations rest. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 ζωικέ δέ καὶ η φύσις βούλευται τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἰσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ (1) τοῖς μὲν χείροσιν
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

οὖν ἔμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκέν μόνον, (2) τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελείωσιν, 3) ὅσα δὲ φρονμιώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφήν, (4) τοῖς δὲ δὴ ἅλλοις κοινοῦσι φρονήσεως καὶ πρὸς τελειωθέντα γίνεται συνήθεια αἱ φιλία, καθάπερ τοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων ἡνίοχοι, τοῖς τ' ἄρνοι μέχρι τοῦ γεννήσαι καὶ ἐκθέσαι. διότι καὶ μὴ ἐπιφάνεσαι ἱ θηλέατι ὅταν τέκνωι, διατίθεναι χεῖραν ἵππερ ἢνὸς τύπος στερεακὼς ἔμει τῶν συμφώνων. Here we have the different stages of φιλία clearly traced, and these stages are made to depend upon the degree of φρόνησις, or knowledge of the good for one's own kind, which is present at each. In fact φιλία is, we may say, the altruistic use of φρόνησις, a use which is its 'natural' use in spite of public opinion to the contrary (cf. 1141 b, 29 sqq.). We can see, then, how the treatment of φιλία is quite in its right place here, and we shall see later how it leads us naturally through the stages of love for the good as such, and love for our own 'best self,' to its highest manifestation, the amor dei intellectualis. It is, in fact, θλία and φιλία alone that can bridge the gulf between φρόνησις and σοφία, the practical and the theoretic life.
Metà δὲ ταύτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιη ἀν ἔιελθείν· ἔποιη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ’ ἀρετῆς, ἓτι δ’ ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τῶν 5 βιῶν. ἀνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδὲις ἐλούτ’ ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλούσιοι καὶ ἄρχας καὶ δυναστείας

1155 a, 3. EE. 1234 b, 18 Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστι καὶ τούτο τι, καὶ τὸ ὁ φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἡ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἡ πλεοναχῶς, καὶ

I. § 1. ἡ ἀρετὴ κ.π.λ. The reasons given for discussing φιλία are (1) that it is καλὸν, (2) that it is ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the distinction between τὸ καθ’ ἀυτὸ αἰρετὸν, τὸ σὲ ἴκελον and the conditio sine qua non, τὸ σὲ ἴκελον τὸ εἶ. The distinction between καλὸν and ἀναγκαῖον πράξεων plays a great part in the Politics, and is derived from Plato, cf. Rep. 493 c (ἀναγκαῖον δίκαια καλὸν καὶ καλὰ τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀναγκαίου φῶν ψων διαφέρει τῷ ὡς, μὴν ἐναρκὼς αὐτὸ τὸ ἄλλο δυνατὸ δεῖξαι. Ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία is an ἀρετή equivalent to saying it is καλὸν. The two points are then taken in the reverse order: (1) τὸ ἀναγκαῖον §§ 1—4, (2) τὸ καλὸν § 5.

ἀρετὴ τίς. There is an ἀρετή which, for want of a better name, we called φιλία, but that is not what we are going to speak of now. It was not based on feeling (πάθος) or affection (τὸ στέργειον ὦς ὡμολογεῖ), and we are now going to discuss φιλία as a feeling (cf. 1126 b, 19 sqq.). In this sense it may or may not be strictly an ἀρετή itself; it is certainly μετ’ ἀρετῆς, for in its true form it can exist, we shall see, only between the good.

ἀναγκαιότατον. The proofs that φιλία is (ἐξ ἐποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖον to the good life may be reduced to three: (1) it is necessary as supplying its δῶς and also its ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά, (2) it is necessary because it is natural, and ‘nature makes nothing in vain,’ (3) it rather than justice is the bond of the state, and the good life is possible only in the state.

ἀνευ γὰρ φίλων κ.π.λ. It supplies the δῶς (the ἐπ’ ὑμῖν) for good activities.

καὶ γὰρ πλούσιοι κ.π.λ. These are taken as examples because they can choose freely (cf. 1105 b, 21 n.). If we find, then, that they would not choose to live without friends to benefit, we get a strong ἐπίδοσιν.
κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρέει· τί γὰρ ὀφελος τής τοιαύτης εὐεργείας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἢ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπιμετετάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ δὲν ἄν τηρηθείν καὶ σφόντ' ἀνεύ φίλους; ὅσον γὰρ πλείον, τοσοῦτον ἐπισφαλέστατα· 15

2 λεστέρα· ἐν πεπωλθεὶ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οὖνται καταφυγήν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέρους πρὸς θεραπεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλλείπον τῆς πράξεως δὲ ἀνθένιαν βοηθεῖαν, τοὺς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σὺν τε δ' ἐρχομένῳ" καὶ γάρ

3 νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατότεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχει ἐνοχὲ πρὸς τὸ γεγενημένον τῷ γεγνήσαται καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεγενήσαν τῷ γεγνηθέντι, όμοιόν εἰναι ἀνδράτως ἄλλα καὶ ἐν δρυσι

καὶ πλευράς, πόσα έστιν, ἐτί δὲ πώς χρητεύειν τὸ φίλον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεφτένιον οὐδένυς ἢττον τῶν περὶ τὰ Ἡρη καλῶς καὶ ἀρετῶς. τοῖς τε γὰρ πολιτικᾶς ἤργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα τοιεύοντας πιθανόν καὶ τὴν ἀρκετὴν διὰ τοῦτο φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδεχεσθαι φίλους ἐκτοιεῖ εἶναι τὸς ἀδικομεθοῦς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. εἰτ' τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὅ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἔστιν εἶναι καὶ ἄγαθος καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία θέληκα τις εἶναι εξίς. καὶ έκ νυσταρμήθη τοιεῦντας ὡστε μη' ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς (ἀλλ' Ζήκκον) φίλους ποιεῖται· οί γὰρ ἀληθείς φίλοι αὐτοὶ ἀδικοῦσιν.

εὐεργείας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 π.

§ 2. πρὸς θεράπευσιν κ.τ.λ. This clause is obscure owing to the fact that πρὸς has to do duty twice over by a sort of brachylogy. The full construction would be πρὸς θεραπεῖαν καὶ πρὸς βοηθείαν πρὸς τὸ ἐλλείπον τῆς πράξεως. For the plural βοηθείαι and for βοηθεία πρὸς τε see Bon. Ind. 139 a, 2 seqq. The old editors took βοηθείαν as gen. sing. (ob infermiatem aequili Zell), Bekker reads βοηθεία on inferior authority, Susemihl and Bywater both restore the reading of the best mss. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 4, 6

ὁ ἄγαθος φίλος ἑαυτὸν τέτατε πρὸς πάν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῷ φίλῳ.

§ 3. φόνοι κ.τ.λ. If a thing exists φόνει, it must be ἐν ἀτελείᾳ ἀναγκαῖον, for nature aims at the good and ὀθενία μάρτυς ποιεῖ. The fact that the
hen-bird is uneasy if not allowed to sit (cf. Gen. An. quoted on p. 345) is already a sign that filia is a necessary condition of the good life.

**tois ómoun.** 'animals of the same race.' Eudemos says ὄμογένεις (p. 380). Cf. Rhet. 1371 b, 12 ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἄδικον, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοιο ἴθεα ὡς ἐπεὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὅπως ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὅμοιο ἴθεα καὶ ὅμοιο ἴθεα.

ἐν ταῖς πλαίσισι. This is one of the few places in Aristotle where we see a sign of the coming cosmopolitanism. He was himself an ἄνθρωπος.

οἰκεῖον, opp. ἀλλόρα. Cf. below 1171 a, 16 ὀικεῖον ἐντυχεῖται.

§ 4. ὦ ὁλίκη ἐν κτᾶ. The good life is impossible without the πόλις, filia is the bond of the πόλις, therefore filia is ἀναγκαῖον.


τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα, sc. δίκαιον, 'justice in the fullest sense.' I do not think there is any reference to special forms of justice, either ἀδίκεια (Zwinger) or τὸ παλαιότερον δίκαιον (Aspasios), but simply to the general principle ἀδίκεια δὲ πέφυκεν ἀμα τῇ φύλε καὶ τῷ δίκαιον (1160 a, 7).

§ 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν. For the opposition between τὸ (ἐν ὑποθέσεις) ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ καλόν, cf. 1120 b, 1 n. Friendship is not only a means but an end.

θοικά Νικομάχεια

ποιμένες, ἂ τε πολυφώλια δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι· τι τῶν αὐτῶν οὖνται ἄνδρας ἄγαθοι εἶναι καὶ φίλους. αἱματικὴτεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς ὁλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τηθά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτήν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, "τὸν ὁμοίον" φασιν ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον, καὶ "κολοίον ποτε ὄν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δὲ εὖ εὐαντίας 'κεραμεῖς' πάντας 35

55 a, 32. ΕΕ. 1235 a, 4 ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς ἄποψεως ἀνεύρει τινας εἰς τί πλέον τις· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοίον ἐγείρει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον, καὶ γὰρ κολοίον παρὰ κολοίου. ἔγνω δὲ φράτε φίλα, καὶ λύκος λύκον.

φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἄρχην λαβῶντες τὸ

τα. The reference is probably a provisional rendering reached in Lysis 214, a—A passage which, shall see, Aristotle had before composing this part of his—Ἐξομων ἔρα ἄριστα τὼν οἱ ὅ γὰρ λόγως ἠμαῖναι δι' οὗ αἰ τὸ αὐγάλω.

Διαμαθήσεται κ.τ.λ. The ἔρευς are taken from Plato's 214 a sqq. and together form a critical problem. The first is ὅλα is of the like, cf. Lysis i.c. 17 ἄ(οι τοντιτάτης)... αἰεὶ τοῦ τὸν δεῖ χθες ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον καὶ γνώριμον, ὥς οὐκ ἐστήθηκες τοὺς ἄγαλος... Ἐγώνε, ἐφη, καὶ τοῖς τῶν συμφώνων συμφώνωσι ἐστήθνεκας τοῖς αὐθάνει, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ αἰεὶ φιλῶν εἶχα; εἰς δὲ τὸν ὁμοίον περὶ προστέθη τι καὶ τοῦ ὅμοιου ἄλλη καὶ τράπελη. The ἔρευς is that φιλα is of the...

ἐπήγερο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς δρᾶ "καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ αἰδων αἰδοί, καὶ πτωχοὶ πτωχῷ κ.τ.λ.

τὸν ὁμοίον φασιν κ.τ.λ. Ὅδ. xvii, 218 ὃς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοίον ἐγείρει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον, quoted by Plato i.c. with a slight verbal difference. Theophr. Char. xxix, καὶ ἔρθην ἐντός τῆς παραμιας τὸ ὁμοίον πρὸς τὸν ὁμοίον παρονῆθαι.

κολοίον ποτε κολοίον. MM. 1928 b, 9 κολοίος παρὰ κολοίου ἱδέας. Rhet. 1371 b, 15 διῆν καὶ αὐτομαλία εἰμιέται, ὡς "ἡλίκη θλικά τέρτια" (cf. 1161 b, 34) καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοίον," καὶ "ἐρωθεν δὲ θηρί θηρία," καὶ "αἰεὶ κολοίος παρὰ κολοίον," καὶ δοὺ ὄλλα τοιαῦτα. Here Aristotle seems to be quoting from Dorie source (Epicharmos?).

κεραμεῖς. From Hesiod, Works and Days, 25 καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτοι τέκτων, καὶ πτωχοὶ πτωχῷ φιλοῦει καὶ αἰδων αἰδοί.

also quoted in the Lysis i.c. with verbal differences.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

[Θ. 1.6]

tο δόμον λέναι πρώ τὸ δόμον, δο Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κού ἕφι καθήσαι ὑπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἐχεῖν πλεῖστον ὅμοιον. οἱ μὲν οὖν σφῶ τὸ φίλον λέγουσιν. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασίν ἔχει φίλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπίθυμον πάντως εἶναι φιλον, ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐφόν τοῦ ἐροῦ, ἀλλὰ ἐροῦ, οὐθὲν εἰρήνη

ἐρφ ἐν δὲ ὅμοιον γαία.

καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκῆ.

η δὲ μεταβολη εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον. τὸ δὲ δόμον ἐχθρὸν τῷ δόμοι. καὶ γὰρ

κεραμίδας κεραμίδι κοτείνει,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πρεσόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλαις ζώμα. αὐτίκα μὲν

οὖν αἱ ὑπολίμπεις τοιούτων διεστάσαιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ δόμον φίλον,

τὸ πλεόν δὲ αἰτὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται
tοῦ τούτου, ἐχθρὰς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται.

ἀνώτερον, sc. 'in serie causarum' (Bon. Ind. 68 b, 47); for φωσκή is ἡ ἄνω ἐπανών with regard to τὸ πολεμικόν, just as ἡ πρωτή φιλοσοφία is with regard to τὸ φως (Met. 1005 a, 33 ἐπὶ τοῦ φώσκου τὴν ἀνωτέραν). They take φωσκή instead of ἔθικα προφάσει (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.). This explains the use of ἄνωθεν 1144 a, 12.

Ἐφρατεία μὲν κ.τ.λ., fr. 898 Nauck, beginning Τῷ Ἀφραδίτῃν ὅδε ἤρις ἢγεθαθεΐς: The lines more immediately referred to here are—

ἔρφ μὲν δομβρόν γαί', ὅτε ἔχρον πέδων ἄκαρπον αἰχμήν κοτίδοις ἐπεθὺν ἐχθρ'.

ἐφα δ' ὅ σειμον νομίσεων πληροφόρειν δομβρῳ πτερίνων εἰς γαίων Ἀφραδίτην ἐον.

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος κ.τ.λ. Cf. 'Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158 sqq. In

the Lysias 215 e Plato quotes some sayings which are clearly of Herakleitean origin (Kratylos). ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον (τὸ ἐναντίον) ἐκατό τὸν ἄλλον τοῦ ὅμοιον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐχθρὸν ἕφθοι, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν ἰθαμβοῦ, τὸ δὲ προκροὺν γλυκόν, τὸ δὲ δέ εἰρήνα, τὸ δὲ κοῦν πληρόθεσι, καὶ τὸ πληρές δὲ κενώσεως...τροφήν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐχθρὸν τοῦ ὅμοιον οἴδειν ἀν ἀκολουθεῖ.

τὸ ἀντίζημου συμφέρον κ.τ.λ., fr. 46 Bywater. It seems to be fairly well made out (Zeller 1, p. 567 n. 1 ed. 5) that the primary reference of this fragment was to pieces of wood used in building and supporting each other by leaning in opposite directions. The stability of the building is due to opposite strains or, as Chrysippos
ἀρμονίαν" καὶ "πάντα κατ' ἐριν" γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτως ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἔμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ δμοιον τοῦ ὀμοίου 7 ἐφεσθαι· τὰ μὲν οὐν ψυχικὰ τῶν ἀπόρρημάτων ἀφεότισιν (οὐ γάρ οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως) διὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικά καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἢθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτα "ἐπισκεψάμεθα, οἷον τοῖς πότερον ἐν πάσιν γίνεται φιλία ἢ οἰχ οἷον τε μορφήν ὅταν φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδοι τῆς φιλίας ἑστίν ἡ ἡμείς ἡ δὲ μωθήρων ὅταν φίλους εἰναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδοι τῆς φιλίας ἑστὶν

ἐκ δὲ καὶ οἱ τότε κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἑναντίων, ἡ δὲ φιλία ὅταν συνάγεται · οἱ δὲ τὰ ἑναντία φίλα, καὶ Ηράκλειτος ἐπιτημάτῳ τοῦ ποιήσαντε

ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄπλονατο,

οἱ γὰρ ἐν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ἄντονος ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξίωμα, οὐδὲ τὰ ζωὴ ἀνεν θῆλεως καὶ ἁρπενος ἑναντίων ὅταν.

1155 b, B. EE. 1235 a, 29 δῶν μὲν αὖτα δοξά περί ψυχός εἰσί, λιαν τα καθόλου τοι ἐνεργομένῳ ἄλλα αἱ ἡμέρες ἐνεργομένῳ καὶ οἰκείῳ τῶν ψυχικῶν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀνδρεύοντο δοκεῖ τοῖς φύσις ἐνεργομένοις, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοὺς δὲ ἀποτελεῖν μὴ ἐνεργομένοις ἀλλὰ μητέρας τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεριαῖς ἑνοῦσα φιλία· προσοχή ἑνεργομένῃ γούς ἀδρούντας τῶν τέκνων· τοὺς δὲ τὸ χρῆσανταταξία τοιοῦτοι ἐνεργομένοις μέρον. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ἰδὼνοι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἀρχοντα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν· ἡμείς Σωκράτης δ' ἐγράφω ἐλθεῖ τόν πτέλει καὶ τός τρίχα καὶ τός ὅνυχας παραβάλλον, καὶ τὰ μέρα ὅτι ὅπτουμεν τὰ ἀρχοντα, καὶ τέλος

puts it (ap. Aul. Gell. vii, 1, 2) 'opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quaeque fulsa nimx consistere.' But in any case the point lies in the pun 'The hostile is good for us,' 'what disagrees with us agrees with us.'

ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων κ.τ.λ. This is the παλαγος ἀρμοική δεσποτικός δόζον καὶ λόγος (fr. 46, 56) on which see Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158, 159. Cf. fr. 48 ἀρμοική ἀφανίς φαιν. ρίς κρέασιν.


'Εμπεδοκλῆς. For the meaning of his doctrine of "like to like," cf. Early Greek Philosophy, p. 245 sqq.

§ 7. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. These φυσικαὶ προτάσεις are not relevant to the present enquiry, we shall confine ourselves to ἀποταμικαί, raised by θεματικαὶ προτάσεις.

οἱον πότερον κ.τ.λ. This also comes from Lysis 214 d ὅτι τῶν πάνω ἀντίσταται, ὃ ἐμοι ὑποταινόμαι, ὲ ἐπαρέ. οἱ τὸ δμοιον τοῦ δμοιον φιλον λέγοντο, ὣς ὁ ἄγαθος τῶν ἄγαθων, μάχος μικρὸς φιλος, ὲ δ' ἄγαθος ἄγαθος ὀστε ὁ σωκράτης ἔφεξεν εἰς ἄρθη φιλίαν ἔρχεται.

πότερον ἐν εἴδος κ.τ.λ. We shall
find that the answer to this πρόβλημα will furnish the λεῦσις of all the ἀποφασι.

ὅτι ἐπιδεχέται κ.τ.λ. The question at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference. According to Plato, Phileb. 24 e ὅποιον ἢ ἄλλο τὸ τὰ καὶ τὸ ἄναλλον τὰ καὶ τὸ ἄναλλον τὰ τὰ καὶ τὸ ἄναλλον τὰ τὰ, καὶ τὸ ἀναλλόν τὰ τὰ, καὶ τὸ ἀναλλόν τὰ τὰ, καὶ τὸ ἀναλλόν τὰ τὰ. This doctrine Aristotle fully accepts, and it follows from it that difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἦττον is not ὑπόστασις, cf. Pol. 1259 b, 36 ὁδὸν γὰρ τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον ὁλὸν τὰ διαφέρει... τὸ ἀναλλόν καὶ τὸ ἀναλλόν ὁδὸν (ὡς, εἰδή διαφέρει). But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude specific difference, though it may exclude generic, cf. Part. An. 644 a, 18 διὰ διαφέρει... κατὰ τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον, τοῖς ἀπέχειται ἡ γένει. If anything can be ‘more or less’ something, it must be that thing, but there is nothing to prevent the ‘more’ being a different species from the ‘less’ under certain conditions.

δέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ μέσον cannot be εἰσόρατο, this can only be in cases where, as Plato would say, τὸ στέρα is ‘mixed,’ with τὸ ἀναλλόν, i.e. where there is some λόγος or determinate ratio constituting a form (ἐίδος). The most instructive example of this is furnished by musical ‘intervals.’ It is true that the genus φόντον admits of τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἦττον, and we might conclude from this that it can have no specific differences. But this is to leave out of account the fact that ἀναλλόν, the δύναμις κριτική, cannot distinguish any interval less than the δίσεις. The μεσότης of ἐκεί and ἐκεῖ may be a little ‘more’ or ‘less,’ the note may be slightly ‘flat’ or ‘sharp’; but it remains specifically the same note. So too with colours. They are all generically one, and their genus has the εὐδοκίας white and black corresponding to δέκα and βάρος in the musical scale. But ἀναλλόν cannot distinguish an infinite number of colours between white and black. There are a certain definite number of λόγοι or proportions of white and black which sight can distinguish, and mixtures a little more or a little less are referred to these λόγοι, which therefore constitute the ἐκδοχα χρώματι. Red is specifically different from green, in spite of the fact that it is whiter. In de Sens. 446 a, 1 Aristotle illustrates this by the old puzzle of the grain of millet. We do not hear the fall of one grain, nor does it make the sound louder if we add one grain to a bushel.
πό μάλλον καὶ τὸ ἡττον καὶ τὰ ἔτερα τὸ εἶδε. εἰρηται δ' 15 ὑπέρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν.

II. Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκει γὰρ οὐ τῶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητὸν, τοῦτο δ' εἰναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιµον: δόξει δ' ἂν χρῆσιµον εἶναι δ' οὖ γίνεται ἀγαθὸν τι ἡ ἡδονή, ὡστε φιλητὰ 20 ἂν εἰη τάγαθον τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τάγαθον

dokein filon einai). o' d' oide tois suneidaménonen en tais atuxiais dèmouj avis epistein, os eixapatojntas kai prospoioménois, na kathéntai dia tis twn atuxiwn onomalías pálw éuikouménov filian.

1155 b, 17. EE. 1235 b, 13 ληπτεο δ' τρόπος ὡστε ημῖν ἀμα τα τα δεκοῦντα περὶ των μάλλα ἀποδοξεί, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τούτο δ' ἐσται, ἐὰν εἰλάγων φαύνηται τὸ ἐναντία δεκοῦντα: μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὸς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν οὕτως ἀληθῆ ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἕστι δ' ὡς οὖ. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ φαινομένον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φαινομένοι οὐ εἴπερομένοι, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ έρως τοιοῦτο—οὔεις γὰρ ἐρασθης ὡστε οὐκ ἀεὶ φίλη—

ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἱδέος, ταύτη μὲν τὸ φαινομένον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ τὸ βούλομένα, τὸ ἀγαθὸν· ἕστι δ' ἔτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

τὸ εἴδει. Things γένει ἔτερα do not. 

II. § 1. περὶ αὐτῶν, quite general.

'The subject may be cleared up'

gnwrísthntos toû philhtou. So prosleptes was defined after an en-
quiry into toû prosairhtov, boulhtesias and boulhthesias after an enquiry into toû boulhtovn and toû boulhtovn. This
dialectical method is skéfta eis tâs ptóswes, and is here applied to
the próblhma, pòteron polllhkeiv ou

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φιλοθέν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνιοτε ταῦτα. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἢδον. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλων ἐκαστος, καὶ ἐναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὰν φιλήτων, ἐκαστὸν δὲ 25 τὸ ἐκαστὸν φιλεῖ δὲ ἐκαστὸς οὐ τὸ οὐν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διότι ἡ ὀφθαλμίς ἐστι ὁ τὸ φαινόμενον. τριῶν δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐστὶν ὁ φίλος, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀγίων χων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνη ἀγαθοῦ—γελοιοῖς γὰρ ἵσως τῷ οἶνῳ βούλε-
obvious to us because we have the verb 'to like' for this sort of φίλας. Cf. French aimer le vin, but not une amitié pour le vin.

είπερ, 'if at all.'

έκεινον ἕνεκα. This is merely a popular belief the mention of which is suggested by the problem of the φίλας. We must not press it or make it part of the definition; for, as we shall see, it does not strictly hold of all or indeed any species of φίλα. The truth which underlies this ἐνδοτικός is otherwise expressed by Aristotle.

έννοια. On εννοια see below 1166 b, 30. Here it is defined as βολήνως ἄγαθον ἕκεινον ἕνεκα, but something more is required to differentiate φίλα from it.

ἐν ἀντιπεπνοθείς, i.e. εν ἀντιφαίλοντες. Here, as in commercial exchange, supply and demand, action and reaction (τό παῖσιν τό πάροιχον, cf. 1133 a, 15 in.) must be equal.

§ 4. μὴ λανθάνοντα. This is added to meet the possibility even of reciprocal and disinterested well-wishing which is unknown to either parties. If A may entertain such a feeling towards B without B's knowledge, it is equally possible that B may be entertaining it towards A without A's knowledge. This may be common enough, for instance, between writers of different nationalities.

δὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν εἰρμηνέων, sc. τό ἄγαθον ἢ τό ἱθοῦ ἢ τό χρήσιμον. Cf. the definition in Rhet. 1380 b, 35
III. Διαφέρει δὲ ταύτα ἄλληλοις εἶλει: καὶ αἱ φιλώσεις ἁρὰ καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἵσαρπθια
tοις φιλητοῖς: καθ' ἐκαστοῦ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλήσεις οὐ λαθάν-
νουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἄλληλους αὐτοῦ λεγόνται τάγαθα ἄλληλοικ
tαὐτὴ ἡ φιλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἄλ-
ληλοις οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ γίνεται τι αὐτοὺς παρ'
ἄλληλον ἄγαθον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δὲ ἰδιοῦν, οὐ γὰρ τῷ
ποιός τινας εἶναι ἀγαπᾶσθαι τοὺς εὐτράπελους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴδει

1156 α, 6. Cf. EE. 1236 a, 16 sqq. ἀνάγκη ἁρὰ τρία φιλίας οἴο
ὲλα, καὶ μῆτε καθ' ἐν ἀπάσας μη' ὡς εἶδη ἕνος γένους, μῆτε πάμων
λέγονται ὑμνώμ. πρὸς μῖαν γὰρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὡσπέρ
τὸ λατρείαν. καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπηρέτητοι λατρείαν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὁργαν
καὶ ἐργα, ἀλλ' σοφίας τοῦ πρώτου. πρῶτον δ' οὐ λόγος ἐν ἅλλω ὑπάρχει.
οἰον ὁρόν ὁμοιότατον. ἐκ τοῦ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἱεροὰρ ἐκ τοῦ του ἱεροῦ
λόγω ὡς ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ὁργανοῦ. ἐξετεῖται μὲν ὁποιοι κατ' ἐπιτοκοῦ τὸ πρῶτον
διὰ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι [τοῦ] πρῶτῳ λαμβάνομαι καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου,
tοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ψεύδος. ὡστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ λέγονται παρ'
ἀποδιδόναι τα φαινόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόζοντος ἐνὸς λόγου ὥσ

ἐστιν δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βοηθεῖν τινα δ' ὠλεῖν ἔκεινα ἕκαστο μὴ
ἀντίοι, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικῶν
eνα τούτων. φιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν δ' ἐννοεῖν καὶ ἀντιφιλήσεις. λέγομεν δὲ φιλεῖν
ἐίναι οἱ ὁστα ἔχειν ὁμοίως τοῦτο ἄλληλοι.

III. § 1. ταύτα, etc. τὰ φιλητά,

i.e. τὸ ἄγαθον, τὸ ἱδο, τὸ χρήσιμον.

The inference from the πτώσεις is marked by the particles ἀρα, δή.

οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the different species of φιλητά furnish us with a
dιαφορά τοῦ γένους βοηθητής ἄγαθον
ἐν ἀντιτεστικῶς μὴ λαθανὼσα.

There cannot be three εἰδῆ φιλίας unless they are differentiated by
dιαφοράι, which are diaphora of this
génos. So Aristotle proceeds to show
that each species of φιλία is βοηθητής
tος ἄγαθον etc.

ταύτη ἡ φιλοῦσιν, i.e. the φιλία

which has τὸ ἴδον for its object is, if we may coin the phrase, βοηθητής τοῦ
προὶ ἱδονῆς ἄγαθον. On the other hand,
if the φιλητά is τὸ ἄγαθον, it will be 
βοηθητής τῶν πρὸς ἱδονῆς ἄγαθον.

οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς is explained by

κατὰ συμβεβηκός below. We wish
such a friend to be rich, for instance,
not because we believe such riches to
be a necessary χρήσιν for the full
development of his nature, but for
what we hope to get out of him.

οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιός τινας εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

We must supply αἱ δι' ἱδονῆς φιλοῦσι
as subject to ἄγαπων, for it would
be quite possible to love witty people
to the ἄγαθον. Wit is an ἅρητη, a
part of καλοκάθαρσις, and might there-
fore be πρὸ τοίου φιλητάν ἡ ἄγαθον.

In that case we should love the wit
to the ἄγαθον τινα ἔλαι.
δι. οί τε διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλούντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ στέργουσι, καὶ οἴ δὲ ἠδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἤδυ, καὶ 15 ἡ ὁ φιλούμενος ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἡ χρήσιμος ἡ ἠδονή. κατὰ δὲ βεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταὶ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐστὶν ὁσιάστων ὁ φιλούμενος, ταῦτα φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἡ πορίξουσιν ἐν ἀγαθῶν τε αἱ ὁδοὺν εὐθείαν εὐθείαν δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται ὑπὸ διαμενώντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· εἰ δὲ μηκέτι ἢδεῖς λέγοιμεν 20 τὸ φιλούμενον δὴ, παῦσαντα φιλούντες, τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ ἔνει, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτέ ἀλλὰς γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δὲ 6

<τὰς> ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὖν ὁμοίως εἰσίν· ὅταν ἡ πρώτῃ μὴ ἐφαρμότητι, ὡς ὁδοὺν καθόλου ἀν, εἴτε ἢδι, οὐδὲν εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασιν· ἐστὶ δὲ τὰλλα ἐδοξήθη φιλίας. ἢρ ῥηθέντων ἡ ἢδη, ἐπεί οὐδὲν διώρισται τριχώς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν, γὰρ διώρισται δὲ ἄρετὴν, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἢδυ. αὐτῶν ἡ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐστὶν ἢ [διὰ] τῶν πλεῖστων φιλίας· γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλότριοι, καὶ μέχρι τούτων ἡ παρομία.

Γλαυκ., ἐπίσκουρος ἀνήρ τόσον φίλος ἐσκε μάχηται,

οὐκετὶ γιγαντιασώσιν Ἀθηναίοι Μεγαρασ—

ἐδ' ἢδονήν τῶν νέων· τοῦτον γὰρ αἰσθήσιν ἔχοντα· διὸ εὐμετα-φιλία ἡ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἢδι κατὰ τὰς ἔλλειχ ἄλλες καὶ τὸ ἢδυ· ἢ δὲ κατ' ἄρετὴν τῶν βελτίωτον.
φιλοί ἴσοι, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς ὀσοφὴς τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκείνα. μάλιστα δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταῖς ἡ τοιαύτη δο-4 25 κεῖ φιλία γίνεται (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἦδον οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διάκοκουν ἄλλα τὸ ὕφελμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὡς οὐκ τῷ συμφέρον διάκοκουν. οὐ πάντως δὲ οἱ τοιούτοι οὐδὲ συζώσας μετ' ἄλλων ηδέ τὸν ἐν ὦθειν ἤδεις οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέομεν τῆς τοιαύτης ὀμολογίας, εὰν μὴ ὕφελμοι ὤσιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 30 γὰρ ἐσιν ἤδεις ἐφ' ὦθειν εὐποίδαι ἐξουσίων ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταῦ- τας δὲ καὶ τῆς ἔννοιας τιθέασιν. ἢ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' 5 ἡδονῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζωῆς, καὶ μάλιστα

Φανερῶς δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὑπὸ τὴν πρώτη φιλία, ἡ τῶν ἁγάθων, ἤτιν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροσώπησις πρὸς ἄλληλους. φιλοὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλοεμενὸν τῷ φιλούντων, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλομένῳ καὶ ἀντιφίλοι. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώπων μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία—μόνον γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπισκέψεως—ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς θρησκεύσις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ µικρὸν τι φαίνεται ἐννοῶντος ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμέρων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸ προσώπον φιλούν ἁράδοις τῷ προσώπως, καὶ ὡς οἱ μαντεῖς τᾶς συνεργείας καὶ βεβαιότητας ἀρέσκοντο. καὶ οἱ φαίλοι ἂν εἰς φίλοι ἀλλήλους καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ Ἴδον. ἢ δὲ ἢ ἡ πρώτῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὐ φαίλοι φίλους εἶναι—ἀδικοχθεὶς γὰρ ὅ γε φαίλοι τὸν φαίλον, οἱ δ' ἀδικοχθεὶς οὐ φιλοῦσιν σφαίρας αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦσι μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτῃ φιλιαν, ὅτι τὰς γε ἐπέφηβος ἐβέβηκεν καλοῦν. δι'

§ 4. ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις, cf. Rhet. 1389 b, 36 πρὸ τοῦ συμφέρον ζῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλ' ὡς πρὸ τὸ καλὸν μάλλων ἢ δι' ἂν τὸ φιλούντων εὑαί, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἄγαθων έστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἄγαθων. The ήθοσκοι here reminds us once more of the New Comedy with its typical old men and young men.

οὐ πάνω...συμβλητοῖς. "are not much given to simulating." Cf. Ind. s. v. οὐ πάνω.

τὴν ἑνικήν. A merchant will not necessarily introduce his "correspondent" from a foreign country to his family or his club. A Hellenic called his ἐξων by the name of φίλοι, but clearly this is διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον.

§ 5. τῶν νέων. For the ἱδρος cf. Rhet. 1389 a, 2 οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἁγάθα εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικά καὶ οὐδὲ ποιοῦν ὅν ἐπιθυμητικά. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμητών μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσεις εἰς τὸ περὶ τὰ ἀφορεῖται καὶ ἀραξεῖν ταῦτης, εὐμεταβάλλω τὴν καὶ δὲ ἑκείνος πρὸς τὰ ἐπιθυμής, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμητοῦ ταχέως δὲ παύομαι οὗτος γὰρ αἱ βουλήσει καὶ οὐ μεγάλα, ἄλοιποι αἱ τῶν καρδιών δίσχοι καὶ πεύκη...καὶ μᾶλλον αἰρόμενοι πράπτετε τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφεροντῶν τῷ γὰρ ζῴων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ...καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλούμενοι τῶν άλλων ηλικίων διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ σύζων καὶ καθὼς πρὸ τοῦ συμφέρον κρίνειν μεθένω, ὡστε καθ' ἄλλας φίλοις.
Διώκεται τὸ ἤδυ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρὼν, τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπτομένης καὶ τὰ ἤδεα γίνεται ἐτέρα. Διὸ ταχέως γίνονται ἡλίου καὶ παύονται ἅμα γὰρ τὸ ἤδει ἢ ἡ χρία μεταπτομένη 35 πτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡλικίας ἡτανάκις καὶ μεταβολή, καὶ ἐρωτήται Εν πειράται δὲ οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δὲ ἤδονῇ τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως· διόντες γὰρ ταχέως καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπτομένες. Συνήμερευεν δὲ καὶ συμίτην ὅποιον βουλόνται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν 5 ἡμέραν ὁδόν.

Τελεία δὲ ἦστιν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμέρα καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὅμοιον. ὃντι γὰρ τὰ γαύδα ὅμοιος βουλόνται ἀλλήλους ὑπομένουν ἀλλήλους ἀλλήλους ἀλληλονικὸν ἔχουν, ὅπως καὶ ἀλλιώτως ἀλλιώτως· ὥστε δὲ οἱ δὲ κατὰ τούτῳ ἐργάζονται ἀλλήλους. Τό μὲν οὖν οἰκεῖος μὸνον ἔλεγεν τὸν ἡμέραν βιώτησαν τὰς ἄλλακτας ἔσται, καὶ παράδοτα λέγειν ἀναγκαίον· καθὼς ἐνάντια δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀποκαλοῦσαι· λέγεται δὲ τούτων ὁμώς, ὅτι ἐτί καὶ μὲν ὁ διὰ τὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡμέραν, ἐστὶ δὲ όσον τάσσεται, οὕτως ὁμοιός καὶ ὁ οὗτος ἠχότατος πρὸς ἐκείνος, οὕτως κατά ἐν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἐν.

1156 β, 7. ΕΕ. 1236 b, 27 ἔστι δὲ ἀκριβῶς ἁγαθῶν καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἠδονός τό αὐτὸ καὶ ἁμα, ἀν μὴ τί ἐκμετάλλευσε, δὲ ἀληθινός φίλος καὶ ἁματος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἦστιν, ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὃ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀκριβῶς ἀναγκαίον· (ἀγάπη δὲ ἐστὶν) τοιοῦτος· ὡς γὰρ βουλεῖται τις δὲ αὐτὸν ἔχεις τάσσεις, ἀναγκή καὶ

§ 6. Τελεία δὲ ἦστιν κ.τ.λ. The friendship of the good is distinguished from the other two by being telēos τι. We have seen that φίλος exists φόινος (1155 a, 16 n.) and is therefore capable of growth or evolution. By calling the friendship of the good τελεία, Aristotle means to say, in accordance with the strict use of the word, that the growth is complete and that the 'form' (εἶδος) of φίλος is realised in it so that none of it is left out (τὸ τέλεον = ὁ μικρότερος εἶδος). It is, in fact, 'full-grown' φίλος, as a τέλεως ἀνήρ is a 'full-grown' man. We can now see why the ἄτελειος φίλος were shown at length to be characteristic of youth and age; the one is underdeveloped, the other is past its prime. Eudemos has worked out this point more fully. Cf. 1236 a, 16 sqq., quoted on p. 356.

καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὅμοιον. As φίλος is ἐν ἀντικειμενικῷ (1155 b, 33), it is necessary to make it clear that the τελεία φίλος implies the goodness of both parties. It is only then that the βούλησις ἁγαθοῦ ἢ ἁγαθοῦ can be reciprocal.
αγαθοί, αγαθοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ καθ’ αὐτοὺς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τάγαθα
τοῖς φίλους ἐκείνων ἐνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δὲ αὐτοῖς γὰρ
οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμεῖνει οὖν τ’
τούτων φίλων ἐνυ πάντας ὅσις, ἡ δ’ ἀρετή μόνῳ μοι, καὶ οὕτως
ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγάθος καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ καὶ
ἀπλῶς ἀγάθοι καὶ ἀλλήλως ἀφελιμοί, ὡμοίοις δὲ καὶ

καθ’ αὐτοὺς, ’essential,” not merely κατὰ συμβεβηκός or in so far as they may be ‘some good’ to one another. The disinterested character (ἐκείνων ἐνεκα 1155 b, 31) of true φίλων depends upon the φιλοίων, not in relation to the φίλων (τῷ φίλωντι), but καθ’ αὐτοὺς, for βουλόμενοι τάγαθα διὰ ἀλλήλους ταύτῃ γίνεται (1156 a, 9).

δι’ αὐτοὺς, here as often a reflexive pronoun, more emphatic than δι’ αλλήλων. They love (οὗτος ἔχοντες i.e. φιλοίων for ‘each others’ own selves,’ in other words each loves ἡ δ’ φιλοίων ἐστι, ‘for what the object of his love is’ (1156 a, 16).

διαμήνυσιν ὅν κ. τ. λ. A thing cannot be ‘complete’ unless it has sufficient time to develop fully (cf. ἐν βίῳ τελείοι 1098 a, 18 ὁ); for all κίνησις is in time. We now see why it was shown above that the διελθεὶς φιλαῖ are

εὐδαιμονίας (1156 a, 19). That which is really τέλειον must be τέλειον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον (1156 b, 33).

ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ μόνῳ. Cf. 1100 b, 11 sqq., and contrast 1156 b, 21 τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον ὁπι διαμάκης, ἀλλ’ ἐσοντες ἔλεε γίνεται, καὶ 34 τὰ ἔλεος γίνεται ἐπερα.

καὶ ἐστιν κ. τ. λ. This continues the proof that such φίλων is ‘complete.’ Since τὸ τέλειον is ὁμοίως ἐξω, ‘complete’ φίλα must include the incomplete or undeveloped forms of φιλία. The good, therefore, must be (1) good, (2) good for one another, (3) pleasant, (4) pleasant to one another.

καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀφελιμοί, i.e. (3) good for one another. This φίλα therefore includes the advantages of φιλία ἀλλ’ τὸ συμβέβηκέναι ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ηύδεις, i.e. both (3) ἀπλῶς and (4) τῷ φίλῳ.
καθ' ἡδονήν, equivalent to ἡδεῖα, more often πρὸς ἡδονήν.

οἱ οἰκεῖοι...καὶ αἱ τουατεῖαι, ‘his own acts, and (therefore) acts like them.’ If a colour is pleasant, it will be pleasant when reflected in a mirror.

οἱ αὐτοὶ ἡ ὡμοια. The acts of one good man are ‘the same as or similar to’ those of another, and therefore pleasant to him. This friendship, then, includes the advantages of ἀλλός διὰ τὸ ἠδό.

§ 7. Ἡ τουατή δὲ κ.τ.λ. If I am right in my interpretation of this section, it is not a duplicate of the last. It puts the whole matter in a more scientific form and shows that all four advantages of friendship not only belong to the friendship of the good, but belong to it καθ' ἀντίθεν, and that this is the reason of its permanence.

συμβάλλει, intrans. ‘join,’ ‘meet,’ cf. 1157 a, 34.

πάσα γὰρ φιλία κ.τ.λ. It is not necessary to mention τὸ χρήσιμον, for it is not φιλοτέμον. It is sufficiently provided for by the qualification τὸ φιλοτέμον.

ἡ τῶν φιλοτέμων καὶ καθ' ὕμωμετα τῶν, ‘either for pleasure simply or for pleasure to the lover, i.e. pleasure depending on a similarity.’ I delete the comma after φιλοτέμον with Grant, though I do not adopt with him the interpretation of Aspasios. The meaning, I think, is that friendship is either δι' ἡδονήν ἀπλῶς, as for instance the friendship of kings for εὐπράτελοι (cf. 1156 a, 12 n.), or it may be δι' ἡδονήν τοῦ, i.e. It may be based on the fact that activities ‘the same as or similar to’ our own are pleasant, for instance the friendship of bad men who ‘rejoice in each other’s badness’ (cf. 1159 b, 10). The first kind is based upon pleasure as such, and may exist between the most unlike persons; the
second is based on a pleasure which can only be felt by a like person on recognising acts like his own. Aspasios, followed by Grant, takes καθ’ ἀμωψτήρα in the sense of ‘metaphorically,’ by analogy (cf. Ind. s.v. ἀμωψτήρα), but this would imply the doctrine that friendship δεὶ ἤδη ἐπιλογίζεται was true friendship, whereas from 1158 b, 6 we see that all friendship based on pleasure is only φίλα καθ’ ἀμωψτήρα. On the other hand, to put a comma after φιλεῖν with the other editors would make Aristotle say that all friendship is based on similarity, which would be to prejudice the λογία of the ἀμωψτήρα stated 1155 a, 32 seqq., and that in a manner inconsistent with the λογία actually given below.

ταύτῃ...καθ’ ἀντίκους. Strict grammar would require either ταύτῃ...καθ’ ἀντίκους ἢ τούτους...καθ’ ἀντίκους, but the change from the abstract to the personal is in complete accordance with Greek idiom, being in principle the same as the use of αὐτός in reference to the name of a town. All the four advantages belong to this φίλα, and that too essentially and therefore permanently.

ταύτῃ γάρ ὅμοιοι, sc. ἡ ἄνθρωπος. Both being good they will be ἄνθρωποι, as shown above. The reading I have adopted has far the highest authority (K* Ι. Ἀσπ.), and makes excellent sense if we only put a comma after it. The other reading ταύτῃ δὲ ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ λογία (‘and the remaining εἰς ὅλας are like it’) is mentioned by Aspasios and is plainly accommodated to his erroneous interpretation of καθ’ ἀμωψτήρα above. For the sense given to ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι, cf. 1157 b, 2 where it can hardly mean anything else.

καὶ τὰ λογία, the remaining two of the four advantages enumerated above, explained by τὸ τε ἀπλάνω ἄγαθον καὶ ἢδι ἀπλόν. Hitherto καὶ τὰ λογία has been taken either as an accusative limiting ὅμοιοι, or as the subject of ὅμοιοι.

ἔστω. My interpretation of course makes it necessary to give ἔστω the full force of ἔστων τινί ὑπάρχειν. This is quite in accordance with Greek idiom, which repeats a compound verb by the corresponding simple one.
§ 9. Βούλησις...φιλία, i.e. εὔνοια, cf. 1155 b, 33.
IV. § 1. Αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. A comparison between the δρείει πλοίων and τελεία φίλης gives the answer to the question whether there are more ἔθη φιλίας than one. Strictly speaking there is only one; the rest are only ἔθη πλοίων καθ’ ἄλλην ἄλλην. But, as current language calls these φιλία also, it will be best for us to do so too. There are then three ἔθη φιλίας in the popular sense of the word.

καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ, the remaining ὑπάρχουσα, viz. good and pleasure both simpliciter and τῷ φιλοῦσι.
καὶ κατὰ πάντα κ.τ.λ., ‘and in respect of them all each gets from each the same and similar things.’

ομοίωμα...ἐκα, but only in the sense of having ταύτα τι, the sense in which παρέχεσθαι is said in Pol. 1339 b, 35 ομοίωμα ἔχειν τῷ τέλει, because both imply pleasure. It is not even a ομοίωμα like that between things which are εἰδή ἐστιν, but admit of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦστον (cf. 1155 b, 14 n.), they are not ‘like’ in the sense that white lead is ‘like’ snow. For we must not infer from Aristotle’s mention of εἰδή which admit of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦστον that he meant to apply this to φιλία. They were only adduced to show that the argument adduced (by Speusippos?) was insufficient.

καὶ ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς κάθ’ ομοίωτητα φίλοις.

μένονι. ι.κ. has διαμένων, but the compound is referred to by the simple verb, cf. 1156 b, 23 n.

ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται κ.τ.λ. The forms of φιλία in which the two parties do not get the same thing from one another are discussed in Book IX and there for the first time get the name of ἄμοιον ἐλαίῳ φιλία (1155 b, 33).

All the φιλία discussed in this book are ομοίωμα and are further subdivided into φιλία (1) ἐν ἑσυχίᾳ, (2) καὶ ἄμοιον.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The ομοίωμα to true φιλία is most complete when there is reciprocity not only of pleasure but of the same pleasure.

Αγηθοῦσι δὲ κ.τ.λ., suggested by Plato, Symp. 183 e ποιηθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶν ἔκεινον ὁ ἐρατής ὁ πάνθημος, ὁ τῶν σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρωτόμενος. γαρ οὔθε μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχή καθίσταται. γάρ τοῦ ἔρατος ἄνθρωπος σωμάτων ὁ σύμμαχος ἔρωτος ἔχειν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔρατος δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνον ὁ τῶν ἄνθρωπων καθίσματος. οὐ δὲ τοῦ ἔρατος ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶν.

§ 2. Ὁ τύπος φίλος, less even than those who exchange different pleasures. Of course ὁ τύπος goes with διαμένων as well as φίλοι.
µηδέτερον ὑποφείξεν, 'one who is neither good nor bad to a person of any character you please.'

ἐνποτίσι, the reciprocal reflexive, an emphatic ἀλλόμουν. Cf. 1156 b, 10 π. ἀδιάβλητος. The proper meaning of διαβλέπων is 'to set at variance,' 'to estrange.' The meaning 'to misrepresent,' 'slander' is secondary.

τὸ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ., 'the sayings πιστεύειν ('I trust him') and ὀδηγεῖσθαι ἀν ἀδιάβλητος ('He would never do me wrong').

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν τούτῳ ἀδιάβλητος.

§ 4. ἔπει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'I say ἐν ταῖς ἐπεξεργάσεις (sc. φιλοσ.) for, since people call them φιλοσ., we may do so too,' though strictly speaking only the friendship of the good, as τελεία φιλεία, deserves the name. But, if we use the word in this comprehensive way, we must allow more ἐπιθυμίαι than one. Eudemos is at pains to point out exactly where the unity of these different φιλείαι lies. They are not καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα οὐ συμφωνεῖν as the ἔπος of one γένος, since the γένος is only predicated of one of them καθ' αὐτὸν. Nor are they mere chance ὀμφάνεια (cf. 1156 b, 27 π.): for they are all called φιλεία in virtue of a common element. They are πρὸς ἔν λεγόμενα, just as the ἄρετή of a πάθος is so called πρὸς τὸ τέλος (Fol. 1260 a, 32), i.e. in the light of what it will be when fully developed. Now this relation between the ἄρετης and the τέλος is just τὸ ἀνάλογον. For instance the less highly developed animals have not blood but something 'analogous,' Hist. Λπ. 489 a. 21 ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς μεν ἀλμα καὶ φλέβ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον τοῖς· ἐστι δὲ ἀνάλογα ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐν μεν ἐν τὸ δὲ ἵκωρ (for the biological theory see Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. Trans. ii, 24 sqq.). The different φιλείαι are therefore πρὸς ἀνάλογον ἐν σε καθ' ὀμφάνεια, for this is the only kind of unity that can exist between the undeveloped and the developed, just as it is the only kind that can exist
between different γένη. We see then that Aristotle does not adopt the suggestion he made that the difference is one of μᾶλλον καὶ ήττων, for that difference is expressly contrasted with τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. Hist. An. 588 a, 25 τὰ μὲν γὰρ (sc. ἦνα) τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ήττων διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον...τὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει. The true doctrine is that the other φιλία is so called because they show in a rudimentary and undeveloped way the characteristics of true φιλία, and it is only to avoid unnecessary conflict with current language that we speak of them as ἄλλη φιλίαι at all.

διστερ αἱ πόλεις...διστερ οἱ παιδεῖς.

People talk of ‘friendly states’ and of children ‘playing with their friends,’ and we must respect the nunc loquendi if possible. Strict grammar would require διστερ τὰς πόλεις...διστερ τοὺς παιδεῖς (it is quite wrong to supply λέγων or ἄφωσιον); but Greek idiom can use the nominative after διστερ without regard to the structure of the sentence.


ἡ γὰρ ἄγαθον τι, sc. φιλοί, to be supplied from φιλοί. Τὸ ήδος is their φαυλομενον ἄγαθον, and therefore holds an ‘analogous’ position in their φιλία to that of τὸ ἄγαθον in true φιλία, καὶ δρῶν τι, sc. φιλοί. This is another point of ‘analogy.’ Their φιλία is based, like that of the god, on the fact that ἐκάστῳ καθ’ ἴμμοιτητα εἶναι πράξει καὶ αἰ ταὐτὰ. The acts of (e.g.) the εὐστράτευος are pleasant to the εὐστράτευος, just as the acts of the good man are pleasant to the good man. Again, however, we have a variety of interpretations due, as above 1156 b, 29, to the two senses in which τὸ δρῶν and ἴμμοιτητα are used throughout this passage. In Lb τι after δρῶν is omitted, and this shows that the passage was understood to mean ‘in so far as it is something good and like the good.’ But this loses sight of one point in the analogy.
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἴδιαι ἠγαθὸν τοῖς φιλεῖσθαι. οὐ τάνυ δ' αὐτὰς
συνάπτοσιν, οὔτε ήν δεύτεροι οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον
καὶ διὰ τὸ ἴδιον. οὐ γὰρ τάνυ συνυδαίζεται τὰ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός.

§ 6. Εἰς ταύτα δὲ τὰ εἰδή τῆς φιλίας νεοερεμμένης οἱ μὲν 1157
φίλοι ἐσονταί φίλοι δὲ ἠδονὴ ἢ τὸ χρῆσιμον, ταύτη
δομοιοὶ ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δὲ αὐτοὶς φίλοι ή γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ.
οὕτως μὲν οὐν ἄπλως φίλοι, ἐκείνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
καὶ τῷ ὁμοιώσει τούτως. Β. ἀστερὸς δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τίς
οἱ μὲν καθ' ἐξίν ὁ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω

§ 6. οὐ πάνω...συνάπτοσιν, 'are not very apt to coincide.' It is a mistake
not to suppose that οὐ πάνω means 'not at all' in classical Greek, in spite of
Cobet's contentions to that effect. Where it seems to mean 'not at all,'
it is only by a litotes; just as ὁδὲ ἡμιστα may seem to mean μικρὰτα.
The friendship of the good is necessarily both pleasant and useful (1156 b,
18), but a friendship for pleasure is not very likely to be useful, nor a
friendship for use very likely to be pleasant.

οὐ...τάνυ συνυδαίζεται, cf. 1121 a,
16. Pleasure and profit belong to the friendship of the good essentially,
but there is nothing to bind pleasure to profit nor profit to pleasure. As
'accidents' they are 'not much found in combination.' Cf. Met. 1027 a, 11
ὅνων οὐκ' αὐτοὶ οὐδὲ εἰς ἐπί τοῦ κολύōν ὁ
λευκὸς μοιχαῖς ἔναστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεται
ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν. The
phrase, then, excludes the συνυνθείσης of
pleasure and profit from τὰ ὦ ἐπὶ
τοῦ κολύω.

§ 6. ταύτη ἡμοιοὶ ὄντες, cf. 1156 b,
22 n., and 1157 a, 32 ἢ...μοιῶν τι, sc.
φίλοις.

δι' αὐτός, i.e. δ' ἄλλοις, cf. 1156 b,
10 n.
τῷ ὁμοιώσει, i.e. καθ' ὁμοιώτητα.

V. § 1. ἀστερὸς δ' ἐπί τῶν ἀρετῶν
κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 33 ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ
ἐξίν ἐνδεκάται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖ
ἀπάρχοντας, οὐκ ἂν καθευδόντες ἢ καὶ
ἄλλοι ποι ἔργησαντο, τῆς δ' ἐνέργειαν
οἷς οὖν τέ...πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
eβ πράξεi.
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλιᾶς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζώντες χαίρουσιν ἄλλοις καὶ πορίζουσι πάγαθα, οἱ δὲ καθευδοῦντες ἢ κεχωριμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δὲ ἔχουσιν ὧδ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικὸν· οἱ γὰρ τότε οὐ διαλύοντο τῆν φιλιὰν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνος ἢ ἀποστασία γίνῃ, καὶ τὴς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήπην ποιεῖν· οὖν εἰρήνην ἥπαν ἐποίησεν "πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσπηγγοῦντα διελύσειν," οὐ φαίνονται δὲ οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβύτατοι οὐθ' οἱ στρατφυλοὶ φιλεῖν εὐναί· βραχύν 15 γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ηδονῆς, οὗδεις δὲ δύνανται συμμερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ήδει· μάλιστα γάρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τῷ λυπηρῷ φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ηδέος. οίρα μαραμεῖσαι, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φιλοῖς. οὐ γίνεται ἢ φιλία ἢ προήγεν ἐν παλλόις, ὅτι χαλέπων παλλῶν πείραν λαβεῖι· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ οὐδὲ συζώναι· οὐδέ δὴ αἰρετόν δημοῖσιν περὶ ἱματίον καὶ φιλοῦν· καίτοι ἐν πάσῃ δοκεῖ τοῦ νῦν ἔχοντο δυοῖν τὸ βελτίων αἰρείσθαι, καὶ οἰ μὲν τῷ χαίρον πάλαι ἔχομεν, τῷ βελτίων δὲ μηδέποτε· τοῖς αἰρετέοις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄντι τοῦ πάλαι φιλοῦ τὸν ἄγαθον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἄνεος πείρας οὐδὲ μίας ἡμέρας τὸ φίλον, ἀλλὰ χρόνον δει. δοῦ εἰς παρομοίαν ἐλημυθείν τὸ μένιμιν τῶν ἀλῶν· ἄμα δὲ δει μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἀγάθων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοι, εἰ δὴ φιλιῶς ἐσται σοι φιλὸς· ἀγάθως μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐστι τῷ ἄγαθῷ εἰναι, φιλοὶ δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἄγαθῷ, ἀπλῶς ἄγαθος καὶ φιλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταύτ', ἁμαρτά, οὕτω τῆς ἀπλῶς ἄγαθον, τὸ τοῦτον ἄλλω, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαῖον, ἀλλὰ δ' ἄγαθος, ὅτι χρύσιμος· τὸ δὲ παλλοὶ ἄμα εἰναι φιλοὶ καὶ τὸ φιλω ἀλκάδι· οὗ γὰρ οἶνον τὸ ἀμα πρὸς παλλοὶ ἐνεργεῖν.
3. ἄποδεχόμενοι ἄλληλους, μὴ συζώντες δέ, εὑνως ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἡ φιλία. οἵ δὲ γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλον ὡς τὸ συζών —ἀφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεικνύεται, συνημμερεύεται δὲ 20 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι μονοτάις γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτοι ἥκεστα προσήκει—συνειδάγεν δὲ μετ' ἄλληλον οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἢδεις ὑπερ γὰρ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἐχεῖν.

4. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἔστι φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ 25

1157 b, 25. EE. 1238 a, 11 ὡς τούτων φανερῶν ὅτι ἀρθοὶ λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βέβαιων, ὅπερ ἡ εὐθυμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων, καὶ ὁρθῶς εἴρηται.

ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιων, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.

τολὴ δὲ κάλλιον εἰσεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἄρετή τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύει τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχῶν. τότε γὰρ δήλον ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνον ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ δ' αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, ἀροῦνται μᾶλλον ἀνθρωπον ὅτι τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι); ἡ δὲ ἀτυχία δηλαὶ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χράσιμον τυχόντας. ὅ δὲ χρόνοις ὁδηλαὶ ἀμφοτέρους: οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χράσιμος ταχὺ δηλοὶ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀνθρώπους. τὸν οὖν ὅτι ἀπλῶς ἔδοξε ταχύ. ἢμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι τοῖς οἴνοις καὶ ἔδοξεν. ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδόν ταχὺ δηλοὶ, πλακὼ δὲ χρόνον γενόμενον ἀνής καὶ οὐ γλυκό, καὶ ἔπει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως, ἄπει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδύ τῷ τέλεα ὁμοίως καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὑμαλλογήσαι δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάματος καλύπτει γλυκόν. τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαίνον ὄχι ἡδύ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατάτο.

§ 3. ἄποδεχόμενοι, probantes, cf. above 1156 b, 28.

οἱ μακάριοι, beatit, as opposed to οἱ ἄθετοι, those who are in need of nothing. It is not necessary, however, to limit the meaning so far as to make it merely equivalent to οἱ πλούσιοι.

μονοτάις, cf. 1197 b, 9 n.

ἡ ἐταιρικὴ, sc. φιλία.

§ 4. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The connexion of thought here seems to be this. The distinction just drawn between the ἔτεια and the ἐνέργεια of φιλία suggests another important distinction which still further brings out the nature of the τέλεια φιλία. Although it is true that something more than the ἔτεια is necessary for it, we must distinguish the ἐνέργεια which comes from the formed ἔτεια and the more πάθος of φιλος which is the material out of which the ἔτεια is formed. The ἐνέργεια of true φιλία is not a πάθος, but an ἐνέργεια which is ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνέργεια and implies προσήκοις. The distinction is just like that between the καταστασις which make up
polllakis eirhotai: dokei gar filotetovn men kai airotovn to aplovs agathon he ydou, ekastov die to autov toioouton: o de agathos to agathof di amphi taota. Ewke de mein filo-lymata padei, he de phila exeis: he gar filotetais ouk etto 30 pro telsa agnyxha estin, antuphlovdai de metap prosaireseis, de die prosaireseis afi exeis: kai tagebba boulontai tois philouvmenois ekeinovn eneka, ou kath to pados alla kath ezin. Kal philouves ton filon to autovs agathon filousin: o gar agathos filos ginomevnois agathon ginetai filos. Ekateros 35 ouf filoie te to autov agathov, kai to ton anaptrodoiwsis tis boulontai kai to eidei: lgetai gar filoteta isosth, man-

ethimos kai the good activities which arise when the ethos is complete.

to autov toioouton, sc. agathov he ydou.

δι' αμφο ταύτα, (1) διά το απλόν, (2) διά το αυτόν.

§ 5. έσωκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Three σημεῖα are given which show that true φιλία is a ξίζη, (1) αντιφάλαις implies προαιρέσεις, (2) the boulhetais agathos is ekeinos eneka, (3) the philotetais to agathov. Ultimately this means that philia is not an ελλογίας but a τέλειωs of the soul. Cf. 1103 a, 35 n.

η γαρ φιλίας κ.τ.λ. We can now explain why the word φιλία has a more restricted application than φιλίας (i.e. the verb φιλεῖν, cf. above 1155 b, 90 n.). It is just because αντιφάλαις implies προαιρέσεις and προαιρέσεις implies a ξίζη. For the presence of προαιρέσεις as a means of distinguishing ξίζης from πάθη cf. 1106 a, 3, where it is given as one of the arguments to show that αρετή is not a πάθος but a ξίζη, that the αρετεῖα are προαιρέσεις τιμᾶς he oik proeiréseis. Now it is clear that the reciprocation of φιλία must be ‘deliberate’ or μετά άγνωρο—no mere ελλογίας of το δρεκτικόν could amount to reciprocation—and it therefore implies the union of the intellectual with the appetitive, i.e. προαιρέσεις, and that implies a ξίζη.

καὶ τάγαθα βουλοῦται κ.τ.λ. The fact that the boulhetais is disinterested (ekeinos eneka) also shows that it can be no mere πάθος.

καὶ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. The fact that the boulhetais, so far as it is self-regarding, is of the true δι' αμφων also shows it is no mere πάθος. It always requires a determinate ξίζη to make τι φιλοῦμενον ἁγαθὸν, the object of all boulhetais, coincide with τὸ φίλον ἁγαθῶν.

τῇ βουλήτῃ, the boulhetais agathos is reciprocal (αντιπαθιδικος, cf. αντιφαλαις, ex antiterosthous above).

καὶ τῷ εἰδεῖ. This φιλία is (1) εἰσόδημα, cf. το ἑαυτον αντιπαθιδικος, and also (2) ὑμωθης as explained below 1158 b, 1 τα γαρ αυτα γίνεσθαι απ' ἄμφων (cf. 1157 a, 4 n.) kai boulhetai allolhos as contrasted with the ἄμφοτεροι φιλοι in which ἐτερον απ' ἐτερου kataallaptontai, ouw ἡμοι αὐτ' ὑφελεία (1158 b, 3). This point is as important as the other and could hardly be omitted here. The K's reading kal to τῷ εἰδεῖ seems to me to spoil the argument, though it is no doubt true that they give each other equal pleasure.

φιλότης ισοτής. This is said to be a Pythagorean formula.
ΘΟΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

ΛΙΣΤΑ ΔΕ ΤΗ ΤΟΥΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΤΑΙΘ' ΨΤΑΡΧΕΙ. VI. ΕΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΙΣ 1158.Α
ΣΤΡΟΦΕΙΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΒΕΤΙΚΟΙ ΗΤΤΟΥΝ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ Η ΦΙΛΙΑ, ΌΣΦ
ΔΥΣΧΟΛΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΗΤΤΟΥΝ ΟΙΚΛΙΑΙ ΧΑΙΡΟΥΝΣΤΑΤΑΤΑ
ΓΑΡ ΔΟΧΕΙ ΜΑΛΙΣΤ' ΕΙΝΑΙ ΦΙΛΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΦΙΛΙΑΣ.
ΔΙΟΥ ΒΕΝΙ ΜΕΝ ΓΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΙ ΤΑΧΥ' ΠΡΟΣΒΕΤΕΤΑΙ Δ' ΟΥ' ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΓΙ' Α
ΝΟΝΤΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΙ ΟΙΣ ΑΝ ΜΗ ΧΑΙΡΟΙΣΙΑΙ ΟΜΟΙΩΣ Δ' ΟΥ' ΟΙ ΣΤΡΟ-
ΦΕΙΟΙ. ΑΛΛ' ΟΙ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙ ΕΙΝΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΕΙΣΟΝΤΑΝ ΑΛΛΗΛΟΙΑΙ· ΒΟΥΛΟΝΤΑΙ
ΓΑΡ ΤΑΓΑΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΑΝΤΩΣΙΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΑΣ ΧΡΕΙΑΣ ΦΙΛΟΙ Δ' ΟΥ'
ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΕΙΣΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΣΥΝΙΜΕΡΕΙΤΟΝ ΜΗΔΕ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ ΑΛΛΗΛΟΙΩΣ.
2 Δ' ΔΗ ΜΑΛΙΣΤ' ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΟΧΕΙ ΦΙΛΙΚΑ. ΠΟΛΛΟΙ Δ' ΕΙΝΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΙ ΤΟ
ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΛΕΙΑΝ ΦΙΛΙΑΝ ΟΙΚ ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΟΥ' ΕΡΑΝ
ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΑΜΑ (ΕΟΙΚΕ ΓΑΡ ΥΨΕΡΒΟΛΗ, ΤΟ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟ ΔΕ ΠΡΟΣ ΕΝΑ
ΤΕΦΥΚΕ ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ) ΠΟΛΛΟΙ Δ' ΑΜΑ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ ΑΡΕΣΚΕΙΝ
3 ΣΟΦΟΝΤΑΙ ΟΥ ΡΑΘΙΟΝ ΙΩΝΟΣ ΟΥ' ΑΝΑΘΟΙΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ.
ΔΕΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΑΝ ΛΑΒΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΣΥΝΙΜΕΡΕΙΑ ΤΕΗΣΘΑΙ, Δ' ΠΑΝΧΑΛΕΠΟΝ.
15 ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΧΡΕΙΑΜΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΗΔΟΝ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΑΡΕΣΚΕΙΝ ΕΝΔΕΧΕ-
ΤΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΓΑΡ ΟΙ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΟΛΗΝ ΧΡΩΝ ΑΙ ΙΣΤΗ-
4 ΡΕΣΙΑΙ. ΤΟΙΤΟΥΝ ΔΕ ΜΑΛΛΙΟΝ ΕΟΙΚΕ ΦΙΛΙΑ ή ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΗΔΟΝ ΟΤΑΝ

1158.Α. 1. ΕΕ. 1238.Α, 30 ή μιν ουν πρωτη φιλια, και δι' ην αι
ΔΑΣΙΑ ΛΕΓΩΝΤΑΙ, ή κατ' αρετην ίστι, και δι' ηδονην την αρετην, ουσπερ

VI. § 1. ΕΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΙΣ ΣΤΡΟΦΕΙΟΙ Κ.Τ.Λ. ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΙΣ
ΤΟΥΤΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ 
ΤΟ ΛΕΥΚΟ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΛΕΥΚΟ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ 
ΤΟ ΙΕΡΟΝ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.

VI. § 2. ΕΟΙΚΕ ΓΑΡ ΥΨΕΡΒΟΛΗ. ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΙΣ
ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ 
ΤΟ ΙΕΡΟΝ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.

§ 3. ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΓΑΡ Κ.Τ.Λ. ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΙΣ 
ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ 
ΤΟ ΙΕΡΟΝ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.

§ 4. ΤΟΙΤΟΥΝ ΔΕ Κ.Τ.Λ. ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΙΣ
ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ 
ΤΟ ΙΕΡΟΝ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.

§ 5. ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙΟΙΣ 
ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ 
ΤΟ ΙΕΡΟΝ ΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.
εἰρθητι πρότερον τι οἱ ἄλλαι ἔγγινονται φίλιαι καὶ εἰν παισὶ καὶ θηρίων καὶ τοῖς φαίλοις. ἄλλον λέγεται, "ὅλης ἦλικα τέρτες" καὶ
κακὸς κακῷ <ὁ> συντέτηκεν ἤδην.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἰναι τοῖς φαίλοις, οὐχ ἃ φαίλου ἡ μηθέτεροι, ἀλλ' ὅσον ὑδίκοι ἀμφω, ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλοφός ὁ δ' ὑδίκος ἓτει, καὶ ἢ τάτες ἔχουσιν ἄγαθον καὶ ταύτη συναρμολογοῦσαν ἀλλήλους· ὥστε χρήσιμοι ἄν ἔνει ἀλλήλους καὶ ὑφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄλλα πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ <ὁ> οὔθετεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιείκη φαίλων εἰναι φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμοι ἄν ἐπὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαίλως πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ ὑπονοίαν, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν μὲν ἀκρατῶς πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ ὑπονοίαν πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ ἄναρχουσαν ἄγαθὰ, ἄπλως μὲν τὰ ἄπλως, τὰ δ' ἀκείμεν ἐξ ὑπονοίας, ὡς πανί

Ἀριστοτέλευς. Ἀγοραίων. These words are properly contrasted, cf. below 1152 b, 26.
καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ, opp. οἱ οὐδεῖς; 1157 b, 20.
οὔθ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἄγαθόν. I do not know why Grant should doubt that Aristotle was capable of meaning this as a joke. It may be true that he jokes with difficulty, but he was certainly not above a little banter of the Academy.
τούτοις οὖν ταῦτα, sc. ἥδεις, καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς, sc. ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἥδεις. This gives all four ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 8. οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔξονσισι. Λαύγον ταῦτα γεμάτα, cf. 1905 b, 21 ε. The obvious fact that princes and potentates have two sets of friends confirms our doctrine. They wish to have all the advantages that can be derived from friendship; but, as ed. πάνω συνιστάται τὰ κατὰ συνμερίσματα (1159, 35 ε.), they cannot as a rule find pleasant friends who are also useful. So they have both 'agreeable people' (poets, philosophers, musicians, wits) and also 'able henchmen' (men, for instance, who can poison a troublesome brother) at their courts. Aristotle
knew all about this from personal experience in Macedonia. We may see the same thing in the case of Frederick the Great.

`τούς μὲν εὐτραπέλους...τούς δὲ...` For the “twofold use of the article” cf. 1117a, 12 n. We must take `δεινοὺς` as a secondary predicative object after `γινομαι`. `They seek others who shall be skilful at executing orders.` For the predicative object after `γίνεσθαι` cf. 1132a, 22 n.

§ 6. Ἡδος καὶ κ.τ.λ. This section answers the question `why do tyrants not avoid the necessity of having two sets of friends by taking good men as their friends?`'

`ἄλλα υπερέχοντι κ.τ.λ.` `But such a man (τοιοῦτος = ὁ στρατηγός) does not become a friend to one who exceeds him (in power, i.e. τῷ ῥυθμῷ), unless he (the good man) is exceeded (by the tyrant) in goodness as well as (καὶ) in power. Unless this is so, the good man is not equalised to the tyrant by being exceeded in power (only) in proportion to the amount by which he is exceeded in goodness. Such tyrants are not found every day` (on ὀδ τάνυ see Ind. s.v.). This is how recent editors (Grant, Stewart) take the passage. The old view, according to which ὃ ὑπερέχων and not ὁ στρατηγός is the subject of υπερέχειν is grammatically improbable and morally absurd. It would make Aristotle say that the good man would find it easier to be the friend of a tyrant the worse the tyrant was! This sentence is really the close of a long debate. Plato had suggested in the `Laws` that, even if philosophers could not be kings, a philosopher might do something as the friend of a young tyrant. Aristotle, who knew what court life was, renounces the idea. It is better to lecture on `πολιτική` with the hopes of training a `νομοθέτης`.

`οὐκ ἴσαξαι.` `For ἴσαξαι intransitive` cf. 1154b, 24–1161a, 2. Aristotle has not yet explained what he means by `ἀνάλογον ὑπερέχομενος`, and he has only been led into mentioning it here by the case of the tyrant. We shall see from the next section that the principle is the same as that of Distributive Justice. If the tyrant is
1158 b. Εἴςοι δὲ οὖν αἰ ἐφημέναν φιλίαν ἐν ἴσότητι· τα γὰρ ἀυτὰ γίνεται ἀπ’ ἀμφότεροι καὶ βουλοῦνται ἀλλήλους, ἢ ἔτερον ἀνθ᾽ ἐτέρου καταλαμάττονται, οἶνον ἤδονην ἄντ᾽ ὀφελεῖς· ὅτι δ᾽ ἤττον εἰσὶν αὐταὶ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἰρητικά· διὸ δόκουσι δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνωμοιότητα ταύτῳ εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖναι φιλίαι· καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα γάρ τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρόσιμον, ταύτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει κακείσιν), τῷ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀδιαβάλλοντο καὶ μόνιμον εἰσαι, ταύτας δὲ ταχεῖς·

1158 b, 1. ΕΕ. 1238 b, 15 τρία μὲν οὖν εἶδος ταύτα φιλίας· ἐν τοῖς δὲ τούσοις κατ᾽ ἴσότητα πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία. καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὰν φιλοὶ ἐν ἴσότητι τοὺς εἰσὶν ἀρετῆς φιλοὶ ἀλλήλους. ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἢ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολήν, ὡσπερ θεῷ ἄρετῃ πρὸς ἀνθρώποι. τούτω γὰρ ἔτερον εἰδῶς φιλίας, καὶ διὸς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καθαρός καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔτερον· κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἤδον, κατ᾽ ἄρμον δ᾽ οὖν ἤδον. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει παθήρ πρὸς ἦν καὶ δὲ εὐεργετής πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετήθαντα. ἄνυν δὲ τούτων διαφορὰ εἰσὶν· ἄλλη πατρὸς πρὸς ἦν καὶ ἄνδρος πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὐτῇ μὲν ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, δὲ δὲ εὐεργετοῦ πρὸς εὐεργετηθάντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ ἢ οἷς ἐνεστὶν ἢ οἷς ὁμοῖος τὸ ἀντιφιλεύθηκαί·· γελοιοῦν γὰρ εἰ τῇ ἐγκαλία τοῦ θεοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ὁμοῖος τὸ ἀντιφιλεύθηκαί· φιλεύθηκαί γὰρ, ὅτι φιλεύθηκαί, τὸν ἄρχοντος, ἡ φιλεύθηκαί ἄλλον τρόπον, καὶ ἤδον διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἢ τοῖς αὐτάρκως ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κτήματι ἢ παῖς, καὶ τοῖς ἐνδοχως ἐπὶ τῷ γυναῖκε. ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ την χρήσιν φιλοὺς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δὲ ἤδον ὃς καὶ κατ᾽ ἴσότητα εἰσὶν, ἢ δὲ καθ᾽ ὑπερχών. διὸ καὶ οἱ Εκεῖνοι οἷομενοί ἐγκαλιούσαν, εἰς μὴ ὁμοῖος χρήσιμοι καὶ εἰς τούσαν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἤδον. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς

as much better than the philosopher as he is more powerful, there will be a proportionate equality between them, and therefore the possibility of φιλία, though not φιλία of the kind we have been discussing hitherto, but a φιλία κατ᾽ ἄξιαν in which γίγνεται πώς ἴσον (1158 b, 27).

§ 7. Εἰςοδὲ οὖν κ. τ. λ. We now pass from φιλία ἐν ἴσοτητι, which is ἐν ἀντιπαρόβολη, and resembles τὸ διαφορτικὸν δίκαιον, τὸ φίλα καθ᾽ ὑπερχών, which is κατ᾽ ἄξιαν and resembles τὸ διαφορτικὸν δίκαιον. It is of great help in the interpretation of this Book to keep this analogy in view.

τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται, sc. ἐν τοῖς ἀμοιβαίοις, ἢ καταλαμάττονται, sc. ἢ ταῖς ἀμοιβαίοις.

ἀδίκαι, ‘the latter,’ sc. αἱ ἀμοιβαίες.
μεταπάτησεις ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν ποιλοίς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλιές, δὲ αὐτοσύντατα ἑκείνας. VII. ἔτερον δὲ ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς γιόν καὶ δόλως προαιρετίκος πρὸς νέοτέρον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παιδὶ ἁρ-
χουσὶν πρὸς ἀρχήμενον. διαφέρουσι δὲ αὐτὶ καὶ ἄλληλων· οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτὴ γονεύοις πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀρχούσι πρὸς ἁρ-
χύμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς γιόν καὶ γιόφ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ’ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναῖκι πρὸς ἀνδρα. ἔτερα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἔτερα δὲ καὶ δι’ ἡμᾶς παῖσθαι. ἔτερα οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλίας καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.

2 ταύτα μὲν δὴ οὕτω γίνεται ἐκατέρθω καὶ θανάτου οὗτε δεὶς ἡ ἤθελεν. οὕτω δὲ γονεύοις μέν τέκνα ἀπονεμήμενοι ἢ δεῖ τοῖς γεννησάσι, γονεῖς δὲ νεκροῖς ἢ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνομοι ἢ τοῖς τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικῆς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δὲ ἐν ἑρωτικοῖς· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτόν τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἄλληλοι πολλοίς. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἐφόρον ὅτι οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προκομίζειν. διὸ εἰρηκέναι νείκος δὲ (εἰρηκέν Εὐσκος Jackson) "ἐρωτικῶς τοιαύτη ἢ οὐκ ἐφόρον λέγει." οἱ δὲ νομίζοντες τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

b, 20. ΕΕ. 1239 a, 1 ὡσπέρ οὖν εἰρημένη, τριῳ ὁποίου εἰδον φιλίας, καὶ ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ θρόνον αὐτοῦ πάλιν διδρυται εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἱσοῦν αὐτὸς καὶ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἑίσουν. φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἁμφότεραι, φίλια δὲ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἱσοδομίαν· ἅτομον γὰρ ἐν εἷς εἰς ἁμφότερα φίλους, φιλεῖ δὲ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐναχοῦ δὲ φιλεσθαί, μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, εἰ δὲ φιλή, οὐδέστω ως ἀναχώρειν φιλών· τῇ γὰρ ἁμφότεροι μεταρρυθμίζεται καὶ τινι ἱσοῦν· τὰ μὲν οὖν δὲ ἡλικίας ἀλλεπών ἀναχωρεῖς οὕτως φιλεῖτα, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἀρετῆς ή ἱσοῦν ή κατὰ ἄλλην τοιούτην ὑπεροχήν. δει δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ή ἱσοῦν ή μὲν φιλεῖν αἰτίων, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρήσιμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑδείς καὶ καθ’ ἀρετήν, ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἐκόπτεις γίνονται ἁμφορευθήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐναι διὰ ἵσχευς, ὡσπέρ ἐν ἑώρου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐν χρυσῷ), ἀλλ’

VII. § 1. καθ’ ὑπεροχήν, in the mathematical sense of the word, cf. Ind. s.v.
καὶ ἄλληλος, as well as from the ἀλληλε καθ’ ἱσοδομίαν.
§ 2. ταύτα μὲν δὴ κτ.λ. Friendship καὶ ἱσοδομία is always ἠμφορευθήσεις.

ἀνάλογον...καὶ τὴν φιλίαν δεὶν ἱσοδομίαν. I do not think we should press the meaning of καθ’, as if there were anything other than the ἱσοδομία which is ‘in proportion.’ Rather
Aristotle has in his mind two forms of statement (1) kath' ὑποτρίχη καὶ τὸν ἰδίον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν διὰ τὸ ἓχει, καὶ (2) ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἰδίον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν διὰ τὸ ἕχει. Even an English writer might say loosely "if there is excess on either side, the affection must be in proportion as well."

§ 3. Οὐχ ὡς ὀμοιός δὲ κ. τ. λ. In spite of the parallelism between ἦκαθ' ὑποτρίχη ... there is really a great difference. In the latter the proportion is everything and it does not matter how great the excess may be; in the former equality in the strict arithmetical sense is the norm, and if the excess goes beyond a certain limit φίλοι cease altogether. The δίκαιον of a democratic state is only one form of justice among others, the friendship of equals is the typical friendship from which all others are variations. Eudemos (L.c.) goes so far as to say that, though they are φίλοι, you cannot call the parties φίλοι.
Orismos, eis tivos oi filoi polloV γαρ αφαιρουμενων eti 6 μενει, polu de xaristerov, oion tov theou, ouketo. Θεον και 5 απορεται μη ποτε ou boullontai oi filoi tois filios ta meigista ton anagov, oion theous einai. ou gar eti filoi esontai autois, socde di anagov. ou gar filoi anagov. ei di kalos eirnetai eti o filios tou filov boulletai tagnayta ekeinoV ekeiV, menein and deoi oios poti estin ekeinoV. anphrwpou 10 de ynti boulligetai ta meigista anagov. isos V ou pov pantaV autov gar malisV ekastos boulletai tagnayta. VIII. oi pol- loV de dokousai dia filotimian boullountai filieisvai malloV he filiev. did filokolakes oi polloiV uperechomevov gar filios o kolaz, he prospoteitei toioV toutoV, kai malloV 15 filiev he filieisvai, to de filieisvai egvus einai dokiei toutou.

1159 A, 12. EE. 1239 a, 21 deilov de kai dia ti zctoVn malloV oV anprapov tiVn kalV uperechyn filian tiVn kata ladosmta. anma gar uparchei auton autous eti te filieisvai kai he uperechyn. did o kolaz par' einoV upomteros tou filiou. amfow gar filoeisvai touV uparcheVV tiV kolaVmenov. malista V oV filotimoi toioV toutoV. to gar thamezetai

At eisV fous oV anagov, se. anagov. I do not therefore think it necessary to read h filia as Bywater proposes (Contr. p. 60). Nor is there any difficulty in the singular meves which follows.

Aphairoumenwv, 'subtracted' from the one party. Aristotle might equally well have said prootibwmenwv, 'added' to the other; for uperechyn arises from aphaires and prothesis.

§ 6. AporetaV mu' pot' ou, 'there is a difficulty as to whether perhaps...'
ou gar eti k.t.l. The point is that in wishing a friend to become a god, you are wishing to deprive him of something good, namely your own friendship.

Autov gar k.t.l. We shall come to the question of philaria presently.

VIII. § 1. oi polloi de k.t.l.
We have said that filia in the primary sense is ev ladosmte, but we have to account for the fact that the mass of men prefer filia kath' upere- chyn. It is because they prefer to be loved rather than to love, and this is due to their love of esteem. It is easy to account for the love of flattery; the common run of men like to feel their superiority. It may seem more strange to say that men seek friendships in which the other party exceeds them, but this also is true. They love the friendship of the great because of the expectation of favours to come, and the friendship of the wise and good as a testimony to their own worth. In all these cases, however, the filia is only alperwv kath' suymbe- bethen kath' aivov, whereas the friendship of equals is alperwv kath' aivov and therefore better.

prospoteita toioV toutoV. Cf. Dem. de Cor. § 125 hrh mu' toioV toutoV meV ekdias eti, emos de prosoV.
τιμάσθαι, οὐ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίλεται. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ δὲ εὐδαίκως αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίροντι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμῶμεθα 20 διὰ τὴν ἐπιτίθεν (οἴονται γὰρ τεὐθεῖα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀν τοῦ δεώντων· ὡς δὴ σημεῖον τῆς εὐπαιθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ); οὐ δὲ ἐν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδών ὄρθωμεν τιμής βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίλεται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὴ, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.

25 τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δοξεῖσαν ἀν κράτειν εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φίλα καθ᾽ αὐτὴν αἰρέτη εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ εἰν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημεῖον δὲ αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἕναι γὰρ διδόσαι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν μὲν εἰσι, 30 ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δὲ οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδεχότατα, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὸν αὐτάς θυκίνοι εἶναι εἰ τὸν ὄρωσιν εἰ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὅν μητρὶ προσ-

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότομοι φιλητικὸς δὲ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίροντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότομος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλώσει τῇ ὑπεροχῇ φίλος· ου δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ὑδόνῃ δοφιλητικός. ἐκεῖ τῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνεργοῦσα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἐστι γὰρ λατανάλλουσιν φιλοῦσιν, φιλοῦσι δ᾽ οὐ. ὡς δὲ κατὰ τὴν φιλῶν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δὲ· ἐκεῖνος ἢ φίλοις μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον αὐθαίρως γεγονός ἡ γεγονότερα, οἷον εἰν ταῖς ὑποθέσεσις αἰ γνωσθεῖ παοῦν, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἢ Ἀντιφώντος. καὶ γὰρ ήοικε τὸ μὲν ἀθέελει γνώσεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τε ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γνώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἐνεκα. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμενεῖσθαι τῷ φιλεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῖται ἐσπαρόσιμον· γνώσκοντο γὰρ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γνωστονταν.

§ 2. ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. Cf. 1095 b, 21 p. 
§ 3. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἰ κ.τ.λ. Another reason why φίλα καθ᾽ ὑπεροχήν is not φίλα in the true sense. Whether we regard the ὑπεροχήν or the ὑπεροχήν, such φίλα is always δὰ τι φιλεῖσθαι, cf. 1159 a, 12 p. 
§ 4. σημεῖον δ᾽ αἱ μητέρες κ.τ.λ. This σημεῖον derives its force from the fact that φίλα is φίλα. We shall expect to find the characteristics of true φίλα in a rudimentary form (_xpath|) even in purely instinctive feelings.
4 ἢ ἑκεῖ ἀπονέμωσα διὰ τὴν ἄγριαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας
οὔτε ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφιλῶν ἐπαινοούμενων, φίλον
ἀρέτῆ τῷ φιλεὶν ὕσκε, ὡστ' ἐν ὦς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, 35
5 οὗτοι μόνοι μοί φιλοὶ καὶ ἢ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 1159 ᾧ
ἀναγενέστερον ἐλεών φίλοι· ἵσοντων γὰρ ἢν. ἢ δ' ἵσονται
καὶ ὁμοίωτοι φιλίας, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἢ τῶν κατ' ἀρέτῆν
ὁμοίωτης· μόνοιμοι γὰρ δυνατές καθ' αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους
μένουσι, καὶ οὕτε δεόται φαίλον σοῦ ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, 5
ἀλλ' ὡς εἰσεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν τῶν ἁγαθῶν γὰρ μητ'
αὐτοῦ ἀμαρταίων μέτα τῶν φίλων ἐπιτρέπεται. οἱ δὲ μο-
χηθροῦ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἤχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμέ-
νουσιν ὁμοίων δυνατές· ἐπ' ὁλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
6 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλους ρομφηρίας. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἴδεῖς 10

1159 a, 33. EE. 1239 b, 3 δ' μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας,
καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖν καὶ οἱ
φίλοι διαφέρονται, οἱ τε κατ' ἱσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπερχών, ἔρημα· ἐπεὶ
δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὡσπερ καὶ κατ' ἄρχας ἔλεγχη,
ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωθεὶν συμπεριλαμβανόμενων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὄριον φαίνεται εἰναι
φίλοι, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτόν καὶ περὶ τῶν τῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὰς
eἰρημενὰς φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄριον καί εἰς τὸ ἴδιο καὶ εἰς τὸ
ἀγάθον. τὸ τε γὰρ ἁγαθῶν ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ
ἀγάθος μὲν ὄριος ἄει καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἱδίο, ὁ δὲ φαίλος καὶ οὗ
ἀφρών οὔτε ἑτοικεν ἠθεν καὶ ἐπίτερα. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλοισιν οἱ
φίλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἐναυτοίς, ἀλλὰ διώτανται· ἢ δ' οὔ βέβαιος φίλος οὐ
φίλος. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὄριον φιλέων, ὅτι τὸ ἅγαθον ὄριον, ἢτοι
dὲ ὦς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἴδιο τοῖς γὰρ ὄριοις τοιάθ' ἴδεν, καὶ ξεκαθὼ δὲ

§ 4. τῶν φιλοφιλῶν ἐπαινοούμενων.
 Cf. above 1155 a, 29. This is another
 σημείο. No one is praised for being
 loved.
 § 5. οὗτοι δ' ἂν, sc. τῷ φιλεῖν (not
 merely τῷ φιλεῖν) κατ' ἄξιαν οὐ
 ἀναλόγον. The ὑπερχώνοι may
 make up for his inferiority by the
 strength of his affection.
 τῶν κατ' ἀρέτην, sc. ὄριον.
 μόνομοι...καθ' αὐτοῖς, virtually
 διαμένουσιν ἁγαθοὶ δυνατές καθ' αὐτοῖς,
 from which it follows that they are
 permanently ἁγαθοὶ πρὸς ἄλλους,
 their activities being "the same or
 similar" 1156 b, 17.
 οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς, much less ἄλλοις.
 We cannot be sure that the
 activities of one bad man will be the
 same or similar to those of another,
 as we can in the case of the good. See
 the fuller account in EE. loc. cit. above.
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ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἔως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἰδοὺς ἢ ἀφελείασ ἀλλήλους. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ᾧ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένθος πλούσιον, ἀμαθῆς εἰδῶτι· οὐ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεής ὁν, τούτου εφεύμηνοι ἀν' 15 τιδορεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἂν τὸν ἔλκου καὶ ἐφαρμ. καὶ ἐρωμένον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῦν· ἐνίοτε, ἀξιώντες φιλεῖται ὃς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὴ φιλτότους ὑντας ἑσθος ἐξερεύνεσθαι, ὑπὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐχόντας γελοῦν· ἵσως δὲ οὐδὲ ἐφεύεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίῳ τοῦ ἄν- 20 αντίων καθ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ δ' ὀρεξίς τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ἐρασιτερβάδιον υἱῷ ἵρῃ γένεσθαι ἄλλ. ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταύτα μὲν οὖν ἀφεῖτα ή καὶ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

φύσει αὐτῷ αὐτῷ ἔδω. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἔξεις καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῦ ὁμογενεῖν ἔσται ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔφοιτος· καὶ ταῦτα ἐνέδεχεται καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.

κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντήρηκεν ἕδω. τὸ δ' ἐναντίῳ τῷ ἐναντίῳ φιλεῖν ὡς τὸ χρῆσιμον· αὐτὸ γὰρ αἰτῶ τὸ ὁμοίον ἄχρηστον. διὸ διεπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δούλου δεσπότου, καὶ γυνῆς καὶ ἀνήρ ἄλληλον, καὶ ἴδιόν καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίῳ ὕστερον· καὶ οὐκ ὡς ἐν τέλει ἄλλῳ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἔστει, οὔκ ὁρίζεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τῷ θερμῷ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῷ ἐξωτερικῷ τοῦ ἄργου. ἐστὶ δὲ ποσὶ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ φιλεῖ τῷ ἀγαθῶν. ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολο ἔστιν ὁρίζεται ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ σύμφωνον γίνεσθαι εἴ τινι ἐν μέσῳ. ἐπὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔστι τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῇ μεσότητι ὁρίζεται γὰρ οὐκ ἄλληλων τἀναπηρωτὰ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερφυσικῶς γὰρ, ἐὰν θερμαυσθῇς, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίσταται, καὶ ὑπερφυσικῶς, ἐὰν ψυχαύσῃς· ὁμοίως δε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν εἰς ἐπιθυμήσιν, οὐκ εἰ τῶν μέσων. ἀλλὰ χαίρει δ' ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἀνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσις ἔδωσι, οἱ δὲ τῶν τούτων τοῖς τριῶν ἐξεσθεῖται. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ ἔλεος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφικόνν ἔστιν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ὑπεν τῶν

§ 6. οἷον πένθος. cf. 1157 b. 21 n.
§ 7. οἷον τῷ ἐρασιτερβάδιον. Cf. the 1155 b. 2.

quotation from Euripides 1155 b. 3.
IX. "Εσοκε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἰρηταί, περὶ ταύτα καὶ 25 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἡ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάτῃ γὰρ κοινωνία δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δὲ προσαγορεύουσις γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συντρατιῶτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίς κοινωνίαις. καθ’ ὁσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐστὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ 30 δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ παρομία "κοινὰ τὰ φιλῶν," ὅρθως ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἐστὶ δ’ ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δὲ ἀλλοίς ἀφορισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείον τοῖς δὲ ἐπάττω καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ’ ἥττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ 35 ταύτα γονεῦται πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοίς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 1160 οὔτ’ ἑταίροις καὶ πολλάκις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἕπτ’ τῶν ἀλλῶν φιλῶν. ἔτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστος τούτων, καὶ αὐξησιν λαμβάνει τὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς φιλοὺς εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταίροις δεινότερον ἢ πολλῆν, καὶ μὴ 5 ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνυμοίοις χαίροντα, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐρητέλοις καὶ ὁδεῖς ῥαβύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίσταται ὡς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὖν, δοτερ ἑλέχθη, τὰ ἑναντία φιλία, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἁγάθων.

1159 b, 25. EE. 1241 b, ΙΙ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἵνα τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἱσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἱσότης [ἡ] φιλίτης. αἱ δὲ πολεμικαὶ πάσαι δικαίου τι εἴδος· κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνετήκη, ὡστε ὅσα εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίοι καὶ κοινωνίαι, καὶ πάντα ταύτα σύνορα ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐγὼς ἔχει τὰς διαφορὰς.

IX. § 1. "Εσοκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We pass now to the discussion of φιλία ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, especially in the state. It is here that the parallelism of φιλία and κοινωνία comes out most clearly. ἐν ἀρχῇ. 1155 a, 32 sqq. περὶ ταύτα, the things which are its matter, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, the persons who are its object. Cf. 1118 b, 6, τι δίκαιον. Cf. Plato Rep. 351 b, sqq. προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The usual confirmation from current language necessary to set up an εἴρηται πρότασις. So in English, 'My learned friend,' 'My Right Hon. friend.' κοινὰ τὰ φιλῶν, often quoted by Plato. It is said to be a Pythagorean maxim. Cf. especially Gorg. 507 c άτιθ δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ κοινωνία, φιλία σῷ ἄν επ᾽.

§ 2. ἢττὸ δ’ ἀδελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. This is an implied criticism of Plato's Republic.

§ 3. αὐξησιν λαμβάνει, virtual passive of αὔξησιν. Fritzsche compares ἐνίδος λαμβάνει Soph. El. 183 b, 21.
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βοηθήσατε ἄδελφῳ ἡθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξας πατέρα ἡ ὀντυνών ἄλλον. αὐξάσατω δὲ πέρρῳ ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ, ὥσ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δυναὶ καὶ ἐπὶ ὅσον διήκοντα. αὐτὲς δὲ κοινωνία πάσας μορίων ἐνίκασι τῆς πολιτείας: συμφέροντες γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς συμφέροντες, καὶ πορευόμενοι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον καὶ ἡ πολιτεία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν: τούτων γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχαζόντας, καὶ δικαίως φασίν εἶναι τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κοινωνία κατὰ μέρη 15 τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίκεται, οἶον πλοῖσις μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τοῖς τοιούτοις, συντραπεῖν δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ἁρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φιλεῖται καὶ δημιοῦται. ἦν δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δὴ ἡδονήδον δοκεῖν δίνεσθαι, διὰ τῶν 20 τῶν καὶ ᾠραυστῶν αὐτὸν γὰρ θυμίας ἐξεκα καὶ συνουσίας πᾶσας δὲ αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐνίκασιν εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρώντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτεία ἐφίκεται, ἄλλ᾽ εἰ

1160 α, 14. ΕΕ. 1241 b, 24 αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλα κοινωνία εἰσὶν [ἡ] μοῖροι τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οὐδὲν τῶν φρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργῶν, ἢ αἱ χρησματικῶς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας.

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, masc. of the persons, ἐπὶ τῶν διήκοντα = ἐπὶ ταῦτα 1159 b, 25.

§ 4. τῆς πολιτείας, sc. κοινωνίας. συμπεριφέρονται, sc. οἱ κοινωνοί, cf. below a, 25, especially οἱ σύμβουλοι and the like.

ἐπὶ τῶν συμφέροντων, 'the condition upon which they make a journey in common is profit of some kind.' For the sense of ἐπὶ cf. 1110 a, 23.

τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν. Pol. 1278 b, 23 sqq. τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον συνάγει, καὶ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μῆν ἐκάστη τοῦ γίνεται καλώς. We see from this that τὸ συμφέρον includes τὸ εἰς τὴν σιμφερόντος καὶ τὸ γίνεται ἀλλὰ ὡς καὶ τὸ γίνεται. φασιν. For the ἐνθονον cf. Plato, Rep. 369 c. Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 17. 1281 b, 17.

§ 5. τῆς πόλεως, Ramsauer understands this as referring either to exiles trying to recover their city or colonists seeking for a new one. But surely it is more natural to think of a polis. For ἀπ᾽...ἐπὶ... η... cf. 1113 a, 23. ἔναι δὲ... συνουσίας. It is clear that Bywater is right in holding that b, 23 ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κ.τ.λ. is continuous with this. I think it safer, however, to assume an interpolation than a dislocation, and b, 21 πάσας... b, 23 βίον is not wanted here. It is repeated in substance at the end of the chapter.
Πολιτείας δ᾽ ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἵσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβασίν, φθορά τοῦτον. εἰς δ᾽ αἱ μὲν πολιτείαι βασι-

περεβάσεις, 'deflections.' The name is taken from music where certain scales were called 'deflected.' Cf. E.E. loc. cit. p. 385. The fullest explanation of the meaning is given in Pol. 1290 a, 13 sqq., where we are told that oligarchy and democracy are commonly regarded as the typical constitutions, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πτυχῶν λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια ὁ πιοῦς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦτον παρεκβασίας. People make aristocracy a kind of oligarchy and the polis a kind of democracy just as they make the west wind a deflection of the north and the east wind of the south. He goes on ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀρμονίας, ὥστε τινὲς καὶ γὰρ ἐκεί τίθεται εἴδω δύο, τὴν δυνατίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα συνάγαγα τὰ μὲν ἀρμονία τὰ δὲ φύσιν καλούσι. But the true doctrine is ὅτι διὰ μᾶς αὐθέντη τῆς καλὸς συνεστρεφόμεν, τὰς ἄλλας εἰς παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τὶς εἰς κοιναίς ἀρμονίας (the well tempered scale) τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας, διαγραφές μὲν τὰ συνταγματά καὶ δυσταγμα-

τέρας, τὰ δ᾽ ἀνεμώνες καὶ μαλακά ἰδιωτικά. We shall therefore best realise Aristotle's meaning if we think of the παρεκβάσεις as 'out of tune,' remembering at the same time that
vulgar people at Athens preferred scales which were not natural, cf. Pol. 1342 a, 22 elai 6' ὑσπερ αὐτῶν ἀλ

ψυχαὶ παροτρυμέναι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἰξώσει, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν παρακτικῶν ἐλαίο, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ παρακτικωσμένα (see Susemihl and Hicks p. 636).

The ὀρθαὶ πολι
tείαι are based on the natural notes of the scale.

βασιλεῖα ... ἀριστοκρατία. Pol. 1279 a, 32 καλεῖ 6' ἔλθαν τῶν μὲν μοναρχῶν τῆς. πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβιβάζοντον συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τῆν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν, πλείστων 6' ἐνδείκνυντο ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶν ἐξήγη τὸ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβιβάζον'to κοινὸν ἀποβιβάζον'to κοινὸν πάσαν tōn τῶν βασιλείων, πολιτείας. But he means exactly the same thing as he does here. That he is not thinking of a 'timocratic' state, in which there are several classes based upon a property qualification, is shown by b, 18 ὧν πάντως ἐκ τῆς τιμητικῆς.

§ 2. βασιλεῖα ... βασιλεῖα. This is only to be understood, however, of the ideal ruler in the παραβασιλεία, the man of ἀριστεία καὶ δημοτική ἀρετῆ. The whole question is thoroughly discussed in the Third Book of the Politics.

χειριστή ... τιμητική. The reason is given Pol. 1279 a, 39 ἐνα μὲν διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετήν ἡ ὀλιγία ἐνδεχεται, πλείους δ' ὑσπερ χαλεπόν ἡμετέρως πρὸς τάσιν ἀρετῆς.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὸς κ.τ.λ. Pol. 1279 b, 6 ὃ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὸς ἐστὶν μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ μοναρχοῦτος. 1311 a, 2 ὃ δὲ τυραννὸς πρὸς ὀλίγων ἀποβιβάζεται κοινῶν, εἰ μὲν τῆς ὀλίγων φιλελεῖας χάρων, ἢ ἐστὶ σκέψει μὲν τυραννικὸν τὸ καλὸν, βασιλείας δὲ τὸ καλὸν.
ἀν σκοτοῖσιν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτός ἂν τις ἐξ ἐβασιλεύσ. ἦ δὲ τυραννὸς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης τοῦ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διόκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὑπὲρ τῆς χειριστής· καίκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτιστότω·

3 μεταβαίνει δὲ ἐκ βασιλείας ἐκς τυραννίδας· φαινότης γὰρ τὸ ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίας, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τυραννὸς γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ ἐκς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακὰς τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐαυτοῦ· καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀπὸ τοὺς αὐτούς· περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενον τὸ πλούστευν· ὀλίγους 15 δὴ ἄρχουν καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστῶν. ἐκ δὲ τιμοκρατίας ἐκς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ·

1160 b, 12. ΕΕ. 1241 b, 33 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄσδον τὸ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν· καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἰδὴ ἐσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας, κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ <δημοκρατικὴ> κοινωνία καὶ ἡ ἐπιτρεπτὴ φιλία, τὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁρῷ μετεχεῖται· κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀριστή καὶ βασιλεύτη. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα δικαίων τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

κληρωτὸς... βασιλεύς. Ramsauer refers to Plato, Polit. 290 e sqq. καὶ δὴ καὶ παρ᾽ ὅμιλ... τῷ λαχὴν βασιλεύς φασι τίδε τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα πάντα τῶν ἀρχαίων δυνάμεων ἀποδεδώθη. 291 a ταύτων τε ταύτων τῶν κληρωτῶν βασιλείς ἰκανὰ καὶ ἱσχίας. The reference, then, is primarily to the βασιλεῖας at Athens and, as Mr. J. Solomon has shown (Cl. Rev. iii. 194), the meaning is practically 'a merely titular king.' Mr. Solomon quotes two further passages in illustration (1) Ar. Pol. 1318 a, ἀπερείπθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν αἱρετῶν κληρωτῶν ποιεῖν (as a means of reducing a magistracy to insignificance) and (2) Plato, Laws 692 a ὃν φιλόν ἔτεκε βασιλεύς αὐτή (i.e. the ἀρχηγὸς τῶν Σαρπινῶν) τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ὥστε τὴν κληροτη̣

B. A.

δημοκρατίαν. Pol. 1290 b, 17
πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἦσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμῆματι. ἡκιστὰ δὲ μοχθηρὸν ἐστὶν ἡ δημοκρατία: ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος, μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μόλις οὕτως ὁποῖοι αἱ πολιτείαι ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ μέγα ἐκβάλουσιν. ἄμοιώματα δ’ αὐτῶν καὶ οἶον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ εἰ ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἥ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς νεῖες κοινωνία βασιλείας ἐξερχεται αὐτός σχῆμα τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Ἰμηρος τῶν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει τῷ πατρικῷ γὰρ ἄρχῃ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι, ἐν Πέρσαρι δ’ ἤ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικῇ: ἥρων ἄρχῃ δῶς δοῦλος τοῖς νεῖσιν. τυραννικῇ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσποτία πρὸς δοῦλους· τὸ γὰρ τὸ τεσσαρῶν συμβέβην ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἄρχῃ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ’ ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφέρουν τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν καὶ ἄρχαί διάφοροι. ἄνθρωποι δὲ καὶ γνωσίας ἄρσις στοιχείον φαίνεται· κατ’ ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ

1160 b, 32. EE. 1241 b, 27 αἰ δὲ πολιτείαι πάσαι ἐν οἰκίαις συνυπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅστις δημοκρατία ὑπάρχει, ἡκιστὰ μοχθηρὸν. ὁ δὲ πολιτικὴ χειραίσχειν αἰσθήσις τῶν πλείστων ἀπείρων, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. τῇ πολιτείᾳ, sc. τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ. § 4. τῷ πατρὶ μᾶλι, so that his ἄρχει τῷ τῶν ἀρχείων συμβέβην. EE. 1249 b, 10 ἡ ἐν τῶν τέκνων ἄρχῃ βασιλείας. Here too Homer's Ζεὺς πατὴρ is referred to. Βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 π. ἐν Πέρσαρι π. τ. η. This is in striking contrast to Xenophon's ideal picture. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν, i.e. the 'tyrannical' relation between master and slave, as opposed to that between son and father. τῶν διαφερόντων. How they differ we learn from Pol. 1260 a, 9 ἄλλω γὰρ τρόπῳ τῶν ἀρχείων τแพ้[...]

§ 3. ἂνθρωπος δὲ καὶ γνωσίας, sc. κακωσία. In Pol. 1259 b, 1 we have γνωσίας μὲν (sc. ἄρχεις) πολιτείας, τέκνων δὲ βασιλείκας.
περὶ τὰ τὰ ἡ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γνωσκείς ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνην ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἄνηρ εἰς ὁλο-35 γαρ χάνει μεθατησίαν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὖχ ἢ ἁμένων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχοντι ay γνωσκεῖς ἐπικλήρους 1181
οὕτω· οὐ δὲ γίνονται καὶ ἀρετὴν ἣν ἄρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλού-6 τον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλγγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατι-κὴν δὲ ἐξακούῃ ἢ τῶν ἄδελφῶν· ἵστοι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφὶ ὅσον
tαῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διὸπερ ἄν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
διαφέρουσιν, οὐκετὶ διδολφεῖκά ἢ μεῖται ἡ φυλή. δημοκρατία
dὲ μᾶλλον μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότους τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα

cαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολειτείαις). βασιλικὴ
μὲν ἡ τοῦ
γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικὸς, πολειτεία δὲ ἡ τῶν
ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννίσ ὀλγαρχία δήμος. καὶ τὰ
dίκαια δὴ τοσοῦτα.
Ε.Ε. 1242 α, 1 λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι συνεγκαί ἐταιρική κοινωνικὴ ἡ
λεγομένη πολιτική. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἐχουσα εἰδή, ἢ μὲν ὡς
ἀδελφῶν, ἢ δὲ ὡς πατρὸς καὶ uων (καὶ ἱκρα καὶ ἀνάλογαι, ὃν ἡ
πατρικία, καὶ καὶ ἀριθμόν, ὃν ἡ τῶν ἄδελφων· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς
ἐταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνοντο, γὰρ καὶ ἑνταῦθα πρόσβεσιν). ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ
συνώνυμη ὑπὲρ καὶ τὸ χρυσόν καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μη αὐτάρκειν
δοκοῦν συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνήθην γὰρ ἢ ἐν καὶ τοῦ συνῆθιν χαρῆν.
μόνη δὲ
ἡ πολιτική καὶ ἡ παρ᾽ αὐτῆς παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φιλίαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς
φιλοι κοινωνικά· αὐδὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄποιος. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ
ἐν τῇ τῶν χρυσῶν φιλία, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.
ἀλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνήθην πρῶτο καὶ τέχνη, διὸ ἔνεκα κοινοῦ τόνος
(ὅτι γὰρ οἴγανον καὶ ψυχῆν) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦν ἐνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ
καὶ τούτω οἴγανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει, ἢς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἐργον
ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐνεκεν ἑστὶν. καὶ τὸ τρυπάνι εἶναι διεστὸν, ὥστε τοῦτον
ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτω τῇ ἑδὲ σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, δοῦπερ
ἐτηρεῖ πρότερον.

 μεθιστήριον, sc. τὴν κοινωνίαν, i.e. εἰς ὀλγαρχίαν.
ἐπικλήρων οὕτω. Cf. the well-
known lines of Menander—
“Ὅσις γενοῖς ἐπικλήρων ἐπιθυμεῖ λα-
βεῖν πλούσιον, ὦτα μήν ἑκτείναι θεῶν,
ἡ δοῦλετ ἄτυχεον, μακάρος καλομέροις.

§ 6. τῶν ὀικήσεων, ἑ habitation. As
Stewart points out, the word is often
used of the habitation of wild beasts:
“Dicuntur autem haud male oecidae
qua quae non sunt oecia, nedum oecou.”
Ramsauer. The word oecia implies
an organised family, oekheis is a mere
place to live in.

25—2
XI. Καθ' εκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐφεσίας; εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἰπέρ ἄγαθος ὁ πολιτικὸς ὑπέρφυτοι αὐτῶν, ἐν ὑπ' ἐπάτωσιν, ὑπὲρ νομεύς προβάτων. ὧδεν καὶ Ὀμηρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέ-15 μονα τοιμένα λαῶν ἐπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική διαφάρει δὲ τῷ μεγαθέρ τῶν εὐφεσίματων. αὕτης γὰρ τῷ εἶναι, δοκοῦσιν μεγίστον, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ πατρίδος, καὶ τοῖς προφόροις δὲ ταύτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τέ ἄρχην πατήρ νόμον καὶ πρόνοιαν ἐγκονόν καὶ βασιλεῖς βασιλευο-20 μένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὕτης, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται ταῖς γονεῖς, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ εἰν τούτῳ οὐ ταυτὸ ἄλλα τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρός δὲ πρὸς ἤγαγα καὶ εἰς ἄμορφον τι κατὰ τὴν μεγερίαν καὶ ἠμοιθείαν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκα-25 στὸι οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ὡς δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐταιρίᾳ ἀνεικεῖ· ἵναι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικίωτα, οἴκων καὶ ὑπέρφυτα, ἵνα ταὐτῷ δὲ ὑπ' ἐμοπά-θεις καὶ ὑπεροχῆς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. δεικταὶ δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατίαν. ἵναι γὰρ οἱ πολίται θεολογοῦνται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ εἰς ἐμοῖς οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὁπερ καὶ τὸ διε-30 καινόν ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἠκοίμητα εἰν

1161 a, 30. ΒΕ. 1241 b, 17 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σώμα
καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ἄρχων καὶ διστοτής πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν ὁ δὲ

XI. § 1. Καθ' εκάστην κ.τ.λ. We may compare the modern ideas of
(1) Loyalty, (2) Noblesse oblige, (3) Fraternity.
εὖ δἐνον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. How far
that is is explained above, 1134 a, 46 sqq.
ἦσαν νομεύς προβάτων. Here
again Aristotle is thinking of Plato's
Polítikos.

§ 2. ἡ πατρική, sc. φιλία.
διαφάρει, sc. τ' ἀρχῃ.
§ 3. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. The
son or the subject οὐσίᾳ ἀμφοῖν ὑπεροχῆς ἀνεικεῖ

§ 5. βοῦλονται...εἶναι. 'The ideal
of the polis is that the citizens
should be equal and good.' Here
ἐπιεικεῖς = ἀνθρώποι, cf. 1136 a, 35 π.
τῇ χειρότερῃ ἐν τυραννίδε γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλιάς. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινῶν ἐστὶ τῷ ἀρχαίτε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλιά: οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιοι οὐκ εὑρίσκει τῶν ἄρχων καὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεισπότη πρὸς δούλους ὠφελεῖται 35 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δὲ οὐκ 1161 b ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιοι. άλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἰπποὺς ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλους ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινῶν ἐστιν· ἃ γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἐμψυχος δοῦλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἀνθρώπου: δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τῶν δυνάμενον κοινωνίσαι νόμον καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ 8 φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρῶν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλείοντον πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἵσον ὀσφύν.

XII. 'Εν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πάσα φιλία ἐστὶν, καθάπερ εἶρηται. ἀφορίσεις δ' ἀν τις τὴν τε συγγενείαν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν, αἱ δὲ πολιτικαί καὶ φυλετικαί καὶ συμπλοίκαι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαύτα, κοινωνικαῖς ἐσκασὶ κάλλους. οἱ οὖν γὰρ

ζητεῖ κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς [οὐδέν]. οὐδὲ διαφέρεται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄκατερο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφότερον τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἑνεκα ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ σιωπή ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφωνον, καὶ τὸν δεισπότην ὁ δοῦλος ὀφελεῖται καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετοῦν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὀφελεῖ δοῦλος ἐμψυχον.


§ 7. ἢ δ' ἀνθρώπου. Cf. Ulpian 'Quod attinet ad ius civile servi pro nullis habentur, non tamen jure naturali; quia, quod ad ius naturale pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales.' Pol. 1245 b, 12 did καὶ συμφέρον

έστι τε καὶ φιλία δοῦλος καὶ δεισπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσεως τοῖς οἴκοις.

= XII. § 1. ἀφορίσεις δ' ἀν τις κ.τ.λ. 'We might make synnechēs and ηταιρικὴ φίλα into separate species' from κοινωνική φίλα in the strict sense. Eudemos (loc. cit. p. 387) actually does so. πολιτικαί, 1161 a, 10 sqq. φυλετικαί 1160 a, 18. συμπλοίκαι, 1159 b, 28. 1160 a, 15. καὶ ὅσα τοιαύτα, e.g. των συστασιωτῶν.
15 καθ’ ὁμολογίαν τινά φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταῦτας δὲ τὰ ἐξεστῶ ἃν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν, καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται ταῖς πολυεθῆς εἶναι, ἢρητὶ δὲ τὰ πάσα ἐκ τῆς παρεκκλησίας οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὸ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτὸν τι ὁντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ὃπ’ ἐκείνους τι ὁντα. μᾶλλον
20 δὲ ἑστασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτε ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνφιλεῖται τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γεννήθην τῷ ποιησάντι τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ’ οὗ, οἱ δέδους θρίξ στοργῆς τῷ ἐχοντι’ ἐκεῖνον δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ, ἡ ὁποῖον, καὶ τὸ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν
25 γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προσθέτωντος χρόνου τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθήσιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δήλους καὶ δ’ ἀφιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν 3 τέκνα φιλούοντο ὡς ἑαυτοῦς (τὰ γὰρ εξ αὐτῶν οἴνοι ἔπετοι αὐτοῖ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ’ ἐκείνων πε- 30 φυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἀνήλικους τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν περικε- ναι: ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταύτης ἀνθρώπος καὶ τοῖς ποιεῖν: ὅθεν φαντάζεται αἰμα καὶ βίζαν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτη ἐστὶν ἢτο τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ εὐδημοίους. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φίλους καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἡλικίαν. ἢτις γὰρ ἡ ἡλικία,
καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἔταραὶ· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδέλφικη τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἢ ἀλλοτριώτερος τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δὲ οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δὲ ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω
5 τῶν ἀρχηγῶν εἶναι. ἦστε δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνως, καὶ ἀνθρώπων πρὸς θεοὺς, ὡς πρὸς ἄγαθον καὶ ὑπέρέχοι. εὖ γὰρ ἐπευπήκασε τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆ.
6 ναὶ αἰτία, καὶ γενομένως τοῦ παιδεύθησαι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἑδὴ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν θηλείων, ὥσι καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ἐστίν. ἦστε δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδέλφικῇ ἀπερ ἢ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσις, καὶ ὅλος ἐν τοῖς ὑστεροῖς, διὸ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἄλλοις, καὶ διὸ ὑμοπέπτο-
5 στηροῖ εἶκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθεῖτες ὑστεροί—καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ ἐβεβαιοτάθη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγε-15 νῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχησι· ἀνθρώπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυασμοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικῶν· ὅσον πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαίοτέρον οἰκία πόλεως καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ἐξῆς. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστὶν, οἱ δὲ ἀνθρώποι οἱ μόνον ἐτέρων,
αριστοτέλους [Θ. ΧΙ. 7
τής τεχνητοῖσι χάριν συνοικούσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εἰθὺς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐστερα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὐν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τεθεῖτο τὰ ἑαυτα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἥδυ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἰ δ' ἂν καὶ δὲ ἄρετή ν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰλὲν· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐκατέρων ἄρετή, καὶ χαίροιεν ἀν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνεδρος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θάττον οἱ ἄντεκνοι διαλύονται τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πώς βιωτέου ἄνδρι βραθημενοὶ ἀνήθησεν πρὸς γούνα καὶ δίκαιος, διὸ ἐν τῷ ταῦτα διαλύεται· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων φαινεται ζητείσθαι η τῶν δικαιόν· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων φαινεται

1162 a, 29. ΕΕ. 1242 a, 19 τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν δικαίων τι ἐστιν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλος τὸ δικαίον ἀπαν πρὸς φίλον. τό τε γὰρ δικαίων τις καὶ κοινωνικός, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνικός. ο μὲν γένους, ο δὲ βίον. ο γὰρ ἅνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῆτο, καὶ οὐ ωσπέρ ταλά ποτὲ συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι [καὶ] δῆλα καὶ ἀρρεν̣ † α' α' α' ἀι διὰ δούμων αἰμιλίων (ἀλλ' δὲ δὲ δὴ μοιασμένω?), ἀλλὰ κοινωνικόν ἅνθρωπος ζῆτον πρὸς οὐ διὰ φύσιν συγγένεα ἐστὶν· καὶ κοινονία τοῖον καὶ δικαίων τί, καὶ εὐ μὴ πόλις εἰρήν. οἰκία δ' ἐστὶ τῆς φιλία. δευτέρων μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλων ἦσαν καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὄργανων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαύτα οὕτω φιλεῖ οὕτω δικαιούνται, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον, ωσπέρ καὶ τὸ ὑγιείνον οὐ δικαίως, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον· γυναικός, καὶ δὲ ἄνδρος φιλεῖ ὡς χρῆσθαι καὶ κοινωνικά· παρότρυς γὰρ καὶ πολυ η' αὐτὴ ἤσπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εἰ ποιήσας πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλος τοῦ φύσει άρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει άρχοντος· η δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρῶς ἀλλήλες ἑταίρας μάλιστα η κατ' ισότητα. οὐ γὰρ τι νόθος τῷ παθήθην· ἀμφότερος δὲ τιμῆρ αὐτοῦ ἐκλήθη· Ζεὺς ἐρωτέ τρόχου.

ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἱσον ζητοῦντων λέγεται. διὰ ἐν οἰκία πρῶτον ἄρχαι καὶ πηγαί φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίων.

(φαινόνται γὰρ μᾶλλον βοήθεοι γινώμεναι καὶ ἐθνίκι καὶ συνεργάσι μικραίς, ἐν ἄνθρωπῳ δὲ καίστα, οὐκ οὐ μόνον τοῦ εἰρηνεύτων καὶ τοῦ εὐ ἐνεργέα ἄλλο χρόνο καὶ τοῦ ἀρρέντος.

διήρηνται τὰ ἔργα. Fritzsche quotes

oceps. 1343 b, 26 οἴκων προφητεύματι ὑπὸ τὸν θεοῦ ἐκατέρων ἡ φωνή, τοῦ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν, κ.τ.λ.

§ 8. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαινεται, sc. τὸ δικαίων.
τοῦ φιλοῦ πρὸς τῶν φιλῶν καὶ τῶν θυνείων καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων καὶ τῶν συμφοιτητῶν.

XIII. Τριττῶν δ’ οὐσῶν φιλῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἰρηταί, καὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἴσοτητῃ φιλῶν δυτῶν τῶν δὲ 35 καθ’ ἑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἄγαθοὶ φιλοὶ γίγνονται καὶ ἄμεινοι χεῖρον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιν-1162 b μον, ἴσαξοντες ταῖς ὀφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἵσων μὲν κατ’ ἴσοτητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἵσαξεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνίσους τῷ ἁνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόνασι.

2 γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ 5 τῷ χρῆσιμῳ φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγοις, οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὲ ἀρετὴν φιλοῦ δύνατο εἰ δρᾶν ἀλλὰς προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τότε δ’ ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα ὑπὲρ μάκαν: τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦν καὶ εἰ δοκεῖν συνεχεῖαι, ἀλλ’ ἃν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύ-10 νεται εἰ δρῶν. δ’ ὑπερβάλλον, τυχάνων οὐ ἐφείται, οὐκ ἃν ἐγκαλοῦν τῷ φιλῷ ἐκάστος γὰρ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ὀρέγε-3 ται. οὐ πάντως δ’ οὖν ἐν τοῖς δὲ οὐδόμην, ἀμα γὰρ ἀμφότερα γίγνεται οὐ ἀπείγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγενει χαίροντι, γελόιος δ’ ἃν φαίνετο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντε, ἐξον μη 15 ἄν γίγνεται καὶ τῷ χρῆσιμῳ ἐν μητρικῆς ἐπ’


XIII. § 1. Τριττῶν δ’ οὐσῶν φιλῶν κ.τ.λ. We come now to certain practical rules about φιλία. We always make a point of drawing practical conclusions from our theories, even if they interrupt the main argument. They serve also, however, to bring out the true nature of Friendship.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, κ.τ.λ., i.e. they may be equally pleasant or useful, or one more pleasant or useful than the other (ἱσαξοντες... διαφέροντες).

cat’ ἴσοτητα closely with ἱσαξιον.
Ἀφέλεια γὰρ χρόνους αὐλήλαοι αἰὲ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἐλαττὸν ἔχειν ὀλονταὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὡτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται ποισύνον τινήσων αἴξοι διότες: οἱ 20 δὴ εἰ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πά- σχοντες δέονται. Εἰοικε δὲ, καθάπερ τὸ δικαίον ἔστι διττόν, 5 τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρόσειμον φίλας ᾗ μὲν ἥπικη ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλιστ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συν- 25 αλλαξοι καὶ διαλέονται. ἔστι δὲ ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ 6 ῥητος, ἡ μὲν πάμταν ἄγοραλα ἐκ χειρός εἰς χείρα, ἢ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρα εἰς χρόνους, καθ' ὀμολογίαν δὲ τὰ ἀντί τίνος. ἐξὼν δὴ ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον.

1162 b, 21. Ε.Ε. 1242 b, 22 ἢ δὲ κατ᾽ ἵστα φιλία ἐστίν ἡ πολιτική. ἡ δὲ πολιτική ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρόσειμον, καὶ ὅσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὀμοίως:

οὐκέτι γεγονόκειν Ἄθηναίῳ Μεγαρῆς,
καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χροσιμοὶ αὖληλαοὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χείρα ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενοι οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτων ἕνεκα ὅπως εὐ τοιχὶ διὸ όθεὶς, ἀλλ᾽ Ἰερών ἑν τῷ ἄγαθῳ καὶ τῇ λειτουργίᾳ. κατ᾽ ἰσότητα δὴ βούλονται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χροσιμοῦ φιλίας εἶδος ὧν, ἢ μὲν νομικὴ ἢ δὴ ἥπικη. βλέπει δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἱσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ὅσπερ οἱ πολιοῦντες καὶ οἱ ῥυόμενοι. διὸ ἐφηται

μεσθος ἀνδρὶ φιλῳ.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ὀμολογίαν <ἡ> ἡ πολιτικὴ αὐτὴ φιλία, [καὶ] νομικὴ.

§ 5. κατὰ νόμον. The opposition is not quite correctly stated, for a νομικὸν δίκαιον may quite well be unwritten, nor is an ἄγραφον δίκαιον necessarily φόσει δίκαιον. But the expression is natural, for τὰ γεγραμμένα δίκαια are περὶ ὅν ὁ νόμος ἄγοραλος (Rhet. 1374 b, 19).

φίλας. So Kβ and Asp. This reading is guaranteed by Eudemos (loc. cit.), otherwise we might be tempted to adopt the reading of Lβ ἄφελες.

ἡπική. We still speak of a 'moral' as distinct from a 'legal' obligation, though the associations are different.

ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν, sc. φιλίαν, συναλλάξεται ... διαλέονται, 'when they contract and dissolve the friendship.'

§ 6. ἡ μὲν ... δὲ ... A further subdivision of ἡ νομική.
καὶ ἡ τῆς ἄνωθεν ἐξέχει· διὸ παρ᾽ ἐνίοις οἷς εἰσὶ τοῦτων, ἀλλὰ οἶονται δεῖν στήριξιν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάζοντες· ἡ  ἡ ἰθική οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλὰ ὡς φίλοι διαφέρονται διήπτωτε ἄλλοι· κομίζοντες δὲ ἀξιοῦ τὸ ἱσοῦν ἢ πλέον, ὡς διδακτέος ἀλλὰ χρῆσας· οὕτως ὡμοίως δὲ συναλλάζοντες καὶ διαλυμένοις ἐγκαλέσεις τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει· ὁ βουλεύεται μὲν πάντας ἡ τοὺς πλείοτος τὰ καλά, 35 ἵππεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθονα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὐθεῖαν μὴ αὐτοπαθῶς, ὡφελούμεν δὲ τὸ εὐφρενεῖται. δυνάμενος 1163α

εἰπτρέποντας αὐτοῖς, ἰθική βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἐταγορα. Ἑλεία ἐγκλήμα τῷ ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἷτον δὴ παρὰ φιλίαν. γὰρ φιλεῖ ἡ κατὰ τὸ χρῆσμον καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οἱ δὲ βουλοῦνται ἄρα ἐχεῖν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μὲν τὸν χρῆσμον ἐνεκαὶ δὲ ποιούσιν ὡς ἐπικεκυκλωμένοι, διὸ ἦσαν πιστεύοντες ὡς νομικὴς ποισίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν πρῶτων πλείοντα ἐγκλήματα (ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δὲ ἱδεῖς ἤξοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ τοῖς οἷς εἰδόθης διαλύονται, ἂν µὴ νομικὸς καὶ ἐταγορικὸς προστασίας· ὡμοὶ δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἡ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλησις. ἔστι δὴ ἡ µὲν διάλυσις πρὸς νόμου (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τῷ ἱσοῦ), ἡ δὲ ἰθικής ὡς διὰ ἐναρχῆς νόμος ἐστι τῶν λεγομένων συναλλαγμάτων, ὧν· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ εὖ δικαίον εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἄγαθοι καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττοντος. ἔστι ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ, τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, ἑκάστοις ἐγκαλεῖ, ἄτιθ τῇ ἰθικῇ ἀλλὰ µὴ νομικὸς πιστεύοντος.

κόν... ἐχει, ‘the postponement friendly element in it.’

παρ᾽ ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Stewart

Theophrastos Peri συμβολιῶν τοβεν Χαρώθας καὶ Πλάτων ὁρμαν ελείωνι καί καὶ καί, ἐν δὲ τῷ πιστεύοντι, μὴ ἐφε, αὐτὸν γὰρ αὔτων εἶναι τῇ...
καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπόριαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δικαίον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πράγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθεῖν, πόσον, ἢ ποιον ἢ τὸ πεποιθήθη. ένδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θολύννες.

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σοἰς μὲν τούτοις ὑπηρετήθην ἢ μή. ἀμφισβητήσας 10 δὲ ἔχει πότερα δει τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὑφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ

suspect the interpolator meant it so, not seeing the drift of the next clause. Aspasios, as well as K', omits the words.

Ἀκοντα γὰρ κ. τ.λ. Α long ‘digestive parenthesis’ (Bywater). We must not assume that our benefactor meant to be a friend to us.

ὅς δὴ διαμαρτόντα κ. τ.λ. There is an anacolouthon here caused by the parenthesis within a parenthesis of γάρ...δρῶτος. We expect ἀποδοτέων, but the sentence is resumed by καθάπερ οὖν κ. τ.λ.

καὶ δ ὁμολόγησιν ἢν, sc. ἀνταποδοτέων. I have adopted Bywater’s conjecture here. We must join closely τὴν ἄξιαν ἢν ἔπαιθεν καὶ δ ὁμολόγησιν ἢν. ‘He must repay the equivalent of the benefit received and what he would have agreed to repay if he could’ (but for the misunderstanding).

οὐδ᾽... ἔκεισθαν ἢν. He is entitled to assume that it is not a mere commercial transaction and that the giver is so much his friend that he would not have asked him to pay if he were unable.

ἐπὶ τίνι, ἦν on what terms.’ ὑπομένει. sc. ὑπηρετήσῃς.

§ 10. Ἀμφισβητήσας δὲ ἔχει, ‘there is room for difference of opinion,’ and therefore ἐγκλήματα may arise. Ind. s.v. ἔχειν.
πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσία. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τουατά φασὶ λαβέσθαι παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβέσθαι, κατασκαμψάντες· οἱ δὲ ἀναπαύοντα εἰς μέγαστα τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ δὲ παρ’ ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ εὶν 15 κινδύνους ή τουατάσις χρείας. ἀρ’ οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρῆσιμόν τῆς φιλίας οὕσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ἀφελεία μέτρων ἔστιν; οὕτω γαρ ὅ δεὸμεν, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κοιμισμένος τὴν ἵστην· τουατάτη οὖν γεγένηται ἢ ἐπικουρία δύον οὕτω ἀφελεία ταῖς καλλιών γαρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ’ ἄρετην ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δὲ διοίκη ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαιρέσεις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γαρ καὶ τοῦ ἔθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίοι πὼς τότ’ ἦν, ὃ δὲ πώς νῦν, ἂν μὴ διείστωνται. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτική βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ἡ δ’ ἡθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαιρέσειν. ἢςτε καὶ διὰκον τούτο μάλλον ἔστι καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλικῆ. ἀιτίον δὲ τοῦ μάχονθων, διὸτα καλλίων μὲν ἡ ἡθική φιλια, ἀνάγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησιμή: οἱ δ’ ἀρχοντα μὲν ὡς οἱ θεωροί φίλου καὶ δὲ ἀρετὴν ὅστ’ ἦν τῶν ἁγίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἔστερον ἔσταν. ἐκ περιονοιας γαρ διακοσμοῦνται οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλὸν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλική φιλιαν. ἢστε φανερὸν τὸς διαμετέρεον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαιρέσειν βλεπτῶν εἰ ξῆθος, καὶ οὕτω άλλον αξιότερον βαθέρον παρὰ βαθέροις· εἰ δ’ ὃς χρησιμοὶ καὶ πολιτικοὶ, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσσέτει ὁμολογούντων· ἄν δ’ ὃς μὲν φῦ ὅστ’ ὃ δὲ εκεῖνος, οὐ καλόν μὲν ἀντιπόσχημα, ἀπὸ τούς καλοὺς λέγει λόγους, ὑμοῖον δὲ καὶ τετε βαθέροι, ἀλλ’ ἢτε οὐ διείστω τούτο ὡς ἡθικός, δεῖ κρίνειν τύχα, μηδ’ ὑποκρίνωμεν μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξατάταν. ὅστ’ ἦν στέργει αὐτῷ τὴν τύχην, ἐτέρ’ ἦστιν ἡ ἡθικὴ κατὰ προαιρέσειν, δῆλον, ἢτε καὶ εἰ μεγάλα παθῶν μὴ ἀπόφυγ’ δι’ ἀδύναμοι, ἀλλ’ ὃς ἠθικότερος, καλός· καὶ ὃς θεοὶ ἀνέκτησαν κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνον τὸς θυσίας. ἀλλ’ ὃς πιολόλητον οὐκ ἰκανόν ἢτε, ἂν μη ἡθικά δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, ὅδε τῷ δανέλοντα.
XIV. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχήν φιλίαις: 25 ἄξιοι γὰρ ἐκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, όταν δὲ τούτο γίνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὃ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν. τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὀψελμότερος· ἄρχειοι γὰρ ὑπὲρ ὅσοι διαδίκησαν ἔχειν. λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὗ φιλίαι, εἰ μὴ 30 κατ' ἄξιαν τῶν ἑργῶν ἐστάτα τὸ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴεται γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρηματίας κοινωνία πλέον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεοῦν, οὕτω δειν καὶ εν τῇ φιλίᾳ. οὐ δ' ἐνδεχόμεθα καὶ οὗ χειρὶς ἀνάπταλην φίλοιν γὰρ οἶκον ἐναντίου εἶναι ἔναρκτος τῶν ἑνδείᾳς· τὶ γὰρ, φασίν, ὅσοις σπουδαίως 35 ἡ δυνάμεις φιλοιν εἶναι, μηθέν περὶ μελλοντα ἀπολαλομεί; 1183 a, 24. ΕΕ. 1242 b, 2 ἐπεί δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρτέρ, κατὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ὑγίᾳ, τούτων δὲ ἐκάτερος δύο διαφοραί (ὅ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρτέρα ἐστίν ἐκάτερα αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀρμοδιῶτων χρημάτων), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξίων τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οἶχος φθαττώς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνισοτροπικὸν τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάσσον, οὕτω περὶ τοῦ ἐλαστικοῦ γνώμονον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖ, διακειμένου ὁπερ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς ἀρχαίον· εἰ δ' εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' τὸ ἱσόν κατ' ἀρμήθην αξίων καὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἀναλογίας τὸ ἱσόν διαβαλεῖται. ὥστε μὲν γὰρ ἀρμήθην τοῦ ἱσού μετέχουσιν, ὡς δὲ λόγῳ, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱσόν ἀρμήθην, ἐνυπήρκον εἰσφέρον ἀρχαίον, ἵσον καὶ τὸ ἱσόν ἀρμήθην διαλαμβάνονεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱσόν, ἀναλογία. οὖν δ' ὑπερεχομένως τούτων περίπλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διαμετρὸν συζεύγησιν. διότι εἰ δ' ἀν νῦν εἰσέτοιχοι διαμετρῶς ὑπερέχον καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δει τινὶ ἐπίρα

XIV. § 1. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., ὡς ἐγκαλοῦσθαι ἀλλάθειν. εἰ τοιαί καθ' ὑπεροχήν, and therefore in the Family and the State. νέμεσθαι, ὡς προσήκειν. οἴεται γὰρ κ. τ.λ. The ὑπερέχων wishes to regulate the friendship on the principles of Distributive Justice, while the ὑπερεχομένως regards it as falling under the head of an exchange of services for honour, and therefore, as Eudemos puts it, συζεύγησι τῷ διαμετρῷ. Cf. above 3133 a, 6 n.

§ 2. ὅλος δ' ὁν ὑπερθεντίκων. Aristotle solves the difficulty by applying τῷ διαμετρῷ δίκαιον. We must find τὸ καθ' ἀναλογίαν ἵσον καὶ apply the rule of τῷ ἐπίστευσθαι. Then only will 'diagonal conjunction' be fair.
καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ τιμή γέρας, τῆς δ’ ἔνδειας ἐπικουρία
3 τό κέρδος. οὕτω δ’ ἔχειν τούτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται: ὦ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τῷ κοινῷ γὰρ διδοται τῷ τῷ κοινῷ ἐνεργειοῦντι, ἡ τιμή δὲ κοινῶν. ὦ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶται, ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τῷ ἐλαττόν τοῦτος ὑπομένει τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἑπαττομένῳ τιμῆν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ ἐν τῷ δεινοδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανοικοὶ καὶ σφαζεῖ τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ ἐιρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄνω
σις ὀρκισθέντων, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὀφελομένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρέτην τιμῆν ἀνταποδοτεῖν, ἀποδιδόντα τῷ ἐνδεχόμενα.
4 τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φίλια ἐπίτηδει, οὐ δὲ κατ’ ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ
15 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοθῇ, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπικουρίας εἶναι δοκεῖ. διδ κἂν δο-
ξεῖν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι νῦν πατέρα ἀπείσαθαι, πατρὶ δ’ νῦν
όφελον ταῷ ἀποδοτέου, οὐδὲν ἐντὸς ἀξίας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργήμενον διδρακεν, ὥστε ἄν ὀφελεῖ. οἷς δ’ ὀφελεῖται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ, ἢ ἀμα δ’ ἵστοι οὐδεὶς ποτ’ ἂν ἀποστήμαι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβαλλοντος μυχθρείας, χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικοὶ μὴ
dιωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φιλοτόν ηὐ ὀποιοδοτοῦ τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, 25 μυχθρείᾳ ὡς ἐν πᾶσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλομαι, τὸ
δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελεῖς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήθω.

ἀνισοῦσαι καὶ ποιήσαι αὐνόλογον. τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἀρχαίντα φύσει καὶ θεοὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀρχομένου. δει δὲ ἴσοισθαι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν.

§ 4. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In this φίλω differs from διαφωτισθή.

ἐστιν, sc. τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν.

ἐς δύναμιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. for the ἐνδον Xen. Mem. i. 3. 3 ἐπικουρίαν ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἔνως τοῦδε (Hes. Πολ. 336).

Καὶ δύναμιν δ’ ἐρείδι ἑτ’ ἀναδέουσι


Biost. § 29 ἐνομοῖ τὸς γονεῖς τοῖς εὐρίους παῖδες καὶ μόνον θέσθαι τὸν ἄρχει μὲ ἀρχής, διὰ καὶ τὰλει ξαλεῖψις εἶναι βούλομαι καὶ ἀντακριβεῖσι.

τῶν ὑπηργίσας, sc. τῷ ἰδίῳ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς.

τῆς ἐπικουρίας, sc. τὴν ἀνταποδο-

φίαν.
'Εν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἴσαξει καὶ σφηξὶ τὴν φιλίαν, καθώς ἐίργει, οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκιττόμπορῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ύποθημάτων ἁμοιολογεῖσαν 35 θῇ γίνεται κατ᾽ ἄξιαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφαντή ταῖς λοιποῖς. 1164 a ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπορίσταται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ Ι.

1163 b, 32. ΕΕ. 1243 b, 15 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ταῖς μη κατ’ ἐνθυναίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἴδειν οὐ βαθίον. χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρῆσαι ἐν τῷ γάρ ταῦτα μὴ κατ’ ἐνθυναίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἑρωκτικῶν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ διάκειται ὡς [τὸν] ἴδιον ἐπὶ τὸ συζήτηται, ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνον ἴσον ὡς χρῆσθαι οὔτε ἔσται ἐνταῦθα κατ’ ἄξιαν δὲ πανορμηται τοῦ ἔργου, ἀλλὸν γινομένου ἀλλος γίνεται, καὶ τὸ τούτο λογίζονται παντὶ τινος, καὶ ὡς Πίθανον καὶ Παμμένην.

I. § 1. 'Εν πάσαις ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαις, ἢ. ὡς ταῖς ταῖς τό ἐπίθου. The reading of L a ἀνομοειδεῖς deserves the preference over the ἀνομοειδεῖς of K b (cf. Bon. Ind. s.v. ὀμοειδής); for what is meant is friendships in which the φιλίαι of the one party (ἀγαθοῦ, ἁδύν οὐ χρῆσιτί) is τῇ εἰς τῆς ἐπιτροπῇ, not merely ἀνόμως, from that of the other. In other words, they are friendships in which ἐπιτροπὰ ἀντὶ ἐπιτροπῆς ἀντικατάλληλοι ἐν τῷ θνοῦ ἄντι ὑφελεῖσι. They must not be confused with αἱ κατ᾽ ἐπιτροπὴν φιλίαι. Eudem. (loc. cit.) describes friendships of this kind as μὴ κατ᾽ ἐνθυναίαν, by which he means apparently friendships in which the φιλία differ not merely by attaining a higher or lower degree along the same line, but in which they are wholly disparate. So in Met. 9.94 a, 2 the αἱ ἐπιτροπὰ τῶν ἑρωκτικῶν are said to be ἀνήσπεροι neither κατ᾽ ἐνθυναίαν (as an infinite series) nor κατ᾽ ἐπιτροπῆς.

ἀντίληψι. The reference, if genuine, must be to 1132 b, 31 sqq., the account of justice ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκοσίοις ὑφαλλήγμασιν.

καθέστηρ εἰρήγεται. It has not been said, though it has been implied in 1163 b, 1 sqq.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, sc. κοινῳ, as we see from Eudem. loc. cit. The point of the illustration is that here too the parties are ἀνομοειδεῖς.

§ 2. ἐνταῦθα, sc. ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινῳ. Cf. 1133 a, 19 sqq.
πρὸς τούτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφυλάτων οὐκ ἀντιμιλεῖται, οὔτε ἔχουν φιλήτων, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δὲ ὁ ἐρώμονος ὅτι πρῶτον ἐπαγγελλόμενος 3 πάντα νῦν οὐδέν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν δὲ ἱδονὴ τοῦ ἐρώμονος φιλή, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφότερον ὑπάρχει· διὰ ταῦτα ἐὰν τῆς φίλως οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδάν μὴ γίνηται ἵνα ἕνεκα ἐφίλου· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦς ἐστηριγμῶν ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὁποῖα, διὸ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι διεφέροντο καὶ ὅλως διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητὴς (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήσιμα οὐχ ἐνι μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Πρόδικος (Ἡρόδικος Σπέγγελος) ὁ ἱερός πρὸς τὸν ἀποδότα μικρὸν τὸν μασθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαριστὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὃς ἦνε, ὃ δὲ ὁ χρήσιμος ὁμιλεῖ, ὃ δὲ ἐπεὶ ἰδεῖ ἀποδοθαναι, αὐτὸν αὐτόν ὃς ἦν ἐπολίσθη, καὶ ἐφή, ὃσπερ ἔκεινον ἕστατα εὐφράτευε, οὕτω καὶ αὐτός ὑποσχόμενος ἔκεινον. ὁμοιὸς δὲ φανερῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωστοῖσι· ἐνι μὲν γὰρ μετρητῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅρως ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογῳ γάρ μετρητῶν, ὃσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία. πῶς γὰρ κοινωνίας γεωργῶν σκυτοτόμους, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογῳ ἱσορρόπεσθαι τὰ ἔργα; τοὺς δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυνίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν σοφὸς δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἶτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἐκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῷ ἐλάττωνος ἡμῖν ἐδώκει, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοσσιῶν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖ. ἦστα δὲ καταπλῆθεν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φης ὁ μὲν ὁ χρήσιμον συνελθέναι αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ ἀλλὴ των τινὰς φιλίαν.
καθ’ αὐτὴν, i.e. in it καθ’ αὐτῶν φιλοῦσι. This is a striking example of the way in which καθ’ αὐτῶν has come to be treated as a simple adjective without regard to its literal meaning.

§ 4. εἰτέτα. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

οἶνον καὶ τὸ κηδαρφόδι κ.τ.λ. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 401 (where αὐτῶν ὑπὸ ἔτοιμον εἰσέβαλον means ‘adopted the rôle of a friend διὰ τὸ ἵνα’), and Plutarch, Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης 333 f. Δημοσίους γονίων ὁ τόραμες, ὁ πρῶτος, κηδαρφὸδι τινί εὐδοκιμοῦντοι ἀκόων ἐπηγγέλθησα δια- δρέα τοῦτο τάλαντον. τῇ δὲ ἔστερᾳ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τῆς ὑπάρχουσαν ἀκοφυύ- τος, Χρόνιος, εἶνε, εὐφυείαν ὕστερον ὅποιον παρ’ ἐμὲ χρόνον, εὐφράξαν κάτω σὲ τοῖς ἐλπισί, ὦτε τὸν μισθὸν ὅποι ἐ- τερπέσ ἀπελάμβανες εἶναν ἀντιπαρ- μένοις. Note the loose, conversational way in which Aristotle alludes to the story.

κάκουν γε χάριν, sc. ὥστε δεόμενος τυγχάνει. τῶν, sc. ὅ εἶχε. Muretus conjectured τὰ αὐτόν.

§ 5. τοῦ προλαβόντος, not merely τοῦ πρότερον λαβόντος, as the editor say, but (as often) ‘the one who has got the start,’ ‘the advantage.’ Ηε is called ὁ πρὸχος below 1164 b, 9. This rendering makes the aristotic sense (suspected by Bywater) natural and right. The second alternative introduced by η is preferred, as shown by the following clause with γάρ. Cf. 1165 b, 34.

ὅπερ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Prot. 328 b ἐπεῖδην γὰρ τῷ παρ’ ἐμῷ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν θυμηθῶς, ἀποθέσαν δὲ τὸ πράττομα ἄργυρον, ἐὰν δὲ μηδενές ἐμὶ ἐρημοῦ ὄντα, ὅποι ὁ πρὶν ἡμῖν τὰ μαθήματα τοσοῦτον κατέθεκεν.

ποιεῖν, imperf. inf. ‘used to do,’ τὸ “μισθὸς δ’ ἀνδρί.” Hesiod, Ἀργ. 368— μισθὸς δ’ ἀνδρί φιλῶν εἰρήμενον ἥκε τοῦτο, καὶ τε κατηγνοῦσιν γελόσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρας δέθανεις; πιστεῖς δ’ ἑρεμία ὧν καὶ ἀποτίσατο ὅλον ἄνδρα.
προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἄργυρον, εἶτα μὴν ποιοῦντες ὅν ἐφα-
σαν διὰ τὰς υπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων, εἰκὸς ἐν ἐγ-
7 κλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιθετοῦναι ἰ ἀμολογήσαν. τούτῳ 30
δ’ ἱσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταί ἀναγκαζόνται διὰ τὸ μιθέον ἅν
δοῦναι ἄργυρον ὅν ἐπισταίναται. οὐτὼς μὲν οὖν ὁ ἔλαβον τὸν
μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐμπλήμασι εἰσίν. ἐν ὦς
δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπογραφῆς, οἱ μὲν δὲ αὐτοὺς
προϊέμεντο εἶρηται ὅτι ἄνεγκλητον—τοιαύτη γὰρ ἢ κατ’ 35
ἀρετὴν φιλία—τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέων κατὰ τὴν προα-1164
τίταμι· αὐτὴ γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὕτω δὲ ἐσικε
καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ
ἡ ἁξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ δὲ ἵσορροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ’
ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοῦ καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ 5
ἐνδεχόμενον, μὴ τοιαύτης δ’ οὕτως τῆς δοσεως ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ
τις, μᾶλλον μὲν ἰσος δεὶ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι διο-
κούσαι ἀμφοῖν κατ’ ἁξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνη
οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαίον δόξειν ἃν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ ὅτι δοξὴν ὑφελθή ἢ ἄνθ’ ὅσον ἐν
τῇ ἡδονῇ ἐπετ’ ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβῶν ἠξει τῇ παρὰ
τοῦτο ἁξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὀνομαῖς οὕτω φαίνεται γνώμε-

Even among friends things should be done on a business footing.
§ 7. τοῦτο, i.e. to have a fixed charge payable in advance.
ὅτι ἀνθεοῦ, 'for the sake of their friends themselves,' not for what they hope to get out of them. ἥρηται, 1162 b, 6 sqq.
κατὰ τὴν προαίτησιν. It is not a case for 'payment by results.' It is the will (προαιτέως) rather than the power (δόσασιν) that is essential.
καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1164 b, 5.
§ 8. ἐν τινι, 'for some return,' 'on the understanding that a return has to be made.' The context shows that we are still dealing with 'understandings,' not with 'agreements.' So ἐν τινι is not equivalent to ἐν ὅρθοις.
τὸν προέχοντα, 'the one who has the start.' Cf. the note on τοῦ προ-
λαμβάνοντος 1164 a, 23. The editors appear to think that ἀ προίχων can mean ἐ πρόερων σχοῦ. Even Zell says "is qui prior habet, id est, qui prior accipit."
ὑποτε, sc. ἀ προίχων. ἢ ἄνθ’ ὅσον κ.τ.λ. The pleasure has to be calculated in terms of τὸ ὑφελθέον.
ἐξει, sc. ἀ προιχειοῦν. τὴν παρὰ
tοῦτον, sc. τοῦ προέχοντος.
ἐν τοῖς ὀνομαῖς, 'in the case of things offered for sale.' The seller will take as much as he can get, but the just price is the value of the article to the buyer. Aristotle is still thinking of χρήσις as the only standard of value. He forgets that there is a Normal Value determined by Cost of Pro-
vov, eniaxou t' eiši nómoi tōn èkousiów symboulaión ókias 9
mē elnav, ócs dein o èpísteuse, diaphýrmei prós toútov
15 katháter èkounwíasen. O ğer èpetrárfh, toútov òlētai di-
kaiósteron elnav tázi tōn èpetréfwnostov. Tā polla gàr oú
tou ʿesou timósin oi èxounte kai oi bouvlmouen labeiv: tā
ğer oikeía kai d diðásisn èkastos fainetai pollou diá-
all' òmou h àmoufth gímei prós toútovn òsou an tā-
20 toswin oì laubãánontes. Dei 8 ʿisoi oú tosoúton timán òsou
èxonti fainetai áxion, all' òsou prin èxen étma.

II. 'Aporíaan 8' èxei kai tā toviaútā, oíon póteron déi
pánita tō patrí àtonouein kai peíðeosthai, h kármonta
mēn iatrífr peiostēn, stratfýgon dè xeuratofrtytov tōn polé-
25 mikón: òrmos dè phífr mállov h spoudaìo úprrptetēn,
kai èn efërgētā antapodotov xārim mállov h étairo prótev,
even úmfoín mē ùn èneíketai. Ær d' oún pánita tā toviaútā ákri-
bos mēn diorízai oú bádiov: polla gàr kai paiowías

1164 b, 22. EE. 1244 a, 1 peri dè tōn ògathoi kai kai'
drēthn phívov skopetón póteron dèi èkeiné tā chrístma òpphretēn kai
bofhēn h tō àntupohúnti kai dývamérf. tōtō dè tō autó próbhlma
èst, póteron tōn phívov h tōn spoudaioi ex poikhtovs mállov.
An mēn gàr 8 hè phíov kai spoudaioi, òsos oú ìan xalētopan, an mē tis tō mé
aftrh tō tē tapywng, phívov mēn sphiðra poiów, epieikì dè ñmra-
ei dè mē, polla próblēmata gínei, oíon ei dè mēn ʿi, oík òstai dè, dè
èstai, oúpov dè, h dè mēn ègýntov, èst, dè oú, dè òstov, oûk òn dè

duction. If the seller does not get this, he will withdraw his wares from
the market, unless indeed they are
perishable.

§ 8. eniaxou te k.t.l. Cf. 1163 b, 29.

tōn èkousiów symboulaión. Cf. above 1131 a, 2 sqq. and the notes.

òlēta. There is no difficulty in
the third person singular which Aristotele uses very freely without a definite
subject (cf. 1110 a, 14 n.). Here we
may supply ʿr ymòthēra from oí rhyov
if we like.

All' òmou k.t.l. However high
the seller's estimate may be, it is the
buyer's estimate that is decisive.

8èt 8' èsow k.t.l. A reservation is
favour of the seller. When the article
has been bought its apparent value to
the purchaser is lowered, for he is no
longer conscious how much he wanted
it. Of course, if he wishes to sell it
again, its apparent value to him rises
again.

II. § 1. 'Aporíaan 8' èxei k.t.l.
These àporiai form a sort of casualty of
Friendship. For èxei cf. Ind. s.v.
έχει διαφοράς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητα καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαῖῳ. οὕτως ὅπου πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἀδήμονι λοιπόν· καὶ τῶς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ χαρισματικὴ ἐτάφρως, ὡσπερ καὶ δάνειον ὁ ὁφειλεῖ ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἡ ἑταίρᾳ δοτέον. ἦσος δὲ οὐδὲ τούθ᾽ ἀεὶ, οτὸν λυτροθεύει παρὰ λῃστῶν πάτερα τῶν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτροτέον, κἂν ὀσίσσον ἦ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἔαλωκότι 35 ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτροτέον; δέξετε 1165 ιγάρ ἄν καὶ Εὐανδροῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἰρηται, καθὸλου μὲν τὸ ὁφειλήμα ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἦ οὐρπενὴ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταύτ᾽ ἀποκλείειν ἐπίστατο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστω ἵνα γίνῃ τὸ τήν προοπαρχὴν ἀμελήσασθαι, 5 ἐπειδὴ οὐ μὲν σπουδάζων εἰδὼς εἰ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀντικλοντι ἀμφότεροι. οὐδὲ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἐργαδότερον. μὴ γὰρ τι λέγει Εὐμητίως, τούτοις λόγον δικαίον μισθῶν ἢν λόγοις φέρεις, ἔργον δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἔργον <δεικνύω> παρέσχετο. καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐστίν ἄλλ᾽ ὁ δὲ τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τοῖς βελτίων ὁ πατέρα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Ἀδριάντα δίκοι, οὐδὲ ἔχει πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινὰς· ἦσος οὖν ἔστω οὐκ ἔστω ἡ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἀλλὰ δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οὐκ οὖν εἰ σῶτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαία, καὶ συνήν τούτῳ δεῖ πάντως τὸν συνήν, τούτῳ ἢ μὴ οὕτω δίδωσιν ἀλλὰ χρησίμοις. ἄλλ᾽ οἱ τούτοι ποιοῦντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδάσκων οὐ δέναι, οὔθεν οἷον εἰσὶν ἄξιοι. καὶ οἱ εἰ τούτοι λόγοι ὁροὶ τῆς φιλίας πάντας μὲν πῶς εἰσὶν φιλίας, ἄλλος ὁ τῆς αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τὰ κεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εἰ ποιοῦνται καὶ τῷ ὁποίον δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισήμανεν οὕτως ο ὁμιλοῦ τῆς φιλίας), ἀλλὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ συνῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ᾽ ἢδονήν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχάρειν· πάντες δὲ οὕτωι οἱ ὁροὶ κατὰ ἀντικλοντι.
απόδοσις γίνεται δι' αυτήν μορφήν, είναι. ουδὲ γάρ τὸ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ο μὲν γάρ οἶδαμεν κομιεῖσθαι ἑδανείσαι ἐπιεικεῖ ἂντι, ὃ δ' ὦκε ἐπιλέξει κομιείσθαι. 10 παρὰ ποιηροῦ. ἐνε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσαν τὸ ἁξίωμα· ἐνὲ ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως ὀνομάζεται δὲ, οὐκ ἰδίᾳ ἐξαιρεῖ ἀποστά ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὐν πολλάκις εἰρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ ἑν πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὠμολογεῖ τὸ ὁμοιόμενον τῶν περὶ ἃ εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταύτα πάσιν ἀποδοτέοι, 15 οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὑδὲ τῷ Διό θυεῖται, οὐκ ἄναμεν. ἔπει δ' ἐτέρα γονεοῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἔταιροι καὶ εὔρηκταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοτα ἀποπνευμένον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνεται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτους γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος τοι καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο τῇ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὴ κηδείᾳ δὲ μάλιστα ὀνομάζονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταύτο. δόξει δ' ἀν τροφῆς μὲν γονεοῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκείν, ὡς ὀφειλοῦντος, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῷ εἶναι κάλλους ὃ ἦ ἐναυτὸς εἰς ταύτ' ἐπαρκείν· καὶ τιμήν δὲ γονεοῦσι καθάπερ θεοῦ, οὗ

φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οὐδείς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσί, καὶ ἐκάστοις μᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὦν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ εἶναι προαιρεῖται κἂν γὰρ ὡς ὑπεροχήν καὶ ποιησαί εἰς. * * βούλειται τῷ ἐγγὺ τῇ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδίδοναι, ἀλλὰ συγήρων οὐ τούτω, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἰδίῳ.

ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φιλοὶ ἀλλήλων ἄνειόν· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μάλλον, ἄλλ' οἱ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κἀκεῖνος οὐν διότι ἠδῶν τὸν ὠν ἐλέετο, καὶ ὅτι ἤρεμοι τὸν πλεοῦτον εἴλετο· ἐχθρισμώτερος γὰρ. δῆ <οὐ> δεῖ ἄγανακτεῖν, ὡσεὶ ἢν εὶ μάλλον εἴλετο αὐτῷ ἡττονος. οἱ δ' ἐγκαλοῦσι· ἀκείνον γὰρ νῦν ἐξηποίσα τὸν ἠθόπον, πρότερον ἐξηποίσα τὸν ὠν ἢ τὸν ἤρεμομεν.
πάσαν δὲ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ, οὐδ’ αὐτήν τὸν τοῦ σοφοῦ τὴν τοῦ σπατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, 9 ὀμοιώσες δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τὸ προσβυντέροι τιμῆν τὴν καθ’ ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους πρὸς ἑταῖρους δ’ αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησιαν καὶ ἀπαντῶν κοινώτητα. καὶ συγκενέσθε δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ 30 πολίταις καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἄπασιν ἀιὲ πειρατῶν τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονεμεῖς, καὶ συγκρίνεις τὰ ἐκάστως ὑπάρχοντα κατ’ 10 ὀικείωτητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἡ χρήσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὀμογενῶν πάνω ἡ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργῳδευτέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ τούτῳ ἀποστατεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὄν ἐνδεχόμεθα, οὕτω διοριστέον. 35

Π. Ἐχει δ’ ἄποριαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύσθαι τῶν φίλων ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμενούσαντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ 1165 τὸ χρῆσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδύ φιλίων δίτας, ὅταν μνήμη ταῖς ἔχον, οὐδὲν ἄποφθος διαλύεσθαι; ἐκεῖνοιν γὰρ ἦσαν φίλαι· ὅλ’ ἀπολυμπότων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλεῖτε δ’ ἂν τὶς, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδύ ἀγαπῶν προσπεποιηθείτο διὰ 5 τὸ ἱθος. δ’ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἰπομεν, πλειοῦντα διαφορά 2 γίνονται τῶν φίλων, ὅταν μὴ ὀμοιώσεως ἵσταται καὶ ὅσει 2 φιλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαφευσθῇ τῆς καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἱθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνον πράττοντος, ἐαυτὸν αἰτιώτ’ ἄν: ὅταν δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, 10 δικαίων ἐγκαλεῖν τὸ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσο περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία.


καὶ συγκρίνεις κ.τ.λ., ‘and compare the claims of each in respect of closeness, goodness and usefulness.’ I cannot feel convinced of Professor Bywater’s view (Contra. p. 62) that συγκρίνεις is here used in the sense of συμβολεύειν (or συγκρίνει) and that the reference is to “combining the persons and their respective dues.” These, I take it, would be προσήκοντα, not ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 10. ἡ κρίσις, i.e. ἡ σύγκρισις according to the usual practice of repeating a compound by the simple word (1156 b, 23 n.). Ruelle’s σύγ-

κρισίς is therefore unnecessary.

Π. § 1. εἰς ἄρχῃ, probably 1162 b, 23.

§ 2. ἡ τοῖς...κιβδηλεύουσιν. Zwinger quotes Theognis, ν. 200—Χριστοῦ κιβδήλου καὶ ἀργυροῦ ἀνοχεντο ἀπή; Κύριε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν ἑβδομάν ἀνθρό σοφή;
Δὴν δ’ ἀποδέχεται ὁς ἄγαθον, ἴσην τιαν δὲ μοχθηρός καὶ δοκεῖ, ἃρ’ ἐτί φιλητέου; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἰτέρος μὴ πάν τινι φιλητέου τον ἀλλὰ τάγαθον; οὔτε δὲ ἀνομοίωτον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεί φιλοπόνιον γὰρ οὐ χρῆ εἶναι, οὐδ’ ὀρθοῦντας φαύλος ἐρηται δ’ ὅτι τὸ ὀμοίον τῷ ὀμοίῳ φίλου. ἃρ’ οὐν εὐθὺς διαλείπειν τῇ οὐκ αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνώτατοι κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἐπανόρθωσιν δ’ ἔχουσιν μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἂνθος ἢ τὴν τοῦ ὀνείλαια, σου θέλειν καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκεῖοτερον. δόξειε δ’ ἀν ὁ διαλείπομενον οὔθεν ἄποικον ποιεῖν οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φίλον ἢν ἀλλοιοθέντα οὐν ἀδυνατόν ἀνασώκυνε αὑρίσκεται. εἰ δ’ ὁ μὲν διαμένωι ὁ δ’ ἐπεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλαττοὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἢ ἀρα’ χρηστεύων φίλον ὢσ’ οὔκ εὑρέσχεται; 25 ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστατεῖ μάλιστα δὴν γίνεται, οἷον εἰ δαίμων παιδικώς φιλίας; εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένωι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ’ ἀνήρ εἰ ὁ τὸς κράτος, πῶς ἂν εἶναι φίλον μὴ ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μῆτ’ χαίροντες καὶ λυποῦμενοι; οὖθε γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλων ταῦτ’ ἦπαρξει αὐτοῦς, ἀνεν ἰδ’ ὑπὸ τοῦτον οὐκ ἄλλοις εἶναι συμβαίνων γὰρ οὐχ ὃν τε. ἐρηται δὲ περὶ τοῦτον. ἃρ’ οὐν οὐθέν ἀλλοιοτερον πρὸς 5 αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλοις μηδέποτε; ἢ δεὶ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνθέσεις, καὶ καθάπεταν φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὑδείους οὐρμέθα δεῖν χαρῆσθαι, οὔτω καὶ τοῖς

ei de filon vono anobvoi eni sththei alevhe

pyvdoin eon, dolon de' en frseon hotor exei, toito theo kibdhlaton poiase bropoitoi, kal geniono pateion toit' aniprhotaton. Camerarius adds Dem. Lept. § 167—

thetaimazh de' etsygei ei tois me tō rōmama diafthrētoun thano tou par' oymen osetin, h emia, tois de' dhon tēn plōn kibdholo kai apiston poiouin logon douxete.

§ 3. oite de filhnto k.t.l. There is clearly something wrong. Stahr reads oite de filhnton. <t> pouro, and so Bywater. Stewart supposes the original text to have been h ou

the words oite de filhnto pouroin being due to a ditography of oithe de filhntoareis.

filhntoareis. gyar k.t.l. We have perhaps an echo of this in Theophrastos, Char. 14. (Peri filhntoareis) kal to dhon filhntoareia adelaphē esti tēn pouriasa kai ἄλληθες ἐστι τῇ τῇ παρομοίᾳ τῇ δομῇ πρὸς τῇ δομῇ παρείσθαι.

epanorhthwv de' echnou, 'capable of reform.' For echnoi cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 4. ην. For the imperfect cf. Ind. s. v. ην.

sumbion. Cf. 1126 a, 31 n.
IV. § 1. Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

We now come to what is really the important part of the discussion of φίλια so far as regards the main argument. It is φίλια alone, in the sense of the higher self-love, that can lead us from the practical to the theoretic life.

Cf. Introductory Note p. 345.

πρὸς τοὺς ἀλασ (σο K for vulg. πρὸς τοὺς φίλους). Friendship as a feeling πρὸς ἔτερον is, in its highest form, an externalisation and transference to others of the good man’s relation to himself.

ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. We must not supply φιλικῶν, for Aristotle does not intend to assume yet that there is such a thing as self-love. That question is raised only to be dismissed below (σ. 33). There is no definite ellipse. Eudemous says more clearly ὧς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχειν (loc. cit. p. 410).

τιθέασι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Five φιλικὰ are enumerated and shown to be characteristic of self-love, viz. (1) βοηθησις ἀγαθοῦ ἑκείνου ἑνεκα, (2) βοηθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, (3) τὸ συνεδέαν (=τὸ συνήπτω), (4) τὸ ταῦτα αἱρεῖται (τὸ ὄνομανωσιν), (5) τὸ συναλέγειν καὶ συνεχάειν.

οἱ προσεκρουκότες, ‘who have quarrelled’ (perhaps about a trifle) and ‘never see each other now,’ so that their friendship is clearly dis-
καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τούτο περὶ τᾶς μυθέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τινὶ καὶ τῷ φύλιν
10 ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἐκαστὸν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ πάρι-2
χεῖ—τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἦ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι
(ἔοικε δὲ, καθάπερ εἰρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἡ ἄρετη καὶ
ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)—οὕτως γὰρ ὁμογενοῦσει ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν δὲ
αὐτῶν ὅρεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὑπολείται
15 δὴ ἑαυτῷ τάγαθα καὶ τὰ φανόμενα καὶ πράττει—του

δόν πως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπάρχει πως ταύτα, ἦ δὲ οὖ διηρημένα, σοὶ ὑπάρχει.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὐτῶν ἔξεσι [ὁ] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν
dιωρισμένοι, καθ’ οὗ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοποῦν εἰδώλας. δοκεῖ γὰρ
φίλοι εἶναι ὁ βουλημένος τινὶ τάγαθα ή σοὶ οἰκεῖα ἄγαθα, μὴ δὲ αὐτῶν,
ἀλλ’ ἐκείνων ἔνεκα. ἀλλὰν δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δὴ ἐκείνων καὶ
μὴ δὲ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ διαγεμένων τάγαθα, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ἀλλ’ ὁμολαμβάνειν ἰδίως δὲ τρόπον ὁ συζύγῳ αἱρέται δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν

ημέραν καὶ μὴ δὲ ἐτέρων τι, οἶνον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις,
συζύγῳ δὲ ἐτέρως. μάχεται δὴ ταύτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλλην. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀδὰ τὸ ἑαυτὸ, οἱ δὲ ἢν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζύγῳ, οὐκ οἴονται

καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν, i.e. there is no variance between his ὅρεται, his
ἐνθυμία καὶ θυσίας have the same objects as his βουλήσεις. It is not
true of him that τὰ ἢδη μάχεται (1099 a, 12); πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ

λόγῳ (1102 b, 18). We must avoid the Paraphrast’s error of saying τῶν
αὐτῶν ὅρεται κατὰ τὰ λογικὰ ἐν ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἱλογογ. The λόγον ἔχει

καὶ ὑπολείται δὴ κ.τ.λ. The first
φιλεῖν, τίς, βουλήσεις ἄγαθαν αὐτῶν ἔνεκα.

καὶ τὰ φανόμενα. Of course to

the good man these are identical with

τὰ καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀγαθά, but Aristotle

inserts the words lest we should forget

that ὅρεται is ὅσο ἐνιαν φαντασίαν.
οὗτος εἶναι δοκεῖ, 'which each of us is believed to be.' We need not seek far for the author of this ἔδαφος. Plato in Rep. ix. had already expressed the φιλόσοφος in the likeness of a man, while θῦμος and ἐνέμοια are in the image of a lion and a many-headed monster. We need not yet consider whether, or in what sense, Aristotle himself could accept the formula. Cf. 1168 b, 30 sqq. 1178 a, 2 sqq.

καὶ τούτῳ ἐτέρῳ, the second φιλόσοφος.

§ 4. γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος κ.τ.λ. Stewart is evidently right in trying to explain this sentence by the light of the ἀφορίστα about βουλεῖται ἀγάθου raised above (1159 a, 5 sqq.). There we saw that a man will not wish his friend to be a god, here we see that he will not wish to be a god himself. We are coming closer to the idea of Self.

γεγομένος δ' ἄλλος, 'by becoming another.' The sentence "No one chooses by becoming another that the thing he has become should have all good things" is not logical; but the thought does not lend itself to clear expression. If we bracket ἐκεῖνο τοῦ γεγομένου with Vermehren, the sentence is smoother; but I am inclined to think the confusion of two inconsistent thoughts is intentional.

καὶ τούτῳ, 'as it is,' so he would be wishing for something which already exists. Cf. Leibniz's "A quoque vous serviroit-il de devenir Roy de la Chine à condition d'oublier ce que vous avez esté? Ne seroit-ce pas la même chose que si Dieu en même temps qu'il vous détruisoit, créoit un Roy dans la Chine?"
θεός τάγαθον—άλλων νόμον ὁ τι ποτε ἐστίν. δόξετε δὴ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἐκαστὸς εἶναι ἡ μάλιστα. συνιδάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐαυτὸς ἰθαλείαν ἀδελφόν τὸν ἄρην τοῦτον πεπραγμένων ἐπιτρέπει αἱ μονείας, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπιτίθεται ἀγαθὰ, αἱ τοιαῦτα δὲ ἑδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δὲ εὐποιεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μᾶλλον ἐκαστὸς πάντων γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρὸν τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλον ἀλλ' ἀλλοί ἀμεταμελήτων γάρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς 30 αὐτὸν ἐκαστα τούτον ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιπελεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τῶν φιλῶν ἔχειν ὡστε πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτῶς), καὶ ἡ φίλια τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλος ὁς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πάτηρον ἐστὶν ἢ διὰ οὐκ ἐστι φίλια, ἀφείσθω ἐπι τοῦ παρόντος. δόξετε δὴ ἂν καὶ τὸ συγχαίρει καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖ, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχή, καὶ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν ἄλλων μηδε ζῇν, ἀλλὰ συναποθηκεύονται. ὁτὼ γὰρ ἔχει ὡς εἰς, καὶ ἵστος ἀνεκτα αὐτῶς ἀποτελεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἄγαθῳ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτὸν. ἐν γάρ τῷ ποιημένῳ διαφωνεῖ, σοφόν εἰς τῷ ἀκρατεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἑχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἴλαι. ἢ δὲ εἰς καὶ ἀδιάρετος, ὀρκότος αὐτῶς αὐτῶς, τοιοῦτος ὁ ἄγαθος καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἔπει δὲ γέ μοιχόντος οὐκ εἰς ἄλλα πολλά, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἔτερον καὶ ἐμπληκτος. ὅταν καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτῶν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γὰρ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ καὶ εἰς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸς

Ἀλλ᾽ ἂν δὴ τι ποτε ἐστὶν, 'remaining just what he is,' sc. αἰτεῖται πάντ᾽ ἔχειν. A will not accept bliss on condition of becoming B. It is nothing to A that B is blessed.

§ 8. συνιδάγεις τε κ.τ.λ. The third phileus.

μείαν. I prefer this, the reading of Kρ', to the more commonplace μείαν. The ποιητικὸν color is quite in place here. Cf. 1165 b, 33.

συναλγεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. The fifth phileus.

ἀμεταμελήτως. Zwinger compares Epicharmos (fr. 280 Kaibel), αἱ μεταμελεῖν ἀλλὰ προοιμεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἄθροα τοῦν

σοφὸν.

τῷ δὲ...ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. Men's views of the characteristics of φίλα are entirely derived from the good man's relation to himself. His relation to himself is transferred to his relation to his friend; for the friend is "another self," and that is why men regard the points enumerated as φιλεῖν.

§ 6. πρὸς αὐτοῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is introduced as an entirely fresh point. We have seen that our view of what friendship is is based upon the good man's relation to himself; can we put it the other way and say that the good
man loves himself? This is precisely parallel to the question in Book V. whether a man can wrong himself.

η ἑστι δύο η πλείον. This has been taken in two ways, (1) 'in so far as he is two or more,' (2) 'in so far as two or more of the characteristics mentioned are present.' With regard to (2) I would ask why 'two or more' are mentioned. Surely the good man has them all and the bad man fancies he has. EE. 1240 a, 17 sqq. (loc. cit. p. 409) seems to me decisive in favour of (1). We have there τα μερη εξερ πωσ προι ἀλληλα τα της ψυχης, and below a, so η δε δο δω και η ψυχη, ὑπάρχει πωσ ταυτα. This is an authoritative explanation. Eudemus also (loc. cit.) refers to the parallel question ποτεν ἔθηται ευτυχεις δυνατης η αθικ. If we follow this hint and turn to 1138 b, 5, we find κατα μεταφοραν και ὑμιστημα ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτὴ προς αὐτὸν δικαιων ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τινων. Here as there we have a reference to the Platonic view. This Aristotle regards as a metaphor, so we may be sure that the argument here is still purely dialectical.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημενων, Bywater (Contr. p. 63) puts a comma before ἐκ τῶν εἰρημενων to show that it goes closely with διεξε η δια. I do not see how it follows from what has been said, and prefer to believe the words have crept in from the paraphrase. We see from the next sentence that τα εἰρημενα most naturally means the φιλοκα which have been enumerated, and it is therefore likely that they are introduced here to support the interpretation we have rejected.

§ 8. ἐπεραν μὴν κ.τ.λ. Observe that the διαφορα is entirely in the ὀρκικων, not between ἄρεξις and διάνοια.
τοῦ πραττεῖν ὁ δὲ οἱντά τα ἕαυτος βελτίστα ἦναί. οἷς ἐδὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πεπρακταὶ καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ ἠφόνουσι τὸ ἢὲν καὶ ἀναροῦσιν ἕαυτον. ἤποιοις τε οὐ μοχθηρὸν μεθ᾽ οὐν συνιδημερεύσουν, ἕαυτος δὲ φεύγουσιν. 15 ἀναμμαχήσοντα γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἔτερα ἐλπίζοντες καὶ ἔαυτος ὅπτες, μεθ᾽ ἐτέρων δὲ ὅπτες ἑπιπλανάνται. οὐδὲν τε φιλητῶν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλεικὸν πάσχουσιν πρὸς ἕαυτον. οὕδε δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἕαυτος. στασίζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή. 20 καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεί ἀπεχομένων τινῶν, τὸ δὲ ἤστει, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖρο τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖθε ἔλκει ὁ πτέρνη συγχαίροντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶον τε ἀμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἤδεισθαι, 25 ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρὸν τε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἡ ἐσθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἐβούλετο ἢδεα ταῦτα γενέαθαι αὐτὸ. μεταμελεῖας γὰρ οἱ φαίλων γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαιλὸς οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕαυτον φιλεικὸς διακείσθαται διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχον φιλετῶν. εἰ δὴ τὸ ὅπτες ἔχειν λλὰν ἔστειν ἄθλων, φευκτῶν τὴν μοχθηρίαν διαστατεμένοις καὶ πειρατεῖν ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἕαυτον φιλεικός ἄν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρω φίλος γένοιτο.

καὶ... μισοῦνται, 'and who are hated' (the relative cannot be repeated in Greek), καὶ φεύγουσι, 'actually shun.'

φεύγουσι τὸ ἢὲν, ὁ μὲν βολεῖται ἑαυτὸς (1166 a, 17).
V. ‘Εδώ εὐνοια φιλία μὲν ὕπικεν, οὐ µὴν ἔστι γε φιλία.’ 30 γίνεται γὰρ εὖνοια καὶ πρὸς ἄγνωστας καὶ λανθάνουσας, φιλία δ’ οὐκ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταύτ’ εἰρήται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ φιλήσεις ἑστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ’ ὁρεῖς, τῇ φιλήσει 2 δὲ ταύτ’ ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἣ μὲν φιλήσεις μετὰ συνθεθείας, ἥ δ’ εὐνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαθείας, οἷον καὶ περὶ τούτ’ ἀγνωστάς 35 συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλονται, συμ- 1167 a πράξειν δ’ ἂν οὐδέν’ ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαθείας εὖν 3 γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἐσκε δὴ ἄρχη φιλίας εἶναι, ἀστερὸς τοῦ ἑρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄθεως ἠδονῆς· µὴ γὰρ προσταθεῖς τῇ ἱδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἑρᾶ, ὃ δὲ χαῖριν τῷ εἰδεὶ οὐδέν 5 µᾶλλον ἑρᾶ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῆ καὶ τῆς παρού- σιας ἐπιθυμῇ· ὅπως δὴ καὶ φιλίας οἷον οἷον τ’ εἶναι µὴ εὐνοις γεγονόμενοι, οἱ δ’ εὖνοι οὐδέν µᾶλλον φιλίας· βού- λονται γὰρ µόνον τάγαθα οἷς εἰσιν εὐνοι, συμπράξειν δ’ ἂν οὐδέν’, οὐδ’ ἄχληθεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ µεταφέρον φαινει 10

1166 b, 30. EE. 1240 b, 38 τοσαχῶς µὲν οὖν τὸ φιλίαν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πάσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν προθηκὴν, δήλου ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεορήσας καὶ περὶ ὁμοιοίας καὶ εὐνοίας. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὺς µὲν εἶναι ταύτα, τοὺς δ’ οὐκ ἄνευ ἄλληλον. ἐστὶ δ’ ἡ εὐνοια τῆς φιλίας οὕτω πάμπαν ἔτερον οὕτω ταύταν. δερ- ρημείης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρείς τρόπους, οὐτ’ ἐν τῇ χρήσει ὡτ’ ἐν τῇ καθ’ ἠδονήν ἄστιν. εἰτε γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος, βούλεται αὐτῷ τάγαθα, οὐ δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ δ’ αὐτῶν βουλοῖτ’ ἂν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὅσπερ <ἡ φιλία> καὶ

V. § 1. καὶ πρότερον. 1155 b, 32. We here begin an examination of cognate ἔχει and διατατέω like that in Book VI., 1142 a, 31 sqq.

диάτασιν, animi intentionem. The word is originally a medical term. Cf. Plato, Rep. 407 e καθαλῆς τινε... διατασσε, migrariet.

ἀκολουθεῖ. Cf. Ind. s. v.
§ 2. περὶ τοὺς ἀγνωστάς. Cf. Lat. fatuer.
§ 3. ἄρχη φιλίας. Cf. EE. (loc. cit.), which proves that ἄρχη here means simply ‘beginning.’

τῇ ἱδέᾳ...τῷ εἴδε. There is no difference of meaning.

οὖν µᾶλλον οἰρὰ, ‘is not in love for all that.’

ἀπόντα ποθῆ, absentem desiderat; for πόθος (desiderium) is always τοῦ ἀπόντος, Plato, Krat. 420 a.

µεταφέρων, ‘in a metaphor.’ Cf. Ind. s. v.
τις άν αὐτῆς ἄργην ἐναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, σὺ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρησίμου οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἥδυ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖ νοια ἐπὶ τούτως γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐφρενητικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐν πέπονθεν ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χρησίμον οὐδὲ πεπονθέν 15 ἄπονειμεν τὴν ἐννοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· οὔ δὲ βουλόμενος τῷ εὐπρεπεῖν, ἀποκεῖται ἄχαρη ἐνπρεποίᾳ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἄκικτον ἐννοιαν. ἐν τῷ δὲ ἐν- φοι τῷ ἀρέτην καὶ ἐπεικείμενα τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φαινέται 20 καλὸς τῆς ἡ ἀνδρείας ἡ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν ἐγώες.

VI. Φιλικῶν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διότερον οὖν ἐστὶν ἀριστοκρατία: τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀργοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν ἂν οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁμοῦν ὁμογενικῶς ὁμοιοῦντας ὁμοιοῖο, 25 σιν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικῶν τὸ περὶ τῶν ὁμοιοίον), ἀλλὰ τὰς τοίχες ὁμοιοίοις φαινεῖ, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογενικῶς καὶ ταῦτα προαι-

ἡ ἐννοια σὺν αὐτῶν ἐννοια τοῦ εὐνοιομένου εἰναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁ ἐννοια· εἶ ὃς ἡν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὠδίσ φιλία, καὶ τοῖς ὁμόχως εὐνόουι, ὅστε δὴν ἄρα περὶ τῆς ἀκακίᾳ φιλίαν ἡ ἐννοια ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοιοῦντος βούλευσθαι μένον ἂντι, τοῦ ὁ δὲ φιλία καὶ πρᾶττει ἅ βούλευται. ἦστι γὰρ ἡ ἐννοια ἄρχη φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φιλίος πᾶς ἐννοιος, ὁ δὲ εὐνοιος οὐ πᾶς φιλός. ἀρχομένου γὰρ θαυμάζειν τὸ εὐνοιον μένον, διά ἀρχή φιλίας, ἀλλ’ οὐ φιλία.

1167 a, 22. EE. 1241 a, 15 δοκοῦντες γὰρ οἱ τοῖς φίλοις ὁμονοιεῖ καὶ οἱ ὁμονοιότεροι φίλοι εἰναι. ἔστι δ’ οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλίη, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοιοῖς, καὶ οὐσα εἰς τὸ συνήσων συνετείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἔστιν γὰρ τάναιτα τὸ κυνῆν ἐπιθύμειν, ὡστετε ἐν τῷ ἀεριτεί διαφθονίᾳ τούτῳ), οὗ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσθαι ὁμονοιαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

ἀργήν. The metaphor is probably from fields that lie fallow or mines that are unworked. Contrast ἐνεργεια. τὰ δίκαια δρῶν. He is δίκαιος rather than εὔνοος, in the proper sense.

VI. § 1. ὁμόνοια, concordia, a political term.

περὶ ὅτουν. As the writer of MM says (1212 a, 15) we do not call it ὁμόνοια to agree with Empedolkes about the elements. As Eudemos put it, it is neither κατὰ διάνοιαν nor yet κατὰ ὄρεξιν solely. Hence its relation to προαιρέσθαι.
2 ρώται καὶ πράττωσε τὰ κοινὴ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτᾶ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτον περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδι-χομενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἡ πᾶσιν, ὅσον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν 30 πᾶις ὁκή τὰς ἄρχας αἰρέτος εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖς Δακε- δαιμονίους, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἦσθεν. ὅταν δὲ ἔκαπερος ἐαυτὸν βουλήται, δύστερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔκαπερον ἐννοεῖν ὅντος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὅσον ἦν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 35 καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖσ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὔτω γὰρ πᾶσι γί· 1167 δὲ- νεῖται οὐ ἐφείσεται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμο- νοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἔστι 3 καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκουντα. ἔστι δὲ τοιαύτη ὁμονοια

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμονοια· οἱ δὲ φαύλως ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐνθυμοῦντες βλάπτονται ἀλλήλοις. οὐκε δὲ καὶ η ὁμονοια οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥστε οὖθ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν πρωτὴ καὶ φύσει σπουδαῖα, διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶ τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονεῖν, ἐτέρα δὲ καθ' ἦν καὶ οἱ φαύλοι ὁμονοεῖν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὔτω δὲ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρέγονται, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρους ὑπάρχειν οὐ δρέγονται. ἄν γὰρ τούτοι δρέγονται δ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφότεροι, μαχοῦσι· οἱ ὁμονοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦσι. ἦστι δ' ἡ ὁμονοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεῦσαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ἦ, μὴ τοῦ ἔκαπερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμονοια φιλία πολιτική.

§ 2. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ. There are three things to note in answering the question περὶ τῶν; (1) it has to do with πρακτὰ, (2) on a large scale, (3) in which it is possible for the desires of all parties to be satisfied. Cf. Eudemos loc. cit.

ἡ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν. The illustration is to the point, for (1) Pittakos was an elates tyrant (Pol. 1255 a, 35), and (2) he resigned against the wishes of the citizens. Accordingly θῆται prevailed only during the period when he consented to rule (ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἦσθεν).


“Was mein Bruder Karl will, dass will ich auch.”

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, 'in the same person.'

οἱ ἐπιεικεῖσ. These are the same as οἱ δραμοῦν.

πολιτικὴ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. If it has to do (1) with πρακτὰ on a large scale and (2) with things as to which the desires of all may be satisfied, it will be political.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται. 'Ομονοια is used technically by Thucydides of agreement as to the constitution. So in viii. 93 ἐν ἡμέραν μητὸς ἐκκένωσιν παίρνοι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ δημοκρατία.
VII. Οἱ δὲ εὑρήγεται τούτων εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐ παθῶντες τούτων δράσαντας, καὶ ὅσοι παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιτίθεται. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαινομένους ἐπὶ τοὺς παθῶντας ἢ οἱ παθῶντες εὐ τοὺς παθῶντας. δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τοινκαίον. τοῦτο δὲ ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἂν τις διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ὁφελέμον συμβαίνειν. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφειλεῖται, τῷ δὲ ἀποδοῦναι

§ 3. ἐν τοῖς ἐπικίκοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς, opp. ἐν τοῖς φαῦλοις, without the political significance which the word has above (b, 1).

ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δητεῖ, being of one mind. The phrase ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης εἰλά, γίγνεσθα, μένει is common in Demosthenes, and can be replaced by ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰλά, γίγνεσθα, μένει in the same sense (see Kehdanz Ind. s.v.). There is no reference whatever to the proverb ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὤρειν.

Ἀστερ εὑρίσκω. "Significantur hoc nomine omnia maris loca angustiora in quibus contrarii sunt fluctuum motus," Zell. For the simile cf. Aischines p. 66. 27 πλείον τραπεζομενος τροτά τοι Ἐυρίσκεν παρ᾽ ὃ ἔφεκα

§ 4. τῶν τῆς ἐκτατές. Cf. the complaints of Demosthenes in the Philippics.

—VII. § 1. Οἱ δὲ εὑρήγεται κ.τ.λ. This ἄροπα too serves to bring out some important points about φαῦλος

παρὰ λόγον, i. q. διὰ λόγον, διὰ λόγον, ἐδώειν.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλαστοῖς. Friesche compares Thuc. ii. 40 βεβαιότατος δ ἄρας τὴν χάρα ὅτε ὀφειλεῖται αὐτῷ εἰνολος δ ὁ δεῦρις σεῖν τοῖς αὐτοφελεῖοι ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐστὶ χάρα ἔναν ἐς ὀφειλεῖα τὴν ἀνεπιδότων ἀνθρώπων.
ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἱ ὀφείλονσι, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφείλοντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐρεγῆταντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελεῖς τὸ ἀυτοποιοῦναι. Ἐπιχάρμος 25 μὲν οὖν τὰς ἄναν τὰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτούς ἐκ ποιημονοῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δὲ ἀνθρωπικόν· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, 2 καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὑφίστανται. δύο οὖν ὃ ἔνθε νεκρῶτερον εἶναι τὸ αἰτίου, καὶ οὐδὲνος τὸ περὶ τοῦς δανείσαντας· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 30 σφέξεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἐπεκείς· οἱ δὲ εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπᾶσθαι τοὺς πεποιηθέτας καὶ μηδενὶ ὡσάμενοι. 3 χρήσιμοι μὲν εἰς ὑστερον ἄνοικον· ἀν. ὁπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβεβηκέναι. τὰς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐργον ἀγαπᾶ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἄν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐργοῦ ἐμψυχίῳ γενομένου. 35

deī. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τούτῳ μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ φυσικῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἱρετήσατο, τοὺς αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἐργόν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷς εὗ παθῶν ὑστερο ἐργον τοῦ εὗ ποιησάντος. διὸ καὶ εὗ τοὺς ζῴους ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα σπουδὴ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ γεννήσαι καὶ ζῆσαι· γεννώμεναι σοφεῖν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ τέκνα [καὶ οἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων] ἣν φιλοῦσαν· καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ὡς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἀριστον· καὶ οἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὀφειλόντος αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἐργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διορίζουσιν, πλεῖον δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τῆς γένεσιν μήτηρ.

ἐκ ποιημονοῦ θεωμένου. Epicharmos fr. 146 Kaeber, where θαρεόνας is restored. I do not think the interpretation given by Koraes "as if from a bad seat in the theatre" is adequate. It seems more likely that ἐκ ποιημονοῦ should be understood on the analogy of ἐκ δεξιάς, ἐκ ἀπροσπέ, ἐκ ἐναντίος, so that the meaning will be: "looking at the thing on the bad side" or, as we say, "the seamy side" (metaphor from tapestry). Cf. the Latin in malam partem.

Ἀνθρωπικός. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.

§ 2. φυσικωτέρον. Cf. 1147 a, 24 n. In 1155 b, 8, 9 φυσικὰ ἀπορρηματίζονται are opposed to ἀνθρωπικὸν.

οὐδέμιον, "is not even analogous." Cf. 1105 a, 26. Bywater (Contr. p. 64) reads τὸ περὶ τοῦς δανείσαντας, a decided improvement.

περὶ ἀκατακτῶν, ἢ τοὺς δανείσαντας, "there is no φιλησις in them" (for their debtors).

τοῦ σφέξατο βούλησις κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1155 b, 30.

κομιδῆς. Cf. κομιζόμεθα 1162 b, 32.

27—2
1168 a μάλιστα δ’ ἵσως τούτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπερ- αγαπᾶσθαι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὕστερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔσωσε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εἰς πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τούτω δὴ ἀγαπᾶσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ 5 τὸ ἔργον τῶν ποιητῶν. τούτω δ’ αἰτίον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἰρετοῖς καὶ φιλοτοῖς, ἐσμὲν δὲ ἐνεργεία· τῷ γὰρ καὶ πράττειν—ἐνεργεία δὲ ὅ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶν πῶς· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τούτω δὲ φυσικῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν δυνάμει, τούτῳ ἐνεργεία τὸ ἔργον μνημεῖ. ἀμα δὲ καὶ 10 τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτη καλοῦ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὡστε χαίρειν ἐν τῷ τούτῳ, τῷ δὲ παθῶντι σωθὲν καλοῦ ἐν τῷ δρᾶσαντι, ὅλλ’ εἰτέρι, συμφέρον· τούτῳ δ’ ἡττον ἢδ’ καὶ φιλοτοῖς. ἤδεια δ’ εἰτέρι τοῦ μὲν παράνοιᾳ ἡ ἐνεργεία, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος

§ 3. περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν. Cf. 1120 b, 13 n.

§ 4. ἐνεργεία δ’ ὅ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the syllogism is that τὸ ἔργον is φιλοτοῖς, and this is reached through the middle term τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσι (τῶν ποιησάντων). Thus τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσι φιλοτοῖς.

τὸ ἔργον is τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσι.

From this it follows that τὸ ἔργον must be the subject (or predicate) of the sentence which contains the minor premise, the article being added to both subject and predicate because the terms are convertible (cf. 1097 b, 22 n.).

'The product is (in a sense) its producer in activity.' If we write ἐστι for ἐστὶν and translate 'the producer of the product (ὁ ποιησάς τὸ ἔργον) is (in a sense) actively,' we could only conclude that he loves production, not that he loves the product, and the word πῶς becomes meaningless. It is clear, then, that here Aristotle is really trying to show that the love of an ἔργον is a form of self-love, and this helps the main argument considerably. Further, the doctrine that the ἐνεργεία of the ποιητής is embodied in the πᾶσχων is thorough-

ly Aristotelian, cf. De An. 426 a, 4 γὰρ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς καὶ κυανοῖς ἐνεργεία ἐν τῷ πᾶσχοιν ἐγγίνεται, and especially Phys. 202 a, 13 sqq. where the whole problem suggested by the fact that ἡ ἐνεργεία ἐν τῷ κυανῷ is discussed. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 419.

ἐστιν ποιησάς. The meaning of this reservation is clear from De An. 424 a, 25 (of the ἀλοιπονικοῦς and the ἀλοιπονικοῦ) ἐστί μὲν ὁμοιότατον, τὸ δ’ ἐνεργεία ἐταφέρον (1130 a, 12 n.), compared with 418 a, 3 τὸ ἀλοιπονικοῦ διόμητα ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ ἀλοιπονικὸν ἥδ’ ἐνεργείαι. We may say, then, that the τὸ ποιησάς ἐνεργεία is not the same as τὸ ἔργον ἐνεργεία but the producer is potentially the product and the product is the producer actualised. Therefore the producer loves the product; for he loves τὸ ἐνεργεία, and τὸ ἐνεργεία in the primary sense is τὸ ἐνεργεία ἐνεργεία.

ἐν τῷ τούτῳ, i.e. τῇ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ, 'the object of the act.' Cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

The τῶνος τοῦ καλοῦ is now applied.

§ 6. ἡ μὲν ἐνεργεία τῶν ἀλοιπονικῶν. We now look at the question from the τῶνος τοῦ καλοῦ, which is applied to the προβλῆμα of τῶν ἀλοιπονικῶν in Top. 116 a, 13.
Η ἑλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητῶν ὀμοίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι 15 μενει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τὸ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρῆσιμον παροίχηται. ἦ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἤδεια, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνω ἢ ἢπτον· ἡ προσδοκία δὲ ἀνάπα- λων ἔχειν θοικεῖν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φιλήσις ποιήσει θοικεῖν, τὸ φιλεῖνθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πράξειν 20 ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἦτε δὲ τὰ ἐπιτυχούς γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσι, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὗρε τὸ πάσχειν ἀπονοι εἰναι, τὸ δὲ εὗρεν ἔργον. διὰ ταύτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνώτεραι· ἐπεπονυτέρα γὰρ ἡ γένως 25 ισαίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἵσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξησε δὲ ἀν τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐνεργείταις οἰκείοις εἶναι.

VIII. Ἀπορείται δὲ καὶ πóτερον δεὶ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μά- λιστα ἡ ἀλλὸν τινά. ἐπιτυχώσῃ γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μάλιστα ἀγαπώσῃ, καὶ ὦ εἰν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτως ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τὲ 30 οὔ μὲν φαίλοι ἑαυτῷ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ δοκούν ἀν μοχθηρότερον ἢ, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦν δὲ αὐτῷ διὰ οὐδὲν ἃφι ἑαυτῷ πράττει—ὁ δ' ἐπιεικής διὰ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ δοκούν ἀν βελτίων ἢ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ φίλον ἑνεκά, 2 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρήσαν· τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διὰ· 35 φοινεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγους. φασί γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ὁ βούθεται τάγαθα ἐκεῖνον ἑνεκά, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς εἶσται· ταύτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ πάνθ' 30 οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἰρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ 5

καὶ ἡ μὲν φιλήσις κ.τ.λ. For the τότος cf. De An. 430a, 18.
§ 7. οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα κ.τ.λ. Cf.
above 1168a, 1 and Plato Rep. 330b. b.
VIII. § 1. Ἀπορείται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.
We now approach the question of
φιλία νίκης more directly. It is to this
that the whole discussion has been
tending.

οὖθιν ἃφι ἑαυτοῦ, 'that he does
nothing of himself.' I do not see how
the phrase can mean 'he does nothing
without an eye to his own interest.'
But the self-lover is emphatically the
man who does nothing 'unless he has
to.' Cf. Dem. Chers. § 3 τα γ' ἀφ'
ὑμῶν ἔτοιμ' ὑπάρχοντα ὁμῶς, Eur. Tro.
74 ἔτοιμ' ὁ βελτίως τὰς ἑνεκά.


φιλικα και προς τους άλλους δεικει, και αι παρομιαι δε πασαι ομογνωμονουσιν, οιον το "μια ψυχη" και "κοινα τα filon" και "ιςοτης filotης" και "γονυ κενης έγγονον" παντα γαρ ταυτα προς αυτων μαλατ των ισταρχων μαλατα το γαρ filon αυτων και filητεων δε μαλατ έ έαυτων. Αποτειται δε εικοτων ποτερων χρεων θεσθαι, αμφοι εχουτων το πιστων. Ισως ουν τους τοιουτους δει των λογων διαιρεις και διοριζεις εφι αυτων εκατεροι και ηι αληθευουσαν. ει δε λαβομεν το filantow ποις εκατεροι λογουσιν ταχ τον γενοις διηλων. οι μεν ουν εις ουνειδοις άγνουτες αυτο διαφαντους καλωσι 4 τους έαυτως απονεμοντας το πιστων εν χρηματι και τιμαι και ηυδαις τας σαματικας ταυτων γαρ οι πολλοι ορι-

μια ψυχη. Eur. Or. 1045 έχουν... 

και τα filon. 1159 b, 31. 

λαβομεν, και 1125 α, 35 π. 

γονυ κενης έγγονον. Theokr. xvi, 18 άπωτηρω ν γενυ κενη.

ποτερως, 'which set of ἐνδοξα.' 

This is a regular dialectical προβλημα. 

§ 2. άπωτηρως, cf. 1125 α, 35 π. 

For the των of το filantow λεγο-

μενων, cf. Top. 110 α, 23 sqq. It is specially applicable to the case of filantow. Cf. 1125 b, 14 π. 

§ 2. το fillo. For the restriction of a word's application by the behaviour of το fillo, cf. 1153 b, 35. 

§ 3. άπωτηρως δε και κ.π.λ., 'Just is the sovereign is held to be the state in the fullest sense, and in any com-

posite whole the ruling part is taken to be the whole, so the ruling part of a man is the man.'
τατον μᾶλιστ’ εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πάν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπος· καὶ φιλαντρος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατῆς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τοῦτον ἐκάστοτε ὅπως· καὶ πε-35 πραγματεία δοκοῦσα αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μᾶλιστα. 1169α ὃτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ’ ἐκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μᾶλιστα τοῦτ’ ἄγατον, διὸ φιλαντρός μᾶλιστ’ ἂν εἴη, καθ’ ἑτέρου εἶδος τοῦ ὄνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρουσιν τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζην τὸ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὅρε-5 γε θεάτη ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ ἡ τοῦ δοκοῦσως συμφέρει. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφέροντος σπουδίζονται πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμφιλοχοῦν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττετε κοινῇ τ’ ἂν πάντ’ εἶναι τὰ δεόντα καὶ ἱδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εὔπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιούτων ἐστιν. 1/ ὅποτ’ τὼν μὲν ἀγαθῶν δεῖ θείαν εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅνησεται τὰ καλὰ πράττε-7 των καὶ τὸς ἄλος ὑφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθῆρον οὐ δεῖ βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλους πάθεσιν ἐπίμενοι, τὸ μοχθῆρον μὲν οὖν διαφαίνει ὃ δεῖ πράττετε 15 καὶ ὃ πράττει· ὃ δ’ ἐπιεικής, ὃ δεῖ, τάῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βελτιστὸν ἑαυτῷ, ὃ δ’ ἐπιεικής

tοῦ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή. For the construction cf. 1118 b, 93. This is not, of course, Aristotle’s own theory. We are dealing with ἐνδοξα. τοῦτον ἐκαστόν ἐντὸς (cf. 1178 a, 2-7), ‘implying that mind is each one of us.’ The ἐγκράτης is κρατη-7 τῶν τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν, a phrase which implies that he himself is good and not ἐπιθυμία. We are not yet en-7 titled to say that this is Aristotle’s own view, but it certainly was Plato’s. Here it is only inferred from an ἐνδοξα. τὰ μετὰ λόγου, i.e. τὰ προφετευκευ-7 μία (1112 a, 16). The intellectual element is essential to prosopaeia. ἡ μάλιστα. Now that the doctrine νοῦς ἐστὶν ἐκαστός is more positively stated, a reservation is added. κατὰ λόγον...κατὰ πάθος. Cf. 1095 a, 10 n. καὶ ὄργανον closely with τὸ κατὰ λόγον ὑπαίθ. There is no difficulty in saying that the good man κατὰ λόγον ὄργανον τοῦ δοκοῦσως συμφέρει. Some mss., however, omit ὑπαίθ. before τοῦ καλοῦ from a desire to avoid this. The meaning will then be ‘as much ὃ τὸ ὄργανον τοῦ καλοῦ differs from τὸ ὄργανον τοῦ δοκοῦσως συμφέρει.’ But it is not true that ὃ κατὰ πάθος ὄργανον ὄργανον τοῦ δοκοῦσως συμφέρει, his ὄργανον is surely τοῦ παρώνος ἡμῶν. § 7. ἀποδέχονται. cf. 1155 b, 28 n. τοιοῦτον, ἢ. αἰγαθὸν. § 8. πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς κκ.λ. Rams-7auer quotes Rhet. 1361 a, 24 (ἀγαθά
πειθαρχεί τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἐνεκα πολλὰ πράττεν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, καὶ δὲν ὑπεραποθυσίκευν προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμῶς καὶ δλωσ τὰ περιμάχτη αγαθά, περιτοιομένους ἐαυτῷ τὸ καλὸν. ὁλόγον γὰρ χρόνον ἠσθήναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιπ' ἢ ἡ πολὺ ἡρέμα, καὶ βιώσαι καλῶς ἐναιᾶτον ἢ τολλ' ἐτη τυχόντως, καὶ μιᾶν πράξειν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς 25 καὶ μικρὰς. τοῖς δὲ ὑπεραποθυσίκωσι τούτ' ἦσος συμβαίνειν αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἐαυτοῦς, καὶ χρήματα προσκολλάται ἐν ἐφ' ὧ πλείονα λήφυται οἱ φίλοι γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ καλὸν, τῷ δὲ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμῶς δὲ καὶ ἀρχαῖς ὁ τῶν 30 αὐτῶν τρόπος: τῶνα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταύτα προῆσεται, καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπαινετὸν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, αὐτὶ πάνων αἰρόμενος τὸ καλὸν, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προσέβαιναι, καὶ εἶναι καλῶς τὸν αὐτόν πράξαι τὸ αὐτὸν τῷ φίλῳ γενέβαιναι. ἐν τῷ δῆ τούτῳ 35 ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἐαυτῷ τῷ καλῷ πλέον.
Δαίμονες εὐ δέδω, τί δεῖ φιλῶν;” ἔσκε δ’ ἀτοπὸ τὸ πάντ’ ἀπονέμοντας τάγαθα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλῳ μὴ ἀποδεῖδω, δ’ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἰ τε φίλου μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐφέρεται, κάλλιον δ’ εἰ ποιεῖν φίλους ἠθεῖν, τῶν ἐν πειρόμενοι δείσται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπεζητεῖται πῶτερον ἐν εὐνυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φιλῶν ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὅσ καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦτος δεομένου τῶν εὐφερετησόντων καὶ τῶν 15 εὐνύχωρων οὐς εὐ ποιήσουσιν. ἀτοπον δ’ ἵσως καὶ τὸ μονάτν ποιεῖν τῶν μακάριων, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐλοιπ’ ἂν καθ’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ’ ἐχειν ἀγαθαί’ πολιτικῶς γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος καὶ συγχζπν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει’ τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἐχει, δῆλον δ’ ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικίσκοις κρέιττον ἢ μετ’ ὀθείνων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συμπερευεῖν. 4 δεὶ ἀρὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλον. τὶ οὖν λέγοναι οἱ πρὸτα, καὶ τῇ ἀληθεύοναι; ὡς τι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους ἀιώνται τῶν χρησίμων εἶναι; τῶν τοιοῦτων μὲν οὖν οὐδεὶς δείσται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπεδεικνύοντα πυρερθείν αὐτῷ’ οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ, 25 ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢδ’ ὁ βίος οὐδεὶς δεῖται ἑπεζητείται ἡδονής’ οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιοῦτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι

ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τὶ ἂν δεῖ φιλῶν; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεσποινὸς αὐτάρκος οὔτε τῶν εὐφραυκότων οὔτε τοῦ συγχζπν’ αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ικανὸς συνειναι. μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ’ δῆλον γὰρ οὐ οὐδεὶς προσδείκτηκεν νοῦ φίλον δείσται, οὐδ’ ἤστα ταὐτὶ οὔτε μὴν ἥσπερ ὑποτιτον. οὔτε καὶ ἀνθρωπος δ’ εὐδαιμονεστάτος ἥκιστα δείσται φίλον, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκην. ἀνάγκη ἀρὰ ἐλαχίστως εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστῳ ἤξυτι, καὶ δεὶ ἑλκεττός γίνεται, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως οὐ φίλοι, ἀλλ’ ὀλγορεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συγχζπν αἰρέτως. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ τοῦ φανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξεων ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἐνεκα οὐ φίλος οὐδ’ ὡφελείας, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἀρετῆς φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθείοις ἑκάστως ὑμεῖς, τότε τοὺς συντονοσυνωμένους ἔχουσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὐ πεινομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς

§ 3. μονάτν. Cf. above 1097 b, 9. sense ‘by himself,’ ‘alone.’
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

§ 5. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1098 a, 16. ὡσπερ κτήμα τι. Cf. the antithesis of κρατεῖ and κτήσ. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1099 a, 21. τὸ ὀλείον, 'what is his own.' Cf. 1136 b, 15 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἤδεις καὶ ἀλλήλως ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἑδῶς \\

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φίλων. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἦστιν ἵσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἶρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια τις ἔστιν, ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι 30 γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὡσπερ κτήμα τι. εἶ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἦστιν ἐν τῷ ζήν καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ του δ’ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεία καθ’ αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀλείον τῶν ζήν, θεώρησι δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἡ ἕαυτος καὶ τὰς ἐκέλευσιν πράξεως ἡ 35 τάς ὀλείες, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεως φίλων ὄντων ἡ

1170 ἡ ηδεία τοῖς ἄγαθοις (ἀμφοῦ γὰρ ἠξούσιο τὰ τῷ φύσει ηδεία)· ὁ μακαρίος δὴ φίλων ταινίων δεῖσται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαίρεται πράξεως ἐπιείκεις καὶ ὀλείας, τοιαύτα ὑπή τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οὐκοντι τε δεῖν ἤδειον ζῆν τὸν εὐδαιμονία. 5 μανθήνῃ μὲν οὖν χαλέπες ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥέμοι καθ’ αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας συνεχέος, μεθ’ ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥέων. ἐσται δ’ οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεία οὕσα καθ’ αὐτήν, δ’ ὑπή

ποιήσοντας. ἅμειν δ’ ἠξομεν κρίνων αὐτάρκειας ὄντες ἢ μετε’ ἐνεργεῖα, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζύγων ἀνών δεόμεθα φίλων.

τερὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτόμεν, μὴ τούτο τὸ μὲν τι λέγεται καλός, τὸ δὲ λαβόμενι διὰ τὴν παραβολὴν. δῆλον δὲ λαβώμενι τι τὸ ζῆν τὸ καθ’ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αὐτόδικανθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ συζύγων τὸ συναπανθείναι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστῖν. ἐστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν αὐτόθανανθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν αἱρετότατον ἐκάστῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ζῆν πᾶσαν ἐμφάσιν ἢ ὀρέξεις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεὶ τυθῶς γνωρίζει τιμά. εἰ οὖν τις τῆς ἀποτέλους καὶ τουσίτας τὸ γνωσθεῖν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ (ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν λαβόμενι, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἐστὶ μὴ λαβόμενι), οὐδὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἣ τὸ γνωσθὲν ἄλλον ἀνθ’ αὐτοῦ· τὸ δ’ ὄμοιον τῷ ζῆν ἄνθ’ αὐτοῦ ἄλλον. εἰ ἀλλόγως δὴ τὸ λαβὼν αὐτόθανανθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἱρετότερον. ἰδιοὶ γὰρ ἄμα συνθείναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τὸ ζῆν καὶ αἰτετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ

§ 5. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1098 a, 16. ὡσπερ κτήμα τι. Cf. the antithesis of κρατεῖ and κτήσ. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1099 a, 21. τὸ ὀλείον, 'what is his own.' Cf. 1136 b, 15 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἤδεις καὶ ἀλλήλως ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ’ ἑδῶς εἰσὶν αἱ ἀλείαι πράξεως καὶ αἱ τοιαύται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὁμοίαι. ἀμφοῦ, ἡ τὰ σπουδαίαν καὶ τὰ ὀλεία.
τοις ὑπάρχοντες τῆς τοιαύτης φύσει. εἰ δὲν ἔστιν αἷς τῆς τοιαύτης συντοχιάς ἢ ἔτερα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἴρετος τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐστιν ὡς ὅλος εἰσίν τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ὑμνημένης φύσεως, ἦστε τὸν αὐτοῦ βουλέσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιαῦτα βουλέσθαι ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲν οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἔστη ἡκαστὸν τοὺς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταληφέν τῶν δύναμεων ἐν τῇ αἰσθανόμεναι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανομένοις μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητῶς γίγνεται τάση καὶ κατὰ τούτο, καθαρὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ, γνωστὸς δὲ γνωστῶς). ὡστε δὲν τούτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βουλέσθαι, ὁτι βουλέσθαι ἢν γνωρίζειν, τούτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστὸν. τὸ δὲ συνήθη αἰρέσθαι δύσεις μὲν ἄν εἶναι σκοπομένως ποιεῖν (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ζῴως, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθεῖν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τὸ γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πληροῦν οὗδε ταύτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χαρᾶς, ἄν ἀφελής τῶν λόγων; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖ τοῦ τυχόντος ἔτερον τοιοῦτον· ἀμα τε ὅπῃ διδάσκοντοι οὕτω μαθώναι τοῖς αὐτοψίας φίλοις οἷον τε· μαθώναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δει, διδακτοῦσας δὲ τοῦ φίλου, ἢ δ ὀρθοτῆς φιλία). ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε, καὶ πάντες ἤδιον τῶν γαϊδαρίων μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνεῖμεν, καθ’ ὅσον

§ 7. Θεούς, ν. 35. Ἐσθάλων μὲν γὰρ ἄπ’ ἐσθάλα μαθηθεῖαι, ἦν δὲ κακοὶ συμμετέχησις ἀπολεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐστιν νόμον, φυσικότερον κ.τ.λ. Χ. \n
If we consider this πρόβλημα in the light of φυσικά πρώτους (cf. 1147a, 24 π.), we are landed once more in the psychology of the Self, and this is in fact the real motive of the inquiry. The argument is intricately stated; but it may, I think, be worked out as a series of syllogisms, the first of which is supported by two prosyllogisms. If these are disentangled, the repetitions and parenthetical can easily be referred to their proper place in the argument.

τὸ δὲ ἂν ὑπάρχοντα κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅρκα δὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην (τ. τῆς θεοποιίας καὶ ἀνθρωποποίησις) ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, τὸ δὲ ἤρθεν δὲ τῇ ἀνθρώπων προτέρως. 414 b, 18 ἔτεροι δὲ (ὑπάρχεις) καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν τε καὶ ροῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώπως.
The capacity is reduced to (or ‘traced up to’) the activity as its ἄρχη. For the ἐνέργεια as the ἄρχη (οὗ ἔκθεται) of the δύναμις cf. Met. 1050 a, 8 sqq., and especially 1051 a, 29 τὰ δυνάμεις ὡστε ἑλς ἐνέργειαν ἄναγκας ἐφικέσατα. As a capacity is always a capacity of some activity, if a capacity is the differentia of a thing, that thing will be the corresponding activity.

tὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνέργεια, 'the primary ἄρχη,' ‘that which makes the δύναμις what it is lies in the ἐνέργεια which is its final cause.' When applied to ἀρχαῖ, τὸ κύριον is practically the same as τὸ πρῶτον (cf. Bonitz on Met. 1015 b, 11). We now have

Prasyllogism A.

The differentia of human life is the capacity of Sensation and Thought.

Every capacity is referred to its activity as primary.

Human life is primarily the activity of Sensation and Thought.

Prasyllogism B.

The determinate is good by nature.

Life is determinate.

Life is good by nature.

For the view that the ‘determinate’ or ‘limited’ is good, cf. 1105 b, 30. As we shall see later, this means that life is ἀκλίνη πατρί, that its form is completely realised.

Prasyllogism I.

Life is Sensation and Thought.

Life is good by nature and therefore pleasant in itself to the good man.

Sensation and Thought are good by nature and pleasant in themselves to the good man.
8 τῶν ἐπεικεῖν· διότερ ἔσοκε πᾶσιν ἡδονὴ εἶναι. οὐ δὲ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωήν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὔτε ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς ἥπιης ἔσται φαινομένον. εἰ δ’ ²⁵ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονὴ (ἔσοκε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὑγείας αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς καὶ μακρύνοντος· τούτους γὰρ οἱ βίοι αἰρετότατος, καὶ ἢ τοῦτον μακριστάτην ζωῆν), ὅ δ’ ἀρόν ὅτι ὅρι ἀισθάνεται καὶ ὃ ἀκούει καὶ ὁ ἑαυτὸς ὃτι ἑαυτὸς· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν όρων ἐστὶ ³⁰ τι τὸ ἀισθαναμένου ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὅτε αἰσθανομένῳ ὃτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἣν ἀισθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ δ’ ἀισθάνεσθαι ὃτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδῶν καὶ ἀτόμον (φῦ ¹¹⁷⁰ ἡσι σει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωῆν, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀισθάνεσθαι ἡδονῆς), αἰρεῖν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἄγα- 

τε ἄττόν μεθεται ἀπερ ἀντί τον αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ ποὺ ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ <το> φίλου γνωρίζειν τὸ αὐτῶν ποὺ γνωρίζει. ὅτα ντα καὶ τὰ ὑφερικά μὲν συνήσεις καὶ συζήν τοὺ φίλου ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦσα (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου ὃμα αἰσθήσεις ἄττός), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θεωτέρας ἥδωνας. αἰτίον δ’ ὅτι ἓτω ἡ ἡδονὴ ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίων ἡγαθῷ. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν 

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις. In the first part of Book X we shall see that such lives do not fulfill the requirements of τὸ ὁμοιόμενον. They are ἀτελεῖς, 'incomplete.'

§ 9. εἰ δ’ ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has compressed the whole argument into one of his enormous protases, the apodosis of which does not come till b, δ’ ὡς. We can disentangle first Syllogism II.

Sensation and thought are good and pleasant in themselves to the good.

Self-consciousness is consciousness of Sensation and Thought.

'.'. The Self-consciousness of the good is consciousness of something good and pleasant in itself.

δ’ ὅριν ὅτι ὅρι ἀισθάνεται κ.τ.λ. For this way of expressing what we call ‘self-consciousness,’ cf. De An. 435 b, 12 ἐπεὶ δ’ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁμοιόμενον καὶ ἀκούσμεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῷ ὄντι ὅτι ὅρι ἡ ἐκτέρη. De Somn. 485 a, 15 ἐν τε καὶ κατὰ δοκοὶ ἀκολούθητα πάσιν, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὅρι καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται: οὐ γὰρ δὲ τῇ γε ὄνει ὅρι ὅτι ὅρι. This consciousness of sensation as distinct from sensation is called by Eudem. ὑποκείσθησις. We are not told here what it is that is αἰσθάνεται ὅτι νόη. We shall see that it is νόη itself in its highest function, νοητικὴ νοησις.
430

πάθος, ὅτε δὲ πράξεις, ὅτε δὲ ἐπερόν τι. εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰ καθή, καὶ ὅτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζύγῳ συνεργεῖς, ἡ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μαλακτά γε. διὸ, τὰ διὰ τὸν φίλον καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται ** ὀμοιότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπαλαίσθαι. ἢ ἂν ἐκατοστάσεις, ἢ δὲν εἰσίν τις γειτονίας ἐν τούτῳ βουλεύεσθαι συζύγῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τοιεῦ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἰροῦνται μάλιστα.

συνασθάνομαι...τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄγαθον κ.τ.λ. The verb συνασθάνομαι is very appropriate for the consciousness of sensation or thought as distinct from either. Just as from σέσυνοισι σοι we get σύνοιας ἑμαυτοῦ, we might get συνασθάνομαι ἑμαυτοῦ from συνασθάνομαι σοι to express the meaning αἰσθάνομαι ἑμαυτοῦ αἰσθάνομεν ἡ νεόπτωσις. Eudemos already has the word συνασθήσεις in the primary sense, and in the secondary it is technically used by Alexander.

§ 10. ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κ.τ.λ. This has been proved above 1166 a, 1 (note how these apparently unconnected discussions fit in with one another) and gives us the major premiss of Syllogism III.

The good man is related to his friend as to himself.

The good man’s consciousness of himself is good and pleasant.

. . The good man’s consciousness of his friend’s self is good and pleasant in itself. Q. E. D.

The doctrine is, then, in modern phrase, that the possibility of sympathy depends upon the presence of self-consciousness, that is, of a self which distinguishes itself from its sensations and thoughts and can therefore relate itself to the sensations and thoughts of a friend in the same way as to our own. It is thus that φίλοι widens the self.

ἐν τῷ συζύγῳ. The συνασθήσεις τῶν φίλων can be fully realised only in intellectual communion. This follows from all that has been said, and is gradually leading us up to the ideal of the θεωρητικὸς βίος.

εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle feels the need of a clearer and more succinct statement of the argument.
οὖν ἐστὶν πολλοὶς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μη ἄρεσκον ὡντα, ἀλλ’ ὃς ἄλληθος ἐπιεικής; δι’ ἄρετῆν δὲ καὶ δι’ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐστὶν πρὸς πολλοὺς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλύγους εὑρεῖν τοιοῦτον. 20

XI. Πότερον δ’ ἐν εὐτυχίας μᾶλλον φίλον δεῖ ἣ ἐν δυστυχίας; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οὗ τε γὰρ ἀνυψώσεις δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οὗ τε εὐπροσώπους συμβιβάζει καὶ οἷς εὗ ποιήσουσι· βουλοῖται γὰρ εὗ δράν· ἀναγκαίωτερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων εὐπραξία δεῖ, κάλλιον 25 δ’ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἔξωθούσιν τούτους γὰρ αἰρετότερον εὐγέρχετει καὶ μετὰ τούτων δίαγεσι. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὕτη τῶν φίλων ἤδεια καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κοινβίζουσι γὰρ οἱ λυποῦμενοι συναλγοῦντων τῶν φίλων. δεδ’ καὶ ἀπορήσεις τις πότερον 30 ὀσπερ βάρὼν μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἡ παρουσία δ’ αὐτῶν ἤδεια οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἐννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύτην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι κοινβίζουσι, 1171 a, 21. EE. 1245 b, 26 καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἀπέινας εἰ πράττοντα 5 τῶν φιλοῦμενον βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχεις τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἁμα βουλοσθαί εἰναι φιλίκον. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἁμα καὶ εὗ, τοῦτο πάντες αἱρεῖται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δὲ, ἀλλ’ ὀσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ίσως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ ἔλεγε θεὸν εἰναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ’ αὐτῆς ὅπως τῇ Εὐρυνθεί βουλόμεθα. ὅμοιος γὰρ ἂν ἔπειν καὶ δὴ ἢ Δάκων ἠςκοφές, ἐπεὶ τε ἐκκαλοῦντα αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τῶν Διοσκῆρως. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦτος τὸ ἀπείρον εἰναι τῆς συμβεβεί σεῖς τῶν χαληπτῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλοῦμενον τὸ βουλόμεθα συμμετέχεις, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλογίως. δεδ’ γὰρ τῷ βάρῳ μηθὲν εἰναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς μὴ ἀντικεῖται τῶν τοῦ βάρους, δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι μή τὸ αὐτοῦ, διὸ καλίσσαντα συμμετέχειν ἰκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἣν μὴ φαινοῦται τὰ αὐτῶν αἰσχροῦτος καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χάριν οὐποθαμένου τοῦ βάρους. εἰ δὲ τὸ κοινβότερον εἰναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά.
αφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ’ οὖν ψάνεται τὸ λεχθέν· ἐστικε δ’ θ
35 ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν είναι· αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὀρῶν
1171 τοὺς φίλους ἦδον, ἅλλως τε καὶ ἄτυχοντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικοίνων πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι—παραμυθητικὸν γάρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, εἰδὼς ἡ ἐπιθέσιος· οἷς γὰρ τὸ ἱθὺς καὶ ἐφ’ ὅ,τι ἔδεται καὶ λυπεῖται—τὸ δὲ λυποῦμενον αἰσθή-4
5 νεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρῶν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος είναι τοῖς φίλοις· διότι οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν
φύσιν εὐλαβεύονται συλλυπῶν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείρηκα τῇ ἀληθίᾳ, τῇ ἐκείνῳ γινομένῃ λύπῃ, σὺν ὑπο-ménei, ὅπως τε συνθέσθωσιν οὐ προσεῖται διὰ τὸ μηδὲ αὐτὸς
10 εἶναι θρησκευόμενος· γίνει δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνδρεῖς τοῖς συ-ντένοντι χαίρονται, καὶ φιλοῦσιν οὖς φίλους καὶ συναλλάγονται. μμείονθαι δ’ ἐν ἄπασι δἐ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίων. ἡ δ’ ἐν 5
tαῖς εὐτυχίασ τῶν φίλων παρουσία τῆς τε διαγωγῆς ἠδίκησ
ἐχει καὶ τὴν ἐννοιαν ὅτι ἔδει τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἄγαθοι.
15 διὸ δοξεῖν ἀν δεῖ εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως—ἐνεργητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλὸν—εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυ-
χίας οἰκονύμων· μεταδίδονταί γὰρ ὅσ’ ἠδίκηστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, δόνθε τὸ ἀλὸς ἑγὼ δυστυχόν.” μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητῶν

ἐτει δ’ αἰρέτων τὸ τ’ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἄμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἄμα εἶναι μὲν
ἐλάκτονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετωτέρον ποιεῖ καὶ μετὰ μείζονον. ἐτει δ’
ἀδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἄμα, ἦδον διαφέρονται καὶ ἄλλο τὸ
新陈代谢 ἣμα πάντων φιλικόν. καὶ δὲν ωσπερ συνειδεύειν ἢμα φαίνειν ἠδίκησα ταῦτα ἢγησάτα: οἱ δ’ ἀν μὲντοι οὐ βουλεύονται. ἐτει δ’ εἰ γε τις
ὑπερβάλλει τούτους. * * ὑμολογοῦμεν ἢμα κακῶν πράττοντοι σφάδα ἢ εὐ
ὑπάρχει χαρῆς. * * παραπλησίων δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας,
ὅτε μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπείκειν οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μείζονος
λέγεσιν ποιοῦμεν πλέον· ὅτε δὲ αὐτοὺς ἠδίκηστον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ τὴν
ὑπεναντιστομὴν ταύτης καὶ μᾶλ’ εὐλογον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ προερμόμενα τοῦτο
συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυποῦμενον ἡ ἐν φαίλῃ ὅταν ξεῖ τὸν φίλον
θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἀπλῶς, ὅσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, τὸ δ’ ὀρῶν τὸν φίλον

§ 3. καὶ μὴ ἕνεκεν τῇ ἀληθίᾳ.
Tr. "even if he is not exceptionally
insensible to pain.'

§ 5. Βιαγωγήν. Cf. 1127 b, 34 δ-
tὸ "Αλὸς ἑγὼ δυστυχόν." We do
not know where this comes from.
ςτιν μέλλωσιν ὁλίγα ὁχληθήνες μεγάλ' αὐτῶν ὡφελήσειν. 6 ἔναυ δ' ἀνάπαυλιν ἱσῶς ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦσας τὸ ἄκλητον καὶ προβόμοο—φίλου γὰρ εὖ τοιείν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀξιωσάντας· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἤδικον—εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προβόμοος—καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταύτα χρείᾳ φιλῶν—πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίοι· οἱ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προβευτεῖσθαι ὡφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν 25 δ' ἀνάλογα ἐν τῷ διωδείσθαι ἤπως εὐλαβητέου· ἐνῶτε γὰρ συμβαίνει· ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἀπασίν αἰρετῇ φαίνεται.

XII. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὡσπέρ τοῖς ἐφόσον τὸ ὅραν ἀγαπητϊτατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱρόμεναι ταῦτα τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λουπᾶς, 30 ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γιορμένου, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων αἱρετϊτατόν ἐστι τὸ συνεν. καὶ κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὐτῶν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἐστιν αἰρετῇ, καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων δή· ἡ δ' ἑνεργεία γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συνεν. 35 ὡστ' εἰκὼν τούτου ἐφίστασται. καὶ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστωσι τὸ 1172 εἶναι ἢ ὃυ ἵνα ἄρωμαι τοῦ ἔτω, ἐν τούτῳ μετά τῶν φίλων βούλομαι διάγενε· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζουσιν καὶ συγκυκνηγοῦσιν

γ'δ' οὖν, ὡσπέρ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἱάστων, διὰ τὴν αἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτούς· ὡστε ὅποτέρον ἐν τούτοις ἢ μᾶλλον ἤδικον, τοιεί τῇ ἰδινῇ τοῦ βουλευταῖ διαρέιναι ἢ μὴ· καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτήν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλητομοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὐ μηδὲ εἶναι ἀνάγκαι * * αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐν τούτοις ἐρωμένους συναποκτινύσατε. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὡσπέρ ἀν εἰ καὶ μεμημένους ὅτι ποτὲ εὐ ἐπράπτε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ λεπτὸ ἄει κακῶς πράττειν.

§ 6. ἡ ἀξιωσάντας. For the reading see Bywater, Contri. p. 66.

XII. § 1. Ἀρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The discussion is concluded by some remarks upon τὸ συνεν which is the ἑνεργεία τῆς φιλίας and therefore the δρός of all φιλεῖ. This is really a summary of the whole argument.

περὶ αὐτῶν—αὐτοῦ. Cf. Ind. s.v. περὶ.

αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς συναποκτινύσεως (the phrase is used in EE. λοικ. cit. p. 431). Aretinus reads αὐτοῖς.

28—2
§ 2. ός οἶον τε. I think this reading (that of Kb) is established by EE. 1245 α, 20 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἐκαστὸν καὶ οἱ δύναται ἀρίστον. When οἶον τε became συζήν would be added as the most obvious verb.

§ 3. ἀπομακρύνονται. ‘They take the impress of those things in one another they are pleased with.’

The verb is properly used of wax taking the impress of a seal.

ἀποθέλων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Theognis 35
’Εσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐσθλά μοιθησείς

ὁ δὲ κακόν

συμπληγή, ἄπολεις καὶ τῶν ἐνώπων

ταῦτα μαθὼν ἀγαθοῖς ὁμίλεε καὶ τοῖς

φήσεις

eι ἐν συμβολεῖν τοῖς φίλοις εἰμὶ.
BOOK X.

THE GOOD FOR MAN.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, but first we must clear up a point which we have left unsettled. In our discussion of the view that pleasure was bad we left it quite an open question whether it might not even be the highest good. This view has often been held, and its most recent and authoritative exponent is Eudoxos who substituted Pleasure for the Platonic Form of the Good. The arguments directed against his position by Speusippus and other members of the Academy are altogether inadequate, and we must therefore come to some understanding on the point before we go any further.

What, then, is pleasure? Contrary to the view received in the Academy it is certainly not a motion. All motions are incomplete and pleasure is something complete in any given moment, just like vision. We can use the present and the perfect tense at once of it. There is not less pleasure in any moment of its presence than there is in its whole duration. It is completely present or not at all, and this shows that it is no motion; for every motion is incomplete till it reaches its end and then it ceases to exist as motion altogether. Pleasure then must be an activity or rather the completion of an activity. Pleasure is the completion of the activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best.

§ 2. It is clear, then, that we can hardly distinguish the pleasure of the highest life from the highest life itself, and in this sense it is true that pleasure is the highest good. But this is not hedonism. Just because the pleasure and the activity which it
completes are so closely bound up together that they can only be
distinguished by an effort of thought, it follows that pleasures
must differ specifically just as the activities do which they
complete. There is therefore no sense in saying that pleasure
in the abstract is the end. There is no such thing as pleasure in
the abstract; but only pleasures that are inseparably bound up
with certain activities. We must therefore continue to look for
human good in some form of activity, which will of course, as
we saw long ago, be essentially pleasant. And we must decline to
separate the activity from its pleasure and discuss which of them
is really the end of life.

§ 3. What activity, then, is it that constitutes human good?
We know that it must be one which is sought for its own sake
and not for the sake of anything else, and therefore it cannot be
the life of action, the life of the man who possesses goodness of
character without anything higher. Of the “three lives” with
which we started it can clearly be none other than the life of the
onlooker, the disinterested spectator. Now there are at first
sight two lives which seem to fulfil this character. There is the
life of amusement and there is the life of the philosopher, the life
of artistic, scientific or religious “contemplation.” But though
some people may make amusement their end, this is not its
proper function. Amusement is properly speaking a form of rest
or relaxation and is a means to an end. We rest in order that
we may be the better able to act. There remains, then, the
“contemplative life,” the life of the thinker. And this is in
complete accordance with the results we have reached already:
for we saw that, if there were more forms of goodness than one,
the good life would be an activity in accordance with the highest
and most complete of these. We have seen too that the highest
and most complete form of goodness is σοφία, and from this it
follows that human happiness consists in an ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν
σοφίαν.

§ 4. Such happiness is possible, however, for man only to a
small extent, and is indeed not strictly speaking human but
divine. The greater part of man’s life belongs to the province
of goodness of character. Our study of self-love has shown us,
however, how these two are related. Self-love, in the sense of
the love of that which is highest in us, is necessary and right, and
so we see that the more properly human life which we live for the
most part, our everyday life, must be ordered with a view to making possible so far as may be the life of Thought which is in some sense the life of our true selves. Now we see what is the true “standard of the means” (ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων), or, as Eudemos calls it, the ὥρα τῆς καλοκαγαθίας (i.e. τῆς θείης ἀρετῆς). It is the theoretic life which the ἐφόνωμος keeps in view when he determines the mean; for he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. Eudemos expresses exactly the same thought in a definitely religious form when he says that the standard which regulates goodness is τὸν θεῷ θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, “to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.”

§ 5. We now know what the good for man is, and we know also how it is to be produced. If we wish to attain to the blessedness of the contemplative life, we must first of all be good in the everyday sense of the word. And we become good by performing good acts. But our aim at present is not merely to secure this blessed life for ourselves even if that were possible. The object of our science is to secure the good for the citizens of a state so far as they are capable of it. How, then, are we to produce in our citizens the character from which good acts arise? Education is of course the only way to produce character, but the education of the family has too little authority to be sufficient. It is true that in the present state of things the state does not discharge this its most important function, and all that the father of a family can do is to become in some sort a domestic lawgiver, but this is clearly only a makeshift. What we have to do is to learn what constitution will really secure the performance of its function by the state, and to train ourselves to be lawgivers who can legislate with this end in view. The details of this constitutional legislation form the subject of the Politics.
Μετά δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἦσος ἐπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφυσώσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύομεν τοὺς νέους οἰκεὶζοντες ἡδονὴ καὶ λυπή· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἱδίου ἁρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν ὡς δὲ καὶ μισεῖν ἡ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἁρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαιμονα 25 βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἠδέα προσαρούνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἤκιστ᾽ ἄν δοξεῖ παρετέον εἶναι, 2 ἀλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόμεν τοῦτον ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ

1. § 1. ἦσος ἐπεται διελθεῖν. This formula of transition, for which cf. 1155 a, 3, is repeated at the beginning of Book X, though Book IX ends with the words ἐπόμενον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς. So far as it goes, this fact favours the view that these transitions are a trace of editorial work.

μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The usual enumeration of more or less irrelevant reasons for the discussion.

συνφυσώσθαι, 'to be most closely bound up with.' For the word cf. 1161 b, 21 and for the thought 1103 a, 1 ἔτι δ' ἐκ νησίου πᾶσα ἡμῶν συνεθέρπαται (Pl. ἡ ἡδονή).

διὸ παιδεύομεν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, 11 n. This seems to be the earliest instance of the metaphorical use of οἰκείζοντες (=οἰκήζοντες), though οἰόξει for the 'helm of government' occurs from Aischylos onwards. The same idea is expressed in Plato's image (Laws 644 d sqq.) of man as a "puppet of the gods" (θᾶμα τῶν θεῶν) whose movements are controlled by the two strings (σημάδια) of pleasure and pain pulling opposite ways.

πρὸς. For μέγα πρὸς cf. 1161 b, 33:

βοτὴν ἔχοντα, cf. 1094 a, 23. προσαρούνται. Strictly speaking this is true only of οἱ δολαισταὶ, but the word is doubtless used in a popular sense as equivalent to διψοντα.

§ 2. ὑπὲρ. Cf. 1096 a, 4 n. Here, by a characteristic brachylogy, ἡμιστα παρετέον takes the construction of λέγετον which it implies.

ἐχόμεν τοῦτον ἀμφισβήτησιν, cf. Ind. ἐν ἔχον.

οἱ μὲν...οἱ δὲ... The two parties are represented in the Ethics by Eudoxos and Speusippus.
II. Eudoxos μεν οὖν τὴν ἤδωρν τάγαθον φησὶ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ

tάγαθον ἤδωρν λεγονταί, οἱ δὲ εἶ ἐναντίας κομβῆς φαύλοι, οἱ μὲν ἵστος πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἴοντες βελτιωτεὶς εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βιον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἤδωρν τῶν 30

φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν· βέστες γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἤδωραις, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τούτοι τοὺς ἄγενθει. ἄλλων γὰρ ἄν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, μὴ ποτὲ δὲ οὐ καλὸς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττῶν εἰςτιν πιστῶ τῶν ἐργῶν· ὅταν οὖν 35

diαφανεῖται τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσειν, καταφρονοῦμεν καὶ ἀληθὲς προσαναρροῦμεν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἤδωρν, ὁθεὶς 1172b

ποτ' ἐφέμενος, ἀποκλῖνει δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην 4

οὕτων ἀπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὖκ ἐστιν τῶν πολλῶν. ἐκάσιεν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμότατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βιόν· συνεποὶ γὰρ 5

dvτῶς τοῖς ἐργῶν πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνέτας ἥμιν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἀλικ. τὰ δὲ εἰρημένα

περὶ τῆς ἤδωρης ἐπεξήγομεν.
Ἀλλογ. Aristotle himself never uses this word for λόγον έχων, nor is it found in Attic writers. This makes it probable that Grant is right in his view that this is a quotation from Eudoxus. If so, the definition of τό ἁγάθον at the beginning of the Ethics will be his. Cf. also Top. 116 a, 19.

tó ἐπισκέπτες, i.e. τό ἁγάθον.

φέρεσθαι, an unusual word in this connexion, but natural in the mouth of an astronomer.

tάγαθον εἶναι. The argument is thus given by Alexander (Top. p. 6 Wallies) ἀν λάβομεν δι᾽ τό πόστα τά ζώα αἵρεται ὡμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἁλωγα, τοῦτο μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν, τό δὲ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν τελειώτατον, καὶ συνλογισάμενοι δι᾽ τό πόστα τά ζώα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἁλωγα, αἵρεται, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τελειώτατον, εἶτα προσλάβωμεν δι᾽ τόν δὲ ἡμών τάς ὡμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἁλωγα, αἵρεται... (ὅτι τό ἡθικόν ἁγάθον) εὐμεθα συνλογισμοῖς μένοι.

§ 2. ἐκ τοῦ ἑναντίου. For the τόπος cf. Top. 117 b, 3 ἐτὶ ἐκ τῶν φθορῶν καὶ τῶν ἀποθελίων καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν λήψεων καὶ τῶν ἐπατ-
tίων... ὃ ἁγάθον ἢ ἀποθελή ἢ τό ἑναντίον
eὐμεθα συνλογισμοῖς μένοι.

This certainly sounds like direct quotation.

προσταθιμένη τε κ.τ.λ. This is from the τόπος προθεσθη, for which cf. Top. 115 a, 26 ἐτὶ δ΄ ἐκ τῆς προθεσθησ. ἐκ τῶν τερητέων ψευδὰ ἁγάθου ἢ λευκοῦ, μὴ δέ προτέρων λευκοῦ ἢ ἁγάθου, τὸ προτεσθη 
τὸν λευκόν ἢ ἁγάθον ὀδούλον καὶ τό ἢ 
λευκὸν. ἐτι εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχο 
(sc. ἁγάθον ἢ λευκῶν) προσταθή τί 
μέγαν τοιοῦτον ὡς ἐπιτρέψας καὶ 
τὸ ἢ. The present case is of course the second. As Aristotle goes on to observe, it only proves that pleasure is a good, not that it is the good.
3 έσεκε δὴ οὔτος γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀυτῆς ἁποφαινεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐτέρου: πάν γὰρ μεθ’ ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετότερον ἢ μονομένον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναίρει δὴ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τάγαθον: αἱρετότερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἴδιον βύτι μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χαρᾶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν 30 κρείττον, οὐκ εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ τάγαθον: οὐδεμόνος γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τάγαθον αἱρετότερον γίνεσθαι. δηλοῦν δ’ ὡς οὖν ἀλλ’ ἀλλ’ οὐ δέχεται τάγαθον ἀν εἴη, δ’ ἴτα τοὺς τῶν καθ’ αὐτό ἀγαθῶν αἱρετότερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινονοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ’ ἐνυστάμενοι ὡς οὖν ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντω ἐφελτεί, μὴ οὐδὲν λέγοσιν. ἓ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταύτ’ ἐνιαία φαμέν’ ὃ δ’ ἀναίρον ταύτην τὴν 1173α

§ 3. τῶν γὰρ μεθ’ ἑτέρου κ.τ.λ.
Τοπ. 117 α, 16 ἐτ’ τὰ πλεῖον ἀγαθά τῶν διατάξεων.

Πλάτων ἀναίρει. Φιλεβ. 60 δ λεγέτο...εἰ τις ἄνευ τάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξις αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς ἄνθρωποι ἐχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἢ πάντως ἡδονῆς, καὶ φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὐτῶν. Οὐκ ἔστ’ πως...Οὐκ οὖν τὸ γε τέλεο καὶ πάση αἱρέσεων καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἄγαθον οὐδὲν ἄγαθον ἄγαθον εἰς τούτον εἰς; That is, the πρόθεσις of wisdom also makes pleasure better, and therefore neither is the good.

τὸ μικτὸν. The phrase is Plato’s. Phileb. 22 δ ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ τιμῶν 27 δ ὅπετε μὲν θημένου τοῦ τῶν μικτῶν ἡδονής τε καὶ προσφέτεσις.

οὐδένος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘There is nothing the addition of which can make that the good more worth having.’ I prefer the αὐτῷ of 1β to the αὑτῷ of Κβ. The good does not admit of πρόθεσις, for all other good things are desired for the sake of it. This is given in the Topics as an ἐνστασις (objection) to the τῶν ἐκ προσβείσεως. Cf. 117 α, 16 ἐνστασις εἰ που θατέρου βατέρου χάριν’ οὖν γὰρ αἱρετότερον τὸ ἀμφότερον τοῦ ἔνδρῳ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔνδρων τῆς ἡγεμονίας τῆς ἐγκεφαλίου ἐκεῖνον αἱρετότερον.

τῶν καθ’ αὐτό ἀγαθῶν. Cf. 1096 b, 16 καθ’ αὐτῷ δὲ ποιά βείσ τις ἄλλα ἀλλάκτημα διεκεταί, οὐκ ἔνδοτες καὶ ἀργῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τοιεις καὶ τιμαί; Even these we desire τῆς ἐνδομονίας ἁρμόν., and therefore ἐνδομονία + pleasure is not more worth having than ἐνδομονία alone.

§ 4. τοιοῦτον, etc. οὐκ ἐν τοῖς καθ’ αὐτό ἀγαθῶν αἱρετότερον γίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τοῖς καθ’ αὐτό ἀγαθῶν αἱρετότερον γίνεσθαι, or, in other words, ἐνυστάμενος (1097 b, 17 n.).

οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινονοῦμεν. As Rodier says, this is added to show that Aristotle does not mean to approve of Plato’s theory of the good, except in so far as the above argument goes.

ἐνυστάμενον, Ἀν. Πρ. 69 a, 37 ἐνστασις δ’ ἐστὶ πρόσθασις προστάσια ἐναρκία.

μὴ οὖθεν λέγοις. See Kühner § 394, 6.

ἄρα πᾶσε δοκεῖ, etc. ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. There is no sense in saying a thing is not good if it is thought good by all.
πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἑρεί. ἦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνώτατα ὅρεγεται
αὐτῶν, ἢν ἄν τι λεγόμενον, ἦ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιμεν
ἀν τι; ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐστὶ τι [φυσικῶν ἁγαθῶν]
5 κρείττον ἦ καθ' αὐτά, ὁ ἐφίστηται τοῦ οἰκείου ἁγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔσκει
δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ
ἡ ἐπίτης κακών ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικείμεναι
γὰρ καὶ κακῶν κακῷ καὶ ἀμφότεροι—λέγοντες
ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀφετέρων ἀληθεύοντες.
10 ἀμφότερον γὰρ ὑπὸ κακῶν καὶ φευγτά ἐδέι ἀμφότεροι εἶναι, τὸ
μηδέτερον δὲ μηδέτερον ἡ ὁμοιός· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν
μὲν φευγόντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἁγαθόν· οὖν
ὅτι καὶ ἀντίκειται. Π. οὐ μὴν οὖν εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιητῶν
ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν τῶν ἁγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰ τὰς
15 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειας ποιητέστες εἰςιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγοντες
ἢ τὸ μὲν ἁγαθὸν ὄρισθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὥσπερ

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So Bywater for
The emendation had been anticipated
by Michele.

ἔστι τι κ.τ.λ. Thurott deleted ἁγα-
θῶν, which Michael does not seem to
have had, and Bywater would delete
ἀφετέρων too. We cannot speak of a
φυσικῶν ἁγαθῶν aiming at an οἰκείον
ἀγαθόν. For the thought cf. 1153 b,
31. This is the θέων τι of 1153 b,
32. Introd. § 25.

§ 5. οὐ γὰρ φασιν κ.τ.λ. The
argument is that of Speusippos and
has been discussed in Book VII
(1153 b, 1 sqq. and the notes).

τῶν μηδέτερων. Stewart points out
that this, the ms. reading, can be
defended by Plato, Rep. 583 c ἦ καὶ
διεκάθαρτο τὸ μηδέτερα ἐν ἀμφότερα
γνωρείας;

δυνάμεν κακῶν. For another read-
ing (ἀντίων <τῶν> κακῶν) cf. By-
water, Contr. p. 66.

τῶν μηδέτερων δὲ. This correction
of ms. τῶν μηδέτερων δὲ is due to
Professor Butcher. ‘That which is
neutral ought to be (ἴδει) neither
shunned nor sought or both alike.’

οὖν δὲ καὶ ἀντίκειται, ‘so the
antithesis is of this kind.’

Π. § 1. οὖν εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιη-
τῶν κ.τ.λ. From this it appears that
the Platonists (Speusippos) regarded
all good things as qualities. Aristotle
held, on the other hand, that τὸ ἁγαθὸν
ἰσαχως λέγεται τῷ ὑπό, ‘is predicated
in all the categories’ (1096 a, 23).
‘Activities according to goodness’ are
κατείς, and so therefore is εὐδαιμονία
itself. But Speusippos, who defined
εὐδαιμονία as έζει τελεία, of course
regarded it as a τοιεία.

§ 2. τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον. Cf.
1150 a, 20 and the argument of Plato's
Philebos 24 c ὡς ἦν ἡ μὴν παύσην
ὅπου μελλὼν τοῦ καὶ ἦττον γενόμενα καὶ τὸ
σφόδρα καὶ ἡμέρα διεχομένα καὶ τὸ
καί καὶ ὡσ τοιαύτη τάσεις, εἰς τὸν
ἀόριστον γένος ὥς ἐς τὶ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
τιθέναι... 31 εἴ ἡ δὲ ἀπεραιτή τα αὐτά
cal τοῦ μετὰ ἄρχον μήτε μέσα μήτε
τέλος εἰ τοιαύτῃ ἃ' ἐναυτὸ εὐχος
μὴ ἔχωτο γένος. The word ἀόριστον,
however, is never used by Plato in the sense of ἀδιάφορος, and this makes it likely that Aristotle is criticizing a contemporary form of the Platonic doctrine. With Xenocrates ἀδιάφορος was the technical term.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδονισμὸς κ.τ.λ. It does not follow from the fact that τὸ ἡδονισμὸς admits of τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἤττον that ἡ ἡδονή does so too. If it did, we should have to say that goodness also is ἀδιάφορος, for people may be more or less good.

εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἡδονισις, sc. ταῦτα κρίνωνοι.

We have seen above (1153 b, 13) that Speusippus, in making all pleasure a γένεσις, ignored Plato’s distinction between ‘mixed’ and ‘unmixed’ pleasures. In the same way he here ignores Plato’s view that ἀμετρία was to be found in the mixed pleasures only, while the pure pleasures possessed ἔμετρια. Cf. Phileb. 52 e, oikoum de metrion ἦν διακεραμέθα χωρίς τὰς καθαρὰς ἡδονάς καὶ τὰς σχέδου ἀνεθάρρυδα ὀρθῶς ἄν λεγέτοιμα, προσδομένων τῷ λόγῳ τὰς μὲν σφαλμαί ἡδονὰς ἀμετρίαν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ τονούμενοι, ἔμετριαν.

§ 3. καὶ τί καλέσω. A fresh point. The reading τί γάρ καλέσω has inferior authority and does not make the argument clearer.

καθάπερ ἡγεσία. For ἡγεσία as a συμμετρία cf. Top. 139 b, 21, where συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχῶν is quoted as a definition obscure from its ambiguity. The illustration here is taken from Plato, Phileb. 25 a.

ἐν πάσιν...ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Masculine. The proportion of health varies in different persons and in the same person at different times.

ἀνεμέμια διαμέανε ἐξ υἱῶν. Cf. 1170 b, 32 a. There is always some latitude in a μεσοτήτις. We cannot distinguish (ἐρώτω) very minute intervals, and so a note may be flat or sharp and still be the same note. Aristotle is never tired of arguing against the abstract use of the formula of τὸ μάλλον καὶ ἤττον.

§ 4. τάλαυν τε κ.τ.λ. This is all from Plato’s Philebos. Cf. especially 54 d ἀρὰ οὖν ἡδονὴ γε ἐπιρ. γένεσις ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ πάθη ἢ τήν τοῖο ἀγαθόν μοιρὰν αὐτὴν τίθεντες ὀρθῶς θέσομεν;
οὐδὲ εἶναι κίνησιν, 'not even a motion,' and therefore a forteri not a γένεσις, which is a species of κίνησις. 

οἶνα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου. Here κόσμος = ὀραματικός. Cf. De Caelo, 388 a, 13 

περὶ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὥστε διαλύεται ὅστις καὶ οὔκ ἀπώλεσα. ...νεκρὸν. Καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτου ὀραματικοῦ καὶ τῆς πρῶτης φοράς. 

The κόσμος of the πρῶτος ὀραματικός is an absolutely uniform motion. It has no ἑταίρας or ἑταίρας, acceleration or retardation. We cannot therefore call it slow or quick in itself (καθ' αὐτίν), for we have no slower or quicker motion of itself with which to compare it. But if we compare it with the derivative motions like that of the planets, we can call it rapid πρὸς ἄλλα. 

οὐδὲτερον, sc. οὕτω τὸ καθ' αὐτίν ὁστε τὸ πρῶτο ἄλλα. 

ἡσθήναι. The ingressive aerost expresses the κίνησις or γένεσις which ends in feeling pleasure, ἡσθήναι. So we may 'get angry' quickly, but we cannot 'be angry' quickly.

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτερον, 'not even relatively.' 

βαδίζει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Walking and growing are ἐνθεν κίνησεις, in all of which there is acceleration and retardation, quick and slow. For the ἐνθεν κίνησεως cf. below 1174 a, 30.
τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικὰ ἐστὶ τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν φ' ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδονή τὸ 10 σῶμα ἀρα'. οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ νῦν ἂστιν ἀραν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γνωμήνης μεν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδονή ἂν τις, καὶ τε- μνόμενον λυπτοῦτο. ἡ δὲ δέ αὐτῇ δοκεῖ γεγενθαί εἰ ἔτην περὶ τῆν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδείξεις γὰρ γενο- 7 μένουσι καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἢδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπλήρωσι. τοῦτο δ' 15 οὖ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἀλητει γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς άιθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ἀνθρόπους, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὅραμα πολλὰ καὶ μνήματα καὶ ἀντίθεσις. τίνος οὖν αὐτὰ γεγένοιτο εἶπον; οὗτος γὰρ ἔνδειξα γεγενήται, οὐ γένοιτο ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ 20 τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐποιειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγων τις ἂν

in this way, Aristotle meets the argument by pointing out that if ἡδονή is ἀναπλήρωσις, it must be in the body, not in the soul.

τεμνόμενοι. Aristotle is probably referring to some passage in which surgical operations (τέμνειν καὶ κάθει) were referred to as examples of violent alterations of the normal state. Grant refers to Tim. 65 b, where al καθεύδει καὶ τοιαὶ τὸ σώματος are given as examples of things which ἀναπληρώσεως ἀδέσποτε and therefore cause great pain, while the recovery causes little pleasure because κατὰ μικρὰ μέγας τὰ εἰς ταῦτα πάθη ἐναυτοῦ καθίσταται. The opposite class is represented by the pleasures of smell (ἐιδώλαι), the satisfaction of which is ἄδεσποτε, while the κρίσις is not perceived. There is therefore no reason to conjecture κενόμενοι (Spengel), δεδομένοι (Zeller) or ἐνδείχθης γεγενεῖς (Bywater).

§ 7. Ἀλητα γὰρ εἴσιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1152 b, 36 ἐκεῖ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν εἰς ἁδραίαν. Plato, however, also explained these as πληρώσεις, though the ἐνδείξεις preceding them was gradual (κατὰ μικρὰ) and imperceptible (ἀδεσποτὰ), while the κατάστασις to the normal state was ἄδεσποτε. Cf. the passage quoted in the last note as to εἰδώλαι. See also Rep. 584 b εἰ τό ἔθελε ἐνοχηθῇ τὰς περὶ τὰς ὅρμας ἡδονάς· αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπὲρ προλυπηθῆναι ἐξαίρεσις ἀνακειμένη τό μέγεθος γίνονται παννυχίως τὴν ἄποψιν ὑπερμικροῦν καταλείποντος. Phileb. 51 b (ἠδωνί) τάς περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρύσατα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὅρων τάς πλείστας καὶ τῶν φύσεως καὶ ὅσα τὰ ἐνεπέλαμα ἀναπληρώσεις ἔχονται καὶ ἀληταῖς τὰ πληρώσεις ἀδεσποτὰ καὶ ἠδωνίς καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδοντο. § 8. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now turns to the argument given above 1152 b, 20 τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας συνθεῖκας, ὥστε εἰς καὶ ἀλεξάρα καὶ ἐνεδίστεθαι.
§ 9. ἡ οὖτω κ. τ.λ. A second tentative answer. The pleasures are good in themselves, but not from these sources. For λύγι τις ἂν see Bywater, Contr. p. 67.

§ 10. ἡ τὸ εἴδε διαφέρουσιν. The third answer. Here this is only shown dialectically; below (1175 a, 21 sqq.) it is discussed φυσικῶτερον.

§ 11. ἐμφάνιζεν δὲ δοκεῖ κ. τ.λ. The point seems to be this. The friend is said πρὸς τἀγαθων διμεῖον, the flatterer πρὸς ἡδων. This suggests prima facie that ἡδων is not ἀγαθων, or, if we insist that the friend after all gives pleasure too, we must say that it is a different species of pleasure. If pleasure were μονοειδῆ, we could not draw any distinction at all.

§ 12. οὐδεὶς τι ἂν λύγι τ. κ. τ.λ. EE. 1115 b, 22 (p. 30). This again indicates that there is some difference in species. Simply as pleasure, a child’s pleasure may be greater than a man’s, and yet no one would wish to have it over again. So, again, no one would wish to have the pleasures of shameful conduct, though, if pleasure were ὠμοειδῆ, they would be just as much worth having as any others.

πριν τολλάτε τ. κ. τ.λ. This is the other side of the argument. We are coming to see that it is the character of the activities, and not the pleasures as such, that decides our choice.
ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἱρεταί καθ’ αὑτὰς διαφέρουσα τῷ εἴδει ἡ ἁφ’ τοῦ ὀν. τά μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθων.

IV. Τὰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ποίον τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ’ ἂν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβόντων. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀράσις καθ’ ὠσίνον χρόνον εἶναι. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδέχεσθαι οὐδένος δ’ εἰς υστερον 15 γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἴδος. τοιοῦτοὶ δ’ ἐσσακε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή; ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστι, καὶ κατ’ οὔδένα χρόνον λάθοι τις ἀν ἡδονήν ἢ ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ 2 εἴδος; διόπερ οὖθε κινήσις ἐστιν: ἐν χρόνοι γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλεια τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομία, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ 20 οὗ τεθείεται. ἦ ἐν ἀπαντε ἡ τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ τοῦτο. ἐν δὲ τοῖς

ἡ ἁφ’ ἂν, ἢ τοῖς ἁφ’ ἂν. Cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

IV. § 1. Τὰ...ἡ ποίον τι. For this formula cf. 1106 a, 15 n.

ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, almost equivalent to ἐωθεν in the sense explained 1155 b, 2 n. The phrase means practically φωσικότερον ἐπισκεπτόμενον.

ἡ μὲν ἀράσις κ.τ.λ. Seeing is taken as the type of an ἐνέργεια which is complete in every instant as opposed to a κίνησις or ‘process’ which is ἀτέλης. Aristotle’s favourite way of expressing the completeness of an activity in any instant is it by saying that the present and the perfect tense can be simultaneously used of it. If I look at a thing for some time, I can say both ὠράω and ὠράωκα at any moment; but if I am building a house, I cannot say ὠράωμαικα till the process (κίνησις) is finished. Cf.

Top. 178 a, 9 ἄρ’ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμα τοῦτο ἄμα τοῦτο ἀνεκταίρεται; 10 ἀλλά μὴν ἄρθρο γε τί ἄμα καὶ ἐφαρμακεύει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τάσσην ἐνδέχεσθαι. Met. 1048 b, 29 πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτέλης, ἱσχυρισμα, μάθησις, βάθισις, οἰκοδομίας αὐταί δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτέλεις γε; ὁ ἁρ’ ἁμα βαθίτει καὶ βεβαίους, ἀυδ’ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ἱσχυρισμεῖ, ὑπερ’ ἡγητεί καὶ γεγονούν, ἡ κινεῖται καὶ κεκινήται...

Β. Α.
μέρεσι [τοῦ χρόνου] πάσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἐπειτε τῷ εἶδε τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων: ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἐτέρα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου βασιλικώς, καὶ αὐτὴ τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ 25 ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία—οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῖς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον—ἡ δὲ τῆς κρήπιδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτέλεις· μέρους γὰρ ἐκάτερα. τῷ εἶδε οὐδὲν διαφέροντο· καὶ οὐκ ἠστίν ἐν ὀπισθών χρόνων λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδε, ἀλλὰ ἔστερ, ἐν τῷ ἄπαντε. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βασιλικῶς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰς 30 γὰρ ἠστίν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποι, καὶ ταύτης διάφορας κατ' εἶδο, πτήσις βαδίσεως ἀλλοι καὶ τὰ τοιάντα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει. τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποι ὁ τοῦ ταύτον ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρε καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὔτε ἔτι διεξείναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κάκεινν.

to χρόνον. This is awkward, as the sequel shows Aristotle is speaking of the parts of the construction, not of the time. The reading of Kβ is καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ, from which Bywater infers that the original reading was καὶ τέσσαρεν. The vulgar reading looks decidedly conjectural.

βαδίσεως, 'fluting.'

τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως, 'the construction of the temple as a whole.' Cf. above τῆς διαν (sc. κινήσεως) καὶ ἀλλήλων. With the φορᾶς τοῦ ναοῦ the κίνησις becomes τελεια and therefore ceases. If we can say τῶν καθεν πτέρειν, we can no longer say τῶν καθ' ἑκάτερον. But we can still say ὅτι even when we can also say ἔστερα.

τὸ προκείμενον, προεικίνω, 'the task in hand.' Cf. ὁ προεικόμενος.

κρηπίδος, 'the base.'

§ 3. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The case of locomotion is just like that of building. It has its specifically different parts just as building has, and each is incomplete in itself. The process of locomotion is only complete when the body in motion has reached its destination and then the process is over. If you can say βεβαια, you cannot still say βαδίσει.

ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποι, Phis. 243 a, 6. There are three species of κίνησις, (1) locomotion or φορὰ (ἡ κατὰ τότον), (2) qualitative motion (ἀλληλωσία, alteration), and (3) quantitative (αὔξασι καὶ ἱκτία, growth and diminution). Here πόθεν τοι is substituted for κατὰ τότον as the emphasis is on the τοι, the goal of the locomotion.

καὶ ταύτης διάφορας. These correspond to the λίθων σύνθεσις, εἰσίν ἁβδομάδας etc. For the ἑθη τῆς κατὰ τότον κίνησις cf. Part. Ἀν. 639 b, 1 οὗ γὰρ φανεῖται μια τῷ εἴδε (ἡ τῷ ἔρχοντά) διαφέρει γαρ πτήσις καὶ βάδισις καὶ κατά δακτυλία καὶ ἑρμήτη. Ματ. Ἀν. 609 a, 5 τῷ μὲν γὰρ πτήσις κατ᾿ ἑδραῖαν τῆς ἐν καθ' ἀλλοις τόξον τοιάντων. τοῦ μόνου δ' ὡστε κ.τ.λ. Not only are there different ἑθη κινήσεως, but if we take any one εἶδος, e.g. walking, every step is ἑτέρον τῷ εἴδει from every other.

ἐν τῷ μέρε, sc. τοῦ σταδίου.

τὴν γραμμήν. The ἑρμήν in the race-course is 'the scratch.' But the meaning seems to be more general here. You may draw a line across
any part of the race-course, and the crossing of each successive line brings the process of running nearer its completion. The crossing of each line is specifically different; for the differentia of φορά is κατ' έπόσι (τόθεν ποι), and the lines differ κατά τόπον.

In the Physics, i.e. in the Physics.

ἐν ἀπαντὶ χρόνῳ, ‘in any given time.’ There can be no difficulty in taking this as equivalent to ἐν ὑπόσιν above. The equivalence of πᾶς (ἀπαι) and δόσιν is normal, e.g. ὑπόσι φαγότι (1173 b, 28) is the same as παμφάγω δοτι (cf. 1149 b, 34), and πᾶς ποιείν is the regular phrase for ὑπόσιν ποιείν (1128 a, 29 n.). Cf. also πάντως ὑποσθεῖν (1124 b, 9). I only mention this because some editors wish to read ὑπό τοὺς ἀπαντὶς χρόνων, adopting the interpretation of Michael, for which see next note.

αἱ πολλαὶ. This must surely mean ‘the many motions’ into which it may be cut up, τά μέρη. I do not think we can translate ‘most motions,’ i.e. all but the κύκλων φορά of the πρώτος οὕσαν, as Michael supposes. It is true, no doubt, that Aristotle regarded this as complete and ἐν ἀδιάφορῳ κατ’ εἶδος, but it seems irrelevant.

ἐπέρ, ἐδοσθείν. If the specific difference of φορά is κατά τόπον (τόθεν ποι), then each part of it will be in a specifically different τόπος, and from a different πόθεν to a different ποι.

§ 4. ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέκεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Phys. 234 a, 34 ἐν τῷ νῦν οὖθεν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι. This is demonstrated from the indivisibility of τό νῦ.

ἐν τῷ νῦ, Phys. 220 a, 18 φανερόν ὅτι οὐθέν μόριον τῷ νῦν τῷ χρόνῳ... ὕπερ οὖθ' ἂν στεγαί τῆς γραμμῆς. 233 b, 33 ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τῷ νῦ... ἀδιαφορῶν εἶσαι.

δῆλον καί. A fresh point. Not only is pleasure not a process, but we cannot even say there is a κίνησις or γένεσις of pleasure. I think the context requires Rausamer’s τῆς ἁρμονίας (the mss. have τῷ ἁρμονίᾳ). He compares for the phraseology Phys. 246 b, 11 τὰ πρὸς τι οὖν ἀυτά οὕτως ἀλλούσιος, οὕτω αὐτῶν οὖν ἀλλούσιος οὐλέ γένεσιν οὐδέ διόις μεταφορές.

οὐ γὰρ παύνων κ.τ.λ. Met. 1044 b, 21 ἔνα δὲν γενέσθαι καὶ φθοράς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, οἷον αἱ στεγαί, ἐπέρ εἰς, καὶ δόσι τὰ ἐδά καὶ αἱ μορφαὶ. Nothing indivisible can strictly speaking be said to come into being or pass away. A process implies that one part of the thing has changed while the rest remains in its original state. Now pleasure, as we have seen, is an indivisible whole, complete at every
γὰρ πάντων ταύτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ διλαμβάνειν οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅρασιν ἐστὶ γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμὴν οὐδὲ μονάδαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτον οὐδὲν κίνησιν οὐδὲ γένεσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ ἴδιωτὴ διλογία γὰρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν ἑνεργοῦσης, 15 τελείως δὲ τῆς εὐ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἰσθησίαν—τοιούτων γὰρ μᾶλλον εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἑνεργεία, αὐτὴν ὡς λέγειν ἑνεργείαν, ἥ ἐν γὰρ ἐστὶν μηδέποτε ἀναφέρετο· καὶ ἐκάκατην δὴ βελτιστὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἑνεργεία τοῦ ἀριστοῖ διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κρατίστων τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὴν. αὐτὴ δ’ ἐν 20 τελειοτάτη ἐν γὰρ καὶ ἔκεισιν. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἰσθήσεσιν εἶσθιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδιστήσθη δ’ ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ’ ἡ τοῦ εὐ γόνου πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὴν· τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἑνεργείαν ἡ ἴδιωτή. οὐ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπου ἢ τε ἡ ἴδιωτὴ τελειοὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε

moment. It can no more go through a process of becoming than a point. If it is not complete, it is not there at all. In the same way we may say τὸ ἔξω τὸ λευκὸν γέγονε, but we cannot say τὸ λευκὸν γέγονε. Whiteness is or is not there, it cannot ‘become’ (Met. 1044 b, 31). What we call the γένεσις of pleasure is not pleasure, but a certain process in us which leads up to it. The pleasure is not there at all till the process is complete. Then it is all there, and no more in one moment than another. Wherever you make a section it is complete.

ταύτα, sc. κίνησις καὶ γένεσις.

§ 5. αἰσθησίως δὲ κ. τ. λ. We are now in a position to see the real relation between ἑνεργεία and ἴδιωτή. The ἴδιωτὴ simply is the τελειότητα of the ἑνεργεία, not something wholly different from the ἑνεργεία.

πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν, for αἰσθησία is essentially relative (πρὸς τι).

ἐν γὰρ ἔστι. The δεσμευμένη τῆς αἰσθήσεως is the αἰσθητήρας. It is ultimately the ψυχή that ἑνεργεία.

§ 6. οὖ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπου κ. τ. λ. We have seen that the activity of the best sensation in relation to the best object is the most perfect and the most complete. But the completeness consisting in the relation between the sensation and its object must be distinguished from the further completeness of the pleasure. To understand this passage, we must bear in mind that τὸ αἰσθητόν is the efficient and ἡ αἰσθήσις the formal cause of the ἑνεργεία. According to Aristotle, sensation consists in a sentient being taking into itself the form without the matter of its object. It must, therefore, itself be that form potentially (De An. 431 b, 21 ἡ ψυχή τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐστὶν πάντα). Hence it is that ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἑνεργεία καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δὲ εἶναι εἰς ταύταν ἀναγίγνει (1120 a, 12 ο. ν.), the ἑνεργεία is one, though it can be analysed into αἰσθήσις and αἰσθητόν. Further it is complete, and the pleasure which supervenes is something different from its efficient or formal cause.
καὶ ἡ αἰσθανόμενη, σπουδαία ὄντα, ὅστπερ οὕδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς ἱερὸς [ὁμοιώματι ἀκτινὸς ἐστι τῶν ὑμάλων].—καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἰσθήσεως οὐ γίνεται ἵδονή, δήλου (μακρὰ γὰρ ἀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἴδεα); δήλου δὲ καὶ οἳ μᾶλλον ἔτειδάν ἢ τε αἰσθάνεται ἐκρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιούτου ἑνεργεῖ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἐσται ἵδονή ἴδονήν τε ὑπάρχοντος γε τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισμένου.—τελείας δὲ τὴν ἑνεργείαν ἡ ἱδονή οὖν ὡς ἡ ἔξω ἑντυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγιμόμενον τε τέλος, οὗτος τοὺς ἅκραμοίς ἡ ἱδονή. ἐδώ ἀν οὖν τό τε νοητόν ἢ αἰσθητόν ἢ οἶον δεῖ καὶ τό κρίνων ἢ θεοροῦν, ἐσται εἰ τῇ ἑνεργείᾳ ἡ ἤδονή: ὁμοίως γὰρ ὄντων καὶ 1175α

ὅστπερ οὕδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς, sc. τελεία. Health is the formal cause and the doctor the efficient cause of being healthy. The two are therefore illustrations of the difference between ἀισθήσεις and αἰσθητόν, not of the difference between these and pleasure. The parallelism is exact; for, just as it is the form of the object that makes actual the potentiality of it in the soul, so it is the form of health in the doctor's soul that is the efficient cause of health in his patient. Cf. Met. 1070 b, 30 τὸ κινεῖν...ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίᾳ τὸ εἴδος...Ὑγίεια γὰρ τῶν ἢ ἱερῶν, καὶ οἰκεῖς εἴδες ἢ οἰκοδομικῆς. Neither ὑγίεια nor ἤσθως illustrates the way in which pleasure completes the activity; the illustration of that is deferred by the characteristically awkward parenthetical recapitulation καθ' ἑκάστην...τοῦ πεισμένου. We must, I think, bracket ὁμοίως αἰσθάνεται ὄντι τοῦ ὑμάλους, which confuses the argument.

§ 7. καθ' ἑκάστην κ.τ.λ. This parenthesis gives the proof of what was said 1174 b, 20 sqq.

πρὸς τοιούτου, sc. πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον, ποιήσαντος...πεισμένου. The ἀπετθανόμενος τοῦτος, τὸ αἰσθητόν πάσχει. The ἑνεργεία may be analysed into action and reaction, but it is really one and complete. Cf. Phys. 255 a 34 ἐν δ' ὄντω διά τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ὑσι, γίνεται ἑνεργεία τοῦ δυνατοῦ.

§ 8. τελείας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note the awkward resumption.

οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἔξω ἑντυπάρχουσα, 'not like its immanent formal cause.' The ἔξω here must correspond to ὑγίεια, and it is parallel to the form which is made actual in the soul by αἰσθήσεις.

ἀπετθανόμενον τε τέλος, 'as a superadded completion' or 'perfection.' It is not like health, but like the bloom of youth, something which supervenes upon the activity when the action and reaction are both at their best. The illustration is now complete, and the parallelism may be exhibited thus—

Formal Cause ὑγίεια αἰσθήσεως.
Efficient Cause τοῦ αἰετθανόμενον τοῦ νοῦ.
Supervenient ἵδονή.
Perfection ἤσθως τὸ κρίνων ἢ θεωροῦν, i.e. τὸ αἰετθανόμενον τοῦ νοῦ.

In An. Post. 99 b, 35 αἰσθήσεως is called δύναμις σώματος κριτικῆς. Hitherto we have been speaking of αἰσθήσεις, but of course all that has been said applies equally to νοῦς. We shall see that the ἑνεργεία of νοῦς is the highest.

ὁμοίως γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ. The agent and patient, the action and reaction, are similar and similarly related in
πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταῦτα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὔδεις συνεχῶς ἤδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἄδυνας νατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὔδε ἡ ἴδιος; ἐπεί γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἐνιαὶ δὲ τέρπετε καὶνὰ ἄντα, ὑστερον δὲ οὐχ ὀμοίως διὰ ταῦτά τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὡσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὅψιν οἱ ἔμβλημαντες, μετεύεται δὲ οὖν τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνεργεία ἀλλὰ τὸ παρημελημένην διὸ καὶ ἡ ἴδιος ἀμαυρώτατα. ὁρέγεσθαι δὲ τῷ τῆς ἴδιοντι οἰκεθεὶς τοῖς ἄναπται, οὗτοι καὶ τοῦς ἄναπταις ἐφένεται. ἡ δὲ ἐκατοστώ ἐνεργεία τῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκαστὸς περὶ ταῖς καὶ τούτως ἐνεργεῖ ἢ καὶ μάλιστ' ἄγαπτα, οἰον οὐ μὲν μονοσκότῳ τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθῆς τῇ διάνοιᾳ περὶ τὰς ἑυφύσιμα, οὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐκαστὸς: ἡ δὲ ἴδιον τελειοται τῆς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὐ ὁρέγεσθαι. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἴδιοντι ἐφένεται: τελειοτε ἐκατοστῷ τῷ ζῆν, αἰρέτον οὖν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἴδιοντι τὸ ζῆν αἰρευμέθον ἡ διὰ τῷ ζῆν τὴν ἴδιοντι αφείσθω εἰ τῷ παρόντι. συνεζεύχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα

κάθεις and αὐθεντικὰ, so the same result will follow.

§ 9. τάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes Met. 1050 b, 22. διὸ ἄλλη ἐνεργεία ὠλοσ καὶ ἡστρα καὶ ἄλος ἐνθρασθε, καὶ ὁ φυτεύω μὴ τοτε στέ, διὸ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κακὰς τοῦτο δρώτα ὡς γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς φύσεως, ἡ κάρια, ὅπερ ἐπίτηδον εἶναι τὴν συνεχίαν τῆς καύσεως ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὅτι καὶ δύναμις οὐσία, οὐν ἐνεργεία, αὐτίκα τοῦτον.

οἱ γίνεται, sc. συνεχῶς, which can easily be supplied from what precedes.

παρακάληται, 'the mind is stirred up.' Cf. Plato, Rep. 523 a τά...οὐ παρακαλοῦθη τὴν νόσθεν εἰς ἐπίκενσιαν. Isocrates regularly uses παρακαλεῖν and προτρέπεται as synonyms.

οἱ ἔμβλημαντες, 'as when people look and do not merely see,' is, I suppose, the meaning.

τοιαύτη, sc. διατεταμένη.

ἀμαυρώτατα, 'is dimmed.' At Athens this word was only poetical, but it is frequent in the koinē. It may have been in common use at Stageira.

§ 10. ὁρέγεσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The fact on which Eudoxos relied, namely that all aim at pleasure, is now explained. It is really life, i.e. activity, they aim at, and the pleasure is in τελειοται.

καὶ τοῦτο, 'and with these facilities' as shown by the examples τῇ ἀκοῇ and τῇ διανοιᾷ. The pleasure each man pursues is not any pleasure, but that which is the natural completion of the activity which is best in his eyes.

§ 11. πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This question has now become almost meaningless. Cf. Introductory Note. συνεζεύχθαι. Cf. 1170 a, 16.
χωρισμὸν οὗ δέχεσθαι. Cf. 1175 b, 35 διὰ τὸ μη χωρίζεσθαι. Cf. 1102 a, 30 ἀγάρμιστα περιφέρια and the note there.

V. § 1. άθεν δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ. We now see what is meant by saying that pleasures differ specifically. Aristotle has to deal with the view that pleasure qua pleasure is the same though from different sources, for which cf. Plato, Phileb. 12 δ εἰς μὲν γὰρ ἀρ' ἐναντίον, οἱ Σύκαρτες, άνταὶ πραγμάτων, οἱ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐν άλληλων ἐναντίοις. τὰ γὰρ ἔτερα κ.τ.λ. As Alexander puts it (Πόλ. προβ. 110, 4 sqq. Bruns) αἱ ἱδιωτα συνεισφέρονται ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, φαίνεται, σ. τελειομονα. Natural products like animals or trees are τέλεια when they have reached their full development of size and structure; the products of art are τέλεια when they have been finished so far as to serve the end for which they are made.

§ 2. αὖτα, 'these in turn,' i.e. the pleasures of thought and the pleasures of sense differ specifically among themselves as well as from one another. Cf. below 1176 a, 3 καὶ ἐκείνη ἄλληλοι.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφερόμενον, 'from their adaptation.' Cf. 1161 b, 21. Not only do the pleasures differ specifically τῷ ἐπὶ διαφερόμενῳ γίνεσθαι ἐνεργείαις, but also in their own nature as being οἰκείαι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις φο' αἱ γίνονται (Alexander loc. cit.).

συναφεῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1177 b, 21. That the specific difference between pleasures is intrinsic and not due solely to their association with certain ἐνεργείαι, is shown by the fact that the ἐνεργεία is increased by its οἰκεία ήδονή. The latter must, then, have some specific character of its own. All this depends upon Aristotle's theory of growth, cf. Gen. Corr. 332 2, 26 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πρωτόν δυνάμει τούτη σάρξ, ταύτη μὲν οὐκετισμὸν σαφὸς κ.τ.λ.
αναβαίνουσι δὲ αἱ ἢδοναὶ, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα ὁικεῖα τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ ὁικεῖα ἑτέρα τῷ εἶδει. ἦττὲ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἀν φανεῖ ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ᾽ ἐτέρων ἢδονάς ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαλου ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλύντως, μᾶλλον χαὶ-5 ροτεῖς αὐλητικὴ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας; ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀυλητικὴν ὁμιλεῖ τὴν περὶ τῶν λόγων ἐνεργείαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἡμῖν περὶ δύο ἐνεργηθεῖ ἡ γὰρ ἢδονὴ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκροδεῖ, καὶ πολὺ διαφέρει κατὰ τὴν ἢδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὡστε μηδὲ ἐνεργεῖαν κατὰ 10 τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαρίζοντες ὁμιλεῖς σφόδρα οὐ πάντων δρομὲν ἑτέρων, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἢδονα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγῳδιζόμενοι, ὅταν φαίων οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὄσι, τότε μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δρόσων ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ μὲν 5 ὁικεῖα ἢδονὴ ἐξακριβῶς τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονοστάσεως καὶ 15 βελτίως ποιεῖ, αἱ δὲ ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, ἤδην οὐκ πολὺ διεστάσωσι. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἢδοναι ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ ὁικεῖαι λύσαται φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ ὁικεῖαι λύεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ τὸ γράφειν ἢδος καὶ ἑπάλυπτον ἡ λογίζεισθαι ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, δὲ οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρὰς ὁυσίας τῆς 20 ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦναύπτην ἀπὸ τῶν ὁικεῖων ἢδονῶν τε καὶ λυτῶν· ὁικεῖαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δὲ ἀλλότριαι ἢδοναί εἴρηται ότι παραπλῆσισσι τῇ λυπῇ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλὴροι όμως, διαφέρουσιν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπεικεία 6 25 καὶ φαύλοτης, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρέτων οὐσίων τῶν δὲ φενκτῶν

§ 3. ἐκ τοῦ...ἐμποδίους...ἐναί. Alexander (loc. cit.) ἦτ οἱ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ ἀλλὰς ἐνεργείας ἢδονα ἐμποδίζομεν τὰς ἡμεῖς ἀλλαὶ γνωρίζομεν...ἐλπὶ δὲ ἢδονα ἡδονῶν φθινοπήκτη. οἱ δὲ εἰσὶν ἢδονα ἡδονῶν φθινοπήκτη, οὐκ ἐπὶ δὲ ἢδονα ἐξεπεραιτοῖ, ἐξωθέω τοῦτο ἐν ἀλλήλαις δὲ ἦν ταὐτερα πρὸς ἀλληλα.

§ 4. ἐνεργη. 1110 a, 14 n. ἐκκρόει. Cf. 1119 b, 10. 1154 a, 27.

§ 5. πολὺ διεστάσω. They are like ἀναιρεία, as Alexander says, and a fortiori they must be εἰδεῖ ἑτερα, for ἀναιρεία are the ἐδοθ οἱ are that are furthest apart in any γέρος.

καθ᾽ αὐτὴν. This brings out the meaning of ὁικεῖα. The pleasures are not attached to the activities in an accidental way; they are essentially the pleasures of the activity. They therefore differ καθ᾽ αὐτής, not merely κατὰ συμβαίνει ὁς ἡ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ ταὐτη τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεσθαι.
§ 6. τῶν ὅρισεων, 'than the appenditions, from which they arise.' Alexander (loc. cit.) γιὰ ώρ τὸ πλέον ἀφέστηκε τὸ ἐφεύμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσα τινος καὶ καθὼς ἐξερ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐχθρὸν καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ, εἰς τὸ καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τὸ πλέον ἀφέστηκε τῇ ἡδονῇ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐφ' ἡ ἡ ἡδονή. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἐφεσι ἔτσι ἡ ἡδονή, τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀνέστη τῇ ἡδονῇ καὶ παρακολουθεί· ὡς' εἰ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις συνδιαρρέουσα αἱ ἡδοναὶ, τῶν τὸ πάλλου ταῖς ἐνεργείαις συν- διαρρέουσα.

ἀλ μὲν γὰρ, sc. αἱ ὅρισεις. Desire is both antecedent in time and different in its nature from the activities. It is the efficient cause (Mot. An. 700 b, 35 ὡς ὅρες καὶ τῷ ὅρει ἀκολούθεσαν κατὰ), while pleasure is the superpredicated perfection of the activity itself.

§ 7. Διάνοια...ἀλοιβός. The typical ἐνεργεία. It is said that this is inconsistent with Book VII where pleasure is defined as ἀνεμοποιοῦσα ἐνεργεία. But that is purely dialectical. The γένεσις ἀλοιβής of Speusippus is there developed dialectically into ἀνεμοποιοῦσα ἐνεργεία, and it is not necessary to go further for the purpose of the argument there. Here we have a further step but no inconsistency.

καθαρεύσεις. This appears to be because sight, hearing and smell are independent of contact, while taste is a form of touch. Cf. De An. 434 b, 14 αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δὲ τέτοια αἰσθάνονται, οὖν δεφθορία ὡς ἄλλοι. 435 a, 14 ἃ τε ἄλλα...πάντω...τῇ δὲ τέτοια αἰσθάνεται ποιεῖ τὴν ἀλοιβήν καὶ διὰ τῶν μεταξύ, ὡς ἄλλοι τὰς ἀντικαὶ ἠττήθησιν. Further (ib. 435 b, 17) ἀνεφ γὰρ ἀφής δεδείσται τοῖς ἀδιανα- τον εἰναι ἔχει...τὸ δ' ἄλλα αἰσθήσεις ἔχει...οὗ τοῦ εἰναι ἑκατον ἄλλα τοῦ τοῦ. In other words, touch (and taste) are ἀναγκαῖα, the rest are καλά. We have learnt already that ἀρετή and ἀκολογία in the proper sense have to do only with ἀφή and γεώις.

ἀλ περὶ τῶν διάνοιαν, i.e. αἱ τῆς διάνοιας (Ind. s. ν. καὶ) ἡδοναί.

καὶ ἐκάτερα ἄλληλων. Cf. 1175 a, 27 καὶ αὐταί ἄλληλοι. The pleasures of each class (pleasures of sense and of intellect) differ among themselves. This has already been shown of the
καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεῖα, ὁσπερ καὶ ἔργον ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἀν φανεῖθ' ἐπὶ τὸν ἐπιτοῦ ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, καθάπερ ὁ Ἰσραήλ ἤσοις σύμμετ' ἅν ἐλεύθαι μᾶλλον ἡ χρυσοῦν ἡδονὴ γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοι. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ ἐδει διαφέρουσιν εἰς τόν τε τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιάφορον εὐλογοι εἰναι. 

10 διακλάττομεν δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τῶν μὲν τέρπει τούς δὲ λυτεῖ, καὶ τῶν μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητα. καὶ ἐπὶ γιλκέως δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει οὖ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέτοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιῶσθαι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἰναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ 15 εὐνεκτικό. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ 10 δ' ἐν ὁπαυ τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰναι τὸ φαίνομεν τῷ σπονδαῖῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλὸς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἄγαθὸς, ἃ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδονὴ εἰναι ἂν αἱ τοῦτο φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα ὃς οὖτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ 20 τοῦτο ἰσυχερῆ εἰ τῷ φαινώται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραί καὶ λήματι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται ἡδέα δ' οὖν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτος καὶ αὐτῷ διακεμένως. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμοιομείνων αἰσχρὰς δήλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἰναι, πλὴν τῶν διευθαραμένων τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἰναι δοκοῦσθαι πολλαὶ ἰδ' δύνατον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰναι ἣ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δήλον; ταύτας γὰρ ἐπονταί αἱ ἡδοναί εἰσθ' οὖν μὰ ἐστίν εἰς τὸ πλείον αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελείουσαί ἡδο-

pleasures of sense, and it is equally true that the pleasures of σοφία are higher than other pleasures of intelect.

§ 8. ὅσπερ καὶ ἔργου. Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, sc. ἡδονή οἰκεῖα ἐκάστῳ. It is the ἔργων which determines what is the οἰκεία ἐνέργεια of each, cf. Pol. 1353 a, 25 πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὑποται.

καθάπερ ὁ Ἰσραήλ φησιν. Fr. 51 Bywater. στραματό τῶν χóρων ὁ Ἰσραήλ λέγει Michael.

ἀδιαφόρον, sc. κατὰ τὸ εἴδος. The technical term for things identical is species.

§ 9. διαλλάττομεν, l.c. διαφέρον, cf. 1161 a, 5. Among the lower animals we do find that each kind has its own pleasures; among men alone do we see that pleasures specifically different are pursued by different individuals.

ἐπὶ γιλκέως κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1113 a, 180 sqq.

§ 10. δοκεῖ δ' κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1115 a, 25 sqq.

μέτρον...δ' ἄγαθος. Cf. 1160 a, 11-
ναὶ κυρίως λέγων· ἄν ἄνθρωπον ἦδοναί εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπὲς δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστάς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

VI. Εἰρημένοι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ταῦτα καὶ μετὰ καὶ 30 ἠδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τούτων διελθεῖν, ἐπειδῆ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν, ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προερχόμενα συντομοστέρας δὲ συν οὐκ έστιν έξεις· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίων ὑπάρχει ἂν, φυτῶν ζωὴν βίων, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦσι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα 35 μὴ ἄρεσκε, ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειαν τεταθέν, καθά 1176 b περ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἰρήται, τῶν δὲ ἐνέργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσίν ἀναγκαὶ καὶ δὲ ἐτέρα αἰτεῖται αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰς, δήλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρέτων τεταθέν καὶ οὐ τῶν δὲ ἄλλα: οὐδὲνος γὰρ ἐνδεές ἢ εὐδαιμονία ἄλλα αὐτὰρ- 3 κης. καὶ αὐτὰς δὲ εἰσίν αἰρέται αἱ δ' ὁμίλη ἐπεζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαύτης δὲ εἰσίν δοκοῦσιν αἱ καθ' ἄρετ- 

§ 11. Δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστάς, "in a secondary and even a far lower degree." Cf. Plato, Philol. 44 e οὐκ εἰσὶν τὰς πολλοστάς ἠδονὰς ἀναγκαῖα. 

VI. § 1. περὶ εὐδαιμονίας. We are at last in a position to explain the real meaning of our ἄρχη, the definition of Happiness. 

§ 2. οὐκ ἔστιν έξεις. The doctrine of Speusippus dismissed 1198 b, 31 sqq. καθεύδοντι· φυτῶν ζωῆς βίων. Cf. 1195 b, 31 sqq., 1198 b, 31 sqq. EE. 1216 a, 3. τῷ δυστυχοῦσι τὰ μέγιστα, ε.γ. τῷ Πραμακίος τόκαι περιείσθεντοι 1101 a, 6. Cf. 1100 a, 8. 1100 b, 28. ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, 1198 a, 5. 

αἰ μὲν...ἀναγκαῖα, sc. εἰς εποθέ- 

sous, i.e. those which have some ἄργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (cf. 1194 a, 3), which are the condiția sine qua 

non of something higher. 

τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς...τῶν δὲ ἄλλο. Of course there are some things αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ also δὲ ἄλλο (1196 b, 17), but εὐδαιμονία belongs to the class of things which are οὐδέτεροι δ' ἄλλο. 

οὐδένος...ἐνδεές, i.e. τελεία. Cf. 1097 a, 30 sqq. 

§ 3. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to discuss the claims of 

amusement to be the end of life for the 

reason given in Book I. 

παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις. Cf. 1195 b, 17. 1158 a, 27.
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οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὅν γὰρ ἐφίέσται,
15 ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφαῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιού-
των, δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν 4
δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἵστος σημεῖον
οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰμί· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστείᾳ ἡ ἀρετή οὐδὲ ὁ νόος,
ἀφ' ὃν ἄρα σπουδαίαι ἐπέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγεννοι οὖν οὗτοι δύτες
20 ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινῶς καὶ ἔλευθερον ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς κατα-
φεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα οἷον αἱρέσεωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ
γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμῶμενα κράτιστα οἶονται εἶναι.
εὐλογοῦ δὴ, ὅπερ παῖς καὶ ἀνδράς ἐτέρα φαί-
νεται τίμα, οὕτω καὶ φαύλους καὶ ἐπιτείκεισιν. καθ' ὅπερ οὖν
25 πολλάκις εἴρηται καὶ τίμα καὶ ήδεα ἐστὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
tοιαύτα δύτη: ἐκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὁικεῖαν ἐξαίρετα-
τάτην ἐπέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ
δὲ ἐν παιδία ἡ ἐυδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἀτοποῦν τὸ τέλος εἶναι
παιδίων, καὶ πραγματευόμεθα καὶ κακοποιεῖται τῶν βίων
30 ἀπαντά τοῦ παιδίου χάριν. ἀπαντὰ γὰρ ὃς εἰπεῖν ἔτορον
ἐνεκα ἁριστομέδα πλὴν τῆς ἐυδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ ἀυτῆς
παιδίας ὡς καὶ πολιν παιδίως χάριν ἡλικίας φαίνεται καὶ
λιαν παιδικῶν. παιδίων δ' ὡς σπουδάζῃ, καὶ ἀνάμφως,
35 ὃ ἀνάπαυσιν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσεις γὰρ ἔχουσι ἡ παιδία,
ἀνάμφως τούτες δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος
1177 ἡ ἀνάπαυσιν· γίνεται γὰρ ἕκαστη τῆς ἐπεργειας. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ
ἐυδαιμωνίας βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὕτως δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς,
ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδία. βέλτιον τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαία τῶν
γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιῶν, καὶ τὸν βελτίωνον ἀεὶ καὶ
5 μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαίωτέρα τὴν ἐπεργειαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν
βελτίωνος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικοτέρα ἡ ἡδή. ἀπολαυσίει
τ' ἄν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ τυχών καὶ ἀνδράποδων οὐκ

ἔφεσται, sc. οἱ τῆς ἀνάπαυσις.
§ 4. τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις, 1095 b, 31 n.
§ 5. πολλάκις εἴρηται, 1058 a, 1 sqq., 1113 a, 25 sqq., 1254 b 36, etc.
§ 6. ἡ ἀνάπαυσις. On the theory of ἀνάπαυσις ἄνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς] see
above 1127 b, 33. 1150 b, 17.

It will not seem strange to us that Aristotle insists so strongly on the
truth that amusement is not the end of life if we bear in mind that διαγωγή
is a form of διανοίας and is therefore liable to be confused with ἀνάπαυσις.
Cf. Pol. 1337 b, 33.
ΗΠΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

7. εἰ μὴ καὶ βιον. The slave, being an ἐφευχὸν ὄργανον (1161 b, 4), has no bios of his own. He is the instrument of another’s life. Cf. Pol. 1380 a, 32 δοῦλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδίων...οὐκ ἐστὶ (sc. ἡ τοῦ) διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τὸ γίνεται κατὰ προαιρεσιν.

καὶ πρότερον εὑρηταί. Cf. 1198 a, 15.

VII. § 1. ἔφραται. Strictly speaking it has not been said, though it is perhaps implied in 1195 b, 14 sqq. where all other lives than the theorētikōn bios are shown to be inadequate while its consideration is reserved (1196 a, 4). In any case it follows at once from the proof given in Book VI that sophia is the highest form of goodness.

§ 2. τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. Cf. 1138 b, 7 π. θεωρεῖν...δυνάμεια συνεχῶς. The reason is that theoria is the énergia of a dònum which is so high as to be almost an énergia. The only reason why it is not continuous is that it is still a dònum, not the actus purus of nósis. Met. 1074 b, 28 εἰ μὴ ἠμαθὴν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ δόνωμα, εὐδοκοῦσιν εἶναι τὸ συνέχεια αὐτὸ τῆς σοφίας.

§ 4. κεχορηγημένων, cf. 1110 a, 15.
From the beginning Greek science was organised on cooperative principles (Early Greek Philosophy, Introd. ad fin.), and the Peripatos itself was so in a high degree. The Greek thinks of scientific inquiry as the give and take of independent minds (dialektes). But of course it is possible for the wise man’s soul to commune with itself.

§ 5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. At the beginning of the Metaphysics it is shown that science arises after everything necessary to life has been secured. Its origin is in Wonder and it serves no end but the satisfaction of our natural desire to know. Cf. 983 b, 24 δὴν ὄνοι αὐτῷ ἐμπιέλαμι αὐτὴν ἀπηδομένα χρείαν ἔτέρας; ἄλλ᾿ ἄστιν ἀνθρωπός φαμεν ἄλθεσις ὥσπερ ἄνω ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄνω ὄν, ὅστω καὶ ἀπτομήν ἔνεκα ἄνω σὺν ἀνθρωπίνῃ συμβολῇ καὶ μὴν γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴν ἔνεκα ἔσυν. διὸ καὶ δυσαίην αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὴν ἐπῆρε.

§ 6. δοκεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. This is the truth which underlies the perverted view that amusement is the end of life. Εὐδαιμονία is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή, though it is not mere ἀντιτύχεια (‘rest’) or ἀνέργεια (‘relaxation’).
ΧΩΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

δε τον νου ενεργεια σπουδη τε διαφείρειν δοκει θεωρητικη
ουσα, και παρ' αυτην ουδενος εφιεσται τελους, εχειν τε ηδονην 20
οικεια—αυτη δε συναιξει την ενεργειαν—και το αυταρκες
δη και σχολαστικου και αξιων οι ανθρωποι, και δος άλλα
tω μακαριω απονεμεται, τα κατα ταυτην την ενεργειαν
φαεται αυτη. η τελεια δη ευδαιμονια αυτη αν ειη ανθρωπον,
λαβουσα μηκος βλου τελους. ουδεν γαρ ατελεις έστι 25
στον της ευδαιμονιας. δε τοιούτος αν ειη βλος κρατησσαι η
κατ' ανθρωπον' ου γαρ η ανθρωπος οτιν αυτο βιωσται, άλλω
η θεων τι εν αυτω υπάρχει: οσον δε διαφερει τουτο του
συνθετου, τοσουτο και η ενεργεια της κατα την άληθεν
αρετην. ει δε θεουν ονοι προς τον ανθρωπου, και ο κατα
tουτον βλος 30 θειος προς τον ανθρωπου βλουν. ου χρη
δε κατα τους παρα
νοιντας ανθρωπινα φρονειν άνθρωπον οντα, ουδε
θυητα τον
θυητου, άλλων έφος ον υπερχεται αθανατειν και παντα
tους προς το ζην κατα το κραπτον των εν αυτω.
ει γαρ και
tω ονεκριντον εστι, δυναμει και τιμωτητη τον μαλλον 1178
α
παντων υπερχει. δοξει δ' άν και ειναι έκαστος τουτο, εισπερ

σπουδη τε διαφειρεν, sc. των εν
σχολη, e.g. των καιδων.
"συναίξει την ενεργειαν. Cf. 1175 a,
30.
μηκος βλου τελους. 1098 a, 15 n.
§ 8. του συνθετου, 'man as a com-
posite being.'
άνθρωπινα φρονειν. Cf. Nauck
FTG, p. 690 where we have the
verse—
ανθρωπον δει δε φρονειν ανθρωπινα.
In Rhet. 1394 b, 24 Aristotle quotes—
θυητα χρη των θυητων, οικ άθανατα
tου θυητου φρονειν.
So Pindar, Isthm. v, 20 θυητα θρυοτα
πρέπει, Sophokles, Terens fr. 515
θυητα φρονειν χρη θυητην φασιν, Anti-
phanes ap. Stob. Flor. i, 316 e θυητα
ειβελιται θυητα κα θρυοτε.

δη άν έγκεχεται άθανατειν.

Aristotle did not believe in individual
immortality. Ναιυ alone is immortal
and it is not individual. But by

identifying ourselves so far as may be
with it we escape to a certain extent
from mortality. The thought was
originated by Plato in the Phaedo,
and remained in one form or another
to the end. Cf. Tim. 90 b των εν
tωρι φαλονειαι και περι τω ανθρωπινα
φρονοισεις οικουδουκαι...πασα άναγκη
tου, καθ' άνω δ' αυτ μετασχειν άνθρω-
πινα φασι άθαναται έγκεχεται, τουτω
μηδεν μερος άπολετειν. Cf. also the
ομωσεις τω θεω κατα το δυνατον τω
Theaet. 176 b.

των εν αυτω. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n.
tω ονεκριντον εστι, Giphanius com-
paredes Soph. El. 183 b, 22 μεγαστον
gαρ εκατον άρχη...δει γαρ κρατουν τω
δυναμει, τοσουτω μερισταν δε τω
μεγεθη χαιλεμενοσ εστιν άθροιν.

Of course the expression is figurative.
1169 a, 2.

1177 a 31]
τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν ἦνοῦτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βλούν αἵρετο ἄλλα τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεγένη τε πρότε- 
5 ρον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστοτε τῇ φύσει κρά-
πιστον καὶ ἱστοιστ τοῦ ἐκάστοτε· καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον δὴ ὁ κατὰ 
τὸ νου ἱστον βλούν, εἰπὲν τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. ὁ δήτος ἁρα 
καὶ ἐνδαίμονος τοῦ.

VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἄρετήν· οἱ γὰρ 
καὶ οἱ τῶν ἄλλην ἄρετῆς· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ταύτην ἐνεργείαν ἄνθρωποι. 
δικαὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία 
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τῶν ἄρετῶν πρὸς ἄλλους πράττομεν 
ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεις παυτοῖς ἐν τοῖς 
πάθεσι διαπροέρχεται τὸ πρότερον ἐκάστοτε. ταῦτα δ' εἰναι 
φανερά πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἤνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
15 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συναφείσθαι τοῖς πάθεσι 
ὁ τῆς ἓθους ἄρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρονήσεως τῇ τοῦ 
3 ἓθους ἄρετή, καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ φρονήσει, εἰπέρ αἱ ἕνας τῆς 
φρονήσεως ἄρχαί κατὰ τὰς ἕθεκάς εἰσιν ἄρετα, τὸ δ' ὅρθον 
τῶν ἑθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρονήσειν. συνήρμαται δ' αὐταὶ καὶ 
20 τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἄν εἰσείν' αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθήτου ἄρε- 
ται ἄνθρωποι· καὶ ὁ βλούν δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἐνδα-
μονα. ἤ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς 
εἰρήσθων· διακρίβωςα γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἑστιν. 
δόξει δ' ἄν καὶ τῆς ἕκτος χρησίμα τῆς μικρῆν ἢ ἔπο' ἐλαττονος 
25 δεισδερα τῆς ἑθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίαν ἀμφοῖν χρεία 
καὶ εξ ἵπτον ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ

τὸ λεγένη τε πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Here we 
see the real sequence of the whole 
argument. For φιλά in its highest 
form is the love of the higher self, 
and it is good, as proved above 
1170 a, 13 sqq., for it is just the self-
consciousness of the activity of thought 
(κοίται νοήματος).

VIII. § 1. Δευτέρως δὲ κ.τ.λ. 
As the κόσμον in man is νοῦθ, the 
best human life will be καὶ πρότερον 
ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν (cf. 1157 a, 31 n.). 
But we must also take the σύνθετον 
into account.

§ 2. ἦνια δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 b, 
3 sqq.

§ 3. συνέζευκται. Cf. 1175 b, 19.

αὐταί, sc. αἱ ἕθεκάς ἄρετα.

περὶ τὸ σύνθετον, i.e. τοῦ συνθήτου, 
cf. Ind. n. περὶ.

διακρίβωςα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Neither 
a note on the Ethics the proper 
place to discuss the χρησίμα of νοῦ.

§ 4. δόξει δ' ἄν κ.τ.λ. It is true 
that this section contains repetitions, 
but that is no reason for suspecting 
it.
Πολυτικός, καὶ ὁσα τοιαύτα—μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέροι—πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίᾳ δεῖσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττει τὰ ἐλευθερία, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δῆ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἀδήλιοι, 30 προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλευσθαι δικαιοσυναγείν), τῷ ἄνδρειῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἰπέρ ἐπιτελεῖ τὶς τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πώς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ 5 οὕτως ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριότερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προσώπεις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν 35 οὕτως· τὸ δὴ τελειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ 1178 b τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσον ἂν μεῖζον δοῦν καὶ 6 καλλιούς, πλεῖονοιν. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντε οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλὰ ὡς εἰπέναι καὶ ἐμπόδια ἐστι πρὸς γε τὴν θεωριαν. ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπὸς ἔστι καὶ πλεῖονοιν συζύγοι, 5 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεῖσται δὲν τῶν τοιούτων τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύσασθαι. ἢ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτε θεωρητικὴ τῆς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεύθεν ἂν φανεῖν. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μᾶλλον ὑπελήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαιμονίους εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ πολλᾶ ἀπονέαμαι χρείαν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δι- 10 καίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φαινοῦνται συναλλάσσοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ οὕτως τοιαύτα· ἀλλὰ τὰς ἄνδρειους** ὑπομένοντες τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντες ὅτε καλὸν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους· τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἀτοπον δ' ἢ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τὰ ἂν εἰεν; 15 ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἐπαινός, ὅτι ὅπως ἔχουσι φαιλαὶ ἐπιθυμίας· διεξεύθυντι δὲ πάντα φαίνοντ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε ἐπὶ πάντες ὑπελήφασιν αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἀρα· ὅτε γὰρ δὴ καθέδειν ὡσπερ τὸν Ἑνδυμίνων. τῷ δὴ ἐξωτικοῦ τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρομένου, ὅτι δὲ 20

ἐξουσίας, κε. τοῦ ἀκαλαστίουν (Kořaes).
§ 5. ἀμφισβητεῖται τε κ.τ.λ. ΕΕ. 1288 α, 15.
§ 7. ἀλλὰ τὰς ἄνδρειους; κε. πράξεις. Ιγρειν ὑπομένοντες with Kαθεκίβεγην. The accusatives of our other authorities seem due to assimilation to ἄνδρειους. Some such words as ἀλλ' ἄτομοι seem to have fallen out before ὑπομένοντες.

οὗ γὰρ δὴ καθεδεὶν. Met. 1074 b, 17 εἴε οὖν μὴν νοεῖ (ο νοεῖ), τί ὅτι ἐν ἔνθε το σεμᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὑπερ ὅτι ἐν δι καθεδεὶν.

B. A.
μάλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴρθεορία; ὁστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητη διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἀν εἴη, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγνεεστάτη εὐδαιμονικαστή. σημείον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, 8 25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἀναὶ, οἱ βίοι μακάριοι, τοὺς ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ᾿ ὅσον ὁμόφοροι τί τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει: τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ᾿ ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μάλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖ, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ᾿ αὐτὴν τιμᾶ. ὅταν εἴη δὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Debeis δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτός εὑμερίας ἀνθρώπων ὄντες· οὐ γὰρ ἄφθαρες οὐ δύσης πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἄλλα δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα 35 ὑμαῖνει καὶ τροφῆν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.

1179 οὐ μὴν οἰηύνει γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεῖσθαι τοῦ εὐδαιμονήσουσα, εἰ μὴ εὑδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἰσί: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ύπερβολῇ τὸ ἀπαρθεῖν οὐδὲ ἡ πράξεις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀρχοντα γῆς καὶ βαλλάς τὰς πράττεν 5 τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύνατ᾿ ἂν τὰς πράττεν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν· τούτῳ δ᾿ ἔστιν ἐβεβηκὼς· οἱ γὰρ ἐδιώκαντα τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἠτῶν δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπεικεῖ πράττεν, ἄλλα καὶ μᾶλλον. ἰκανοῦ δὲ τοσοῦτα ὑπάρχειν· ἐστὰ γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειον τοις Σόλων 10 ἐν τοῖς εὐδαιμονισά ἵππος ἀφεβαίνεσθαι καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτός κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθεν, ὡς φέτο, καὶ βεβιοκότας σωφρόνως· εὑδέχεται γὰρ μέτρα
'Ἀναβαγόρας. Cf. EE. 1215 b, 6 (p. 19) and D. L. ii, 7 πρὸς τὸν εἰσόντα 'Οδήν σε μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν εὑρόθρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' δείξας τῶν ὁδανῶν.

§ 12. συμφώνειν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and Introd. § 25. The λόγοι here are the dialectical arguments derived from λογικὴν προτάσεις, and these are said to be in harmony with τὰ τὸ ὁδοὶς διδοῦμα, which form ἱλικια προτάσεις. They must further be tested by the facts of life (ἐργα), and if they do not stand this test, they are to be regarded as meν λόγοι.

§ 13. ὡ δὲ κατὰ νῦν κ.τ.λ. It has been objected to this passage (1) that it breaks the connexion of ideas, (2) that it is inconsistent with Aristotle's view of the relation between God and Man. Both objections are true, but neither is a sign of spuriousness. The words δοκεῖ and εἴλεγον show that this is merely a new ἐνδείξ. 

IX. § 1. 'Αρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We have now discovered what εὐδαιμονία is, and we have also seen how a man may attain it for himself; but our task is not complete. We have still to ask how the νομοθέτης is to produce it in the state.

35 ἔχειν οὐρέτων τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, ὡς ἔστων 1179 ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γράφων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά: οὐδὲ δὴ ἄρρητα ὑπάρχον τῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ χρὴσθαι πειρατέον, ἦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀγαθῶν μιμομέθη; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς 5 τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἀν μισθοῦς καὶ μεγάλους δι- καίους ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεοὺς, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσα- σθαι: νῦν δὲ φαίνοντα προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμήσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίων ἱσχύειν, ἤδης τ᾽ εὐγενείς καὶ ὁ ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώμχυον ἐκ τῆς ἄρετής, 10 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφίκασιν αἰνεῖθεν πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβος, οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ χειρὶ τῶν φαύλων διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀρχήν ἂν τὰ τιμωρίας: πιθαῖ γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ὑδαίνας διώκοντες καὶ δὲ ὅν ἂν ἄρρητα ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύσεις, τῶν 15 δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὁς ἀληθῶς ἴδεος οὐδ᾽ ἐνιοῦν ἔχοντα, ἄγεν- στοι δοῦτε. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τὸς ἄν λόγος μεταρρυθμεῖται; οὐ 5 γὰρ οἶνον τὴ ὁ ὅρδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῦ ἤθελεν κατειλη-
μένα λόγοι μεταστήσας· ἀγαπητὸν δ', ἵσως ἐστίν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ὃν ἐπεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβαι.

6 μεν τῆς ἁρετῆς· γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθόν διότι οὖνται οἱ μὲν φύσει ἐὰν οἱ δ' ἐδει τὸ διδάχῃ, τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινὰς θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχείν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ ποτ' οὖν ἐν ἀπασίᾳ ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεὶ προδιειργᾶσθαι τοὺς ἱθεῖται τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχήν πρὸς τὸ καλὸς χαίρειν καὶ 35

7 μυσεῖω, ὀσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέφουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ αὖ ἀκούσειν λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὐτὸν χείρισθαι ὃ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶδα τε μεταπείσεσαι; ὅλως τε 8 οἱ δ' ὄντως λόγοι ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βία. δεὶ δὴ τὸ ἱθὸς προπάρχειν πῶς οὐκέτι τῆς ἁρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ 50 δυσχεράν τὸ ἀσύργον. ἐκ νεόν τ' ἀνωγήσῃ ὅρθης τυχεῖν πρὸς ἁρετὴν χαλέπιν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιοῦτος τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σαφρόνας καὶ καρπερικῆς 55 ζῆν ὡς ὧν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέος. διὸ νόμοις δεὶ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὖν ἕσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενό- 35

9 μενα. ὡς ἱκανὸν δ' ἵσως νέοις ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελεῖας 1180α τυχεῖν ὅρθης, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδροθέντας δεὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν

(Why do we sweat more in summer than winter though the body is drier?) we read that τοῦ χειμώνος πεπερικυμένων ἐκτέλεσεν οἱ σωμάτων παρά κατελθήσαντος τῆς ψάθους δερματίνας πενθήμα τις ὑποκείμενο τῶν ὁμοίων. So far from λόγω alone sufficing, "we may think ourselves lucky" if the combination of all the recognised means of attaining goodness is effective.

§ 6. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1099 b, 9 sqq. τὸ...ἡμῶν, cf. 1103 a, 20 n. ἐφ' ἠμῖν. The words show that this is a formal bond in.

Δεί προδιειργάσασθαι...ἀσπερ γῆν. Koraeas compares Hippocr. (Nōm. § 2) ἢ µὲν γὰρ φύσει ἢ δόξας ἢ λογία τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ἅκοιν τὰ σπέρματα...ἡ δὲ παιδομάθη τὸ κατ' ἄρχειν αὐτὰ παθῶν ἕν τῷ ἄρνομεν. The doctrine is the same as 1095 b, 4 sqq. where too Kβ has ἔστειλεν for ἔστειλεν (Lβ).

§ 7. ὃ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν. Cf. 1095 a, 8. § 8. τεί δή κ.τ.λ., the Platonic view. Cf. 1104 b, 12 n. ὑπὸ τοιοῦτον...νόμοις, sc. ὅρθης. After τροφοθεία καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, ὡσ c. dat. is regular. The steps in the deliberative analysis are ἀρετὴ, ἐθικῆς, τοιοῦτον...ἡμῶν. συνήθη γενόμενα. Cf. Rhet. 1369 b, 16 δέτη δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνθετο καὶ τὸ ἐνθάνη ἐν τοῖς ἥλιον...πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσεω ἢ ἡμῶν, ὡς ἡμεθῶσυν, ἡμῶς ποιοῦμεν.
αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δειόμεθα· ἀν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκης ἴδες· καὶ λόγος πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ξημάιας ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διότι ὁ καὶ ἐδάφος τῶν τούτων νομιστεύονται δεῖ μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσμοῦν· τῶν ἐπεικῶν τοὺς ἔθεαν προηγμένον, ἀπεισοῦσί δὲ καὶ ἀφεστέρους οὐκοσκόμετε τε καὶ τιμορίας ἐπιτίθεναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνάκτους ἄλλοις ἐξορίζειν τὸν μὲν ἀργὸ ἐπεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἱπτά τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσαν, τὸν δὲ φαίλον ἢδονήν ὀρεγόμενον λύπην κολάζεσθαι ὅσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διότι καὶ φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτα γίνεσθαι τᾶς λυπής αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπιμέναις ἠδοναῖς. εἰ δὲ οὖν, καθάπερ εἰρήσιτα, τὸν εἰς ἐνδομένων ἁγαθόν τραφῆ θαλάς δεὶ καὶ ἐθισθήναι, εἰς' ὅταν εἰς ἐπιπεδεύμας ἐπεικεῖσται ἐὰν καὶ μὴ ἄκοιντα μηθ' ἐκοιντα πράττετε τὰ σώματα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βουλευόμεθα κατὰ τίνα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἐχοῦσαν ἰσχύν. ἡ μὲν οὖν παρκυρὴ πρόστασις οὐκ ἦνει οἴκυρων οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἡ δὲ οὖν ἐνδεώμενος ἢδονήν ἢ τίνος τοιούτου· ὅ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικήν ἔχει δέναμα, λόγος οὐκ ἀπὸ τίνος φρονήμενος καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐκθαύρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιοῦμενους ταῖς ὀρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ὅρκωσιν· ὅ δὲ

αὐτά. Susenmühl suggests ἄττα, while Rodier points out that Michael seems to have read ἄλα. § 10. ἄναιται τινες. The reference seems to be to Plato's requirement in the Laws 722 d sqq. that all laws should begin with a προοίμων of a persuasive and proreptic character. τοῖς δ' ἀνατοῖς. Ἱππίαν. Plato, Protag. 325 π  ὅδ' ἀν  ἐμ' ὑπακοῆς κολάζεσθαι καὶ ἀκολούθησιν, ἐκ ἀκαταφάνης εἰς ἀκαταφάσιας. διὸ καὶ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, l 10 n.

§ 11. μὴ τ' ἄκοιντα μηθ' ἐκοιντα. We must not press this. It is purely phraseologically like of ἐς ἄττας ὁ ἄκοιντα in Soph. Ant. 1109.
13 νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἑπαχθὲς τάτων τὸ ἑπιεικὲς. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Δακεθαμονίαν τοῖς ἦτοι μετ' ἑλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἑπιμέλειαν 25 ἄκατος ἐπησῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλειστοῖς τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἶττῃ ἐκαστὸς ὡς βουλεῖται, κυκλωπικὸς θεομετέων παλάντων ἦδ' ἄλοχων. κράτιστοι μὲν οὖν τὸ γένεσθαι κοινῶν ἑπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθῶν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτῷ δύνασθαι]. κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων πολλὰ ἀκάτοτω δύσειν ἀν προσείκει τοῖς σφατέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις eἰς ἀρετὴν συμβαλλοῦσαι, **ἡ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μᾶλλον δ' ἔν τούτῳ δύνασθαι δύσειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικῶν γενόμενων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἑπιμέλειαι δήλων ὑπὸ διὰ νόμου χύνοντα, ἑπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ ἀδικαὶ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμμένων... 35 μένῳ δ' ἡ ἀγράφῳ, οὕτων ἀν δύσειν διαφέρειν, οὕτω δυτικὰ 1180 ἠς ἡ πολλοί παιδευθόντων, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ μουσείον ἡ γυμναστική καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εναχθεῖ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἣθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἷοις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἥθη, καὶ ἐν μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας προοπάρχουσι γὰρ στέρ- 15 γονιτε καὶ ἑπιτελεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἐκαστὸν παιδεύειν τῶν κοινῶν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ιατρικῆς καθ' ἐκαστὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ πυρήνατον συμφέρει ἡνωμία καὶ ἁσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἐσοῦν ὡς, δ' τε πυκνικός ἐσοῦν οὗ πᾶσι τῆς αὐτῆς μάχην ιο...
περιτήθησιν. ἐξάκριβωθαι δ’ ἰδίεσιν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ’ ἐκα-
στον ἱδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γνωμενής· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφο-
ρού τυχικῶν ἦκαστος. ἀλλ’ ἐπιμεληθήσεται μὲν <ἀν> ἀρισταὶ καθ’
ἐν καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστῆς καὶ πάσας ἄλλας ὁ τὸ καθῶλου εἰδῶν,
15 τὰ πάντα ἡ τοῖς τοιούθεν—τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστήμηι λέγονται
τε καὶ εἰσὶν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἢσαν καλὸς· ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπι-
μελείας καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ὑπά, τεθαμένων ὅ’ ἀκριβῶς
tὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ’ ἐκάστω δ’ ἐμπερίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ
ἐνοῖ ξοδεύειν ἢ ἐναυτῶν ἀριστοὶ εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὖν ἂν ἦν ὑπομείναι
tοῦ ἑπάρκεσαι. οὐδὲν δ’ ἦτον ἢσος τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γε-
νέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθῶλον βαδιστῶν εἶναι δοξεῖν ἂν,
κάκευνο γνωριστῶν ὡς ἐνδεχεται· εἰρθαι γὰρ οἴ τε περὶ
tοῦ οὐ εἰστὶν ἐπιστήμηι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλομένῳ δ’ ἐπιμελεῖας
c17 βελτίων ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἰτ’ ἄλγος, νομοθετικοὶ πειρα-
tυν ἁγεσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἄγαθον γενομεθ’ ἄν. ὑπερὶ γάρ
οὐν καὶ τὸν προτεθύνατα διαθεῖαι καλὸς οὐκ ἢστιν τοῦ τυχόντος,
ἀλλ’ εἰπέρ τινος, τοῦ εἰδότος, οὐσίν ἐπὶ λατρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
οὐ ἢστιν ἐπιμελείας τις καὶ φρονήσεως. ἀρ’ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἔπι-
c18 σκεπτεῖ τόθεν ἡ πώς νομοθετικός γένεσθαι ἣν τες; ἡ καθάπερ
30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μᾶριον γὰρ ἐδοκεί

ὅ τὸ καθὸλον εἰδῶν. Cf. 1141 b, 22
ἐπὶ δ’ ἵνα τις καὶ ἑσταθῇ ἀρχιτεχνοτης.
Cf. also Met. 981 a, 10 πάσας τοῦ τοι-
οῦθεν καὶ ’ειδός τιν ἄν ἀφοροθεία.
§ 16. δ’ ἐμπερία. Cf. Met. 981 a, 12 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπερία
τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχούσα τοῦτο ἑθεῖν τὸν ἐμπερίας τῶν άνευ τῆς ἐμπερίας λόγων
ἐχθαντός, αὐτὸν δ’ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπερία
tῶν καθ’ ἐκαστῶν ἔστιν γινώσκει, ἡ δ’
tέχνη τῶν καθολίων, οἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ
ἐνεπείρασι πάσης περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν
ἐλαῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ὁμαλὲς ό λατρείας, πλὴν ἀλλ’ ὧν κατὰ
συμβεβηκότας, ἀλλὰ Ἐκκλησία ἢ Ἱερατεία ἢ τῶν
ἄλλων τυριὰ τῶν οὐσίων λεγομένων, ψ
συμβεβηκόντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν
ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπερίας ἔχει τις τῶν λόγων,
καὶ τὸ μὲν καθὸλου γνωρίσθη, τὸ δ’ ἐν
tοσῷ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἄγονθ’· πολλάκις

διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπε-
tῶν γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστον. ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὸ
ἔρειν καὶ τὸ ἐπάλληλον τῆς ἐμπερίας ἐπάλληλον ἄλλο,
καὶ συμβεβηκόντων τοῦτο τέχνης τῶν ἐμπερίας
ὑποτάσσομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ ἐδοκεῖ
μᾶλλον ἀνδροθείαν τὴν σοφίαν τῶν
tοῦτο δὲ, διό μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἢσαν,
οἱ δ’ ὅσ’ ὃς ἐμπερίων τὸ δεῖ μὲν
ἐπαγαγγεῖον, διότι οὐκ ἢσαν ὁ δὲ τὸ
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζοντος.
§ 17. καὶ τοῦ προτεθυντά, ‘any
given subject submitted for treatment.’
§ 18. μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκέπτεσιν. We
have found that ὅμως is the means to
ἐθείμον and that therefore we must
become νομοθετικος. The next step in
the διαλείμνεις is the means of
becoming νομοθετικος.
μᾶριον γὰρ ἐδοκεὶ· ἕνεκ’ οὖν, sc. 4
νομοθετικος. Cf. 1141 b, 23 seq.
τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἦν οὐκ ὁμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλας οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδεδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπὸ αὐτῶν, ὦν λατρεῖ γραφεῖν· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφοί, 35 πράττει δὲ αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δὲ θάνατον ἀν δυνάμει τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἡ διανοία· οὕτω γὰρ γράφοντες οὐτὲ λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται—καὶ τοῦ κάλλου ἦν ἱστος ἢ λόγος δικαίως τε καὶ δημιουργικῶς—οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ πολιτικοὶ πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφῦ· 19 τέρων οὐδὲ ἡ τίνα ἄλλου τῶν φίλων. εἰδογον δὲ ἢν, εἰπέρ ἐδύνατο· οὕτω γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁμεινὸν οὐδὲν κατέλειπον ἄν, οὖθεν αὐτοῖς ἴστράβει προέλθειν ἀν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὔτε δὲ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε δοκεῖν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβαλλόμεθα· οὔτε γὰρ ἐγινοῦν ἀν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνθήκης πολιτικοὶ· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιμενοῖς περὶ πολιτικῆς ἐιδεῖν προσδεῖν ἐδοκεὶ ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφώτων οἱ ἐπαγγέλλομενοι λίγων φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξας. ἀλλαὶ γὰρ οὔδε ποίον τε ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ πολία ἱσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ μητρικῇ οὖθε κέρων ἐπίθεσαν, οὔθεν ἄν ψόντο 15

ἡ οὕτω διοικον κ.τ.λ. This whole passage is an echo of the well-known complaints of Plato in the Meno (91 a—100 c) and Protagoras (319 d—320 b) that the statesmen of Athens have not taught any one their art, not even their sons.

ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων. Cf. 1094 a, 10. b, 4.

§ 20. τῆν αὐτὴν τῇ ἑπηροκῆ. The history of the Greek word ἑπηροκemean its everyday use at Athens led to this identification, the criticism of which forms the first subject of Plato's Gorgias. But, as Spengel saw, Isokrates is more immediately aimed at. Cf. e.g. Antid. § 8a νύσσας μὲν θεοὶ μυρίων καὶ τῶν Ἀλλων Ἐλλήνων καὶ βασιλέως ἱερὰς γεγονόσις, εἰπέν δὲ περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἄξιον τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς Ἐλλάδος οἷς ἄν πολλαὶ δυνάμεις. ἦν ὦκεας τῶν ἔργων τοιούτων τοῖς τοιούτων λόγοι εἰρχομένη τοσοῦτον χρή περὶ πλεῖον ποιεῖται τῶν τῶν νῦσσας ποιοτῶν, ἐστὶ δὲ σπανιότερος καὶ χαλεπότερος καὶ ψυχή φρονιμίας δεδομένη τυχόνως, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νῦν.

οὖθεν ἄν ψόντο κ.τ.λ. Here the reference is quite plain. Cf. Antid. § 82 ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνταῦθα προκήρυκατε ὡστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρχομένους καὶ τῶν νῦσσας τοὺς κείμενους ἀναρρητικῶς εἰπέν· καὶ τῶν μὲν νῦσσας ἐπικατέσχατε τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν κατατέκτων, ολικτί τὴν ἅπαν διανοίαν ἔργον ἄνωθεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν τῶν νῦσσας τιθέναι προκήρυκεν γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κείμενων, οὔδὲν γὰρ αὐτόν ζητεῖν δὲ ἐπέρισθεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

ράδιον εἶναι οἱ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντοι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέγεσθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀριστοὺς, ὡσπερ οὖν τὴν ἐκλογὴν ὡςαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναν ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὡσπερ εὐ τοῖς κατὰ μοντικήν. Οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἕκαστος τοῦ κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι᾽ ὅν τὸς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιάσεως καὶ ποῖα ποῖος συμβαίνει τοῖς ἐκ ἄπειροι ἀγαπητῶν τῷ μῆν διαλαμβάνειν εἰ ἐν ἡ κακὸς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὡσπερ ἕπι γραφικῆς. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἑργός ἐικάσαισιν·

1181 b πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικῶς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀριστοὺς κρίναι· οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὖν ἱεροκοι τοῖς συνεγερμαῖ τοῖς γίνεσθαι. καὶ τοῖς περιώνται γε λέγοντι οὐ μόνον τὰς τερατεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς λαθέειν ἄν καὶ ὡς δὲ τρεπαθέντων ἐκκαθεν, διελθομενοὶ τὰς ἑξεσι· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπειροῖς ὀφέλεια εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονοι ἀχρεία. Ισος οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτείων αἱ συναγγοῖ τοὺς μὲν δυναμένους θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναν τῷ καλῶς ἢ τὸν συναρτήτων καὶ ποῖα ποῖος ἀριστεύει ἑκάστη; ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δὲ ἄνευ 10 ἑξεσι τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξευχομαι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν

παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦνται πειράθηκαι συναγαγεῖν, δὲ ῥᾴδιον δυτὶς οὐν βουληθεὶς ποτέ κ.τ.λ. 'Αριστοτέλες' words are a direct quotation from this.

ἔργους ἐικάσαι. The point is that the laws are τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, not ἡ τέχνη. Cf. the criticism of the rhetorical teaching of Gorgias and the rest, which consisted in giving their pupils speeches to learn by heart. Soph. El. 184 a, 2 oder τέχνης ἀλλά τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδασκεῖ παθεῖς ὑπελαμβανομεν· ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ τις ἐπεισήμην φάσεων παραδόσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μὴν ποιεῖν τοῦ πόδας, εἶτα εὐκοτομομεν μὲν μὴ διδάσκει, μηδὲ ὁδὸν διαφέρει συνεισθήα τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδακτῶν ὕποδημάσων, οὕτω γὰρ βεβαιόθυκε μὲν πρὸ πῆς τῆς χρείας, τέχνην δὲ οὐ παρέδωκεν.

§ 21. ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων. We see from the context that this is an argument a fortiori. Medical books are more scientific than collections of laws, and yet the doctor must use his own judgment.

ἐστι οὖν κ. τ. λ. Cf. Rhet. 1360 a, 30 χρήσιμων δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μῆν τὸν ἐπιλαμβάνει τὰς πολιτείας συμφοράς ἐκ τῶν παρελθόντων θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εἴλαται, οἱ τοῖς τούτως ἀριστευόμενοι. ὡστε δὴ τοῦτο μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν τῆς ἡγίας περίοδος χρήσιμως ἐπείθεθεν ἤπειρος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων νόμων, πρὸς δὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ συμβολαῖς τὰς τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόμενοι ἅπασα ἄρα ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἄλλω ὑπερηφάνεις ἔργον ἔτην.

ἄνων ἐξως. This is the ms. reading, and is supposed to mean either (1) without the habit produced by experience and practice, or (2) without knowledge as a ἐξως ἐποδεικτικς. Neither of which seems
satisfactory. We might read ἄνευ ἐξετάσεως. The words are confused in mss., e.g. in Plato Apol. 22 e.
§ 23. πρώτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The fact that the sketch here given does not agree with the order followed in the Politics as we have it, or, as Newman says, with "any conceivable order," seems to me decisive in favour of its genuineness. Surely an interpolator would have given a more recognisable synopsis. On the whole question, see Newman's Politics vol. II, App. A.

εκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν. We have at last one of these in the Ἀθηναίων πολείς, of which few will now suspect the Aristotelian origin.
APPENDIX A

De Anima 433 a, 9 sqq.

Φαίνεται δε γε διο ταύτα κινούνται, ἢ ὁρέξεις ἢ νοῦς, εἰ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησιν τινα: πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλωσι εἴρηται οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἀμφοὶ ἃρα ταύτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόσα, νοῦς καὶ ὁρέξεις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἄνεκά τοῦ λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς, διαφέρουσι δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὁρέξεις ἄνεκα τοῦ πάσα. οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὁρέξεις, αὕτη ἄρχῃ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ: τὸ δὲ ἐσχατὸν ἄρχῃ τῆς πράξεως. ὡστε εὐλόγως ταύτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινούνται, ὁρέξεις καὶ διάνοια πρακτικὴ τῷ ὀρεκτῶν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἄρχῃ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τῷ ὀρκτῶν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως. ὃν δὴ τι τὸ κινοῦν τῷ ὀρεκτικῶν. εἶ γὰρ διὸ, νοῦς καὶ ὁρέξεις, ἐκόνως, κατὰ καθάνον ἄν τι ἑκάστων εἴδος. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινοῦν ἄνευ ὁρέξεως—ἡ γὰρ βουλήσεως ὁρέξεις—ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινεῖται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δὲ ὁρέξεις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν. ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὁρέξεις τῆς ἐστὶν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁρὸς ὁρέξεις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὁρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὁρθή. διὸ ἂν κινεῖ μὲν τῷ ὀρεκτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὧτ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δὲ, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρακτῶν ἀγαθόν. πρακτῶν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τωματὴ δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλομείρη ὁρέξεις, ϕανερῶν. τοὺς δὲ διαρροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἓν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαρροῆν καὶ χωρίζοντα, πάρμολα γίνεται, βραχείου, αἰσθητικοῦ, νοητικοῦ, βουλευτικοῦ, ἥτις ὀρεκτικοῦ: ταύτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει αλλὰ δὲ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ καὶ θυμικῷ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίως αλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίως ὄσι, γίνεται δὲ τοὺς χρόνους αἴσθησιν ἐξουσίως—οἱ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλλων κελεύει, ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἱθικ. φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἱθικ. ὑμ. καὶ ἀπλώς ὑμ. καὶ ἀγαθόν ἀπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον—εἰδεὶ μὲν ἐν ἀν εἰς τὸ
Βινών τὸ ὁρεκτικόν, ἧ δ ορεκτικών, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὁρεκτόν—τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοσθῆσαι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἄρθρῳ δὲ πλεῖον τὰ κινοῦντα. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐστὶ πρᾶξ, ἐν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δ' ἡ κινεῖ, ἕτη τρίτου τὸ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διδότως, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἁγαθοῦ, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὁρεκτικόν—κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὁρεγόμενον ἤ ὁρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὁρεξὶν κινήσεις τὶς ἄλητι ἢ ἐνέργεια—τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ἄργον· ὃ δὲ κινεῖ ἄργαν ἢ ὀρέξεις, ὡθή τοῦτο σωμάτων ἐστίν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἰργοὺς θεωρητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὅτι δ' ὃς ἐν κεφαλαῖο ἐπείτε, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικὸς ὅπου ἀρχῇ καὶ τελευτῇ τὸ αὐτό, οὗν δ' ἐγγυμοῦ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοίλον τὸ μὲν τελευτή τὸ δ' ἀρχῇ· διὰ τὸ μὲν ἤρμηνεμεν τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἐτερα ὤντα, μεγιθέω δ' ἀξιώριστα· πάντα γὰρ ὁπειρούσα καὶ ἠλέξεις κινεῖται. διὸ δεὶ ὁσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, καὶ ἐνείθεν ἀρχίσατο τὴν κύησιν. ὅλας μὲν οὐ, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, ἡ ὁρεκτικὸν τὸ ἐργαν, ταύτῃ ἐαυτοῦ κυριτικὸν· ὁρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἂνεν φαντασία· φαντασία δὲ πάσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική· ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἡμᾶς μετέχει.
APPENDIX B

De motu animalium 701 a, 7 sqq.

Πώς δέ νοῦν ὅτε μὲν πράττει, ὅτε δέ ὁ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτε δέ ὁ κινεῖται; ὅπως παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἁκιστήνων διανοημένων καὶ συνοικομένων. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν θεωρημα τὸ τέλος—ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοησθή, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνορθό καὶ συνέθηκεν—ἐντάθη δ’ ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἡ πράξις, ὅπως ὅταν νοῆσθῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστῶν ἄνθρωπος, αὐτός δ’ ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθεῖα, ὅπως ὅτι σύνεθε διαδέχοντα καὶ ἄνθρωπος πράττει, ἀν μὴ τῇ κολώθῃ ἡ ἀναγκαία. ποιητός μοι ἄγαθόν, οἰκία ἄγαθόν, ποιητὴς οἰκία εὐθεῖα. σκεπτόμαστο τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἢ ἰματίῳ βαδίζει, ἢ ἰματίῳ δεῖκε, ὅπως ἦκε ἔρμηντος, ἢ ἰματίῳ δεῖκε, ἢ ἰματίῳ ἰματίων, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἰματίῳ ἰματίων, ἰματίων ἰματίων. πράττει δ’ ἐπ’ ἀρχής. εἰ ἰματίῳ ἤστατο, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἱπτόν, εἰ δὲ τὸν, τὸν τρόπο, καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθεῖα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πράξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερῶς δ’ αἱ ἐν τοῖς προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαί διὰ δύο εἰσόδου γίνονται, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἅγαθος καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὅπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώτων ἐνοικίων, εἴσοδο τῶν ἐνεργῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἅδη τοῦ ἰματίου ἐφαρμαγότας σκοτείτι εὐθεία. οὖν εἰ τὸ βαδίζει ἄγαθον ἄνθρωπόν, ὅτι αὐτός ἀνθρώπος εἴκε ένιστατεί. διὸ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος διὰ ἐνιαυτῆς αὐτὸς προτάσεως, διὰ τὰ πράττεν, ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργηθῇ ἡ ἡ ἀποθέσθαι πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔνεκα ἡ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἡ τῇ νόῃ, οὐ ὀρέγεται εὐθεία ποιητική. ἀντ’ ἐρωτήσεως ὑπ’ ἡ νοσήεις ἡ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. ποιητῶν μου, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει, τοῦ δὲ ποιητῶν, ἢ ἀισθήτης ἑιπεν ἡ ἡ φαντασία ἡ ἡ νοῦς, εὐθεία πάνε, εἰσοδεύει μέν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεν τὰ ἔξα ὀρμήσει, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖται ὀρέξεως ὀφθής, τοῦτος δ’ γυνομένης ἡ δ’ ἀισθήσεως ἡ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοσήεις.
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TO THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

NOTE.—I have not thought it necessary to give an Index to the Text, as those of
Grant, Sussemlhl, and Bywater are amply sufficient. The references are to the
pages of this volume.

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