AN INDEXED SYNOPSIS OF THE
GRAMMAR OF ASSENT
AN INDEXED SYNOPSIS

OF AN ESSAY IN AID OF

A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

BY

JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN

BY

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PREFACE

The philosophy of Cardinal Newman is arousing such widespread interest and is assuming such a prominence in the controversial and apologetic literature of the day, that there seems to be a call for a work which shall bring the contents of that philosophy within easy reach of inquiring minds and make it possible to pursue with facility a systematic study of it. The present volume is an attempt in this direction, as regards that portion of Newman’s philosophy which is developed in the “Grammar of Assent.” And whatever be the individual judgment upon Newman’s philosophical system, it is hoped that this Synopsis will commend itself to serious students generally, as contributing in some way towards an adjustment of the claims of that philosophy upon our acceptance.

This volume departs considerably from the ordinary plan of a synopsis: by being thrown into the form of an index, it is intended to serve at once as an analytical index to the “Grammar of Assent,” as a dictionary of Newman’s philosophy, as a catalogue of his doctrines, and as a summary of his arguments. Moreover, this Synopsis has not aimed at presenting a bare outline or skeleton of Newman’s thought, such as is commonly found in a synopsis or index; it goes much
further. As far as is consistent with the scope of the book, Newman has been allowed to speak in his own words, without abridgment; for it was considered that those who should read this Synopsis would be much better satisfied, if Newman's thought was presented to them in his own language, and with a certain fulness, than if it was unduly compressed, or interpreted for them by the words of another.

The cross-references have been made purposely copious, since this course seemed to be demanded by the main object of the book, which is to make readily accessible and, in a certain sense, to co-ordinate the various portions of the "Grammar of Assent."

All the proper names and all the more striking quotations contained in the "Grammar of Assent" have been inserted in their alphabetical order. For it may easily happen that a person may be puzzled what headings to turn to in order to find certain passages in the "Grammar," which nevertheless may be associated in his mind with certain quotations or proper names. Such a perplexity will be forestalled by the plan of indexing adopted in this volume.
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CERTITUDE: let the proposition to which the assent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it to be, that is, objectively true as well as subjectively, then the conviction may be called a certitude, 195–6, 197, 221 (vide Conviction); certitude is a mental state, 344 (vide Certainty); among fairly prudent and circumspect men there are far fewer instances of false certitude than at first sight might be supposed, 196; it is a main characteristic of certitude in any matter, to be confident indeed that that certitude will last, but to be confident of this also, that, if it did fail, the thing itself of which we are certain, will remain just as it is, true and irreversible, 197–200; no man is certain of a truth, who can endure the thought of the fact of its contradictory existing or occurring, 197–8; instances of an adherence to propositions, which does not fulfil the conditions of certitude, 200–2; those who are certain of a fact are indolent disputants, 201; mere assent is not certitude, and must not be confused with it, 203; certitude is accompanied by a specific feeling of satisfaction and intellectual security, proper to it, as its token, and in a certain
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sense its form, 203–4; this satisfaction does not attend on simple assent, or on processes of inference, or on doubt, or on investigation, or on any other state or action of mind, besides certitude, 204–9 (vide Knowledge, Search, and Doubt); popularly no distinction is made between assent and certitude, 210; great numbers of men pass through life with neither doubt nor certitude on the most important propositions which can occupy their minds, but with only a simple assent, 210–11; such is the state of mind of religious Protestants and of multitudes of good Catholics, 211; the simple assent of these people may be called material, or interpretative, or virtual certitude, 211–12 (vide Material Certitude); a simple assent need not be notional, but the reflex or confirmatory assent of certitude always is given to a notional proposition, viz., to the truth, necessity, duty, etc., of our assent to the simple assent and to its proposition, 214; assent to a real proposition is more emphatic and operative than the confirmatory assent of certitude; the confirmation gives momentum to the complex act of the mind, but the simple assent gives it its edge, 214 (vide Real Assent, and Assent, Notional and Real); this illustrated in the case of the proposition, "The cholera is in the midst of us," and in the case of the Martyrs as contrasted with literary and scientific men, 214–16; the reflex assent of cer-
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titude, taken by itself, has scarcely more force than the recording of a conclusion, 215; argumentation which is the preliminary to certitude, is not easily discarded after it has done its work, 217 (vide Introspe&cutive and Argumentation); assents may and do change; certitudes endure, 220; certitude is essential to the Christian, 220 (vide Religion); certitude in any matter is the termination of all doubt or fear about its truth, and an unconditional conscious adherence to it, and therefore carries with it an inward assurance, strong though implicit, that it shall never fail; indefectibility almost enters into its very idea, 221; statement of the case against the indefectibility of certitude, 222-4 (vide Indefectibility); distinction between infallibility and certitude, 224-7 (vide Infallibility); certitude is a deliberate assent given expressly after reasoning, 229, 258, 345; if then my certitude is unfounded, it is the reasoning that is in fault, not my assent to it, 229; vide Re-Consideration; a second certitude is not prohibited by the failure of the first, 231, 232 (vide Error); false certitudes are faults because they are false, not because they are (supposed) certitudes; they are, or may be, the attempts and the failures of an intellect insufficiently trained, or off its guard, 232 (vide Act, Assent, and Mind); no instances whatever of mistaken certitude are sufficient to constitute a proof that certitude itself is a
perversion or extravagance of man's nature, 233; this illustrated by the instance of a clock and of our conscience, 233-4; the sense of certitude is the clear witness to what is true, 233; as a human being, I am unable, if I were to try, to live without those landmarks of thought which certitude secures for me, 234; the multitude of men confuse together the probable, the possible, and the certain, and make little distinction between credence, opinion, and profession; at various times they give them all perhaps the name of certitude, and accordingly, when they change their minds, they fancy they have given up points of which they had a true conviction, and the very idea of certitude falls into disrepute, 234-5; we are sometimes unfairly said to have changed our certitudes, when we have merely revised or repudiated our conclusions upon the hundred matters which come before us every day and on which we have but little right to speak at all, 235; sometimes, again, the absurdities and excesses of the rude intellect are set down as instances of certitude and of its failure, 235-6; no act or state of the intellect is certitude, which does not follow upon examination and proof, 236; the occasions or subject-matters of certitude are under law also; putting aside the daily exercise of the senses, the principal subjects in secular knowledge, about which we can be certain, are the truths or facts which are its
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basis; beyond these lies a vast subject-matter of opinion, credence, and belief, 236–7, 239; vide Probability, and Religion; the first principles and elements of religion are certain, 237, 239; Christian earnestness, as long as it exists, will presuppose certitude as the very life which is to animate it, 239; the primary principles of religion are immutable, but beyond these lies the large domain of theology, metaphysics, and ethics, on which it is not allowed to us to advance beyond probabilities, or to attain to more than an opinion, 239–40; vide Indefectibility; a change of religion does not imply a failure of certitude, 243–55; a man might travel in his religious profession all the way from heathenism to Catholicity, without any one certitude lost, 251 (vide St. Paul, Jews, Anglicans, Christians, and Philosophers); certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude; but indefectibility may at least serve as a negative test of it, 255–6 (vide Criterion, and Indefectibility); there are three conditions of certitude: (1) it follows only on investigation and proof; (2) it is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and repose, i.e., by a sense of finality; (3) it is irreversible; if the assent is made without rational grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice; if without the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference;
if without permanence, it is a mere conviction, 258; from the nature of the case and from the constitution of the human mind, certitude in concrete matters is the result of arguments which, taken in the letter, and not in their full implicit sense, are but probabilities, 293 (vide Probabilities); many of our most obstinate and most reasonable certitudes depend on proofs which are informal and personal, which baffle our powers of analysis, and cannot be brought under logical rule, 301; the recognition of a correlation between certitude and implicit proof seems to be a law of our minds, 301; that supra-logical judgment, which is the warrant for our certitude throughout the range of concrete matter, is not mere common sense, but the true healthy action of our ratiocinative powers, an action more subtle and comprehensive than the mere appreciation of a syllogistic argument, 317; this certitude and this evidence are often called moral, 318 (vide Moral Certitude); there are those who, arguing à priori, maintain, that, since experience leads by syllogism only to probabilities, certitude is ever a mistake; there are others who, in order to vindicate the certainty of our knowledge, have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions, intellectual forms and the like, which belong to us by nature, and may be considered to elevate our experience into something more than it is in itself, 343–4; it is enough to appeal
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to the common voice of mankind in proof of the certainty of knowledge; our possession of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness or an absurdity to be certain, 344; vide Act, and Function; certitude is not a passive impression made upon the mind from without, by argumentative compulsion, but it is an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason, and, when reason forbids, to withhold, 344–5; vide Criterion; there is no science of reasoning sufficient to compel certitude in concrete conclusions, 350 (vide Proof, and Logic); though truth is ever one and the same, and the assent of certitude is immutable, still the reasonings which carry us on to truth and certitude are many and distinct, and vary with the inquirer, 355.

Character: good character goes far in destroying the force of even plausible charges; and the evidence in support of an allegation must be singularly strong to overcome an established antecedent probability which stands opposed to it, 381.

Character-Reading, 332–3.

Charlemagne, 452.

Children: it is instinct which impels the child to recognize in the smiles or the frowns of a countenance which meets his eyes, not only a being external to himself, but one whose looks elicit in him con-
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fidence or fear; and as he instinctively interprets these physical phenomena, as tokens of things beyond themselves, so from the sensations attendant upon certain classes of his thoughts and actions he gains a perception of an external being, who reads his mind, to whom he is responsible, who praises and blames, who promises and threatens, 62; vide Conscience, and Instinct; a spontaneous reception of religious truths is common with children; the child keenly understands that there is a difference between right and wrong; and when he has done what he believes to be wrong, he is conscious that he is offending One to whom he is amenable, whom he does not see, who sees him; his mind reaches forward with a strong presentiment to the thought of a Moral Governor, sovereign over him, mindful and just; it comes to him like an impulse of nature to entertain it, 112.

CHILLINGWORTH: his mistake as regards the distinction between infallibility and certitude, 226–7, 493.

CHINA, 215.

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CHRIST: 244, 449, 450, et al.; the Mediation of Christ is the central doctrine of Revelation, 487.

"Christ in him, the hope of glory," 479–80.

CHRISTIANITY: 56; vide Revealed Religion, and Church; certitude, and not mere probability, is necessary for vital Christianity, 238–9, 220; Pascal
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quoted on the establishment of Christianity, 307–8; the facts of Christianity, as they stand, are beyond what is possible to man, and betoken the presence of a higher intelligence, purpose, and might, 308; the exhibition of credentials, that is, of evidence, is essential to Christianity, as it comes to us; for we must receive it all, as we find it, if we accept it at all, 387; our Lord and His Apostles always treat Christianity as the completion and supplement of Natural Religion, and of previous revelations, 388; Christianity is proved in the Grammar of Assent by the argument of an accumulation of various probabilities, 411 (vide Probabilities, and Concrete); Newman addresses his proof to those only whose minds are properly prepared for it; and by being prepared, he means to denote those who are imbued with the religious opinions and sentiments which he has identified with Natural Religion, 415–16; he assumes the presence of God in our conscience, and the universal experience, as keen as our experience of bodily pain, of what we call a sense of sin or guilt, 417; this sense of sin is chiefly felt as regards violations of God's Sanctity, Truth, and Love; and the three offences against His Majesty are impurity, inveracity, and cruelty, 417; specimens of the state of mind for which Newman stipulates in those who would inquire into the truth of Christianity, 417–18, it may be urged that no appeal will avail, which is
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made to religions so notoriously immoral as those of paganism; but there is a better side of their teaching; purity has often been held in reverence, if not practised; dishonesty and injustice have been under a ban, etc.; moreover, the religious rites and traditions which are actually found in the world are here used only so far as they agree with our moral sense; and it must be laid down that no religion is from God which contradicts our sense of right and wrong, 418–19; vide Vengeance, Providence, Eternity, and Revealed Religion; Paley's Evidences of Christianity, — vide Paley; a man is not better for Christianity, who has never felt the need of it or the desire, 425 (vide Conversion, Truth, and Conscientiousness); in his proof of Christianity Newman only insists on those coincidences and their cumulations, which, though not in themselves miraculous, do irresistibly force upon us, almost by the law of our nature, the presence of the extraordinary agency of Him whose being we already acknowledge, 427, 429 (vide Law); illustrations of such coincidences in the case of the market-woman being struck dead and the arms falling from the hands of Napoleon's soldiers, 428; Christianity is the only religion in the world which tends to fulfil the aspirations, needs and fore-shadowings of natural faith and devotion; so that if it does not come from God, a revelation is not yet given, 429–30, 431; Chris-
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Christianity is not here singled out with reference simply to its particular doctrines or precepts, but because it alone has a definite message addressed to all mankind, 430; thus it differs from the religion of Mahomet and the religions of the far East, 430; description of Christianity, 430–1; it is the continuation and conclusion of what professes to be an earlier revelation, which may be traced back into prehistoric times, 431, 437 (vide Jews); it is a notorious fact that it issued from the Jewish land and people; it professes to be the legitimate offspring, heir, and successor of the Mosaic covenant, or rather to be Judaism itself, developed and transformed, 437; at the very time that the Jews committed their unpardonable sin, and were driven out from their home, their Christian brethren, born of the same stock, also issued forth from the same home; they undertook the very work which their nation actually was ordained to execute; and, with a method of their own indeed, and with a new end, they did it; so that, the fact that Christianity actually has done what Judaism was to have done, decides the controversy in favour of Christianity, 437–8; Christians point to the Messiah as coming when announced; they are not met by any counter claim or rival claimant on the part of the Jews, 438; Christianity clears up the mystery which hangs over Judaism, accounting fully for the punishment of the people, by specify-
ing their heinous sin, the crucifixion of their Messiah; in rejecting their Divine King, they *ipso facto* lost the living principle and tie of their nationality, 438; this apparent correspondence between Christianity and Judaism is in itself a presumption for such correspondence being real; and if the history of Judaism is so wonderful as to suggest the presence of some special divine agency in its appointments and fortunes, still more wonderful and divine is the history of Christianity; and it is more wonderful still, that two such wonderful creations should span almost the whole course of ages, 439; no other religion but these two professes to be the organ of a formal revelation which is directed to the benefit of the whole human race; here it is that Mahometanism fails, 440 (vide MAHOMETANISM); in the book of Genesis it is stated with the utmost precision that the chosen people was set up in this one idea, viz., to be a blessing to the whole earth, and that, by means of one of their own race, a greater than their father Abraham; at the very time of Abraham's call, he is told of it: "I will make of thee a great nation, and in thee shall all the tribes of the earth be blessed"; and this promise and purpose is repeated to Isaac, Jacob, and Judah, and this time with the addition, "The sceptre shall not be taken away from Judah, until He come for whom it is reserved, and He shall be the expectation of the nations," 441–2; from the
heathen historians, Tacitus and Suetonius, and from the Jew Josephus, it is clear that the Jews did thus understand their prophecies, and did expect their great Ruler, in the very age in which our Lord came, and in which they, on the other hand, were destroyed, 443–4; the fact that at that very time our Lord did appear as a teacher, and founded not merely a religion, but a system of religious warfare, an aggressive and militant body, a dominant Catholic Church, which aimed at and has procured the benefit of all nations by the spiritual conquest of all, and now is as living and real as ever it was, and has from the first filled the world, all this is one of those coincidences which are impossible without the Hand of God directly and immediately in them, 444–5; how, as the prophecies said, the Messiah could both suffer, yet be victorious, His kingdom be Judaic in structure, yet evangelic in spirit, His people the children of Abraham, yet "sinners of the Gentiles," all this is interpreted for us, first by the prophetic outline, and still more by the historical object, 445–6 (vide Maze, Prophecy, and Mystery); vide Jews, and Apocalypse; as regards the contrast which is presented to us between the picture which the old prophecies draw of the universality of the kingdom of the Messiah, and that partial development of it through the world, which is all the Christian Church can show, and as regards the contrast
between the rest and peace which they said He was to introduce, and the Church's actual history, it is to be observed that the failure of Christianity in one respect in corresponding to those prophecies cannot destroy the force of its correspondence to them in others; moreover, it was quite aware from the first of its own prospective future, and it meets the difficulty thence arising by anticipation, by giving us its own predictions of what it was to be in historical fact, 447–56; for though our Lord claims to be the Messiah, He shows little of conscious dependence on the old Scriptures, or of anxiety to fulfil them, and He not so much recurs to past prophecies, as utters new ones, with an antithesis not unlike that which is so impressive in the Sermon on the Mount, when He first says, "It has been said by them of old time," and then adds, "But I say unto you"; this is seen again in the two special designations which He chooses for Himself, Son of God and Son of Man, the latter of which is only once given Him in the Old Scriptures, while the former was never distinctly used of Him before He came; in those two Names He separates Himself from the Jewish Dispensation, in which He was born, and inaugurates the New Covenant, 448–9; it was a bold conception, unheard of before, and worthy of divine origin, that He should even project a universal religion, and that to be effected by what may be
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called a propagandist movement from one centre; He began, not to fight, but to "preach the kingdom of heaven," and He said, "My kingdom is not of this world," and He told His disciples that they should "be His witnesses to the end of the earth," should "preach to all nations, beginning with Jerusalem," etc., 450-1; moreover, on its broad field of conflict the preachers of Christianity were to be simply unarmed, and to suffer, but to prevail: "Behold, I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves," "Blessed are they that suffer persecution," etc.; yet the first preachers saw no difficulty in a prospect to human eyes so appalling, so hopeless; and this is shown most signally in St. Paul, as having been a convert of later vocation; his instrument of conversion is "the foolishness of preaching," "the weak things of the earth confound the strong," etc., 452-4; Christianity warns us that, though there are at all times many holy, many religious men in it, and though sanctity is ever its life and substance and germinal seed, yet there will ever be many too, who by their lives are a scandal and injury to it; for our Lord tells us that "Many are called, few are chosen," "the kingdom is like to a net which gathered together all kinds of fishes," etc.; and He opens on us the prospect of ambition and rivalry in its leading members, when He warns His disciples against desiring the first places in His kingdom, etc., 454-6; various writers
have attempted to assign human causes in explanation of the rise and establishment of Christianity; Gibbon especially has mentioned five, 457–63 (vide Gibbon); Christianity made its way, not by individual, but by broad, wholesale conversions, 462; when He who claimed to be the long-promised, long-expected Deliverer of the human race, left the earth, His disciples took upon themselves to go forth to preach to all parts of the earth with the object of preaching Him, and collecting converts in His Name; and they wonderfully succeeded; large bodies of men in various places profess to be His disciples, own Him as their King, and penetrate into the populations of the Roman Empire, and at length convert the Empire itself, 463; the cause of their conversion, in other words, the topics of that preaching which was so effective, we are told by the preachers and their converts; they "preached Christ"; they called on men to believe, hope, and place their affections, in that Deliverer who had come and gone; and the moral instrument by which they persuaded them to do so, was a description of the life, character, mission, and power of that Deliverer, a promise of His invisible Presence and Protection here, and of the Vision and Fruition of Him hereafter, 463–4; the universal Deliverer, instead of making and securing subjects by a visible graciousness or majesty, departs; but is found, through His preachers, to have
imprinted the Image or idea of Himself in the minds of His subjects individually; and that Image, apprehended and worshipped in individual minds, becomes a principle of association, and a real bond of those subjects one with another, who are thus united to the body by being united to that Image, 464 (vide Memory, Inventive Faculty, Real Assent, Individual, and Scripture); moreover, that Image is also the original instrument of their conversion, 464; only by the Hand of God could this new idea, one and the same, enter at once into myriads of men, women, and children of all ranks, and last in vigour as a sustaining influence for seven or eight generations, till it forced its way into the fulness of imperial power, 465; that this Thought or Image of Christ was the principle of conversion and of fellowship, is proved by the words of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. John; e.g., St. Paul: "I make known to you the gospel which I preached to you, which also you have received, and wherein you stand; by which also you are saved"; etc., 465–6; that the principal success of this Image lay among the lower classes is proved, (1) by the passage wherein our Lord returns thanks to His Heavenly Father, "because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones"; (2) by the words of St. Paul: "not many wise men according to the flesh, not many
mighty, not many noble," became Christians; (3) by quotations from the words and writings of friends and enemies for four centuries, 467–86; the steady and rapid growth of Christianity startled its contemporaries, and they had two principal ways of accounting for it,—the obstinacy of the Christians and their magical powers, of which the former was the explanation adopted by educated minds, and the latter chiefly by the populace, 476; in the case of the martyrs, no intensity of torture had any means of affecting what was a mental conviction; and the sovereign Thought in which they had lived was their adequate support and consolation in their death, 478; it was fitting that those mixed unlettered multitudes, who for three centuries had suffered and triumphed by virtue of the inward Vision of their Divine Lord, should be selected in the fourth, to be the special champions of His Divinity and the victorious foes of its impugners, 486; the Religion of Nature can have but one complement, and that very complement is Christianity, 487; Natural Religion is based upon the sense of sin; it recognizes the disease, but it cannot find the remedy; that remedy, both for guilt and for moral impotence, is found in the central doctrine of Revelation, the Mediation of Christ, 487; this was the secret of the power of Christianity in the early ages of the Church, and this is how at present it is so mysteriously po-
Christianity: continued.
tent, in spite of the new and fearful adversaries which beset its path; it has with it the gift of staunching and healing the one deep wound of human nature; it is a living truth which never can grow old, 487; its rites and ordinances are continually eliciting the active interposition of that Omnipotence in which the Religion long ago began; first is the Holy Mass; next is the Holy Communion; and then, there is His personal abidance in our churches, 488; as human nature itself is still in life and action as much as ever it was, so He too lives to our imaginations, by His visible symbols, as if He were on earth, with a practical efficacy which even unbelievers cannot deny, 489; and Napoleon declared that His Name is just the One Name in the whole world that lives, 490–1; Christianity is addressed, both as regards its evidences and its contents, to minds which are in the normal condition of human nature, as believing in God and in a future judgment; such minds it addresses both through the intellect and through the imagination; creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various for direct enumeration, too personal and deep for words, too powerful and concurrent for refutation, 491–2.

Christians: 35, 38; in regard to the disgust felt towards the primitive Christians, and the deep prejudice now existing against the Church among Protestants, and the numberless calumnies directed
Christians: continued.

against individual Catholics, against our religious bodies and men in authority, as a persistence in such prejudices is no evidence of their truth, so an abandonment of them is no evidence that certitude can fail, 254; those Christians in this day remain Christian only in name, and (if it so happen) at length fall away, who are nothing deeper or better than men of the world, savants, literary men, or politicians, 414.

Christmas, 139.

Christus, 469.

Chrysostom, St., 103.

Church: it is a familiar charge against the Catholic Church in the mouths of her opponents, that she imposes on her children as matters of faith, a great number of doctrines which none but professed theologians can understand, 142 (vide Dogmatic Theology); that the Church is the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the Catholic religion, 153; the "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church" is an article of the Creed, and an article, which, inclusive of her infallibility, all men, high and low, can easily master and accept with a real and operative assent, 150; the Catholic Church, though not universally acknowledged, may without inconsistency claim to teach the primary truths of religion, just as modern science, though but partially received, claims to teach the great principles
Church: continued.

and laws which are the foundation of secular knowledge, and that with a significance to which no other religious system can pretend, because it is its very profession to speak to all mankind, and its very badge to be ever making converts all over the earth, 242 (vide Christianity); the Catholic faith contains within itself, and claims as its own, all truth that is elsewhere to be found, and more than all, and nothing but truth; this is the secret of the influence by which the Church draws to herself converts from such various and conflicting religions; they come, not so much to lose what they have, as to gain what they have not, 249, 377–8; prejudice against the Church among Protestants,—vide Christians; among political and literary men,—vide Philosophers.

Cicero, 29, 50, 103, 297.

Cilicia, 485.

Circumstances: the circumstances of an act, however necessary to it, do not enter into the act, 157.

Circumstantial Evidence: the principle of circumstantial evidence is the reductio ad absurdum, 322; quotation about it from Phillipps' "Law of Evidence," 324; an instance of the application of the principle in a particular instance, 325–8.

Civilization: the so-called religion of civilization,—vide Philosophy.

Clanthes, 250.
Clarke, Dr. Samuel: quoted, 313; 315.
Classics: young and old are differently affected by the words of a classic author, such as Homer or Horace; passages, which to a boy are but rhetorical commonplaces, neither better nor worse than a hundred others which any clever writer might supply, at length come home to him, when long years have passed, and he has had experience of life, and pierce him, as if he had never before known them, with their sad earnestness and vivid exactness, 78; an instinctive sense that the medieval intellect could not write the classics, and a faith in testimony, are the sufficient, but the undeveloped argument on which to ground our certitude of the genuineness of the classics, 298.
Clement: quoted, 475.
Clinton, Mr., 364, 366.
Clock: the sense of certitude illustrated by the action of a clock, 233, 236.
"Cogito ergo sum" is not an argument, but is the expression of a ratiocinative instinct, 287 note.
Coincidence of laws, — vide Law.
Coleridge: quoted, 305.
Columbus, 261.
Complex Assent is an assent which is made consciously and deliberately, 189 (vide Conviction, and Certitude).
Conclusion: a conditional proposition expresses a conclusion, 3 (vide Proposition); a conclusion is the
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expression of an act of inference, 5; no man will be
a martyr for a conclusion, 93; a conclusion is but an
opinion, 93 (vide Deduction); the conclusions of
one generation are the truths of the next, 229.

Concrete: in concrete matter demonstration is im-
possible, 8; no number whatever of abstractions is
equivalent to one concrete, 33 (vide Facts, Lan-
guage, and Mind); reasoning in the concrete,—
vide Informal Inference, Natural Inference,
and Reasoning; it is in human nature to be more
affected by the concrete than by the abstract, 37;
all concrete laws are general, 255; there is no science
of reasoning sufficient to compel certitude in con-
crete conclusions, 350; we are not justified, in the
case of concrete reasoning, and especially of religious
inquiry, in waiting till logical demonstration is ours,
412 (vide Truth); in any inquiry about things in the
concrete, men differ from each other, not so much
in the soundness of their reasoning as in the prin-
ciples which govern its exercise; those principles are
of a personal character, and where there is no com-
mon measure of minds, there is no common measure
of arguments, and the validity of proof is deter-
mined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative
sense, 413.

Conditional Assent: when we use the phrase "con-
ditional assent," we only mean to say that we will
assent under certain contingencies, 182; if we in-
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dlude a condition in the proposition to which our assent is given, that condition enters into the matter of the assent, but not into the assent itself, 182.

Conditional Proposition, — vide Proposition.

Conduct: Aristotle calls the faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct, by the name of *phronesis*, or judgment, 353–4; no science of life, applicable to the case of an individual, has been or can be written, 354; what is written is too vague, too negative for our need; it bids us avoid extremes, but it cannot ascertain for us, according to our personal need, the golden mean, 354; the authoritative oracle, which is to decide our path, is seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him; it comes of an acquired habit, though it has its first origin in nature itself, and it is formed and matured by practice and experience; it is a capacity sufficient for the occasion, deciding what ought to be done here and now, by this given person, under these given circumstances; it decides nothing hypothetical, 354–5; it has an elasticity, which is not studious to maintain the appearance of consistency, and thus it differs from state or public law which is inflexible, 355; in this respect the law of truth differs from the law of duty, that duties change, but truths never, 355; to learn his own duty in his own case, each individual must
have recourse to his own rule; and if his rule is not sufficiently developed in his intellect for his need, then he goes to some other living, present authority, to supply it for him, 356 (vide Phronesis).

CONGREGATIONALIST, 32.

Conscience: conscience is the sense of moral obligation, 104; its action is aided by teachers, and is influenced by certain original forms of thinking or formative ideas, connatural with our minds, 64, 112, 115, 390; we can attain to a real assent to the Being of a God, and enter with a personal knowledge into the circle of truths which make up that great thought, by an instinctive association of His presence with the phenomena of conscience, 102-4 (vide Phenomena, and Instinct); from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and then again we image Him and His attributes in those recurring intimations; and, if the impressions which His creatures make on us through our senses oblige us to regard those creatures as sui generis respectively, it is not wonderful that the notices, which He indirectly gives us through our conscience, of His own nature are such as to make us understand that He is like Himself and like nothing else, 104; in explaining how we gain an image of God and give a real assent
to the proposition that He exists, Newman assumes that we have by nature a conscience, 105; the feeling of conscience is a certain keen sensibility, pleasant or painful, — self-approval and hope, or compunction and fear, — attendant on certain of our actions, which in consequence we call right or wrong; this feeling is twofold: it is a moral sense and a sense of duty; a judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate; its act is indivisible, but it has these two aspects, distinct from each other, either one of which may be lost without the other being lost, 105–6; conscience has both a critical and a judicial office, and though its promptings are not in all cases correct, that does not necessarily interfere with the force of its testimony and of its sanction: its testimony that there is a right and a wrong, and its sanction to that testimony conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong conduct, 106; conscience is spoken of in the Grammar of Assent as a sanction of right conduct, 106; this is its primary and most authoritative aspect, and is the ordinary sense of the word, 106; it corresponds to the sense of the beautiful; but this sense has no special relations to persons, but contemplates objects in themselves; whereas conscience is concerned with persons primarily, and with actions mainly as viewed in their doers; further, taste is its own evidence, appealing to nothing beyond its own sense of the
Conscience: continued.

beautiful or the ugly; but conscience does not repose on itself, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs its decisions; hence we speak of conscience as a voice, imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience, 107; conscience has an intimate bearing on our affections and emotions, leading us to self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future; and their contraries, when the conscience is good, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, etc.; these emotions constitute a specific difference between conscience and our other intellectual senses, 108; it is always, what the sense of the beautiful is only in certain cases, it is always emotional; it always involves the recognition of a living object towards which it is directed; inanimate things cannot stir our affections, 109–10, 391; this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear, 109–10 (vide Inventive Faculty); the phenomena of conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the moral sense is the principle of ethics, 110; that an infant should be able in the dictate of conscience, without previous experience or analogous reasoning, gradually to perceive
the voice, or the echoes of the voice, of a Master, living, personal, and sovereign, is not more strange or difficult than that he should have a knowledge of his mother or nurse, 111–12; if a child of five or six years old has already mastered and appropriated thoughts and beliefs, in such sort as to be able to handle and apply them familiarly, according to the occasion, as principles of intellectual action, those beliefs at the very least must be singularly congenial to his mind, if not connatural with its initial action, 112; vide CHILDREN; an ordinary child, if he has offended his parents, will all alone and without effort, as if it were the most natural of acts, place himself in the presence of God, and beg of Him to set him right with them; this shows that the child has in his mind the image of an Invisible Being, who exercises a particular providence among us, who is present every where, who is heart-reading, heart-changing, ever-accessible, open to impetration, 112–3; this image is that of One who is good, inasmuch as enjoining and enforcing what is right and good, and who kindles in him love towards Him, as giving him a good law, and therefore as being good Himself; and the child, having a sensibility towards truth, purity, justice, kindness, and the like, which are but shapes and aspects of goodness, for the sake of them all is moved to love the Lawgiver, who enjoins them upon him; and as he can
CONSCIENCE: continued.

contemplate them under the common name of goodness, he is prepared to think of them as indivisible, correlative, supplementary of each other in one and the same Personality, so that there is no aspect of goodness which God is not, 113–14; this apprehension of God acts promptly and keenly in children, by reason of the paucity of their ideas, 114–15; though he cannot explain or define the word "God," when told to use it, his acts show that to him it is far more than a word, 115; whether the elements of the image of God, latent in the mind, would ever be elicited without extrinsic help is very doubtful, 115, 390; it admits of being strengthened and improved; but whether it grows brighter and stronger, or is dimmed, distorted, or obliterated, depends on each of us individually, and on his circumstances, 115–16, 390; a mind carefully formed upon the basis of its natural conscience has a living hold on truths which are really to be found in the world, though they are not upon the surface; it interprets what it sees around it by this previous inward teaching, as the true key of that maze of vast complicated disorder, and thus it gains a more and more consistent and luminous vision of God from the most unpromising materials; thus conscience is a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator, 116–17 (vide Religion); this vivid apprehension of religious objects is independ-
Conscience: continued.

ent of the written records of Revelation, but Christianity adds greatly to its fulness and exactness, 118–19; conscience is recognized by the great mass both of the young and of the uneducated, by the religious few and the irreligious many, by philosophers, in all ages and places, to be the voice of a solemn Monitor, personal, peremptory, unargumentative, irresponsible, minatory, definitive, 122–3; we may lose in manhood and in age that sense of a Supreme Teacher and Judge which was the gift of our first years, because in most men the imagination suffers from the lapse of time and the experience of life, 123; conscience compared with the sense of certitude, 233–4; conscience is a personal guide, and I use it because I must use myself, 389; it requires nothing besides itself, and is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most momentous to him individually, 390; it teaches us, not only that God is, but what He is, and provides for the mind a real image of Him, as a medium of worship, 390; we learn from its informations to conceive of the Almighty, primarily as a God of Judgment and Justice, as One, who, not simply for the good of the offender, but as an end good in itself, and as a principle of government, ordains that the offender should suffer for his offence, 390–1; the aspect under which Almighty God is presented to us by Nature, is of One who is angry
Conscience: continued.

with us, and threatens evil; hence its effect is to burden and sadden the religious mind, 391; where conscience is, fear must be, 426 (vide Truth).

Conscientiousness: even the ordinary matters of life are an exercise of conscientiousness; it is insisted upon in writing, painting, and singing; and so it has surely a place in the most serious of all undertakings, the inquiry into the truth of Christianity, 426 (vide Inquiry, and Truth).

Conservative, 85.

Consistency is not always the guarantee of truth; but there may be a consistency in a theory so variously tried and exemplified as to lead to belief in it, 323; nothing is more common than to praise men for their consistency to their principles, whatever those principles are, that is, to praise them on an inference, without thereby implying any assent to the principles themselves, 38–9.

Constantine, 142, 143.

Cons实质性: this word was inserted into the Creed of the Church by the Council of Nicaea, 142; Bishop Jeremy Taylor’s view of this insertion, 142–4; the word has a plain meaning, as the Council used it; for “cons实质性 with the Father,” means nothing more than “really one with the Father,” 144; it is the one instance of a scientific word having been introduced into the Creed, 144.

Controversy, a writer of, 32.
Conversion: with Newman some exertion on the part of the persons whom he is to convert is a condition of a true conversion; they who have no religious earnestness are at the mercy, day by day, of some new argument or fact, which may overtake them, in favour of one conclusion or the other, 425 (vide Paley, Truth, and Moral Being).

Converts come to the Catholic faith, taking their certitudes with them, not to lose, but to keep them more securely, and to understand and love their objects more perfectly, 249 (vide Religion, and Church).

Conviction: a conviction is an assent, not only to a given proposition, but to the claim of that proposition on our assent as true; it is an assent to an assent, 195; a conviction of a proposition objectively true as well as subjectively is a certitude, 195–6 (vide Certitude); Protestants use the word in the sense of opinion, 59.

Corpus Christi, 139.

Councils: the repudiations of error contained in the Canons of Councils will ever be foreign, strange, and hard to the pious but uncontroversial mind; for good Christians have nothing to do, in the ordinary course of things, with the subtle hallucinations of the intellect, 148–9 (vide Dogmatic Theology).

Court: rules of court are dictated by what is expedient on the whole and in the long run; but they incur the
risk of being unjust to the claims of particular cases, 424.

Creator: the Creator is incomprehensible by an incommunicable attribute, 283.

Credence: credence is a notional assent, 42; giving credence to propositions is pretty much the same as having "no doubt" about them; it is the sort of assent which we give to those opinions and professed facts which are ever presenting themselves to us without any effort of ours, and which we commonly take for granted; it is of an otiose and passive character; these informations, received with a spontaneous assent from a great variety of subject-matters, constitute the furniture of the mind; they are its education, as far as general knowledge can so be called, 53; to believe frankly what it is told, is in the young an exercise of teachableness and humility, 54; the ungrudging, prompt assents of credence put us in possession of the principles, doctrines, sentiments, facts, which constitute useful, and especially liberal knowledge; they give us in great measure our morality, our politics, etc.; they supply the elements of public opinion; they are our channels of sympathy, and become our moral language, 54; the assent of credence is the ordinary assent of an Englishman to his religion, 55–8 (vide England, Church of); difference between credence and opinion, — vide Opinion.
CREDENDA: the credenda of the Church contain numerous notional propositions, 145–6 (vide Dogmatic Theology).

CREEDS: the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Unity is not called a mystery in the Creeds; the reason seems to be that the Creeds have a place in the Ritual; they are devotional acts and of the nature of prayers, addressed to God, 132; the ante-Nicene Symbols add summarily one or two notional articles, such as “the communion of Saints,” and “the forgiveness of sins,” which, however, may be readily converted into real propositions, 144–5; the dogma of the Real Presence is necessarily absent from all of them, owing to the ancient “Disciplina Arcani,” 145.

CRITERION: certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude; but indefectibility may serve as a negative test of certitude, or sine quâ non condition, so that whoever loses his conviction on a given point is thereby proved not to have been certain of it, 255–6; our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds, 302 (vide Informal Inference, and Truth); the sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, 345 (vide Illative Sense);
Criterion: continued.

in no class of concrete reasonings is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense that gives them its sanction, 359, 413 (vide Concrete); there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by the mind itself, and this phenomenon is a normal and inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man on a stage such as the world, 350.

Cromwell, 340.

Crucifix: the Crucifix secures the thought of the Deliverer in every house and chamber, 489.

Cruelty, — vide Sin.

"Cuique in arte suâ credendum est," 341, 45.

"Cursed is he that doth the work of the Lord deceitfully," 141.

D

Damaris, 423.

Danaides, 208.

David, 337, 457.

Davy, 102.

Dead Man: the sight of a dead man restored to life would not shake our certitude about his death, 256–7.

Death: our certitude of our future death is reached through informal inference, 298–301; the strongest proof I have for my inevitable mortality is the
Death: continued.

reductio ad absurdum; there is a considerable “surplusage,” as Locke calls it, of belief over proof, when I determine that I individually must die, 300.

Deductions have no power of persuasion, 92 (vide Conclusion).

Degrees: we might as well talk of degrees of truth as of degrees of assent, 174; degrees refer to the relation of the conclusion towards its premisses, 179–80; vide Assent, and Assent and Inference.

Deism, 241.
Deist, 85, 246.

Deliberate Assent is an assent following upon deliberation; it is sometimes called a conviction, 183.

“Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi,” 405.

Deliverer of the human race, 434, 463–4, 488; vide Christianity.

Demerara, 295.

Democrat, 85.

Demonstration is impossible in concrete matter, 8; vide Syllogism, and Logic.

Depositum of faith is the revealed word, 152 (vide Dogmatic Theology).

Dervishes, 404.

Descartes: dispute between Descartes and Gassendi, 287 note.

Detectives: experts and detectives, when employed to investigate mysteries, in cases whether of the civil or criminal law, discern and follow out indica-
Detectives: continued.

tions which promise solution with a sagacity incomprehensible to ordinary men, 332.

Deuteronomy, 435.

Development of Doctrine, Newman's, 163 note, 396 note, 477 note.

Devotion: devotion must have its objects; those objects, as being supernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions, 121 (vide Religion); it is excited by the plain, categorical truths of revelation, such as the articles of the Creed; on these it depends; with these it is satisfied; it accepts them one by one; it is careless about intellectual consistency, 146–7; vide God.

Dido, 11, 296.

DIOCLETIAN: quoted, 476.

DIONYSIUS, 423.

Disbelief in a proposition is an assent to its contradictory, 6 (vide Doubt).

"Disciplina Arcani," 145.

Discretion in conduct, — vide Taste.

Discussion: if we assume nothing but what has universal reception, the field of our possible discussions will suffer much contraction; so that it must be considered sufficient in any inquiry, if the principles or facts assumed have a large following, 122.

Discussions and Arguments, Newman's, 91 note; quoted, 92–7.
DIVES, 312.

_Divine Legation of Moses_, Warburton's, 373.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE,—vide PROVIDENCE, DIVINE.

DMOUSKI: quoted, 186 note, 187 note.

Doctrines: The same doctrines, as held in different religions, may be and often are held very differently, as belonging to distinct wholes or _forms_, and exposed to the influence and the bias of the teaching, perhaps false, with which they are associated, 251.

Dogma: A dogma is a proposition; it stands for a notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as it stands for the one or for the other; to give a real assent to it is an act of religion; to give a notional is a theological act; it is discerned, rested in, and appropriated as a reality, by the religious imagination; it is held as a truth, by the theological intellect; there cannot be any line of demarcation or party-wall between these two modes of assent, the religious and the theological, 98.

Dogmatic Theology: Theological science is the exercise of the intellect upon the _credenda_ of revelation, 147; though not directly devotional, it is at once natural, excellent, and necessary; its deductions are true, if rightly deduced, because they are deduced from what is true; and therefore in one sense they are a portion of the _depositum_ of faith or _credenda_, while in another sense they are additions to it, 147; the disavowal of error is far more fruitful in additions than the enforcement of truth, 148; the greater
Dogmatic Theology: continued.

number of the statements of theology are more or less unintelligible to the ordinary Catholic, as law-books to the private citizen, 148 (vide Councils); the Catholic Church is charged with imposing on her children, as matters of faith, a great number of doctrines which none but professed theologians can understand, 142, 145-6, 149; the Church must exclude heretics from her communion, and the rule she makes for this purpose must be accepted by all, since there cannot be two rules of faith in the same communion; and it would be a greater difficulty to allow of an uncertain rule of faith than (if that was the alternative, as it is not) to impose upon uneducated minds a profession which they cannot understand; but it is not the fact that the Church imposes dogmatic statements on the interior assent of those who cannot apprehend them; the difficulty is removed by the dogma of the Church's infallibility, and of the consequent duty of "implicit faith" in her word; for what the Catholic cannot understand, at least he can believe to be true; and he believes it to be true because he believes in the Church, 149-50 (vide Church); it also stands to reason that a doctrine, so deep and so various, as the revealed depositum of faith, cannot be brought home to us and made our own all at once; but he who believes in it at all embraces in his intention by one act of faith all that there is to believe whenever and as
Dogmatic Theology: continued.

soon as it is brought home to him; so that every Catholic, in accepting the depositum, does implicitè accept the dogmatic decisions of the Church; for these decisions are virtually contained in the revealed word, since the Church declares that they really belong to it, and the Church is the infallible interpreter of revelation, 151–3 (vide CHURCH); “I believe what the Church proposes to be believed” is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and real, 153; vide God.

Döllinger, Dr., 466 note.

Dorotheus, 484.

Doubt: vide Proposition; it is a suspense of mind, 7; to have “no doubt” about a thesis is equivalent to inferring it or else assenting to it, 7; the word is often taken to mean the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being false; in this sense doubt is nothing else than an assent, viz., an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis, 7–8, 195; there are no pleasures of doubt, if doubt simply means ignorance, uncertainty, or hopeless suspense; but there is a certain grave acquiescence in ignorance, a recognition of our impotence to solve momentous and urgent questions, which has a satisfaction of its own; the satisfaction does not lie in not knowing, but in knowing there is nothing to know, 208–9; there are writers who lay down as a general proposition that we have no right in philosophy to make any assump-
Doubt: continued.

tion whatever, and that we ought to begin with a universal doubt; this, however, is of all assumptions the greatest, and to forbid assumptions universally is to forbid this one in particular; doubt itself is a positive state, and implies a definite habit of mind, and thereby necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines all its own; again, our very method of reasoning, our nature itself, the very sense of pleasure and pain, are assumptions, 377; of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of everything; the former seems the true way of learning; in that case, we soon discover and discard what is contradictory to itself, 377.

Δοξαστικόν, 353 note.

Drama: the ideal personages who figure in romances and dramas of the old school are the product only of general notions, 33.

Duellng: the dreamy acquiescence of the governing classes in the barbarism of duelling was changed into a realization by the growing intelligence of the community, and the shock inflicted upon it by the tragical circumstances of a particular duel, 78.

"Dulce et decorum est pro patriâ mori," 10.

"Dum Capitolium scandet cum tacitâ Virgine Pontifex," 10.

Duty: vide Conduct; the law of truth differs from the
Duty: continued.

law of duty in this, that duties change, but truths never, 355.

E

Earth: moral evidence is all that we can attain in proof of the earth's rotatory motion, 318–19.

Easter, 139.

Eastern Sages, 450.

Economist deals with facts, 21; 37.

Economy: in theological investigations an economy is the use of a definition or a formula, not as exact, but as being sufficient for our purpose, for working out certain conclusions, for a practical approximation, the error being small, till a certain point is reached, 47.

Egotism: in mental or moral science, as in the Evidences of Religion, in Metaphysics, and in Ethics, egotism is true modesty, 384; in religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak; what satisfies him is likely to satisfy others; though great numbers of men refuse to inquire at all, it causes him no uneasiness; but he brings together his reasons, and relies on them, because they are his own, and this is his primary evidence; and he has a second ground of evidence, in the testimony of those who agree with him, 385–6.

Egypt, 448, 477, 485.
ELIAS, 280, 281.
EMMANUEL, 449.
EMOTIONS, — vide Affections, and Conscience.
ENCELADUS, 198.
ENGLAND, 33, 199.

ENGLAND, CHURCH OF: religion may be made the subject of notional assent, and is especially so made in our own country, 55; "Bible Religion" is both the recognized title and the best description of English religion; it professes to be little more than reading the Bible and leading a correct life; its doctrines are not so much facts, as stereotyped aspects of facts; it is suspicious and protests, or is frightened, when our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, or the Holy Apostles, are spoken of as real beings, and really such as Scripture implies them to be; God's Providence is nearly the only doctrine held with a real assent by the mass of religious Englishmen, 56–7; 252; vide Scripture.

ENIGMAS: in those enigmatical sayings which were frequent in the early stage of human society, the problem proposed to the acuteness of the hearers is to find some real thing which may unite in itself certain conflicting notions which in the question are attributed to it; the answer, which names the thing, interprets and thereby limits the notions under which it has been represented, 48 (vide Maze).

ENLARGEMENT: to the disconsolate, the tempted, the perplexed, the suffering, there comes, by means of
Enlargement: continued.

their very trials, an enlargement of thought, which enables them to see in Holy Scripture what they never saw before, 79.

Enthusiasts mistake their own thoughts for inspirations, 331.

Epiphany, 139.

Epipodius, words of, 482.

Erastian, 85.

Error: the disavowal of error is far more fruitful in additions to the credenda of the Church than the enforcement of truth, 148; errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings, not to give up reasoning, but to reason with greater caution, 230; if, while weighing the arguments on one side and the other and drawing our conclusion, that old mistake has already been allowed for, then it has no outstanding claim against our acceptance of that conclusion, after it has actually been drawn, 230-1; this illustrated by the mistake made in taking for a man the shadow formed by the moonlight falling on the interstices of some branches or their foliage, and also by the mistake made as regards the identity of the real culprit in a court of justice, 231-2.

"Et tu, Brute," 27.

Eternity: eternity or endlessness is in itself mainly a negative idea, though the idea of suffering is positive; its fearful force, as an element of future punishment, lies in what it excludes; it means never any
ETERNITY: continued.
change of state, no annihilation or restoration; but
what, considered positively, it adds to suffering, we
do not know, 422; 501–3.
ETNA, 198.
EUCLID, 181, 271, 278, 287 note.
EUROPE, 72, 242.
EUSEBIUS, 485.
EVANGELICAL RELIGION, 56.
EVANGELISTS: the evangelists betray an earnestness
to trace in our Lord’s Person and history the ac-
compplishment of prophecy, 448; 449, 450, 451.
“Every one must bear his own burden,” 405.
EVIDENCES OF RELIGION,—vide PALEY, CHRIST-
TIANITY, and EGOTISM.
EVIL: the real mystery is, not that evil should never
have an end, but that it should have had a begin-
ning, 398–9; the existence of evil cannot be ex-
plained except by saying that another will besides
God’s has had a part in the disposition of His work,
that there is a quarrel without remedy, a chronic
alienation, between God and man, 399; good is the
rule, and evil the exception, 117, 402; the laws on
which this world is governed make it probable that
evil will never die out of the creation; experience
teaches us that man is not sufficient for his own
happiness, that disobedience to his sense of right is
even by itself misery, and that he carries that misery
about him, wherever he is, that he cannot change
Evil: continued.

his nature and his habits by wishing, but is simply himself, and will ever be himself and what he now is, or at least that pain has no natural tendency to make him other than he is, and that the longer he lives, the more difficult he is to change, 399-400; vide Natural Religion.

"Ex pede Herculem," 260.

Experience: it often happens that experience is a serviceable help in determining the unknown, especially when a man has large experiences and has learned to distinguish between them and apply them duly, 27; the experience of one man is not the experience of another, 83; various of the experiences which befell this man may be the same as those which befell that, although those experiences result each from the combination of its own accidents, and are ultimately traceable each to its own special condition or history, 86 (vide Individual); no experience indeed of life can assure us about the future, but it can and does give us means of conjecturing what is likely to be; it enables us to ascertain the moral constitution of man, and thereby to presage his future from his present, 399.

"Experientia docet," 12.

Experimentalist or philosopher aims at investigating, questioning, ascertaining facts, causes, effects, actions, qualities: these are things, and he makes his words distinctly subordinate to these, as means to an end, 20.
Experts, — vide Detectives.

Explanation of a maze of facts, — vide Maze.

External World: that there are things existing external to ourselves is a first principle, and one of universal reception; it is founded on an instinct; because the brute creation possesses it; this instinct is directed towards individual phenomena, one by one, and has nothing of the character of a generalization; the human mind lays down in broad terms, by an inductive process, the great aphorism, that there is an external world, and that all the phenomena of sense proceed from it; this general proposition goes far beyond our experience, and represents a notion, 61–2.

Eye-Witness: words which are used by an eye-witness to express things, unless he be especially eloquent or graphic, may only convey general notions, 33.

Fabricius, 279.

Factory Girl, Dying, 312.

Facts: intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts, 12 (vide Concrete, Language, and Mind); we are in a world of facts, and we use them; for there is nothing else to use, 346 (vide Self); to arrive at the fact of any matter, we must eschew generalities, and take things as they stand, with all their circumstances,
Facts: continued.

306; facts cannot be proved by presumptions, 383; vide Informal Inference.

“Facts are stubborn things,” 12.

Faculty: faculty of composition, — vide Inventive Faculty; ratiocinative or illative faculty, — vide Ratiocinative Faculty; sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle; but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as faculties; at most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning; but, in doing so, we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty; we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct experience; nor do we trust in the faculty of memory or reasoning as such, for its acts are often inaccurate, nor do we invariably assent to them, 60-1; moreover, our consciousness of self is prior to all questions of trust or assent; we are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution as our being; we have not the option, 61, 346 (vide Self).

Faith: to say “I do not understand a proposition, but I accept it on authority,” is faith; it is not a direct assent to the proposition, still it is an assent to the authority which enunciates it, 43; faith, in its theological sense, includes a belief, not only in the thing believed, but also in the ground of believing; that is, not only belief in certain doctrines, but belief in
Faith: continued.

them expressly because God has revealed them, 99–100; the pre-eminence of strength in divine faith has a supernatural origin; it consists, not in its differing from human faith, merely in degree of assent, but in its being superior in nature and kind, so that the one does not admit of a comparison with the other; and its intrinsic superiority is not a matter of experience, but is above experience, 186–7; vide Reason; Rule of Faith, — vide Rule of Faith.

False Teaching: St. Augustine tells us there is no false teaching without an intermixture of truth, 249.

Falstaff, 271.

Fear: to fear argument is to doubt the conclusion, 203; vide Truth.

Fine Arts: invention in the Fine Arts, — vide Taste; though true and scientific rules may be given in the Fine Arts, no one would therefore deny that Phidias or Rafael had a far more subtle standard of taste and a more versatile power of embodying it in his works, than any which he could communicate to others in even a series of treatises, 357–8; genius in the Fine Arts is indissolubly united to one definite subject-matter, 358.

Firm and Weak Ascents, 184–6 (vide Assent).

First Principles, — vide Principles, First.

Formal Inference: formal inference is ratiocination, restricted and put into grooves, 263 (vide Reasoning); it is verbal reasoning, of whatever kind, as
opposed to mental, 263; in it the force of the proof lies in the comparison of the propositions with each other; when the analysis is carried out fully and put into form, it becomes the Aristotelic syllogism, 263; it differs from logic only inasmuch as logic is its scientific form, 264; it proposes to provide both a test and a common measure of reasoning; and in this it partly succeeds and partly fails, 264; being conditional, it is hampered with the premisses as well as the conclusion, and with the rules connecting the latter with the former; it is practically far more concerned with the comparison of propositions than with the propositions themselves; the more simple and definite are the words of a proposition, and the nearer the propositions concerned in the inference approach to being mental abstractions, and the less they have to do with the concrete reality, so much the more suitable do they become for the purposes of inference, 264–5; hence it is that no process of argument is so perfect as that which is conducted by means of symbols, as in Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry, 265–6; it is the aim of the syllogistic method to circumscribe and stint the import of the words it uses as much as possible; for the concrete matter of propositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic reasoning; words which denote things have innumerable implications, 266–7; to the logician dog or horse is not a thing
which he sees, but a mere name suggesting ideas; and by dog or horse universal he means a common aspect, meagre but precise, of all existing or possible dogs or horses; his business is not to ascertain facts in the concrete, but to find and dress up middle terms, 267–8 (vide UniversalS); whereas inference starts with conditions, as starting with premisses, here are two reasons why, when employed upon questions of fact, it can only conclude probabilities: first, because its premisses are assumed, not proved; and secondly, because its conclusions are abstract, and not concrete, 268–9, 278, 284; it assumes its premisses, for in order to complete the proof we are thrown upon some previous syllogism or syllogisms, in which the assumptions may be proved; but we never arrive at premisses which are undeniable; for it lodges us at length at what are called first principles, as to which logic provides no common measure of minds,—which are accepted by some, rejected by others, 269 (vide Principles, First); we are not able to prove by syllogism that there are any self-evident propositions at all; but supposing there are, we cannot determine these by logic, 270; vide Syllogism; even when argument is the most direct and severe of its kind, there must be those assumptions in the process which resolve themselves into the conditions of human nature; but that process involves many more assumptions
AN INDEXED SYNOPSIS OF

FORMAL INFERENCE: continued.

in ordinary concrete matters, which are traceable to the sentiments of the age, country, religion, social habits and ideas, of the particular inquirers or disputants; to these must be added the assumptions which are made from the necessity of the case, in consequence of the prolixity and elaborateness of any argument which should faithfully note down all the propositions which go to make it up, 270; this doctrine illustrated by a discussion of the words in "Henry V," "His nose was as sharp as a pen, and 'a babbled of green fields," 271–7; an inference, however fully worded (except perhaps in some peculiar cases), never can reach so far as to ascertain a fact, 278; even in mathematical physics a margin is left for possible imperfection in the investigation, 278; no one would be satisfied with a navigator or engineer who had no practice or experience whereby to carry on his scientific conclusions out of their native abstract into the concrete and the real, 278 (vide Theorist); vide Universals, and Nature; all inferential processes whatever, as expressed in language, require general notions, as conditions of their coming to a conclusion, 283; this illustrated, 283–4; that formal reasonings cannot proceed beyond probabilities is most readily allowed by those who use them most; philosophers, experimentalists, lawyers speak by rule and by book, though they judge and determine by common-sense, 285; the
FORMAL INFERENCE: continued.
uses of logical inference, 285–7; it is the great principle of order in our thinking, 285–6; it supplies us with a tangible defence of what we hold, and gives it luminousness and force; it thus becomes a sort of symbol of assent, and even bears upon action, 286–7. Formalism is the practice of asserting simply on authority, with the pretence and without the reality of assent, 43.

FORMATIVE IDEAS are certain original forms of thinking, connatural with our minds, without which we could not reason at all, 64.

FRANCE, 294.
FREE-TRADE, 3, 5.
FREE-TRADER, 85.
FRENCH, 33, 199.
FRENCHMEN, 33.
“Fronti nulla fides,” 81.

FUNCTION: our duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself right rightly, 7; it is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural, 347 (vide Act, Self, and Man).

FUTURE: no experience of life can assure us about the future, but it can and does give us means of conjecturing what is likely to be; experience enables us to ascertain the moral constitution of man, and thereby to presage his future from his present, 399.
G

GABRIEL, Angel, 449.

Gambier, on Moral Evidence, 174.

Gassendi, 287 note.


Genius: instances of genius as displayed in natural inference, 333–4, 380; genius, as far as it is manifested in ratiocination, is not equal to all undertakings, but has its own peculiar subject-matter, and is circumscribed in its range, 338–9.


Geometry: 262, 266; vide Algebra.

Germanicus, 481.

Germany, 325.

Gibbon: 373; Gibbon has mentioned five human causes by way of explaining the rise and establishment of Christianity, viz., the zeal of the Christians, inherited from the Jews, their doctrine of a future state, their claim to miraculous power, their virtues, and their ecclesiastical organization, 457; but even though these presumed causes, when combined, accounted for the event, it would still remain to show out of what that combination arose, and this Gibbon has not done, 457–8 (vide Wonderful, and Law); moreover, these five historical characteristics of Christianity neither did effect what Gibbon claims they did, i.e., the conversion of bodies of men to the Christian faith, nor were they adapted to do so,
Gibbon: continued.

458–9; for (1) zeal, by which Gibbon means party spirit, is a motive principle when men are already members of a body, but it does not operate in bringing them into it; (2) the doctrine of a future state, by which Gibbon seems to mean the fear of hell, converts only those persons from sin to a religious life who already believe in the doctrine, and the belief in Styx and Tartarus was dying out of the world at the time that Christianity came in; and the hope of eternal life was operative only in the case of men who had been actually converted; (3) the claim to miraculous power on the part of the Christians was so unfrequent (for the heathens had plenty of portents of their own) as to become now an objection to the fact of their possessing it; (4) on Gibbon’s own confession, the heathen viewed with disgust the moral and social bearing of the Christians; (5) ecclesiastical organization gave strength to Christianity, but it did not give it life; it is one thing to make conquests, another to consolidate an empire; it was before Constantine that Christians made their great conquests; besides, even now the Church suspends her diocesan administration and her Canon Law in heathen countries and in countries which have thrown off her yoke, 459–62; 465, 476, 480, 483.

Gibson, Bishop of London: quoted, 429.

“Give to him that asketh thee,” 37.
"Go and make disciples of all nations," etc., 451.
"Go into the world and preach the Gospel to every creature," 451.

God: it may be unmeaning, not only to number the Supreme Being with other beings, but to subject Him to number in regard to His own intrinsic characteristics, 50; the word "Trinity" belongs to those notions of Him which are forced on us by the necessity of our finite conceptions, the real and immutable distinction which exists between Person and Person implying in itself no infringement of His real and numerical Unity, 50; He is not One in the way in which created things are severally units; of the Supreme Being it is safer to use the word "monad" than unit, 51; Providence of God, — vide PROVIDENCE; Infinitude of God, — vide MYSTERY; Omnipresence of God, — vide OMNIPRESENCE; belief in One God, 101-21 (vide CONSCIENCE); description of God, 101; the assent of Theists to the Being of a God admits without difficulty of being a notional assent; yet a real assent to this truth is possible to us, 101-2; the proposition that there is One Personal and Present God may be held either as a theological truth, or as a religious fact or reality; when the proposition is apprehended for the purposes of proof, analysis, comparison, etc., it is used as the expression of a notion; when for the purposes of devotion, it is the image of a reality, 119 (vide RELIGION); the One Personal God is not a logical
or physical unity, but a Living Monas, more really one even than an individual man is one, 125; "There is a God," when really apprehended, is the object of a strong energetic adhesion, which works a revolution in the mind; but when held merely as a notion, it requires but a cold and ineffective acceptance, though it be held ever so unconditionally, 126; not only do we see God at best only in shadows, but we cannot bring even those shadows together; our image of Him never is one, but broken into numberless partial aspects, independent each of each; as we cannot see the whole starry firmament at once, so it is, and much more, with such real apprehensions as we can secure of the Divine Nature; we can combine the various matters which we know of Him by an act of the intellect, and treat them theologically, but such theological combinations are no objects for the imagination to gaze upon; moreover, our devotion is tried and confused by the long list of propositions which theology is obliged to draw up, 131; these propositions are necessary not so much for faith, as against unbelief, 132; ordinarily speaking, abstract arguments for the Attributes of God have not their true force, except according as the Image, presented to us through conscience, on which they depend, is cherished within us with the sentiments which it necessarily claims of us, and is seen reflected, by the habit of our intellect, in the
God: continued.

appointments and the events of the external world, 314-15.

"God heareth not sinners; but if a man be a worshipper of God," etc., 407.

"God is faithful, as our preaching which was among you," etc., 141.

Good is the rule, and evil the exception, 117; good to the good, and evil to the evil, is instinctively felt to be, even from what we see, amid whatever obscurity and confusion, the universal rule of God's dealings with us, 402.

Good Sense is the healthy condition of the living personal reasoning, 300.

Gorgonius, 484.

Gospels, from their subject, contain a manifestation of the Divine Nature, so special, as to make it appear from the contrast as if nothing were known of God, when they are unknown, 119; vide Scripture.

Goths, 376.

Government: there has been a conflict of first principles as to whether government and legislation ought to be of a religious character, or not; whether the state has a conscience; whether Christianity is the law of the land; whether the magistrate, in punishing offenders, exercises a retributive office or a corrective; or whether the whole structure of society is raised upon the basis of secular expediency, 379.
GRAMMAR OF ASSENT: the Grammar of Assent treats of propositions only in their bearing upon concrete matter; it is mainly concerned with Assent; with Inference, in its relation to Assent, and only such inference as is not demonstration, 7; it treats of the distinctions in the use of propositions, and of the questions which those distinctions involve, 12; its object is, not to form a theory which may account for those phenomena of the intellect of which it treats, viz., those which characterize inference and assent, but to ascertain what is the matter of fact as regards them, that is, when it is that assent is given to propositions which are inferred, and under what circumstances, 343; its aim is of a practical character, such as that of Butler in his Analogy, and it is confined to the truth of things, and to the mind’s certitude of that truth, 344; it is addressed, not to controversialists, but to inquirers, 425; a main reason for Newman’s writing it was, as far as he could, to describe the organum investigandi, which he thought the true one, given us for gaining religious truth, 499.

Grammarians: language is notional in the grammarian; he has to determine the force of words and phrases; he has to master the structure of sentences and the composition of paragraphs; he has to compare language with language, to ascertain the common ideas expressed under different idiomatic forms, and to achieve the difficult work of recasting the mind of
Grammarian: continued.
the original author in the mould of a translation, 20.

Great Britain: 181, 189, 190, 198; our certitude of the insularity of Great Britain is gained by informal inference, 294–6.

Greece: 303, 304, 363, 475; Greece is the home of intellectual power, 432.

Greek: the old Greek and Roman polytheists had, as they show in their literature, clear and strong notions, nay, vivid mental images, of a Particular Providence, of the power of prayer, of the rule of Divine Governance, of the law of conscience, of sin and guilt, of expiation by means of sacrifice, and of future retribution, and even of the Unity and Personality of the Supreme Being, 250.


Greeks, 473, 474, 475.

Grote, Mr., 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 371 note.

Growth of Assent, 185; vide Assent.

Guardian: quoted, 333.

H

“Had no oil in their vessels,” 455.

Hagiographa, 118–19.

Half-Assent: a half-assent is not a kind of assent any more than a half-truth is a kind of truth; as the object is indivisible, so is the act, 175; to give a half-
HALF-ASSENT: continued.

assent is to feel drawn towards assent, or to assent one moment and not the next, or to be in the way to assent; it means that the proposition in question deserves a hearing, 176; it is an inclination to assent, or again, an intention of assenting, when certain difficulties are surmounted, 182.

HALF-TRUTH is not a kind of truth; it is a proposition which in one aspect is a truth, and in another is not, 175-6.

HALLAHAN, Mother Margaret M., Life of: quoted, 335.

HANNIBAL, 50.

HARDOUIN, Father, maintained that Terence's Plays, Virgil's "Æneid," Horace's Odes, and the histories of Livy and Tacitus, were the forgeries of the monks of the thirteenth century, 296; but he allows that the Georgics, Horace's Satires and Epistles, and the whole of Cicero are genuine, 297.

HARVEY, 276.

"He left not Himself without testimony," etc., 401.

"He that hath ears, let him hear," 415.

"He that is of God, heareth the words of God," 415.

"He that knoweth God, heareth us," etc., 415.

"He that made the world" "now declareth to all men to do penance," etc., 388.

"He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved," 452.

HEARING: all men, as time goes on, have the prospect
Hearing: continued.
of losing that keenness of sight and hearing which
they possessed in their youth; and so, in like manner,
we may lose in manhood and in age that sense of a
Supreme Teacher and Judge which was the gift of
our first years, 123.
Heart: the heart is commonly reached, not through
the reason, but through the imagination, by means
of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and
events, by history, by description; persons influence
us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us,
92–3 (vide Affections); vide Syllogism.
Hebrew Nation, 432; vide Jews.
Heresies: three of the early heresies more or less
originated in obstinate, unchristian refusal to re-
admit to the privileges of the Gospel those who had
fallen into sin, 455; vide Dogmatic Theology.
Herod, 37.
Herodotus, 250.
Hesiod: quoted, 342.
Hesitating Assent is an assent to which we have
been slow and intermittent in coming; or an assent
which, when given, is thwarted and obscured by ex-
ternal and flitting misgivings, though not such as to
enter into the act itself, or essentially to damage it;
we also speak of a hesitating or uncertain assent,
when we assent in act, but not in the habit of our
minds; till assent to a doctrine or fact is my habit, I
am at the mercy of inferences contrary to it, 183–4.
"His hand is not shortened," etc., 398.
"His nose was as sharp as a pen," etc., 271.
*History of Turks*, Newman's, 396 note.
*Hohenzollern*, 456.
*Holy Land*, 219.

**Holy Spirit**: 135, 140; as the child issues in the man as his quasi successor, and the child and the man issue in the old man, like them both, but not the same, so different as almost to have a fresh personality distinct from each, so we may form some image, however vague, of the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, 136.

**Holy Trinity**: it is the belief of Catholics about the Supreme Being, that this essential characteristic of His Nature [i.e., Personality] is reiterated in three distinct ways or modes; so that the Almighty God, instead of being One Person only, which is the teaching of Natural Religion, has Three Personalities, 125; exposition of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, 124–5; the Catholic dogma may be summed up in this formula, "Tres et Unus," hence that formula is the key-note of the Athanasian Creed, 125; this doctrine is of a notional character, 126; but it admits of being held in the imagination, and being embraced with a real assent, and this is the normal faith which every Christian has, on which he is stayed, which is his spiritual life, 127; the words used in the exposition of the doctrine, viz., Personal, Three, One, *He*, God, Father, Son, Spirit,
HOLY TRINITY: continued.

are none of them words peculiar to theology, have all a popular meaning, and are used according to that obvious and popular meaning, when introduced into the Catholic dogma; they are among the simplest and most intelligible that are to be found in language, 127; they stand for things, and are embodied in simple, clear, brief, categorical propositions, 127–8; not even the words “mysteriousness” and “mystery” occur in the exposition; they are not parts of the Divine Verity as such, but in relation to creatures and to the human intellect; the thesis “the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Unity is mysterious” is indirectly an article of faith; but such an article, being a reflection made upon a revealed truth in an inference, expresses a notion, not a thing; it does not relate to the direct apprehension of the object, but to a judgment of our reason upon the object, 128; strictly speaking, the dogma of the Holy Trinity, as a complex whole, or as a mystery, is not the formal object of religious apprehension and assent; but as it is a number of propositions, taken one by one; that complex whole also is the object of assent, but it is the notional object, 129; a real assent to the mystery, as such, is not possible, because, though we can image the separate propositions, we cannot image them altogether, since the mystery transcends all our experience, 130 (vide God); break a ray of light into its
HOLY TRINITY: continued.

constituent colours, each is beautiful, each may be enjoyed; attempt to unite them, and perhaps you produce only a dirty white; the pure and indivisible Light is seen only by the blessed inhabitants of heaven; here we have but such faint reflections of it as its diffraction supplies; but they are sufficient for faith and devotion, 132; the Holy Trinity in Unity is never spoken of as a Mystery in the sacred book, or in the Creeds, 132 (vide Scripture, and Athanasian Creed); or in the definitions of the Church, 134; but it is so spoken of in catechisms and theological treatises, 134; the dogma consists of nine propositions, each of which admits of a real apprehension, 135; every chapter of St. John and St. Paul is full of the Three Divine Names, 137; the New Testament is ever ringing the changes on the nine propositions, 138 (vide "The Son is God," and "The Holy Ghost is God"); theology has to do with the Dogma of the Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but Religion has to do with each of those separate propositions which compose it, 140; the importance of accepting the dogma is the very explanation of that careful minuteness with which the few simple truths which compose it are inculcated, are reiterated, in the Athanasian Creed, 141.

HOMER, 78, 277.

HOMERIC POEMS, 250.
Hooker, 276, 494.
Horace, 78, 296, 297, 308.
Humanitarian, 246.
Hume: 47, 81 (vide Miracles); quoted, 306.
Hunt, — vide Search.

I

"I am the Good Shepherd," etc., 492.
"I am the least of the Apostles," etc., 466.
"I believe, help my unbelief," 185, 220.
"I determined to know nothing among you, but Jesus Christ," etc., 466.
"I have understood more than all my teachers," etc., 415.
"I live, but now not I," etc., 466.
"I make known to you the gospel which I preached to you," etc., 466.
"I will make of thee a great nation," etc., 441–2.
"I will pray the Father, and He will send you another Paraclete," 137.

Idea, — vide Image, and Notion.

Idea of a University, Newman's, 396 note.

Ideas, Formative, — vide Formative Ideas.

Idolaters: not even are idolaters and heathen out of the range of some religious truths and their correlative certitudes, 250.

"If any man will do His will," etc., 415.

Ignatius, disciple of the Apostles: 480; quoted, 479.

Illative Faculty, — vide Ratiocinative Faculty.
ILLATIVE SENSE: the Illative Sense is right judgment in ratiocination, 342; it is the perfection or virtue of the ratiocinative faculty, 345; it is the power of judging and concluding, when in its perfection, 353; it is the reasoning faculty, as exercised by gifted, or by educated or otherwise well-prepared minds, 361; sanction of the illative sense, — vide SELF, BEING, and MAN; illustrated by reference to parallel faculties, by which the mind exercises supreme direction and control (1) in matters of conduct, 353–6, — (2) in the various callings and professions, 357, — (3) in the Fine Arts, 357–8, — (4) in the useful arts and personal accomplishments, 358 (vide CONDUCT, PROFESSIONS, FINE ARTS, and USEFUL ARTS); in all of these separate actions of the intellect the individual is supreme, and responsible to himself, nay, under circumstances, may be justified in opposing himself to the judgment of the whole world, 353; ratiocination, then, should not be an exception to a general law which attaches to the intellectual exercises of the mind, or be held to be commensurate with logical science, 358 (vide LOGIC); the illative sense, viewed in its exercise, is one and the same in all concrete matters, though employed in them in different measures; we do not reason in one way in chemistry or law, in another in morals or religion; but in reasoning on any subject whatever, which is concrete, we proceed, as far as we can, by the logic of language, but we are obliged to sup-
ILLATIVE SENSE: continued.

plement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of thought; for forms by themselves prove nothing, 358–9; it is attached to definite subject-matters, 359 (vide NATURAL INFERENCE); in coming to its conclusion, it proceeds always in the same way, by a method of reasoning, which is the elementary principle of the mathematical calculus of modern times, 359 (vide INFORMAL INFERENCE); vide CRITERION, and MIND; it has its function in the beginning, middle, and end of all verbal discussion and inquiry, and in every step of the process, 361, 362; it is a rule to itself, and appeals to no judgment beyond its own, 361–2; being nothing else than a personal gift or acquisition, it supplies no common measure between mind and mind, 362; its presence and action in the conduct of an argument described, 363–4, and illustrated by the views upon the state of Greece and Rome during the prehistoric period put forth respectively by Niebuhr, F. W. Newman, Clinton, Lewis, Grote, and Mure, 365–71; these authors differ so much from each other in their estimate of the testimonies and of the facts, because that estimate is simply their own, coming of their own judgment, and that judgment coming of assumptions of their own, explicit or implicit, and those assumptions spontaneously issuing out of the state of thought respectively belonging to each of them, and all these successive processes of minute reasoning superin-
ILLATIVE Sense: continued.

tended and directed by an intellectual instrument far too subtle and spiritual to be scientific, 364; the exercise of the illative sense in relation to first principles illustrated, 371-83; vide STATEMENT OF THE Case, Assumptions, and Antecedent Reasons.

Image: [this word is used repeatedly in the Grammar of Assent in the sense of a real proposition]; an image is an impression left by things on the imagination, 75; it represents the concrete, 89; no description, however complete, could convey to my mind an image of a melody or a mental fact, of which I had no direct experience, 28 (vide Inventive Faculty); images need not be true, 76; the fact of the distinctness of the images, which are required for real assent, is no warrant for the existence of the objects which those images represent, 80; that I have no experience of a thing happening except in one way, is a cause of the intensity of my assent, if I assent, but not a reason for my assenting, 81; accidentally impressiveness does constitute the motive principle of belief; for some men possess an idiosyncratic sagacity, which really and rightly sees reasons in impressions which common men cannot see, and is secured from the peril of confusing truth with make-belief, 81-2; images have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions, and by means of these indirectly become operative; still this practical influence is not invariable, nor to be relied on; for
Image: continued.
given images may have no tendency to affect given minds, or to excite them to action, 89 (vide Real Assent); the mere acquisition of new images, and those images striking, great, various, unexpected, beautiful, is highly pleasurable, quite independently of the question whether there is any truth in them, 205-6; the Thought or Image of Christ in the minds of His subjects is the vivifying idea both of the Christian body and of the individuals in it, 464-92 (vide Christianity, and Individual).

Imagination: the natural and rightful effect of acts of the imagination upon us is, not to create assent, but to intensify it, 82; strictly speaking, it is not imagination that causes action; but hope and fear, likes and dislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirrings of selfishness and self-love; what the imagination does for us is to find a means of stimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them, 82; the imagination may be said in some sense to be of a practical nature, inasmuch as it leads to practice indirectly by the action of its object upon the affections, 83, 89 (vide Affections, and Real Assent); in most men the imagination suffers from the lapse of time and the experience of life, long before the bodily senses fail, 123; vide Reason, and Religion; assent to a real proposition is assent to an imagination, 214.
THE GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

Immaculate Conception, 248.
“Immutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie,” 239.
Implicit Assumptions, — vide Assumptions.
Impurity, — vide Sin.
“In thee and in thy seed shall all the tribes of the earth be blessed,” 442.
“In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed,” 442.
Incarnation, 219.
Incompatible Notions, — vide Notion.
Incomprehensible and inconceivable, 46.
Inconceivable: an alleged fact is not therefore impossible because it is inconceivable, 51 (vide Notion).
Indefectibility: indefectibility almost enters into the very idea of certitude, 221; statement of the case against indefectibility of certitude, 222–4, 228; vide Certitude; objection against it in the primary truths of religion, drawn (1) from the fact that Catholicism is not universally received, (2) from the multitude of men who change their religion, 241; (1) is not valid, for a truth or a fact may be certain, though it is not generally received; we are each of us ever gaining through our senses various certainties, which no one shares with us; again, certainties of science are in the possession of a few countries only, and for the most part only of the educated classes of those countries, 242 (vide Church); (2) is not valid, for to accept a religion
Indefectibility: continued.

is neither a simple assent to it nor a complex, but it is a collection of various kinds of assents, among which there may be very few certitudes, and besides, there are few religions which have no points in common, 243–51 (vide Assent, and Protestant); vide Religion, St. Paul, Jews, Anglicans, Christians, and Philosophers; indefectibility may serve as a negative test of certitude, or sine quâ non condition, 256 (vide Criterion); the indefectibility of certitude is not discredited by the sight of a dead man come to life again; but in such case we have two certitudes, one of his death, and the other of his return to life, 256; it is not affected by the diverse accounts of Revelation and Science concerning the origin of man; for I should never give up my certitude in that truth which on sufficient grounds I determined to come from heaven, 257; prejudice may be indefectible; but it cannot be confused with certitude, for the one is an assent previous to rational grounds, and the other an assent given expressly after careful examination, 258 (vide Certitude).

India, 189, 190, 393, 453.

Indians, Red, 376.

Individual: real assents are of a personal character, each individual having his own, and being known by them, 83–7 (vide Assent, Notional and Real); the characteristics of an individual are accidents,
because they are severally the co-incidents of many laws, and there are no laws as yet discovered of such coincidence; this illustrated by the example of a man who is run over in the street and killed; it does not meet the case to refer to the law of averages, for such laws deal with percentages, not with individuals, 84; illustrations of the characteristics of an individual and of the laws of his nature, 85-6; various of the experiences which befall this man may be the same as those which befall that, although those experiences result each from the combination of its own accidents, and are ultimately traceable each to its own special condition or history; this illustrated by the instance of men who cannot live out of Madeira, and of the belief of so many thousands in our Lord’s Divinity, 86-7; vide Real Assents; even when such belief has one single origin, as the study of Scripture, careful teaching, or a religious temper, still its presence argues a special history, and a personal formation, which an abstraction does not, 87.

Infallibility: a certitude is directed to this or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of mind relatively to a definite case which is before me: infallibility, on the contrary, is a faculty or gift, and relates, not to some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter, 224, 227; this distinction
Infallibility: continued.
illustrated, 225-7; Chillingworth's mistake as regards this distinction, 226-7, 493; infallibility of the Church, — vide Church.
Inference: vide Proposition, and Reasoning; inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition, 8, 59, 75, 157, 172, 189, 259; for it is the acceptance of a proposition on the condition of an acceptance of its premisses, 75; when we infer, we consider a proposition in relation to other propositions, 13; formal inference, — vide Formal Inference; informal inference, — vide Informal Inference; natural inference, — vide Natural Inference; inference and assent, — vide Assent and Inference; inference and opinion, — vide Opinion; inference is ever varying in strength, 38 (vide Assent and Inference); the apprehension which accompanies acts of inference is notional, 39; inference is engaged for the most part on notional propositions, both premiss and conclusion, 39; when inferences are employed on mere symbols, they are clearest and most cogent; the next clearest are such as carry out the necessary results of previous classifications, and therefore may be called definitions or conclusions, as we please, 39-40; processes of inference, however accurate, can end in mystery, 46 (vide Mystery); it is in its nature and by its profession conditional and uncertain, 59; it requires no apprehension of the things inferred; it is concerned with
Inference: continued.
surfaces and aspects; it does not reach as far as facts; it is employed upon formulas; as far as it takes real objects of whatever kind into account, it deals with them, not as they are, but simply as materials of argument or inquiry; they are to it nothing more than major and minor premisses and conclusions, 90 (vide Science, Philosophy, and Universals); criterion of the validity of an inference, — vide Criterion; it is ordinarily the antecedent of assent, 157; acts of inference are both the antecedents of assent before assenting, and its usual concomitants after assenting, 189; the pleasure belonging to inference, 207–8; inference and assent are the immediate instruments of the acquisition of knowledge, 349.

Inference and Notional Assent: it may be difficult, by external tokens, to distinguish given acts of assent from given acts of inference, 38; resemblance exists only in cases of notional assents; because the apprehension which accompanies acts of inference is notional also (for an act of inference includes in its object the dependence of its thesis upon its premisses, that is, upon a relation, which is an abstraction, 40), and because inference is engaged for the most part on notional propositions, both premiss and conclusion, 39, 75; in its notional assents as well as in its inferences, the mind contemplates its own creations instead of things, 75.
INFINITUDE: we believe in the infinitude of the Divine Attributes, but we can have no experience of infinitude as a fact; the word stands for a definition or a notion, 52.

INFORMAL INFERENCE: the real and necessary method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible, 288; example of a syllogism which we may suppose to be presented to an educated, thoughtful Protestant: “All Protestants are bound to join the Church; you are a Protestant: ergo”; he is a concrete individual unit, and being so is under so many laws, and is the subject of so many predications all at once, that he cannot determine, offhand, his position and his duty by the law and the predication of one syllogism in particular, 288–9; none of the questions he puts to himself as regards it admit of simple demonstration; but each carries with it a number of independent probable arguments, sufficient, when united, for a reasonable conclusion about itself; and to this conclusion he comes not by any possible verbal enumeration of all the considerations which unite to bring him to it; but by a mental comprehension of the
Informal Inference: continued.

whole case, and a discernment of its upshot, 291; this method of reasoning in concrete matters has these characteristics: (1) it does not supersede the logical form of inference, but is one and the same with it, only it is no longer an abstraction, but carried out into the realities of life; (2) it is more or less implicit, and without the direct and full advertisement of the mind exercising it; the mind is unequal to a complete analysis of the motives which carry it on to a particular conclusion; (3) it is conditional; for it is still as dependent on premisses as it is in its elementary idea, 292–3 (vide Probabilities); its action illustrated in the case of our certitude, (1) of the insularity of Great Britain, (2) of the genuineness of the Classics, (3) of our future death, (4) of our birth, 294–301; an object of sense presents itself to our view as one whole, and not in its separate details; such too is the intellectual view we take of the momenta of proof for a concrete truth; we grasp the full tale of premisses and conclusion, per modum unius, — by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion in and through the premisses, not by a formal juxta-position of propositions, 301–2, 316; an intellectual question may strike two minds very differently, and lead them to opposite conclusions; and a body of proof, or a line of argument, may produce a distinct, nay, a dissimilar effect, as addressed to one or to the other, 302; in
Informal Inference: continued.

Concrete reasonings we judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles, 302 (vide Criterion); this illustrated, (1) in the case of the proposition, "We shall have a European war, for Greece is audaciously defying Turkey," 303-4, — (2) in the case of passages from Leighton and Coleridge on certain of our conceptions about God, 304-6, — (3) in the case of Hume's argument against miracles, 306-7, — (4) in the case of a passage from Pascal on the establishment of Christianity, 307-10, — (5) in the case of passages from Pascal on the self-satisfied sceptic and the scepticism of Montaigne, 310-12, — (6) in the case of the dying factory girl, 312-13, — (7) in the case of a passage from Dr. Samuel Clarke on the argument for the Divine Attribute of Knowledge, 313-16; a proof, except in abstract demonstration, has always in it, more or less, an element of the personal, 317; vide Proof, "Judicium Prudentis Viri," Certitude, and Moral Being; the principle of concrete reasoning is parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of modern mathematical science, as contained in the celebrated lemma with which Newton opens his "Principia," 320; the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen and predicted rather than actually attained, on account of the nature of its subject-matter, and the delicate and implicit character of at least part of the reasonings on which
Informal Inference: continued.

it depends, 321; the logical form of this argument is indirect, viz., that "the conclusion cannot be otherwise," 321; this illustrated, (1) by a passage from Wood's Mechanics on the proof of the laws of motion, 322-3, — (2) by two passages on circumstantial evidence, 324-8, — (3) by a passage on the divination of the authorship of a certain anonymous publication, 328-9.

Ingleby, Dr., 495.

Inquiry: inquiry is inconsistent with assent; for he who inquires is in doubt where the truth lies, and wishes his present profession either proved or disproved, 191; vide Investigation; a Catholic is not allowed to inquire into the truth of his Creed; for the Catholic who sets about inquiring thereby declares that he is not a Catholic, 191; the pleasure attendant on inquiry,—vide Search; no inquiry comes to good which is not conducted under a deep sense of responsibility, and of the issues depending upon its determination, 426 (vide Conscientiousness, and Truth).

Instinct: instinct is a force which spontaneously impels us, not only to bodily movements, but to mental acts, 62; it is a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving, 334; vide Phenomena, and Substance; it leads the quasi-intelligent principle in brutes to perceive in the phenomena of sense a something distinct from and beyond those
**Instinct: continued.**

phenomena, 62, 110–11; this is no mere physical instinct, such as that which leads the new-dropped lamb to his mother for milk, 111; it is instinct which impels the child to recognize in the smiles or the frowns of a countenance which meets his eyes, not only a being external to himself, but one whose looks elicit in him confidence or fear, 62; and it leads him to perceive in the dictates of conscience an external being, who reads his mind, to whom he is responsible, who praises and blames, who promises and threatens, 62, 104, 105, 110, 112 (vide Conscience).

**Intellect, — vide Mind.**

**Intellectual School** will always have something of an esoteric character; for it is an assemblage of minds that think; their bond is unity of thought, and their words become a sort of tessera, not expressing thought, but symbolizing it, 309.

**Interpretative:** the conclusion in an induction is proved interpretative, 323 (vide Informal Inference).

**Interpretative Certitude, — vide Material Certitude.**

**Interrogative Proposition, — vide Proposition.**

**Introspection** of our intellectual operations is not the best of means for preserving us from intellectual hesitations; to meddle with the springs of thought and action is really to weaken them, 216–17 (vide Argumentation).
Inventive Faculty: we are able by an inventive faculty to follow the description of things which have never come before us, and to form, out of such passive impressions as experience has heretofore left on our minds, new images, which, though mental creations, are in no sense abstractions, and though ideal, are not notional, 27; it is the very praise we give to the characters of some great poet or historian that he is so individual, 27; this faculty enables us to live in the past and in the distant, 28; it is of course a step beyond experience; it is mainly limited as regards its materials, by the sense of sight, 28.

Inventors, — vide Action of Life.

Inveracity, — vide Sin.

Investigation: investigation is not inconsistent with assent, 191–4 (vide Inquiry); there are minds with whom at all times to question a truth is to make it questionable, and to investigate is equivalent to inquiring, 192; in the case of educated minds, investigations into the argumentative proof of the things to which they have given their assent is an obligation, or rather a necessity, 192, 194; processes of investigation often issue in the reversal of the assents which they were originally intended to confirm, 192–3 (vide Belief); my vague consciousness of the possibility of a reversal of my belief in the course of my researches does not interfere with the honesty and firmness of that belief while those researches proceed, 193.
AN INDEXED SYNOPSIS OF

IONIAN FESTIVAL, 78.
IRELAND, 199.
IRISHMAN, 33.
ISAAC, 442.
ISAIAH, 446.
ISLAM, 249.
ISLAMISM, 149, 241.
ISRAEL: 435, 436; vide JEWS; King of Israel, 453.
“It has been said by them of old time,” etc., 448.
“It has pleased God by the foolishness of preaching,” etc., 466.
“It hath not yet appeared what we shall be,” etc., 466.
ITALIANS, 33.

J

JACOB, 442, 450.
JAMES, St.: 200; quoted, 453.
JAMES THE FIRST, 27, 28–9.
JEROME, St.: 103; quoted, 469.
JERUSALEM: 437, 451; siege of Jerusalem by Titus, 435.
JESUS, 39, 474, 475, 476, 479, 482, 483, 484.
“Jesus Christ, whom you have not seen, yet love,” etc., 466.
JEWISH LAW, 252.
JEWS: 10, 250, 252, 308; their poetry pours itself out in devotional compositions which Christianity, through all its many countries and ages, has been unable to rival, 433; the conversion of Jews to Christianity is not an instance of loss of certitude, if the
Jews: continued.

zeal for the sufficiency of their law was not found in those who were eventually converted, 253; those Jews became Christians in Apostolic times who were already what may be called crypto-Christians, 413–14; the Jews are one of the few Oriental nations who are known in history as a people of progress, and their line of progress is the development of religious truth; their country may be called the classical home of the religious principle; Theism is emphatically their natural religion, for they never were without it, and were made a people by means of it, 432; this is a phenomenon singular and solitary in history, and if there be a God and Providence, it must come from Him, and the people themselves have ever maintained that it has been His direct work, and has been recognized by Him as such, 432; they were just the one people who professed, as their distinguishing doctrine, the Divine Unity and Government of the world, and that, not only as a natural truth, but as revealed to them by that God Himself of whom they spoke, 432–3; they begin with the beginning of history, and the preaching of this dogma begins with them; they are its witnesses and confessors, even to torture and death; on it prophet after prophet bases his further revelations, with a sustained reference to a time when it is to receive completion and perfection, 433; when that time of destined blessing came, instead of any final
favour coming on them from above, they fell under the power of their enemies, and were overthrown, and the remnant of their people cast off to wander through every land except their own, 433-4; a peculiar reproach and note of infamy is affixed to their name, 434; it was their belief that God's protection was unchangeable, and that their law would last forever; they were taught that it could not die, except by changing into a new self, more wonderful than it was before; they expected that a promised King was coming, the Messiah, who would extend the sway of Israel over all people, 434-5; the failure of their expectation is not a proof that there was nothing providential in their history; for a second portent does not obliterate a first; and further, the Book of Deuteronomy indicates that the disappointment was not necessarily out of keeping with the original divine purpose, or again with the old promise made to them, and their confident expectation of its fulfilment; their national ruin, which came instead of aggrandizement, is described in that book, in spite of all promises, with an emphasis and minuteness which prove that it was contemplated long before, 435-6; vide Christianity; it is not wonderful that the Jews could not recognize their Messiah as the promised King as we recognize Him now; for we have the experience of His history for nearly two thousand years, by which to interpret their
Jews: continued.

Scriptures; we may partly understand their position towards those prophecies, by our own at present towards the Apocalypse, 446 (vide Apocalypse); the Jews held from the first that each nation had its own gods, holding also that all gods but their own God were idols and demons, 450; 473, 477; vide Gibbon.

Joanna Southcote, 198.

Job, the Patriarch, 80.

John, St.: 137, 139, 152, 200, 244, 250, 468, 472, 480; the first half of the first chapter of St. John's gospel illustrates the real assent which can be given to the proposition "The Son is God," and its power over our affections and emotions, 138–9; quoted, 466.

John, St., the Baptist, 449.

Johnson, Dr., 47, 103, 298, 338.

Josephus: quoted, 444.

Joshua: 442 note; 457; Book of, 442.

Judah, 442, 445.

Judaism, — vide Jews; 241, 251, 252, 432, 437, 438, 439, 440, 449.

Judas of Galilee, 450.

Judea, 443, 444, 469, 475.

Judge: advice of a certain judge to a friend, to lay down the law boldly, but never give his reasons, 303.

Judge, Supreme: 104, 116; vide Conscience.

Judges, Book of, 442 note.

Judgment: judgment in all concrete matter is the
JUDGMENT: continued.

architectonic faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it, 342; judgment in conduct,—vide Taste, Conduct, and Phronesis; Final Judgment, vide Atonement, and Natural Religion; rash judgment,—vide Rash Judgment.

"Judicium Prudentis Viri" is a standard of certitude which holds good in all concrete matter, not only in cases of practice and duty, but in questions of truth and falsehood generally, 317 (vide Informal Inference).

Julian: quoted, 468.

Jupiter: the planet, 71; Jupiter and Neptune, as represented in the classical mythology, are evil spirits, 419.

Just and Unjust,—vide Principles, First.

Justin Martyr, St.: 481; quoted, 474.

"Justum et tenacem," etc., 37, 38, 39.

K

Kent, Duke of, 225.

Key to prophecy,—vide Prophecy.

King: the child’s idea of a king, as derived from his picture-book, will be that of a fierce or stern or venerable man, seated above a flight of steps, with a crown on his head and a sceptre in his hand, 26.

Know: to assent to a proposition objectively true as well as subjectively is to know, 195–6.
Knowledge: do not attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion; the ascendancy of faith may be impracticable, but the reign of knowledge is incomprehensible, 92 (vide Conclusion, and Deduction); certitude about a thing is the knowledge of its truth, 197; what is once true is always true, and cannot fail, whereas what is once known need not always be known, and is capable of failing, 197; the repose in self and in its object, as connected with self, which belongs to certitude, does not attach to mere knowing, that is, to the perception of things, but to the consciousness of having that knowledge; the pleasure of perceiving truth without reflecting on it as truth is not very different, except in intensity and in dignity, from the pleasure, as such, of assent or belief given to what is not true, 205 (vide Image); the pursuit of knowledge has its own pleasure, — as distinct from the pleasures of knowledge, as it is distinct from that of consciously possessing it, 206-7 (vide Search); as there is a condition of mind which is characterized by invincible ignorance, so there is another which may be said to be possessed of invincible knowledge, 211; inference and assent are the immediate instruments of the acquisition of knowledge, 349; knowledge is power, for it enables us to use eternal principles which we cannot alter, 350-1.
L

Lacordaire, Fr., 489 note.

Language: an Economist uses language as the vehicle of things, and a schoolboy translating, of abstractions, 21–2; the use of language, as conveying notions, is not only the very foundation of all science, but may be, and is, carried out in literature and in the ordinary intercourse of man with man; and thus it comes to pass that individual propositions about the concrete almost cease to be, and are diluted or starved into abstract notions, 31; notional apprehension is, and ever must be, the popular and ordinary mode of apprehending language, 33; propositions may and must be used as the expression of facts, and they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals, and for our intercourse with others, 120; it will be our wisdom to avail ourselves of language, as far as it will go, but to aim mainly by means of it to stimulate, in those to whom we address ourselves, a mode of thinking and trains of thought similar to our own, leading them on by their own independent action, not by any syllogistic compulsion, 309 (vide Syllogism); vide Words, Progress, and Mind.

Lateran Council, Fourth, 134.

"Latet dolus in generalibus," 279.

Laud, 361.
THE GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

Lawrence, St., words of, 483.

Law: natural law is the fact that things happen uniformly according to certain circumstances, and not without them and at random: that is, that they happen in an order, 68–9; state or public law is inflexible, 355; a law is not a cause, but a fact, 72; there is no known law of the coincidence of laws, 85, 84, 427, 457 (vide Wonderful); general laws are not inviolable truths; much less are they necessary causes, 280, 202, 255; a law is not a fact, but a notion, 280; a law is a generalized fact, 299; no law is carried out, except in cases where it acts freely, 299.

Laws of Nature: the uniformity of the laws of nature is a first principle, derived by us from experience, and accepted with what is called a presumption, 68 (vide Presumption, and Causation); by scientific analysis, we are led to the conclusion that phenomena, which seem very different from each other, admit of being grouped together as modes of the operation of one hypothetical law, acting under varied circumstances, 69; this generalization loses its character of hypothesis, and becomes a probability, in proportion as we have reason for thinking on other grounds that the particles of all matter really move and act towards each other in one certain way in relation to space and time, and not in half a dozen ways, 69; the order of nature is not necessary, but general in its manifestations, 71; our experience is adverse to the doctrine that the laws
Laws of Nature: continued.

of nature are inviolable; for no concrete fact or phenomenon exactly repeats itself; the earth, for instance, never moves exactly in the same orbit year by year, but is in perpetual vacillation; science accounts for this, not by appeal to experience, but by more or less probable hypotheses, argued out by means of an assumed analogy between cosmical bodies and falling bodies on the earth; "assumed," because that analogy (in other words, the unfailing uniformity of nature) is the very point which has to be proved, 70–1; it has not yet been proved even that the law of velocity of falling bodies on the earth is invariable in its operation, 71; if we expect a thing to happen twice, it is because we think it is not an accident, but has a cause, 71–2; a law is not a cause, but a fact; we have no experience of any cause but Will; That which willed the order of nature, can unwill it; and the invariableness of law depends on the unchangeableness of that Will, 72 (vide Miracles); as a cause implies a will, so order implies a purpose, 72 (vide Order); the agency then which has kept up and keeps up the general laws of nature must be Mind, and nothing else, and Mind at least as wide and as enduring in its living action as the immeasurable ages and spaces of the universe on which that agency has left its traces, 72.

Lawgiver, Sovereign, 114 (vide Conscience).

Lawyer: philosophers, experimentalists, lawyers, in
THE GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

Lawyer: continued.

their several ways, have commonly the reputation of being, at least on moral and religious subjects, hard of belief, because, proceeding in the necessary investigation by the analytical method of verbal inference, they find within its limits no sufficient resources for attaining a conclusion, 285; our lawyers prefer the examination of present witnesses to affidavits on paper, 298; 332; we often hear of the exploits of some great lawyer, judge or advocate, who is able in perplexed cases, when common minds see nothing but a hopeless heap of facts, foreign or contrary to each other, to detect the principle which rightly interprets the riddle, and, to the admiration of all hearers, converts a chaos into an orderly and luminous whole, 372.

Lazarus, 312.

Legitimist, 85.

Leighton: 56; quoted, 304–5.

Leonidas, father of Origen, 482–3.

Lesbos: in old times the mason's rule which was in use at Lesbos was not of wood or iron, but of lead, so as to allow of its adjustment to the uneven surface of the stones brought together for the work, 355.


"Lex orandi, lex credendi," 134.

Libanius: quoted, 468.

Liberty of Prophesying, Bishop Taylor's: quoted, 143.
Life: the action of life,—vide Action of Life; science of life,—vide Conduct.

"Lift up your eyes, and see the countries," etc., 451.
"Light is come into the world," etc., 451.
Lilly, Mr.: 495, 499; letter of, 500-1.

Literary Man: the primary duty of a literary man is to have clear conceptions, and to be exact and intelligible in expressing them, 20-1.

Literature: the tradition of "testimonia," such as are prefixed to the classics and the Fathers, together with the absence of dissentient voices, is the adequate groundwork of our belief in the history of literature, 298 (vide Classics).

Livy, 22, 296, 297.

Locke: this celebrated writer speaks freely of degrees of assent, and considers that the strength of assent given to each proposition varies with the strength of the inference on which the assent follows; yet he is obliged to make exceptions to his general principle; and he allows that inferences, which are only "near upon certainty," are so near, that we legitimately accept them with "no doubt at all," and "assent to them as firmly as if they were infallibly demonstrated," 160-1; quoted, 161, 162-3; inconsistency of his view, 163-4; he takes a view of the human mind, in relation to inference and assent, which is theoretical and unreal; he consults his own ideal of how the mind ought to act, instead of interrogating human nature, as an existing thing, as
Locke: continued.

it is found in the world, 164; Locke's theory of the duty of assenting more or less according to degrees of evidence is invalidated by the testimony of high and low, young and old, ancient and modern, as continually given in their sayings and doings, 176, 316-17; 494.

Logic: logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism, 94 (vide Conclusion, and Syllogism); logic is not the measure of assent, 180 (vide Argument, and Assent); 262; logic is the science which is the regulating principle of inference, 263, 264 (vide Reasoning, and Formal Inference); its chain of conclusions hangs loose at both ends, 284 (vide Universals); the uses of logical inference, 285-7; our inquiries spontaneously fall into scientific sequence, and we think in logic, as we talk in prose, without aiming at doing so, 286; the prejudice which exists against logic in the popular mind, and the animadversions which are levelled against it, are due to the fact that the processes of reasoning which legitimately lead to assent, to action, to certitude, are in fact too multiform, subtle, omnigenous, too implicit, to allow of being measured by rule, that they are after all personal,—verbal argumentation being useful only in subordination to a higher logic, 302–3; reason never bids us be certain except on an absolute proof; and such a
proof can never be furnished to us by the logic of words, for as certitude is of the mind, so is the act of inference which leads to it, 345 (vide Proof); it is natural to ask the question, why logic is made an instrumental art sufficient for determining every sort of truth, while no one would dream of making any one formula, however generalized, a working rule at once for poetry, the art of medicine, and political warfare, 358; men become personal when logic fails; it is their mode of appealing to their own primary elements of thought, and their own illative sense, against the principles and the judgment of another, 369.

London, 26, 64, 129.

"Looked for the redemption of Israel," 253.

Louis the Eleventh, 29.

Lucern, 15, 16, 17.

Lucius, 481.

Lucretius, 391, 392, 400, 401.

Luther, 245.

Lyceum, 469.

"Lydia, whose heart the Lord opened," etc., 415.

Lyons, 481.
Maccabæus, 458.
Madeira, 86.
Mahomet, 252, 404, 430, 440, 452.
Mahometan, 250, 252.
Mahometanism: 251; it is the mere creed and rite of certain races, bringing with it, as such, no gifts to our nature; while Christianity was the heir to a dead religion, Mahometanism was little more than a rebellion against a living one; moreover, though Mahomet professed to be the Paraclete, no one pretends that he occupies a place in the Christian Scriptures as prominent as that which the Messiah fills in the Jewish, 440.
Man: vide Self, and Being; man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal, 94; man is the highest of the animals, and more indeed than an animal, as having a mind; that is, he has a complex nature different from theirs, with a higher aim and a specific perfection; but still the fact that other beings find their good in the use of their particular nature is a reason for anticipating that to use duly our own is our interest as well as our necessity, 348; though man cannot change what he is born with, he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good, 349, 233; he has to learn how to fulfil his end, and to be what facts show that he is intended to be; his mind
is in the first instance in disorder, and runs wild; his faculties have their rudimental and inchoate state, and are gradually carried on by practice and experience to their perfection, 233; this progress is not mechanical, nor is it of necessity; it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species; it is his gift to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self-made; this law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition of knowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments; supposing, then, the advancement of our nature, both in ourselves individually and as regards the human family, is, to every one of us in his place, a sacred duty, it follows that that duty is intimately bound up with the right use of these two main instruments of fulfilling it; and as we do not gain the knowledge of the law of progress by any à priori view of man, but by looking at it as the interpretation which is provided by himself on a large scale in the ordinary action of his intellectual nature, so too we must appeal to himself, as a fact, and not to any antecedent theory, in order to find what is the law of his mind as regards the two faculties in question; such an appeal shows that the course of inference is ever more or less obscure, while assent is ever distinct and definite, and yet that what is in its nature thus absolute does in fact follow upon what in outward manifestation
MAN: continued.

is thus complex, indirect, and recondite, 349–50 (vide Act, and Function); man's progress is a living growth, not a mechanism; and its instruments are mental acts, not the formulas and contrivances of language, 350; we should not distort the faculties of the human mind according to the demands of an ideal optimism, 351 (vide Mind); the laws of the mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but of the will of God; I should be bound by them even were they not His laws; but since one of their very functions is to tell me of Him, and since we are able to feel that He gave them to us, and He can overrule them for us, we may securely take them as they are, and use them as we find them; it is He who teaches all knowledge; and the way by which we acquire it is His way; if we take the way proper to our subject-matter, we have His blessing upon us, and shall find, besides abundant matter for mere opinion, the materials in due measure of proof and assent, 351–2, 412; and especially, by this disposition of things, shall we learn, as regards religious and ethical inquiries, how little we can effect, however much we exert ourselves, without that Blessing, 352 (vide Religious, and Self); vide Evil; a man differs from a brute, not in rationality only, but in all that he is, even in those respects in which he is most like a brute; so that his whole self, his bones, limbs, make, life, reason, moral
Man: continued.

feeling, immortality, and all that he is besides, is his real differentia, in contrast to a horse or a dog; instead of saying that two men differ only in number, we ought rather to say that they differ from each other in all that they are, in identity, in incommunicability, in personality, 282.

"Many are called, few are chosen," 455.

Marcus, Emperor: quoted, 476.

Marengo, 49.

Margin: it is only under the penetrating and subtle action of the mind itself that the margin disappears, which intervenes between verbal argumentation and conclusions in the concrete, 360 (vide Mind).

Market-Woman who was struck dead, 428.

Marriage Feast, parable of, 455.

Mass, Holy: 246; in the Holy Mass He who once died for us upon the Cross brings back and perpetuates, by His literal presence in it, that one and the same sacrifice which cannot be repeated, 488.

Material Certitude: simple assent is material, or interpretative, or virtual certitude, 211–12; mode of changing material certitude into certitude proper, 212; among the multitudes who are implicitly certain, there may be those who would change their assents, did they seek to place them upon an argumentative footing, 213.

Mathematician: a mathematician would not, even in questions of pure science, assent to his own con-
Mathematician: continued.

elusions, on new and difficult ground, and in the case of abstruse calculations, however often he went over his work, till he had the corroboration of other judgments besides his own, 171.

Matthew, St., 152.

Maximilian, St., 477.

Maze: it is a principle which applies to all matters on which we reason, that what is only a maze of facts, without order or drift prior to the due explanation, may, when once we have that explanation, be located and adjusted with great facility in all its separate parts, as we know is the case as regards the motions of the heavenly bodies since the hypothesis of Newton, 445–6 (vide Prophecy, Mystery, and Enigmas).

Medicine: pathology and medicine, in the interests of science, and as a protection to the practitioner, veil the shocking realities of disease and physical suffering under a notional phraseology, under the abstract terms debility, distress, irritability, paroxysm, and a host of Greek and Latin words; the arts of medicine and surgery are necessarily experimental; but for writing and conversing on these subjects they require to be stripped of the association of the facts from which they are derived, 22.

Meditation on Scripture, — vide Scripture.

"Memores conditionis nostræ," 421.

Memoria Technica: writing is a memoria technica, 261, 337.
Memory: memory consists in a present imagination of things that are past; memory retains the impressions and likenesses of what they were when before us, 23; it has to do with individual things and nothing that is not individual, 24; the memory of sights is more vivid than the memory of sounds, scents, or tastes, 24; the image supplied by the memory need not be in any sense an abstraction, 25; the apprehension which we have of our past mental acts of any kind is an apprehension of the memory of those definite acts, and therefore an apprehension of things; propositions embodying the notices of our history remain imprinted upon our memory as sharply and deeply as is any recollection of sight; such recollections may have in them an individuality and completeness which outlives the impressions made by sensible objects, 25; by means of these particular and personal experiences we attain an apprehension of what such things are at other times when we have not experience of them; and when we meet with definite propositions expressive of them, our apprehension cannot be called abstract and notional, 25–6 (vide Experience); the various images of our memory form the materials of the inventive faculty, 27–8 (vide Inventive Faculty); it is difficult to draw the line and to say where the office of the memory ends, and where abstraction takes its place, 26; our trust in the faculty of memory,—vide Faculty; it is not
always accurate, and has on that account led to the adoption of writing, as being a *memoria technica*, unaffected by the failure of mental impressions, 261, 337; there is an analogy between ratiocination and memory, though the latter may be exercised without antecedents or media, whereas the former requires them in its very idea; at the same time association has so much to do with memory, that we may not unfairly consider memory as depending on certain previous conditions, 336–7; we weaken our memory in proportion as we habituate ourselves to commit all that we wish to remember to memorandums, 337; in the case of men of strong memory in any particular subject-matter, all artificial expedients are as difficult and repulsive as the natural exercise of memory is healthy and easy to them, 337; memory, as a talent, is not one indivisible faculty, but a power of retaining and recalling the past in this or that department of our experience, not in any whatever, 340 (vide *Natural Inference*, *Virtue*, and *Phronesis*); illustrations of this, 340–1.

"Men of good will," 253.

**Mental Constitution, acceptance of, — vide Self, Being, and Man.**

**Mental Operations, introspection of, — vide Introspection.**

**Mere Assertion:** a mere assertion is the enunciation of a proposition without an apprehension of the
MERE ASSERTION: continued.

matter of the proposition, 13–14; there are many cases in which it is impossible to discriminate between assent, inference, and assertion, on account of the otiose, passive, inchoate character of the act in question, 43; belief in a mystery can be more than an assertion, 45.

MERIDA, 484.

MERITORIOUS INTERCESSION: the doctrine of meritorious intercession is proper to Natural Religion, and lightens the prophecies of evil in which it is founded; hence every religion has had its eminent devotees, exalted above the body of the people, mortified men, who have influence with the Source of good, and extend a shelter and gain blessings for those who become their clients; a belief like this is one of the most natural visions of the young and innocent, 407–8.

MESSIAH, 434, 438, 440, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 452, 457; vide JEWS, and CHRISTIANITY.

MICAIAH, 453.

MIND: the mind not only contemplates unit realities, as they exist, but has the gift, by an act of creation, of bringing before it abstractions and generalizations, which have no existence, no counterpart, out of it, 9; to compare and to contrast are among the most prominent and busy of our intellectual functions, 30; instinctively, even though unconsciously, we are ever instituting comparisons between the
Mind: continued.

Manifold phenomena of the external world, as we meet with them, criticizing, referring to a standard, collecting, analyzing them, 30; we are ever rising from particulars to generals, that is, from images to notions, 31; what is concrete exerts a force and makes an impression on the mind which nothing abstract can rival, 36; the mind is ever stimulated in proportion to the cause stimulating it, 36; enlargement of, — vide Enlargement; sometimes our mind changes so quickly, so unaccountably, so disproportionately to any tangible arguments to which the change can be referred, and with such abiding recognition of the force of the old arguments, as to suggest the suspicion that moral causes, arising out of our condition, age, company, occupations, fortunes, are at the bottom, 168; our intellectual nature is under laws, and the correlative of ascertained truth is unreserved assent, 170; it is the mind that reasons and assents, not a diagram on paper, 180 (vide Proof); habits of mind may grow, as being a something permanent and continuous, 185 (vide Assent); the mind is like a double mirror, in which reflexions of self within self multiply themselves till they are undistinguishable, and the first reflexion contains all the rest, 195: vide Objections; introspection of the operations of the mind, — vide Introspection; it is ever exposed to the danger of being carried away by the liveliness of its concep-
MIND: continued.

tions, to the sacrifice of good sense and conscientious caution, and the greater and the more rare are its gifts, the greater is the risk of swerving from the line of reason and duty, 82; it is ever active, inquisitive, penetrating; it examines doctrine and doctrine; it compares, contrasts, and forms them into a science; that science is theology, 147; no mind, however large, however penetrating, can directly and fully by one act understand any one truth, however simple, 151; the intellect, which is made for truth, can attain truth, and, having attained it, can keep it, can recognize it, and preserve the recognition, 222; it is plain that, if what may be called functional disarrangements of the intellect are to be considered fatal to the recognition of the functions themselves, then the mind has no laws whatever and no normal constitution; there is a growth in the use of those faculties by which knowledge is acquired, 232–3 (vide Act, Function, Self, and Man); the mind is in the first instance in disorder, and runs wild, 233; vide Certitude; without external symbols to mark out and to steady its course, the intellect runs wild, 263; the mind is unequal to a complete analysis of the motives which carry it on to a particular conclusion, and is swayed and determined by a body of proof, which it recognizes only as a body, and not in its constituent parts, 292; the mind itself is more versatile and vigorous than any of its works, of
which language is one, and it is only under its penetrating and subtle action that the margin disappears, which intervenes between verbal argumentation and conclusions in the concrete, 360 (vide CONCRETE); it determines what science cannot determine, the limit of converging probabilities and the reasons sufficient for a proof, 360; it is to the living mind that we must look for the means of using correctly principles of whatever kind, facts or doctrines, experiences or testimonies, true or probable, and of discerning what conclusion from these is necessary, suitable, or expedient, when they are taken for granted; and this either by means of a natural gift, or from mental formation and practice and a long familiarity with those various starting-points, 360–1 (vide MAN); an action of the mind itself is not less necessary in relation to those first elements of thought which in all reasoning are assumptions, the principles, tastes, and opinions, very often of a personal character, which are half the battle in the inference with which the reasoning is to terminate; it is the mind itself that detects them in their obscure recesses, illustrates them, establishes them, eliminates them, resolves them into simpler ideas, as the case may be; the mind contemplates them without the use of words, by a process which cannot be analyzed, 361; thus it was that Bacon separated the physical system of the world
AN INDEXED SYNOPSIS OF

MIND: continued.

from the theological; thus that Butler connected
together the moral system with the religious; logical
formulas could never have sustained the reasonings
involved in such investigations, 361; that a special
preparation of mind is required for each separate
department of inquiry and discussion (excepting
that of abstract science) is strongly insisted upon in
the Nicomachean ethics, 414.

MINDS: different minds throw different lights upon
the same theory and argument, nay, they seem to
be differing in detail when they are professing, and
in reality showing, a concurrence in it; have we
never found, that, when a friend takes up the de-
fence of what we have written or said, at first we
are unable to recognize in his statement of it what
we meant it to convey? 309 (vide LANGUAGE).

MINUCIUS: quoted, 481.

MIRACLES: though it is a matter of faith with Catholics
that miracles never cease in the Church, still that
this or that professed miracle really took place, is for
the most part only a matter of opinion, 201; philos-
ophers of the school of Hume discard the very sup-
position of miracles, and scornfully refuse to hear
evidence in their behalf in given instances, 81, 255;
Hume says that no testimony can prove a miracle,
since we have no experience of a violation of natural
laws, and much experience of the violation of truth;
but what is abstract reasoning to a question of con-
MIRACLES: continued.

to arrive at the fact of any matter, we must eschew generalities, and take things as they stand, with all their circumstances; the question is not about miracles in general, or men in general, but definitely, whether these particular miracles, ascribed to the particular Peter, James, and John, are more likely to have been or not; whether they are unlikely, supposing that there is a Power, external to the world, who can bring them about; supposing they are the only means by which He can reveal Himself to those who need a revelation; supposing He is likely to reveal Himself, etc., 306–7 (vide LAWS OF NATURE); if, as is not uncommon, unbelievers mean that the fact of an established order is absolutely fatal to the very notion of an exception, they are using a presumption as if it were a proof, 382; to the unsophisticated apprehension of the many, the successive passages of life, social or political, are so many miracles, if that is to be accounted miraculous which brings before them the immediate Divine Presence, 403; all professed revelations have been attended, in one shape or another, with the profession of miracles, 427.

MISTAKES: most men will recollect in their past years how many mistakes they have made about persons, parties, local occurrences, nations and the like, of which at the time they had no knowledge of their own: how ashamed or how amused they have since
MISTAKES: continued.
been at their own gratuitous idealism when they came into possession of the real facts concerning them, 32 (vide Error).

MODIFIED ASSENT: a modified or qualified assent is an apparent assent, 181–2.

MONAD: of the Supreme Being it is safer to use the word “monad” than unit, 51.

MONAS, 125.

MONTAIGNE, 311, 312.

MORAL BEING: truth there is, and attainable it is, but its rays stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual being; and in consequence that perception of its first principles which is natural to us is enfeebled, obstructed, perverted, by allurements of sense and the supremacy of self, and, on the other hand, quickened by aspirations after the supernatural, 311, 320 (vide Truth, Man, Criterion, and Informal Inference).

MORAL CERTITUDE: moral evidence and moral certitude are all that we can attain, not only in the case of ethical and spiritual subjects, such as religion, but of terrestrial and cosmical questions also, 318; vide Certitude.

MORAL EXPERIENCES which perpetuate themselves in images must be sought after in order to be found, and encouraged and cultivated in order to be appropriated, 87.

MOSAIC SYSTEM, 252, 432, 437, 487; vide Jews.
Moses, 185, 475.
Mount, Sermon on the, 448, 455.
Mozart, 28.
"Mundum tradidit disputationi eorum," 237.
Mure, Colonel, 364, 366, 368, 369.
Muscae Volitantes, 217.
"My kingdom is not of this world," 451.

Mystery: a mystery is a proposition conveying incompatible notions, or is a statement of the inconceivable; belief in a mystery can be more than an assertion; we can assent to it, for, unless we in some sense apprehended it, we should not recognize it to be a mystery, that is, a statement uniting incompatible notions, 45-6; words which make nonsense do not make a mystery, 46; the assent which we give to mysteries, as such, is notional assent; for, by the supposition, it is assent to propositions which we cannot conceive, 46; processes of inference, however accurate, can end in mystery; first, because our notion of a thing may be only partially faithful to the original; it may be in excess of the thing, or it may represent it incompletely, and, in consequence, it may serve for it, it may stand for it, only to a certain point, in certain cases, but no further; after that point is reached, the notion and the thing part company; this is seen familiarly in the use of metaphors, and in the use of certain scientific definitions or formulas, and in certain enigmatical sayings (vide Enigmas), and also in algebra, when applied
Mystery: continued.

to geometry (vide Algebra), 46–9; secondly, because our notions of things are sometimes a mistake ab initio; we are accustomed to subject all that exists to numeration; but to be correct, we are bound first to reduce to some level of possible comparison the things which we wish to number; this illustrated in the case of certain predicates which are applied to Napoleon, and in the case of the Angels; but this applies much more to our speculations concerning the Supreme Being (vide God), 49–50; vide Notion; our notion of space lodges us in a mystery, as also does our notion of the infinitude of the Divine Attributes, 51–2.

Mythology, Greek, was for the most part cheerful and graceful, 395.

N

Napoleon: 29, 33, 49, 50, 198, 339: his genius in military matters, 334; the arms fell from the hands of his soldiers, 428; his words on the power of the Name of the Redeemer, 490–1.

"Nascitur, non fit," 331.

Nathanael, 450.

National Defences: when the Duke of Wellington wrote his letter on the subject of the national defences, all classes of the community recognized the truth of his words; yet few could be said to see or feel that truth; but eleven years afterwards the
anger of the French colonels with us, after the attempt upon Louis Napoleon's life, transferred its facts to the charge of the imagination, 76–7.

Natural, — vide Universal.

Natural Inference: natural or material inference, i.e., the mode in which we ordinarily reason, is not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes (vide Reasoning); not only is the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedent also; to the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction; we deal with things directly, and as they stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an intrinsic and personal power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or expedient; and it is especially exemplified both in uneducated men and in men of genius, 330–1; this unscientific reasoning, being sometimes a natural, uncultivated faculty, sometimes approaching to a gift, sometimes an acquired habit and second nature, has a higher source than logical rule, — "nascitur, non fit"; when it is characterized by precision, subtlety, promptitude, and truth, it is a gift and a rarity; in ordinary minds it is biassed and degraded by prejudice, passion, and self-interest (vide Moral Being, and Truth); it comes by nature, and belongs to all of us in a measure, to women more than to men, 331; this illustrated by the instance of a peasant who is
weather-wise, of physicians who excel in the diagnosis of complaints, of a lawyer who "would know, almost by instinct, whether an accused person was or was not guilty," of experts and detectives, and of certain men who possess an intuitive perception of character, 332; sometimes this illative faculty is nothing short of genius, as in the case of Newton, of calculating boys, and of Napoleon, 333-4; such clear presentiments may be called instinct, if by instinct be understood a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving; the immediate perception of what is conducive or injurious to one's welfare, presence of mind, fathoming of motives, talent for repartee, and that divination of personal danger which is found in the young and innocent, are instances of this gift, 334-5; the grounds, on which we hold the divine origin of the Church, and the previous truths which are taught us by nature — the being of a God, and the immortality of the soul — are felt by most men to be recondite and impalpable, in proportion to their depth and reality; as we cannot see ourselves, so we cannot well see intellectual motives which are so intimately ours, and which spring up from the very constitution of our minds, 336; this is found in the case of other perceptions besides that of faith, and is illustrated in the instance of calculating boys and of men who have the gift of playing on an instrument by ear,
NATURAL INFERENCE: continued.
336; there is an analogy, in this respect, between ratiocination and memory, 336-7 (vide Memory); what is called reasoning is often only a peculiar and personal mode of abstraction; it is a power of looking at things in some particular aspect, and of determining their internal and external relations thereby; thus a word or an act on the part of another is sometimes a sudden revelation; light breaks in upon us, and our whole judgment of a course of events, or of an undertaking, is changed; another may see the objects which we are thus using, and give them quite a different interpretation, inasmuch as he abstracts another set of general notions from those same phenomena which present themselves to us also, 337-8; there is an obvious analogy between ratiocination and taste, 338 (vide Taste); this faculty of natural and spontaneous ratiocination is attached to a definite subject-matter, according to the individual; it is not so much one faculty as a collection of similar or analogous faculties under one name, there being really as many faculties as there are distinct subject-matters, 338-9, 414 (vide Virtue); thus it is almost proverbial that a hard-headed mathematician may have no head at all for what is called historical evidence; a shrewd man of business may be a bad arguer in philosophical questions, etc., 339-40; in this respect it resembles memory and virtue, 340-1 (vide Memory); instead
Natural Inference: continued.

of trusting logical science, we must trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge; and if we wish ourselves to share in their convictions and the grounds of them, we must follow their history, and learn as they have learned, 341–2.

Natural Religion: there are three main channels which Nature furnishes for our acquiring the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties towards Him, viz., our own minds, the voice of mankind, and the course of the world, that is, of human life and human affairs; these teach us the Being and Attributes of God, our responsibility to Him, our dependence on Him, our prospect of reward or punishment; the most authoritative of these three means of knowledge, as being specially our own, is our own mind, whose informations give us the rule by which we test, interpret, and correct what is presented to us for belief, whether by the universal testimony of mankind, or by the history of society and of the world, 389; vide Religion, and Conscience; wherever religion exists in a popular shape, it has almost invariably worn its dark side outwards; it is founded in one way or other on the sense of sin; and without that vivid sense it would hardly have any precepts or any observances; its many varieties all proclaim or imply that man is in a degraded, servile condition, and requires expiation, reconciliation, and some
Natural Religion: continued.
great change of nature; this is suggested to us by the accounts of a realm of light and a realm of darkness, of an elect fold and a regenerate state, by the almost ubiquitous and ever-recurring institution of a Priesthood, and by the doctrine of future punishment, and that eternal, 392, 400, 487; the most remarkable of these rites and doctrines is that of atonement, 392 (vide Atonement); these ceremonial acknowledgments imply a brighter as well as a threatening aspect of Natural Religion; for they show that men have some hope of attaining to a better condition than their present, 393–4; the religion of so-called civilization has not legitimately a part in the delineation of Natural Religion; for it is not a development of man's whole nature, but mainly of the intellect, recognizing indeed the moral sense, but ignoring the conscience; and it contradicts informants which speak with greater authority than itself, 395–6, 400; as regards the third natural informant on the subject of Religion, i.e., the system and the course of the world, with our best efforts we can only glean from it some faint and fragmentary views of God, 396–7; there is only a choice of alternatives in explanation of so critical a fact: — either there is no Creator, or He has disowned His creatures; my true informant, my burdened conscience, gives me at once the true answer: — it pronounces without any misgiving that God exists: — and it
pronounces quite as surely that I am alienated from Him; thus it solves the world's mystery, and sees in that mystery only a confirmation of its own original teaching, 397–8; vide Evil; the severe aspect of natural Religion is the most prominent aspect, because the multitude of men follow their own likings and wills, and not the decisions of their sense of right and wrong; to them Religion is a mere yoke, 400; all Religion, so far as it is genuine, is a blessing, Natural as well as Revealed, 400; troubled as are the existing relations between God and man, there are other general laws which govern those relations, and they speak another language, and compensate for what is stern in the teaching of nature, without tending to deny that sternness; the first of these laws is the very fact that religious beliefs and institutions are of such general acceptance in all times and places; men would not subject themselves to the tyranny which Lucretius denounces, unless they had either experience or hope of benefits to themselves by so doing; and hope of future good sweetens all suffering, 400–1; moreover, they have an earnest of that future in the real and recurring blessings of life, the enjoyment of the gifts of the earth, and of domestic affection and social intercourse, reminding them that they are not utterly cast off by God, 401; the great majority of men recognize the Hand of unseen power, directing
Natural Religion: continued.
in mercy or in judgment the physical and moral system; good to the good, and evil to the evil, is instinctively felt to be the universal rule of God's dealings with us; hence come the great proverbs, indigenous in both Christian and heathen nations, 402–3; the spontaneous acts and proceedings of our race, as viewed on a large field, show that prayer, as well as hope, is a constituent of man's religion; and, where prayer is, there is a natural relief and solace in all trouble, great or ordinary, 403 (vide Prayer); the contrarieties of prayers and rites do not come into the idea of religion, as such, at all, 403 (vide Universal); the Religion of Nature has not been a deduction of reason, or the joint, voluntary manifesto of a multitude meeting together and pledging themselves to each other, but it has been a tradition or an interposition vouchsafed to a people from above; the notion of a revelation is congenial to the human mind, so that the expectation of it may truly be considered an integral part of Natural Religion, 404–5; the notion of sacrifice, as well as the notion of divine interpositions, may be considered almost an integral part of the Religion of Nature, and an alleviation of its gloom, 405 (vide Sacrifice, and Atonement); the doctrine of meritorious intercession is proper to Natural Religion, and lightens the prophecies of evil in which it is founded, 407 (vide Meritorious Intercession);
Natural Religion: continued.

Natural Religion is possible to us independently of Revelation, and is the preparation for it; though in Christians themselves it cannot really be separated from their Christianity, and never is possessed in its higher forms in any people without some portion of those inward aids which Christianity imparts to us, 408; the infinite goodness of God and our own extreme misery and need are two doctrines which are the primary constituents of Natural Religion, 423 (vide Revealed Religion, and Christianity); it is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement,—it can have but one complement, and that very complement is Christianity, 487; it is based upon the sense of sin; it recognizes the disease, but it cannot find, it does but look out for the remedy; that remedy, both for guilt and for moral impotence, is found in the central doctrine of Revelation, the Mediation of Christ, 487.

Nature: laws of nature,—vide Laws of Nature; each thing has its own nature and its own history; when the nature and the history of many things are similar, we say that they have the same nature; but there is no such thing as one and the same nature; they are each of them itself, not identical, but like, 280 (vide Universals); one's own nature,—vide Self; nature and art should be combined, but sometimes they are incompatible; thus, in the case of calculating boys, it is said that to teach them the
Nature: continued.

ordinary rules of arithmetic is to endanger or to destroy the extraordinary endowment, 336; nature has an intrinsic claim upon us to be obeyed and used, 388.

Nazareth, 448.

Neptune: when the planet Neptune was discovered, it was deservedly considered a triumph of science, that abstract reasonings had done so much towards determining the planet and its orbit; there would have been no triumph in success, had there been no hazard of failure, 278; vide Jupiter.

Nero, 469.

New Testament: 449; St. John and St. Paul are the two chief writers of the New Testament, 137.


Newton: 102, 230, 298, 320, 339, 340, 341, 446; quoted, 322; the proof of his rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations was discovered by Professor Sylvester, 333.

Nicæa, Council of: 142, 144; words of, quoted, 146.

Nicene Creed: 132, 246; it is a popular form of faith, suited to every age, class, and condition; its declarations are categorical, brief, clear, elementary, of the first importance, expressive of the concrete, the objects of real apprehension, and the basis and rule of devotion, 144.

Nicolas, M., 489 note.

Niebuhr: 364, 369, 370, 371; prescription together with internal consistency was to him the evidence of fact, 365.

"No man can come to Me, except the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him," 451.

Noah, 376.

Nonsense, — vide Mystery.

North and South: quoted, 312.

Norway, 294.

"Not many wise men according to the flesh," etc., 467.

Notion: [this word is used repeatedly in the Grammar of Assent in the sense of a notional proposition]; our notion of a thing may be only partially faithful to the original, 46, 51, 52 (vide Mystery); our notions of things are never simply commensurate with the things themselves; they are aspects of them, more or less exact, and sometimes a mistake ab initio, 49, 52; the free deductions from one of these aspects necessarily contradict the free deductions from another, 52; an alleged fact is not therefore impossible because it is inconceivable; for the incompatible notions, in which consists its inconceivableness, need not each of them really belong to it in that fulness which would involve their being incompatible with each other; I deny the possibility of two straight lines enclosing a space, on the ground of its being inconceivable; but I do so because a straight line is a notion and nothing more, and not a thing to which I may have attached a notion more
Notion: continued.
or less unfaithful, 51; vide Statement of the Case.

Notional Apprehension: notional apprehension is the apprehension with which we infer or assent to notional propositions, 9, 22–3 (vide Apprehension, and Real Apprehension); in notional apprehension we regard things, not as they are in themselves, but mainly as they stand in relation to each other; "man" is no longer what he really is, an individual presented to us by our senses, but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and contrasts which we have made him suggest to us; his appellation is made to suggest, not the real being which he is in this or that specimen of himself, but a definition, 31 (vide Mind); vide Words, and Language; words which are used by an eye-witness to express things, unless he be especially eloquent or graphic, may only convey general notions; such is, and ever must be, the popular and ordinary mode of apprehending language, 33; notional and real apprehension, — vide Apprehension, Notional and Real.

Notional Assent: notional assent is an assent given to a notion, 39 (vide Notion); vide Profession, Credence, Opinion, Presumption, and Speculation; notional and real assent, — vide Assent, Notional and Real; notional assent and inference, — vide Inference and Notional Assent.

Notional Proposition: a notional proposition is a
Notional Proposition: continued.

proposition in which one or both of the terms are common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general, and non-existing, such as "Man is an animal," 9 (vide Proposition); vide Language.

Noun: the terms of a proposition do or do not stand for things; if they do, then they are singular terms, for all things that are, are units; but if they do not stand for things they must stand for notions, and are common terms; singular nouns come from experience, common from abstraction, 22–3 (vide Proposition).

"Now we believe, not for thy saying," etc., 386.

Numeration: we are accustomed to subject all that exists to numeration; but, to be correct, we are bound first to reduce to some level of possible comparison the things which we wish to number, 49 (vide Mystery).

Object: the strong object makes the apprehension strong, 36 (vide Apprehension, Apprehension, Notional and Real, and Concrete); the evidence which we have of the presence of the individual beings which surround us lies in the phenomena which address our senses, and our warrant for taking these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence (vide Substance); and so of those intellectual and moral objects which are brought
OBJECT: continued.

home to us through our senses:—that they exist, we know by instinct; that they are such and such, we apprehend from the impressions which they leave upon our minds, 102–3.

OBJECTIONS: objections, as such, have no direct force to weaken assent; but, when they multiply, they tell against the implicit reasonings or the formal inferences which are its warrant, and suspend its acts and gradually undermine its habit, 194; vide Act; objections and difficulties tell upon the mind; it may lose its elasticity, and be unable to throw them off; and thus, even as regards things which it may be absurd to doubt, we may, in consequence of some past suggestion of the possibility of error, or of some chance association to their disadvantage, be teased from time to time and hampered by involuntary questionings, as if we were not certain, when we are, 217 (vide Mind).

OBJECTIVE, — vide Truth.

"Obscurum per obscurius," 304.

Occasional Sermons, Newman's, 425 note.

OLD TESTAMENT: 393, 427, 440, 441, 448, 454; all through the Old Testament the theological formula, "The Messias is God," gives an interpretation and a persuasive power to many passages and portions, especially of the Psalms and the Prophets, 139.

OLYMPIADS, 363.

"Omnibus umbra locis," 267.
AN INDEXED SYNOPSIS OF

Omnipresence of God: from the recurring instances in which conscience acts, forcing upon us importantly the mandate of a Superior, we have fresh and fresh evidence of the existence of a Sovereign Ruler, from whom those particular dictates which we experience proceed; so that we may, by means of that induction from particular experiences of conscience, have as good a warrant for concluding the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master, as we have, from parallel experience of sense, for assenting to the fact of a multiform and vast world, material and mental, 63; this assent is notional, because we generalize a consistent, methodical form of Divine Unity and Personality with Its attributes, from particular experiences of the religious instinct, 63 (vide Conscience).

"One," as applied to God, — vide God.

Opinion: various meanings of the word, 58; opinion is used in the Grammar of Assent to denote an assent to a proposition, not as true, but as probably true, that is, to the probability of that which the proposition enunciates, 58, 175; as that probability may vary in strength without limit, so may the cogency and moment of the opinion, 58, 175 (vide Probability); opinion differs from inference in this, that, being an assent, it is independent of premisses; we have opinions which we never think of defending by argument, though, of course, we think they can be so defended; whereas inference is in its nature
Opinion: continued.

and by its profession conditional and uncertain, 59; opinion differs from credence in these two points, viz., that, while opinion explicitly assents to the probability of a given proposition, credence is an implicit assent to its truth; moreover, opinion is a reflex act; — when we take a thing for granted, we have credence in it; when we begin to reflect upon our credence, and to measure, estimate, and modify it, then we are forming an opinion, 59; it is in this sense that Catholics speak of theological opinion, in contrast with faith in dogma; it is much more than an inferential act, but it is distinct from an act of certitude; and this is really the sense which Protestants give to the word when they interpret it by conviction; for their highest opinion in religion is, generally speaking, an assent to a probability, 59.

Orator: it is the least pardonable fault in an orator to fail in clearness of style, 21.

Order: as all things in the universe are unit and individual, order implies a certain repetition, whether of things or like things, or of their affections and relations, 69; as a cause implies a will, so order implies a purpose, 72; order of nature, — vide Laws of Nature.

Organum Investigandi, 499, 316.

Origen: 483; quoted, 475–6, 486.

Originality in thinking is the discovery of an aspect
Originality: continued.

of a subject-matter, simpler, it may be, and more intelligible than any hitherto taken, 372.

Orleans Family, 456.

Orley Farm: quoted, 332.

Ourselves, — vide Self.

"Out of the eater came forth meat," etc., 48.

Oxford Spy: quoted, 47.

Paine, 378 (vide Revelation).

Palatine Hill, 219.

Palestine, 485.

Paley: Paley, in his Evidences of Christianity, postulates, for his proof of its miracles, only thus much, that, under the circumstances of the case, a revelation is not improbable; this mode of argument is like a legal proceeding, which is suspicious in questions of history or of philosophy, 424 (vide Court); men are too well inclined to sit at home, instead of stirring themselves to inquire whether a revelation has been given; they expect its evidences to come to them without their trouble; they act, not as suppliants, but as judges; modes of argument such as Paley's, encourage this state of mind; they allow men to forget that revelation is a boon, not a debt on the part of the Giver; they treat it as a mere historical phenomenon, 425–6 (vide Truth, Conscientiousness, and Moral Being); he argues on
Paley: continued.

the principle that the credentials, which ascertain for us a message from above, are necessarily in their nature miraculous, 427; quoted, on the appeal to miraculous power made by the early Christian writers, 460–1.

Pantaleon, St., 201.

Pantheistic Science, 241.

Parliament, 173.

Parnell: poem of, referred to, 421.

Parson, 32.

Parthenon, 219.

Pascal: 230; on the establishment of Christianity, 307–8; on scepticism, 310–11.

Pathology, — vide Medicine.

Paul, St.: 137, 200, 250, 252, 423, 452, 469; quoted, 453, 466, 467; how burning are St. Paul’s words when he speaks of our Lord’s crucifixion and death! what is the secret of that flame, but this dogmatic sentence, “The Son is God”? why should the death of the Son be more awful than any other death, except that He, though man, was God? 139; St. Paul at Athens appeals to the “Unknown God,” 388.

“Peace to men of good will,” 415.

Peasant who is weather-wise may yet be simply unable to assign intelligible reasons why he thinks it will be fine to-morrow, 332.

Peel, Sir Robert: 91, 93; quoted, 94.

Penny Cyclopædia: quoted, 392–3.
Pentecost: the breviary offices for Pentecost and its Octave are the grandest, perhaps, in the whole year, 140.

Πεταδευμένος investigator, 498.

Perception: let the proposition to which the assent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it to be, that is, objectively true as well as subjectively: — then the assent may be called a perception, 195–6.

Peregrinus, 462.

Perpetua, St., 477.

Persistence of certitude, 220 (vide Indefectibility).

Personal: a proof, except in abstract demonstration, has always in it, more or less, an element of the personal, 317, 320 (vide Proof, Moral Being, and Truth); men become personal when logic fails, 369 (vide Logic).

Persons: all concrete laws are general, and persons, as such, do not fall under laws, 255 (vide Individual); vide Heart.

Petavius: quoted, 422 note.

Peter, St.: 467, 469; quoted, 466.

Peter, boy of the imperial bedchamber, 484.

Peveril of the Peak: quoted, 335.

Phenomena: the evidence which we have of the presence of the individual beings which surround us lies in the phenomena which address our senses, and our warrant for taking these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence, 102 (vide
**Phenomena: continued.**

Substance, and Instinct); the phenomena are as if pictures; but at the same time they give us no exact measure or character of the unknown things beyond them; when we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived through the senses, we mean a certain representation, true as far as it goes, but not adequate, 103 (vide Object); phenomena of conscience, — vide Conscience.

Phidias, 357.

Philanthropist, 32.

Philip, 10.

Philippi, 10.

Phillipps' Law of Evidence: quoted, 324.

Philopatris, the author of: quoted, 468.

Philosopher: in a philosopher it is a merit even to be not utterly vague, inchoate, and obscure in his teaching, and if he fails even of this low standard of language, we remind ourselves that his obscurity perhaps is owing to his depth, 21 (vide Psychology); I have no confidence in philosophers who cannot help being religious, and are Christians by implication; they sit at home, and reach forward to distances which astonish us; but they hit without grasping, and are sometimes as confident about shadows as about realities, 93 (vide Paley); a philosopher should so anticipate the application, and guard the enunciation of his principles, as to secure them against the risk of their being made to
change places with each other, to defend what he is eager to denounce, and to condemn what he finds it necessary to sanction, 164; an idea has possessed certain philosophers that miracles are an infringement and disfigurement of the beautiful order of nature; and there is a persuasion, common among political and literary men, that the Catholic Church is inconsistent with the true interests of the human race; a renunciation of these imaginations is not a change in certitudes, 255; vide Lawyer.

PHILOSOPHY: no religion yet has been a religion of physics or of philosophy, 96 (vide Knowledge, and Science); the so-called religion of civilization and philosophy is a great mockery, 400; for it has no sympathy either with the hopes and fears of the awakened soul, or with those frightful presentiments which are expressed in the worship and traditions of the heathen, 396 (vide Natural Religion).

PHRONESIS: Aristotle calls the faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct by the name of phronesis, or judgment, 353–4 (vide Conduct); it is the regulating principle of every one of the virtues, 356; properly speaking, there are as many kinds of phronesis as there are virtues; for the judgment, good sense, or tact which is conspicuous in a man's conduct in one subject-matter is not necessarily traceable in another; he may be great in one aspect of his character, and little-minded in another,
Phronesis: continued.
356-7 (vide Memory, Virtue, and Natural Inference).
Φρόνησις, 353 note.

Physician: there are physicians who excel in the diagnosis of complaints; though it does not follow from this, that they could defend their decision in a particular case against a brother physician who disputed it; they are guided by natural acuteness and varied experience; they have their own idiosyncratic modes of observing, generalizing, and concluding; when questioned, they can but rest on their own authority, or appeal to the future event, 332.

Pilate, 37, 469.
Pindar, 22, 250.

Pius IV, Pope: 290; the Creed of Pope Pius IV prescribes the general rule of faith against the heresies of these latter times, 134.

Pliny: 470, 476; quoted, 471, 472.

Plurality of Worlds, controversy about, 201, 383.

Poet: to fail in clearness of style is the most pardonable fault of a poet, 21; true poetry is a spontaneous outpouring of thought, and therefore belongs to rude as well as to gifted minds, whereas no one becomes a poet merely by the canons of criticism, 331.


Polycarp: quoted, 480.
Polytheist, — vide Greek.
Pompey, 27.
Pontifex Maximus, 10.
Pontus, 470.
Pope, 298.
Pope, The, 199.
Portent: a second portent does not obliterate a first, 435.
Portugal, 304.
Potamæna, words of, 483.
Prætorium, 484.
Prayer: prayer is essential to religion, and, where prayer is, there is a natural relief and solace in all trouble, great or ordinary; it is not less general in mankind at large than is faith in Providence; it has ever been in use, both as a personal and as a social practice, 403; as prayer is the voice of man to God, so Revelation is the voice of God to man, 404.
"Preach the kingdom of heaven," 451.
"Preach to all nations, beginning with Jerusalem," 451.
Predestination, — vide Augustine, St.
Predicate: I apprehend a proposition, when I apprehend its predicate, 14 (vide Proposition).
Prejudice: prejudice hinders assent to the most incontrovertible proofs, 169; it implies strong assents to the disadvantage of its object; that is, it en-
Prejudice: continued.
courages such assents, and guards them from the chance of being lost, 185; our first assents, right or wrong, are often little more than prejudices; the reasonings, which precede and accompany them, though sufficient for their purpose, do not rise up to the importance and energy of the assents themselves, 194; prejudice is an assent previous to rational grounds, 258; it may be indefectible, 258 (vide Indefectibility).

Presumption: presumption is an assent to first principles, 60 (vide Principles, First); it is a notional assent, 42; vide Assumptions.

Presumptive Assent, — vide Prima Facie Assent.
“Pride will have a fall,” 20.

Priest: 32; wherever there is a priest, there is the notion of sin, pollution, and retribution, as, on the other hand, of intercession and mediation, 392.

Priestley, 339.

Prima Facie Assent: a presumptive or prima facie assent is an assent to an antecedent probability of a fact, not to the fact itself, 181–2.

Principia, Newton’s, 320, 340.

Principles, First: first principles are the propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter, 60; they are elementary truths prior to reasoning, 65; without them there can be no conclusions at all, 237; they are very numerous, and vary in great measure with the persons who reason,
Principles, First: continued.

being received by some minds, not by others, and only a few of them received universally; they are all of them notions, 60; our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory is not a first principle, 60–1 (vide Faculty); the proposition, that there are things existing external to ourselves, is a first principle, and one of universal reception, 61 (vide External World); the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master is a first principle, 63 (vide Omnipresence); "There is a right and a wrong," "a true and a false," "a just and an unjust," "a beautiful and a deformed"; these so-called first principles are really conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences, not elementary truths prior to reasoning, 64–5; the belief in causation is an assent to a first principle, 66 (vide Causation); the uniformity of the laws of nature is another first principle or notion, derived by us from experience, 68 (vide Laws of Nature); first principles are the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common measure of minds, — in which lies the whole problem of attaining to truth, — and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates because they are evident in no other way, 269–70 (vide Logic); when there is any difficulty in the investigation of truth, that difficulty commonly lies in determining first principles, not in the arrangement of proofs, 270.
Probabilities: vide Informal Inference, and Certitude; a cumulation of probabilities, over and above their implicit character, will vary both in their number and their separate estimated value, according to the particular intellect which is employed upon it, 293; from the nature of the case, and from the constitution of the human mind, certitude is the result of arguments which, taken in the letter, and not in their full implicit sense, are but probabilities, 293; vide Proof, and Mind; from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude, 411.

Probability: the degrees of probability are infinite, 175, 58 (vide Opinion, Assent, and Inference); vide Certitude; on subjects beyond the elementary points of knowledge the reasonings and conclusions of mankind vary; and prudent men in consequence seldom speak confidently, unless they are warranted to do so by genius, great experience, or some special qualification; they determine their judgments by what is probable, what is safe, what promises best, what has verisimilitude, what impresses and sways them, 237; hence it is that it is common to call probability the guide of life; this saying, when properly explained, is true; however, it is far from true, if we so hold it as to forget that without first principles there can be no conclusions at all, and that thus probability does in some sense presuppose and require the existence of truths which are cer-
Probability: continued.

tain, 237, 239 (vide Principles, First); a decent reverence for the Supreme Being, an acquiescence in the claims of Revelation, a general profession of Christian doctrine, and some sort of attendance on sacred ordinances, is in fact all the religion that is usual with even the better sort of men, and for all this a sufficient basis may certainly be found in probabilities, 237–8 (vide Religion); it is on no probability that we are constantly receiving the informations and dictates of sense and memory, of our intellectual instincts, of the moral sense, and of the logical faculty; it is on no probability that we receive the generalizations of science, and the great outlines of history; these are certain truths, 239; we have a direct and conscious knowledge of our Maker, His attributes, His providences, acts, works, and will, from nature, and revelation; and, beyond this knowledge, lies the large domain of theology, metaphysics, and ethics, on which it is not allowed to us to advance beyond probabilities, or to attain to more than an opinion, 239–40.

Probable, — vide Probability.

"Probitas laudatur et alget," 77.

Profession: profession is an assent so feeble and superficial, as to be little more than an assertion, 42 (vide Mere Assertion); it is a notional assent, 42; such are the assents made upon habit and without reflection; such again are the assents of men of
Profession: continued.

wavering, restless minds, who take up and then abandon beliefs so readily, so suddenly, as to make it appear that they had no view on the matter they professed, and did not know to what they assented or why, 42; when men say they have no doubt of a thing, this is a case, in which it is difficult to determine whether they assent to it, infer it, or consider it highly probable; many a disciple of a philosophical school, who talks fluently, does but assert, when he seems to assent to the dicta of his master, 43; vide Formalism; it is thus that political and religious watchwords are created, 43; this is the way in which men in general adopt the "ipse dixit" of an eminent scientific authority, 44; inference also may impose on us assents which in themselves are little better than assertions, for instance, that the stars are not less than billions of miles distant from the earth, 45; belief in a mystery can be more than an assertion, 45 (vide Mystery).

Professions: various callings and professions give scope to the exercise of great talents, which are matured, not by mere rule, but by personal skill and sagacity, 357.

Progress: man is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good, 349, 233; vide Man; the progress of which man's nature is capable is a development, not a destruction of its original state; it must subserve the elements from
Progress: continued.

which it proceeds, in order to be a true development and not a perversion, 395–6 (vide Natural Religion).

Proof: I may have a difficulty in the management of a proof, while I remain unshaken in my adherence to the conclusion, 180 (vide Assent, and Logic); a body of proof, or a line of argument, may produce a distinct, nay, a dissimilar effect, as addressed to one or to the other of two minds, 302; what to one intellect is a proof is not so to another, 293 (vide Probabilities); a proof, except in abstract demonstration, has always in it, more or less, an element of the personal, 317; the language in common use, when concrete conclusions are in question, implies this; we are considered to feel, rather than to see, its cogency; and we decide, not that the conclusion must be, but that it cannot be otherwise; we say that we do not see our way to doubt it, that it is impossible to doubt, that we are bound to believe it, that we should be idiots, if we did not believe; phrases such as these signify that we have arrived at these conclusions — not ex opere operato, by a scientific necessity independent of ourselves, — but by the action of our own minds, by our own individual perception of the truth in question, under a sense of duty to those conclusions and with an intellectual conscientiousness, 317–18 (vide Truth); a proof is the limit of converging probabilities, 321
Proof: continued.
(vide Informal Inference); reason never bids us be certain except on an absolute proof; and such a proof can never be furnished to us by the logic of words, for as certitude is of the mind, so is the act of inference which leads to it, 345, 353 (vide Criterion); vide Argument, and Man.

Propaganda, 462.

Prophecy: the event is the true key to prophecy, and reconciles conflicting and divergent descriptions by embodying them in one common representative, 446 (vide Mystery, and Enigmas).

"Prophesied of him evil," 453.

Prophets, 139, 448, 452, 453.

Proposition: there are three modes of enunciating a proposition: it may be categorical, conditional, or interrogative; the categorical makes an assertion, and implies the absence of any condition or reservation; the conditional expresses a conclusion, and implies its dependence on other propositions; the interrogative asks a question, and implies the possibility of an affirmative or negative resolution of it, 3; a proposition, which starts with being a question, may become a conclusion, and then be changed into an assertion, 3–4; an assertion is as distinct from a conclusion, as a word of command is from a persuasion or recommendation; command and assertion dispense with, discard, ignore, antecedents of
Proposition: continued.

any kind; they both carry with them the pretension of being personal acts, 4; these three modes of putting a proposition may co-exist as regards one and the same subject, 4. There are three modes of holding a proposition, viz., assent, inference, and doubt, corresponding to assertion, conclusion, and question, 5; propositions, while they are the material of the three enunciations, are also the objects of the three corresponding mental acts, 5; the three mental acts are, with reference to one and the same proposition, distinct from each other, 5; when they are severally carried out into the intellectual habits of an individual, they become the principles and notes of three distinct states or characters of mind; for instance, in the case of Revealed Religion, according as one or other of these is paramount within him, a man is a sceptic as regards it; or a philosopher, thinking it more or less probable considered as a conclusion of reason; or he has an unhesitating faith in it, and is recognized as a believer, 6; in all minds there is a certain co-existence of these distinct acts; that is, of two of them, for we can at once infer and assent, though we cannot at once either assent or infer and also doubt, 6; these three acts are all natural to the mind, 6; it is possible, it is common in the particular case, to err in the exercise of them; but such errors of the individual belong to the individual, not to his nature, and cannot avail to
forfeit for him his natural right, under proper circumstances, to doubt, or to infer, or to assent, 7 (vide Act); vide Assent and Inference. The apprehension of a proposition is twofold, notional and real, 9–10 (vide Apprehension, Notional Apprehension, and Real Apprehension); the terms of a proposition sometimes stand for certain ideas existing in our own minds, and for nothing outside of them; sometimes for things simply external to us, brought home to us through the experiences and informations we have of them, 9; notional proposition, — vide Notional Proposition; real proposition, — vide Real Proposition; assent to a notional proposition, — vide Notional Assent; assent to a real proposition, — vide Real Assent; the same proposition may have a notional sense as used by one man, and a real as used by another, 10, 26; as the multitude of common nouns have originally been singular, it is not surprising that many of them should so remain still in the apprehension of particular individuals, 11; in the same mind and at the same time, the same proposition may express both what is notional and what is real; when a lecturer in mechanics or chemistry shows to his class by experiment some physical fact, he and his hearers at once enunciate it as an individual thing before their eyes, and also as generalized by their minds into a law of nature, 11; I apprehend a
Proposition: continued.

proposition, when I apprehend its predicate; the subject itself need not be apprehended per se in order to a genuine assent: for it is the very thing which the predicate has to elucidate, 14; there are three directions, which among others the assent may take, viz., assent immediately to a proposition itself, assent to its truth, and assent both to its truth and to the ground of its being true; in each of these there is one and the same absolute adhesion of the mind to the proposition, 16 (vide Assent); yet, though these assents are all unreserved, still they certainly differ in strength, 16–17 (vide Assent, Notional and Real); this illustrated by the instance of a child assenting to his mother's veracity; her veracity and authority is to him no abstract truth or item of general knowledge, but is bound up with that image and love of her person which is part of himself, and makes a direct claim on him for his summary assent to her general teachings, 17; without a proposition or thesis there can be no assent, no belief, at all, 119, 120–1 (vide Religion).

Protectionist, 85.

Protestant: vide Opinion; account of the conversion of three Protestants, one to Catholicism, one to Unitarianism, and one to Atheism, 245–7; in none of these cases need a certitude be lost, 247; each of the three men started with just one certitude, and he carried it out and carried it with him into a new
THE GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

Protestant: continued.

system of belief; he has indeed made serious additions to his initial ruling principle, but he has lost no conviction of which he was originally possessed, 247; the conversion of a Protestant to the Catholic Church and back again to Protestantism need not entail a loss of certitude, 247–8; if certain Protestants were to take up the profession of Islam, it would not be a proof of the defectibility of certitude, 248–9; the deep prejudice now existing against the Church among Protestants, if abandoned, is no evidence that certitude can fail, 254.

Protestantism: 244, 245, 251; the fundamental dogma of Protestantism is the exclusive authority of Holy Scripture, 243; vide Protestant.

Proverbs: good to the good, and evil to the evil, is instinctively felt to be, even from what we see, the universal rule of God's dealings with us; hence come the great proverbs, indigenous in both Christian and heathen nations, that punishment is sure, though slow, that murder will out, that treason never prospers, that pride will have a fall, that honesty is the best policy, and that curses fall on the heads of those who utter them, 402–3.

Providence: 56; God's Providence is nearly the only doctrine held with a real assent by the mass of religious Englishmen, 57 (vide England, Church of); the great majority of men recognize the Hand of unseen power, directing in mercy or in judgment
Providence: continued.
the physical and moral system, 402; vide Proverbs; it is difficult to trace the path and to determine the scope of Divine Providence, 421 (vide Vengeance); when we are about to pass judgment on the dealings of Providence with other men, we shall do well to consider first His dealings with ourselves; and we know that He has ever been good to us, and not severe, 421.

"Proximus sum egomet mihi," 61.
Prudence is not a constituent part of our nature, but a personal endowment, 317.
Prudent Men seldom speak confidently on subjects which lie beyond the elementary points of knowledge, unless they are warranted to do so by genius, great experience, or some special qualification, 237 (vide Probability).
Prudentius, Hymn of: quoted, 477.
Prussia, 304.
Psalmist, 452.
Psalms, 139.
"Psalmus Quicunque": the Athanasian Creed has sometimes been called the "Psalmus Quicunque," 133.
Psalter, 118.
Psychology: no power of words in a lecturer would be sufficient to make psychology easy to his hearers; if they are to profit by him, they must throw their minds into the matters in discussion, must accom-
Psychology: continued.
pany his treatment of them with an active, personal concurrence, and interpret for themselves, as he proceeds, the dim suggestions and adumbrations of objects, which he has a right to presuppose, while he uses them, as images existing in their apprehension as well as in his own, 21.

Punishment: all human suffering is in its last resolution the punishment of sin, and punishment implies a Judge and a rule of justice, 407 (vide Atonement).

Pyramids, 219.
Pyrrhonist, 311.
Pyrrhus, 363.

Q

Qualified Assent: a modified or qualified assent is an apparent assent, 181–2.

"Quem tu Melpomene," 296.

Question: propositions take an interrogative form when they ask a question, 3 (vide Proposition); a question is the expression of a doubt, 5.

R

"Racked, mocked, stoned, cut asunder, they wandered about," etc., 453.

Rafael, 357.

Raleigh, 276.

Rash Judgment is an assent made without rational grounds, 258.
Ratiocination, — vide Reasoning.

Ratiocinative Faculty: vide Natural Inference; it not unfrequently happens, that while the keenness of the ratiocinative faculty enables a man to see the ultimate result of a complicated problem in a moment, it takes years for him to embrace it as a truth, and to recognize it as an item in the circle of his knowledge, 169; this faculty, as it is actually found in us, proceeds from concrete to concrete, 338; the ratiocinative faculty, as found in individuals, is not a general instrument of knowledge, but has its province, or is what may be called departmental; it is not so much one faculty, as a collection of similar or analogous faculties under one name, there being really as many faculties as there are distinct subject-matters, though in the same person some of them may, if it so happen, be united, 339 (vide Memory).

Rationality: a man differs from a brute, not in rationality only, but in all that he is, even in those respects in which he is most like a brute, 282 (vide Nature); we are conscious of the objects of external nature, and we reflect and act upon them, and this consciousness, reflection, and action we call our rationality, 346 (vide Man).

Real and Notional Assent, — vide Assent, Notional and Real.

Real Apprehension: real apprehension is the apprehension of a real proposition, 10, 22–3 (vide Propo-
REAL APPREHENSION: continued.

situation, and Real Proposition); it is in the first instance an experience or information about the concrete, 23 (vide Apprehension, and Notional Apprehension); real apprehension, as such, does not impel to action, any more than notional; but it excites and stimulates the affections and passions, by bringing facts home to them as motive causes; thus it indirectly brings about what the apprehension of large principles, of general laws, or of moral obligations, never could effect, 12 (vide Imagination, and Affections); real apprehension is supplied, (1) by our bodily senses or our mental sensations or indirectly by means of a picture or even a narrative, (2) by the memory, (3) by means of the inventive faculty, 23–9; no description, however complete, could convey to my mind an exact likeness of a tune or an harmony, which I have never heard; and still less of a scent, which I have never smelt; and quite as difficult is it to create or to apprehend by description images of mental facts, of which we have no direct experience, 28; as regards the affections and passions of our nature, they are sui generis respectively, and incommensurable, and must be severally experienced in order to be apprehended really, 29; notional and real apprehension, — vide Apprehension, Notional and Real.

REAL ASSENT: real assent is an assent to a real proposition, 214; in real assents the mind is directed
Real Assent: continued.

towards things, represented by the impressions which they have left on the imagination, 75; it is in itself an intellectual act, of which the object is presented to it by the imagination, 89; the fact of the distinctness of the images, which are required for real assent, is no warrant for the existence of the objects which those images represent, 80 (vide Image, and Imagination); assent, however strong, and accorded to images however vivid, is not therefore necessarily practical, 82, 89 (vide Affections); real assent, as the experience which it presupposes, is proper to the individual, and, as such, thwarts rather than promotes the intercourse of man with man; it cannot be reckoned on, anticipated, accounted for, inasmuch as it is the accident of this man or that, 83–4 (vide Individual); images which are possessed in common, with their apprehensions and assents, may nevertheless be personal characteristics; an image, though the same in several minds, would in each case be so idiosyncratic in its circumstances, that it would stand by itself, a special formation, unconnected with any law; though at the same time it would necessarily be a principle of sympathy and a bond of intercourse between those whose minds had been thus variously wrought into a common assent, far stronger than could follow upon any multitude or mere notions which they unanimously held, 86–7; real assents are sometimes called beliefs, convictions,
Real Assent: continued.
certitudes, 87; as given to moral objects, they are perhaps as rare as they are powerful, 87–8; till we have them, in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions, we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies, and wandering lights, whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or religion; these beliefs, be they true or false in the particular case, form the mind out of which they grow, and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views, and is one secret of persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world; they create, as the case may be, heroes and saints, great leaders, statesmen, preachers, and reformers, the pioneers of discovery in science, visionaries, fanatics, knight-errants, demagogues, and adventurers, 88 (vide Action of Life); the images in which real assent lives, representing as they do the concrete, have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions, and by means of these indirectly become operative, 89 (vide Image); belief, being concerned with things concrete, has for its objects, not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful, useful, admirable, heroic; objects which kindle devotion, rouse the passions, and attach the affections; and thus it leads the way to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and the formation of
Real Assent: continued.
character, and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal, 90–1; an assent to a fact, with an imaginative apprehension of it, requires a present experience or memory of the fact, 102; it is assent, pure and simple, which is the motive cause of great achievements; it is a confidence, growing out of instincts rather than arguments, stayed upon a vivid apprehension, and animated by a transcendent logic, more concentrated in will and in deed for the very reason that it has not been subjected to any intellectual development, 216 (vide Certitude).

Real Presence: the dogma of the Real Presence, which is easy to popular apprehension, is necessarily absent from all of the ante-Nicene Symbols; but the omission is owing to the ancient "Disciplina Arcani," which withheld the Sacred Mystery from catechumens and heathen, to whom the Creed was known, 145; 245, 488.

Real Proposition: a real proposition is a proposition which is composed of singular nouns, and of which the terms stand for things external to us, unit and individual, 9–10 (vide Proposition).

Realization: on only few subjects have any of us the opportunity of realizing in our minds what we speak and hear about; and we fancy that we are doing justice to individual men and things by making them a mere synthesis of qualities, as if any number
Realization: continued.
whatever of abstractions would, by being fused to-
together, be equivalent to one concrete, 33 (vide 
Language).
Reason: the heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, 92 (vide Heart); in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason, 121 (vide Sentiment); reason never bids us be certain except on an absolute proof, 345 (vide Certitude, and Proof); reason need not come first and faith second (though this is the logical order), but one and the same teaching is in different aspects both object and proof, and elicits one complex act both of inference and of assent, 492 (vide Christianity).
Reasoning: vide Inference; impressions lead to action, and reasonings lead from it, 95 (vide Conclusion); instances and patterns, not logical reasonings, are the living conclusions which alone have a hold over the affections or can form the character, 97; errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings, not to give up reasoning, but to reason with greater caution; it is absurd to break up the whole structure of our knowledge, which is the glory of the human intellect, because the intellect is not infallible in its conclusions, 230 (vide Error); trust in the faculty of reasoning, — vide Faculty; we reason, when we hold this by virtue of that, 259; our reasoning ordi-
narily presents itself to our mind as a simple act,
Reasoning: continued.

not a process or series of acts; we apprehend the antecedent and then apprehend the consequent, without explicit recognition of the medium connecting the two, as if by a sort of direct association of the first thought with the second; we proceed by a sort of instinctive perception, from premiss to conclusion; instinctive, because ordinarily, or at least often, it acts by a spontaneous impulse, as prompt and inevitable as the exercise of sense and memory, 259–60, 330; nor is there any antecedent ground for determining that it will not be as correct in its informations as it is instinctive, as trustworthy as are sensible perception and memory, 260; if we may justly regard the universe, according to the meaning of the word, as one whole, we may also believe justly that to know one part of it is necessarily to know much more than that one part; but if this *summa rerum* is thus one whole, it must be constructed on definite principles and laws, the knowledge of which will enlarge our capacity of reasoning about it in particulars; — thus we are led on to aim at determining, on a large scale and on system, what even gifted or practised intellects are only able by their own personal vigour to reach piecemeal and fitfully, that is, at substituting scientific methods, such as all may use, for the action of individual genius, 260–1; it becomes a necessity, if it be possible, to analyze the process of reasoning, and to invent a
Reasoning: continued.

method which may act as a common measure between mind and mind, as a means of joint investigation, and as a recognized intellectual standard,—a standard such as to secure us against hopeless mistakes, and to emancipate us from the capricious *ipse dixit* of authority, 262; one such method is geometry; another is algebra; a more ambitious because a more comprehensive contrivance still, for interpreting the concrete world is the method of logical inference, 262; ratiocination, restricted and put into grooves, is what Newman calls inference, and the science, which is its regulating principle, is logic, 263 (vide Formal Inference); in concrete reasonings we judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles, 302 (vide Criterion, Truth, and Informal Inference); our most natural mode of reasoning is, not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes; whether the consequents, at which we arrive from the antecedents with which we start, lead us to assent or only towards assent, those antecedents commonly are not recognized by us as subjects for analysis; nay, often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all, 330–1 (vide Natural Inference); vide Illative Sense.

Re-Consideration of a question which has already been definitely determined need not abruptly un-
Re-Consideration: continued.
settle the existing certitude of those who engage in it, or throw them into a scepticism about things in general, even though eventually they find they have been wrong in a particular matter, 230 (vide Certitude).

Reflex Assent: a reflex assent is an assent which must be made consciously and deliberately, 189; it is an assent to an assent, 195 (vide Conviction); reflex assent of certitude, — vide Certitude.

Reflexion: the mind is like a double mirror, in which reflexions of self within self multiply themselves till they are undistinguishable, and the first reflexion contains all the rest, 195, 255.

Reformation, 245.

Reformers, — vide Action of Life.

Religion: Religion is the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties towards Him, 389; Catholic Religion, — vide Church; Natural Religion, — vide Natural Religion; Revealed Religion, — vide Revealed Religion, and Christianity; religion, as being personal, should be real; such it is with Catholic populations, and with quasi-Catholic as those of Russia, and with the members of old Calvinism and of Evangelical Religion, 55–6; but, except within a small range of subjects, it commonly is not real in England, 55 (vide England, Church of); no one will die for his own calculations: he dies for realities; this is why a literary religion is so little to
Religion: continued.

be depended upon; it looks well in fair weather; but its doctrines are opinions, and, when called to suffer for them, it slips them between its folios, or burns them at its hearth, 93; life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof, 94–5; if we commence with scientific knowledge and argumentative proof, or lay any great stress upon it as the basis of personal Christianity, or attempt to make man moral and religious by libraries and museums, let us in consistency take chemists for our cooks, and mineralogists for our masons, 95–6; no religion yet has been a religion of physics or of philosophy; it has ever been synonymous with revelation; it never has been a deduction from what we know; it has ever been an assertion of what we are to believe; it has never lived in a conclusion; it has ever been a message, a history, or a vision, 96 (vide Knowledge, and Science); the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion, 117; to give us a clear and sufficient object for our faith, is one main purpose of the supernatural Dispensations of Religion, 118; there is no contrariety or antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion, 120; propositions may and must be used, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts; again, they are useful in their dogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths,
Religion: continued.

on which the religious imagination has to rest; knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections; devotion must have its objects; those objects, as being supernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions; the formula, which embodies a dogma for the theologian, readily suggests an object for the worshipper, 120–1 (vide Devotion, and Reason); theology may stand as a substantive science, though it be without the life of religion; but religion cannot maintain its ground at all without theology, 121 (vide Dogmatic Theology); religion demands more than an assent to its truth; it requires a certitude, or at least an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand; without certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession and of observance, but there can be no habit of prayer, no directness of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-sacrifice, 220, 238 (vide Probability, Certitude, and Material Certitude); to accept a religion is neither a simple assent to it nor a complex, 243 (vide Indefectibility); a change of religion does not imply a change of conviction or a failure of certitude, 243–55; vide Church; the great fundamental truths of religion may be proved and defended by an array of invincible logical arguments, but such is not commonly the method in which these
same logical arguments make their way into our minds; the attempts to argue, on the part of an individual *hic et nunc*, will sometimes only confuse his apprehension of sacred objects, and subtracts from his devotion quite as much as it adds to his knowledge, 336 (vide *Natural Inference*); vide Religious; Evidences of Religion,— vide Paley, and Egotism; vide *Natural Religion*, and Conscience; by the dictate of nature we are not justified, in the case of concrete reasoning and especially of religious inquiry, in waiting till logical demonstration is ours, 412 (vide *Truth*); no religion is from God which contradicts our sense of right and wrong, 419; vide *Revealed Religion*, and Christianity.

Religious: not even are idolaters and heathen out of the range of some religious truths and their correlative certitudes, 250 (vide Greek); why men differ so widely from each other in religious and moral perceptions,— vide *Statement of the Case*; as regards religious and ethical inquiries we can effect little, however much we exert ourselves, without the Blessing of God; for, as if on set purpose, He has made this path of thought rugged and circuitous above other investigations, that the very discipline inflicted on our minds in finding Him may mould them into due devotion to Him when He is found; certainly we need a clue into the laby-
Religious: continued.

rith which is to lead us to Him; and who among us can hope to seize upon the true starting-points of thought for that enterprise, and upon all of them, who is to understand their right direction, to follow them out to their just limits, and duly to estimate, adjust, and combine the various reasonings in which they issue, so as safely to arrive at what it is worth any labour to secure, without a special illumination from Himself? 352 (vide Truth).

"Remember our Creator in the days of our youth," 123.

Representations of any kind are in their own nature pleasurable, whether they be true or not, whether they come to us, or do not come, as true, 205.

"Resist not evil," 452.

"Retro Satana," 199.

Revealed Religion: the fact of revelation is in itself demonstrably true, but it is not therefore true irresistibly; else, how comes it to be resisted? light is a quality of matter, as truth is of Christianity; but light is not recognized by the blind, and there are those who do not recognize truth, from the fault, not of truth, but of themselves, 410; the argument Newman adopts to prove Christianity is that of an accumulation of various probabilities, 411 (vide Probabilities, and Concrete); the providence and intention of God enters into his reasoning, 412; instead of saying that the truths of Revelation
Revealed Religion: continued.

depend on those of Natural Religion, it is more pertinent to say that belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural; belief is a state of mind; belief generates belief; states of mind correspond to each other; the habits of thought and the reasonings which lead us on to a higher state of belief than our present are the very same which we already possess in connexion with the lower state, 413; one of the most important effects of Natural Religion on the mind, in preparation for Revealed, is the anticipation which it creates, that a Revelation will be given; that earnest desire of it, which religious minds cherish, leads the way to the expectation of it, 422–3; when our attention is roused, then the more steadily we dwell upon it, the more probable does it seem that a revelation has been or will be given to us; this presentiment is founded on our sense, on the one hand, of the infinite goodness of God, and, on the other, of our own extreme misery and need (vide Natural Religion); it is difficult to put a limit to the legitimate force of this antecedent probability; some minds will feel it to be so powerful as to recognize in it almost a proof, without direct evidence, of the divinity of a religion claiming to be the true, supposing its history and doctrine are free from positive objection, and there be no rival religion with plausible claims of its own, 423; vide Christianity, and Revelation.
"Revelatio revelata," 387.

**Revelation:** vide Religion, and Revealed Religion; Butler quoted on the proof of Revelation, 319–20; an argument has been often put forward by unbelievers, I think by Paine, to this effect, that "a revelation, which is to be received as true, ought to be written on the sun"; Catholic populations would not be averse, *mutatis mutandis*, to admitting this; till these last centuries, the Visible Church was, at least to her children, the light of the world, as conspicuous as the sun in the heavens; and the Creed was written on her forehead, and proclaimed through her voice, by a teaching as precise as it was emphatical; the Church does not fail in this manifestation of the truth now, any more than in former times, though the clouds have come over the sun; for what she has lost in her appeal to the imagination, she has gained in philosophical cogency, by the evidence of her persistent vitality; so far is clear, that if Paine's aphorism has a *prima facie* force against Christianity, it owes this advantage to the miserable deeds of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 378; the Gospel Revelation carries with it the evidence of its divinity, 386; a revelation might have been really given, yet without credentials; thus portions of revealed truth overflow and penetrate into heathen countries, without their populations knowing whence those truths came, 386; but the very idea of Christianity in its profes-
Revelation: continued.

The grammar of assent and history is a "Revelatio revelata"; it is a definite message from God to man distinctly conveyed by His chosen instruments, and to be received as such a message; and therefore to be positively acknowledged, embraced, and maintained as true, on the ground of its being divine, not as true on intrinsic grounds, not as probably true, or partially true, but as absolutely certain knowledge, certain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain, because it comes from Him who neither can deceive nor be deceived, 386–7; the matter of revelation is not a mere collection of truths, not a philosophical view, not a religious sentiment or spirit, not a special morality; but an authoritative teaching, which bears witness to itself and keeps itself together as one, in contrast to the assemblage of opinions on all sides of it, and speaks to all men, as being ever and everywhere one and the same, and claiming to be received intelligently, by all whom it addresses, as one doctrine, discipline, and devotion directly given from above, 387; vide Christianity; Christianity is a religion in addition to the religion of nature; and as nature has an intrinsic claim upon us to be obeyed and used, so what is over and above nature, or supernatural, must also bring with it valid testimonials of its right to demand our homage, 387–8; Christianity does not supersede or contradict nature; it recognizes and depends on it, and that of neces-
Revelation: continued.

sity; for it cannot possibly prove its claims except by an appeal to what men have already, 388; as prayer is the voice of man to God, so Revelation is the voice of God to man, 404; the expectation of a revelation may truly be considered an integral part of Natural Religion, 404–5, 422–3 (vide Natural Religion); all professed revelations have been attended, in one shape or another, with the profession of miracles, 427; the circumstances under which a professed revelation comes to us may be such as to impress both our reason and our imagination with a sense of its truth, even though no appeal be made to strictly miraculous intervention, 429; the central doctrine of Revelation is the Mediation of Christ, 487; philosophical discoveries cannot really contradict divine revelation, 258; in our intercourse with others, in business and family matters, in social and political transactions, a word or an act on the part of another is sometimes a sudden revelation; light breaks in upon us, and our whole judgment of a course of events, or of an undertaking, is changed, 338 (vide Natural Inference).

"Revolving swans proclaim the welkin near," 46.

Right and Wrong,—vide Principles, First.

Risk: to incur a risk is not to expect reverse, 193 (vide Belief).


Roman: vide Greek; 478, 485, 486; the Romans
Roman: continued.

legislated upon the basis that each nation had its own gods, 450.

Romanism, 245.

Romanus, St., 477.

Rome: 363, 469, 478; Rome is the home of political and practical wisdom, 432.

Rule of Faith: there is a great conflict of first principles among Christians about the Rule of Faith; that Scripture is the Rule of Faith is an assumption so congenial to the state of mind and course of thought usual among Protestants, that it seems to them rather a truism than a truth; yet it is by no means self-evident that all religious truth is to be found in a number of works, however sacred, which were written at different times, and did not always form one book, 379–80; Newman's defence of the Protestant view, written while he was a Protestant, 380.

Ruler, Supreme, 104 (vide Conscience).

Russia: 428; assent to religious objects is real among the quasi-Catholic population of Russia, 55.

S

Sabine Hills, 78.

Sacrifice: among the observances imposed by the professed revelations, none is more remarkable, or more general, than the rite of sacrifice, in which guilt was removed or blessing gained by an offering,
Sacrifice: continued.

which availed instead of the merits of the offerer; it falls under the doctrine of atonement, 405 (vide Atonement); in all sacrifices it was specially required that the thing offered should be something rare, and unblemished, 407.

Sages, Eastern, 450.

Saints: even Saints may suffer from imaginations in which they have no part, 217-18; the promised Deliverer has given us Saints and Angels for our protection, 489.

Samaritan Version, 442 note.

Samaritans, 386.

Sanctus, 482.

Saul, 337.

Scævola, 478.

Scavini: quoted, 187 note.

Scent, — vide Sight; memory of scents, — vide Memory.

Sceptic: 6, 32; Pascal quoted on the self-satisfied sceptic and on the scepticism of Montaigne, 310-11.

Scepticism: resolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyze your elements, sinking farther and farther, and finding "in the lowest depth a lower deep," till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism; I would rather be bound to defend the reasonableness of assuming that Christianity is true, than to demonstrate a moral governance from the physical world, 95; a reconsideration
Scepticism: continued.

of a question which has already been definitely determined need not abruptly unsettle the existing certitude of those who engage in it, or throw them into a scepticism about things in general, even though eventually they find they have been wrong in a particular matter; it would have been absurd to prohibit the controversy which has lately been held concerning the obligations of Newton to Pascal; and supposing it had issued in their being established, the partisans of Newton would not have thought it necessary to renounce their certitude of the law of gravitation itself, on the ground that they had been mistaken in their certitude that Newton discovered it, 230 (vide Certitude).

Science: science gives us the grounds or premisses from which religious truths are to be inferred; but it does not set about inferring them, much less does it reach the inference — that is not its province; it brings before us phenomena, and it leaves us, if we will, to call them works of design, wisdom, or benevolence; and further still, if we will, to proceed to confess an Intelligent Creator; we have to take its facts, and to give them a meaning, and to draw our own conclusions from them; first comes knowledge, then a view, then reasoning, and then belief; this is why science has so little of a religious tendency; deductions have no power of persuasion, 92 (vide Religion); science, working by itself, reaches truth
Science: continued.

in the abstract, and probability in the concrete, 279 (vide Formal Inference); science in all its departments has too much simplicity and exactness, from the nature of the case, to be the measure of fact; in its very perfection lies its incompetency to settle particulars and details, 284 (vide Mind); I am suspicious of scientific demonstrations in a question of concrete fact, in a discussion between fallible men, 410–11 (vide Christianity); sciences are only so many distinct aspects of nature; sometimes suggested by nature itself, sometimes created by the mind, 372.

Scots, 33.

Scott, Sir Walter: 27; quoted, 335.

Scott, Thomas, 56.

Scripture: the mere knowledge of Scripture, at least in England, has to a certain point made up for great and grievous losses in its Christianity; the reiteration again and again, in fixed course in the public service, of the words of inspired teachers under both Covenants, and that in grave majestic English, has in matter of fact been to our people a vast benefit; it has attuned their minds to religious thoughts; it has given them a high moral standard; it has served them in associating religion with compositions which, even humanly considered, are among the most sublime and beautiful ever written; especially, it has impressed upon them the series of Divine
Scripture: continued.

Providences in behalf of man from his creation to his end, and, above all, the words, deeds, and sacred sufferings of Him in whom all the Providences of God centre, 56–7 (vide England, Church of); what Scripture especially illustrates, from its first page to its last, is God's Providence; and that is nearly the only doctrine held with a real assent by the mass of religious Englishmen, 57; to the devout and spiritual, the Divine Word speaks of things, not merely of notions; to the disconsolate, the tempted, the perplexed, the suffering, there comes, by means of their very trials, an enlargement of thought, which enables them to see in it what they never saw before; henceforth there is to them a reality in its teachings, which they recognize as an argument, and the best of arguments, for its divine origin, 79; the purpose of meditation is to realize the Gospels; to make the facts which they relate stand out before our minds as objects, such as may be appropriated by a faith as living as the imagination which apprehends them, 79; as regards the mere popular preacher, his very mode of reading, whether warnings or prayers, is as if he thought the more solemn parts of the sacred volume to be little more than fine writing, poetical in sense, musical in sound, and worthy of inspiration; the most awful truths are to him but sublime or beautiful conceptions, and are adduced and used by him, in season and out of season, for
Scripture: continued.

his own purposes, for embellishing his style or rounding his periods; but let his heart at length be ploughed by some keen grief or deep anxiety, and Scripture is a new book to him, 79–80; witness the confession of the patriarch Job, when he contrasts his apprehension of the Almighty before and after his afflictions, 80; the sacred book is addressed far more to the imagination and affections than to the intellect, 132; Scripture as the Rule of Faith, — vide Rule of Faith; the fundamental dogma of Protestantism is the exclusive authority of Holy Scripture, 243; 200, 244, 245, 246.

Search: the pleasure of a search, like that of a hunt, lies in the searching, and ends at the point at which the pleasure of certitude begins, 207.

"See His day, and are glad," 464.

"Seeing is believing," 12.

Self: trust in self, — vide Faculty; what is more rare than self-knowledge? 188; as we use the (so-called) elements without first criticizing what we have no command over, so is it much more unmeaning in us to criticize or find fault with our own nature, which is nothing else than we ourselves, instead of using it according to the use of which it ordinarily admits; our being, with its faculties, mind and body, is a fact not admitting of question, all things being of necessity referred to it, not it to other things; if I may not assume that I exist, and in a particular
SELF: continued.

way, that is, with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate about, and had better let speculation alone; there is no medium between using my faculties, as I have them, and flinging myself upon the external world according to the random impulse of the moment, as spray upon the surface of the waves, and simply forgetting that I am; I cannot think, reflect, or judge about my being, without starting from the very point which I aim at concluding; my ideas are all assumptions, and I am ever moving in a circle; my only business is to ascertain what I am, in order to put it to use (vide Function); what I have to ascertain is the laws under which I live; my first elementary lesson of duty is that of resignation to the laws of my nature, whatever they are; my first disobedience is to be impatient at what I am, and to indulge an ambitious aspiration after what I cannot be, to cherish a distrust of my powers, and to desire to change laws which are identical with myself, 346-7 (vide Being, and Man).

SELF-MADE: it is man's gift to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self-made, 349 (vide Man).

SEMPRONIUS, 32.

SENSE: when we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived through the senses, we mean a certain representation, true as far as it goes,
Sense: continued.

but not adequate, 103 (vide Phenomena, and Substance); our senses at times deceive us, and have to be corrected by each other, 261; an object of sense presents itself to our view as one whole, and not in its separate details: we take it in, recognize it, and discriminate it from other objects, all at once, 301; it is on no probability that we are constantly receiving the informations and dictates of sense and memory, of our intellectual instincts, of the moral sense, and of the logical faculty, 239; we are each of us ever gaining through our senses various certainties, which no one shares with us, 242; vide Statement of the Case.

Sense of Certitude is the clear witness to what is true, 233.

Sentiment, whether imaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay, when sense cannot be called into exercise, 121.

Septuagint, 442 note.

Sermon on the Mount, 448, 455.

Shakespeare, 15, 33, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 298, 494.

Sheridan, 276.

Shiloh, 442 note.

Sibyl, 296.

Sight: memory of sights,—vide Memory; sights sway us as scents do not; our sense of seeing is able to open to its object, as our sense of smell cannot open to its own; its objects are able to awaken the
Sight: continued.

mind, take possession of it, inspire it, act through it, with an energy and variousness which is not found in the case of scents and their apprehension, 36–7; all men, as time goes on, have the prospect of losing that keenness of sight and hearing which they possessed in their youth, 123.

Simon Magus, 462.

Simple Assent: simple assent is that mode of assent which is exercised unconsciously, 189 (vide Assent); it is material, or interpretative, or virtual certitude, 211–12.

Sin: in his proof of Christianity, Newman assumes the presence of God in our conscience, and the universal experience, as keen as our experience of bodily pain, of what we call a sense of sin or guilt; this sense of sin, as of something not only evil in itself, but an affront to the good God, is chiefly felt as regards one or other of three violations of His law; He Himself is Sanctity, Truth, and Love; and the three offences against His Majesty are impurity, inveracity, and cruelty; all men are not distressed at these offences alike; but the piercing pain and sharp remorse which one or other inflicts upon the mind, till habituated to them, brings home to it the notion of what sin is, and is the vivid type and representative of its intrinsic hatefulness, 417 (vide Natural Religion).

"Sinners of the Gentiles," 446.
SIRIUS, 72.
SISYPHUS, 208.
SIXTUS, Bishop of Rome, 483.
SKILL, — vide TASTE.

SLAVE-TRADE: the iniquity of the slave-trade ought to have been acknowledged by all men from the first; it was acknowledged by many, but it needed an organized agitation, with tracts and speeches innumerable, so to affect the imagination of men as to make their acknowledgment of that iniquitous-ness operative, 77.

SMYRNA, 480, 481.
"So may all Thy enemies perish," etc., 485.
"So persecuted they the Prophets that were before you," 453.

SOCINIANISM, 245.
SOCRATES, 250.
SOLOMON, 376.
SON OF GOD, 449 (vide CHRISTIANITY).
SON OF MAN, 449 (vide CHRISTIANITY), 485.
SOUND, memory of, — vide MEMORY.
SOUTH SEAS, 393.

SPACE: "Space is not infinite, for nothing but the Creator is such": — starting from this thesis as a theological information to be assumed as a fact, though not one of experience, we arrive at once at an insoluble mystery; for if space be not infinite, it is finite, and finite space is a contradiction in notions, space, as such, implying the absence of boundaries;
Space: continued.

here it is our notion that carries us beyond the fact, and in opposition to it, showing that from the first what we apprehend of space does not in all respects correspond to the thing, of which indeed we have no image, 51–2.

Spain: 304; among the population of the Spain of this day assent to religious objects is real, not notional, 55.

Speculation: speculation is commonly taken to mean a conjecture, or a venture on chances; but its proper meaning is mental sight, or the contemplation of mental operations and their results as opposed to experience, experiment, or sense; it denotes those notional assents which are the most direct, explicit, and perfect of their kind, viz., those which are the firm, conscious acceptance of propositions as true; this kind of assent includes the assent to all reasoning and its conclusions, to all general propositions, to all rules of conduct, to all proverbs, aphorisms, sayings, and reflections on men and society, 73.

"Speculative Certitude," 326.

Speculator, — vide Theorist.

Spelman, 276, 428.

Spenser, 276.

"Stat pro ratione voluntas," 171.

Statement of the Case: the statement of the case depends on the particular aspect under which we view a subject, that is, on the abstraction which forms our representative notion of what it is, 371–2;
Statement of the Case: continued.

thus, (1) one of the simplest and broadest aspects under which to view the physical world is that of a system of final causes, or, on the other hand, of initial or effective causes, 372 (vide Bacon),—

(2) a great lawyer, judge, or advocate sometimes is able in perplexed cases to detect the principle which rightly interprets the riddle, and converts a chaos into an orderly and luminous whole, 372,—

(3) such aspects are often unreal, as being mere exhibitions of ingenuity, not of true originality of mind; this is especially the case in what are called philosophical views of history, 372–3,—

(4) the aspect under which we view things is often intensely personal; each of us looks at the world in his own way, and does not know that perhaps it is characteristically his own; this is the case even as regards the senses; some men have little perception of colours; some recognize one or two; how poorly can we appreciate the beauties of nature, if our eyes discern, on the face of things, only an Indian-ink or a drab creation! 373,—

(5) each of us abstracts the relation of line to line in his own personal way,—as one man might apprehend a curve as convex, another as concave; again, when it has been asked in a chance company, which way certain of the great letters of the alphabet look, one half of the party considered the letters in question to look to the left, while the other half thought they looked to the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: continued.
right, 373-4, — (6) men form distinct judgments upon hand-writing; some men may have a talent for deciphering from it the intellectual and moral character of the writer, which others have not, 374, — (7) at the beginning of this century, it was a subject of serious, nay, of angry controversy, whether it began with January 1800, or January 1801, 375; these instances, because they are so casual, suggest how it comes to pass, that men differ so widely from each other in religious and moral perceptions, 375 (vide Truth).

STOIC, 38, 39, 250.
"Strong consolation," 239.
"Struggling in the storms of fate," 38.

STYX, 460.

SUBJECT: the subject of a proposition need not be apprehended *per se* in order to a genuine assent: for it is the very thing which the predicate has to elucidate, and therefore by its formal place in the proposition, so far as it is the subject, it is something unknown, something which the predicate makes known, 14.

SUBSTANCE: the evidence which we have of the presence of the individual beings which surround us lies in the phenomena which address our senses, and our warrant for taking these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence; by the law of our nature we associate those sensible
SUBSTANCE: continued.

phenomena or impressions with certain units, individuals, substances, whatever they are to be called, which are outside and out of the reach of sense, and we picture them to ourselves in those phenomena, 102–3 (vide PHENOMENA).

SUETONIUS: quoted, 444, 477.

"Suffered all nations to walk in their own ways," 401.

SUFFERING: all human suffering is in its last resolution the punishment of sin, 407; vide NATURAL RELIGION, Evil, and Atonement.

SUPREME BEING, — vide God.

SURGERY, — vide Medicine.

SWITZERLAND, 303.

SYLLOGISM: first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism; tell men to gain notions of a Creator from His works, and, if they were to set about it (which nobody does) they would be jaded and wearied by the labyrinth they were tracing; their minds would be gorged and surfeited by the logical operation, 94 (vide Science, and Religion); the first step in the inferential method is to throw the question to be decided into the form of a proposition; then to throw the proof itself into propositions, the force of the proof lying in the comparison of these propositions with each other; when the analysis is carried out fully and put into form, it becomes the Aristotelic syllogism, 263 (vide Certitude, Universals, Logic, Formal In-
Syllogism: continued.

ference, and Informal Inference); Aristotelic argumentation compares two given words separately with a third, and then determines how they stand towards each other, in a bonâ fide identity of sense; in consequence, its formal process is best conducted by means of symbols, A, B, and C; while it keeps to these, it is safe; it has the cogency of mathematical reasoning, and draws its conclusions by a rule as unerring as it is blind; symbolical notation, then, being the perfection of the syllogistic method, it follows that, when words are substituted for symbols, it will be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import as much as possible, lest perchance A should not always exactly mean A, and B mean B, 266 (vide Words); syllogisms have little to do with the formation of opinion, 277; example of a syllogism presented to an educated, thoughtful Protestant for his acceptance, 288; a syllogism is a demonstration when the premisses are granted, 293; syllogism, though of course it has its use, still does only the minutest and easiest part of the work, in the investigation of truth, for when there is any difficulty, that difficulty commonly lies in determining first principles, not in the arrangement of proofs, 270; it is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premisses, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms,—by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized,
SYLLOGISM: continued.

by difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for correlations found with received truths, by suspense and delay in the process issuing in triumphant reactions,—by all these ways, and many others, it is that the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession, 321; if I am asked to use Paley's argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their hearts, 425; vide LANGUAGE, and MIND.

SYLVESTER, PROFESSOR: "Professor Sylvester has just discovered the proof of Sir Isaac Newton's rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations," 333, SYMPHORIAN, of Autun: words of, 482.

SYSTEMATIZERS, — vide ACTION OF LIFE

T

Τὰ πρακτά, 353 note.

TACITUS: 27, 296, 297; quoted, 443-4, 469-70.

"Take, my brethren, for an example of suffering evil," etc., 453.

"Take to Himself His great power and reign," 485.

TARGUM, 442 note.

TARTARUS, 460.
Taste: vide Beautiful; taste, skill, invention in the fine arts — and so, again, discretion or judgment in conduct — are exerted spontaneously, when once acquired, and could not give a clear account of themselves, or of their mode of proceeding; they do not go by rule, though to a certain point their exercise may be analyzed, and may take the shape of an art or method, 338.

Tastes, memory of,— vide Memory.


Te Deum, 133.

"Te quoque mensorem," 296.

Tell, William, 10.

Terence, 296, 297.

Tertullian: quoted, 469, 475, 485-6.

Test, — vide Criterion.

"The birds of the air should dwell in its branches," 456.

"The foolishness of preaching," 453.


"The Holy Ghost is God": as to the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, consider the breviary offices for Pentecost and its Octave, the grandest, perhaps, in the whole year; are they created out of mere abstractions and inferences, or what are sometimes called metaphysical distinctions, or has not the categorical proposition of St. Athanasius, "The Holy Ghost is God," such a place in the imagination and the heart as suffices to give birth to the noble Hymns Veni Creator, and Veni Sancte Spiritus? 140.
"The hope of glory," 452.
"The king can do no wrong," 67.
"The kingdom is like to a net," etc., 455.
"The meek shall inherit the earth," 452.
"THE MESSIAS IS GOD": all through the Old Testament, what is it which gives an interpretation and a persuasive power to so many passages and portions, especially of the Psalms and the Prophets, but this same theological formula, "The Messias is God," a proposition which never could thus vivify in the religious mind the letter of the sacred text, unless it appealed to the imagination, and could be held with a much stronger assent than any that is merely notional, 139.
"The mind's eye," 23.
"The mystery which had been hidden from ages and generations," etc., 452.
"The pillar and ground of the Truth," 149.
"The Psalm that gathers in one glorious lay," etc., 133.
"The quality of mercy is not strained," 15.
"The sceptre shall not be taken away from Judah," etc., 442.
"THE SON IS GOD": what an illustration of the real assent which can be given to this proposition, and its power over our affections and emotions, is the first half of the first chapter of St. John's gospel! or again the vision of our Lord in the first chapter of
"The Son is God": continued.

the Apocalypse! or the first chapter of St. John's first Epistle! again, how burning are St. Paul's words when he speaks of our Lord's crucifixion and death! what is the secret of that flame, but this same dogmatic sentence, "The Son is God"? why should the death of the Son be more awful than any other death, except that He, though man, was God? 138-9.

"The time is accomplished, and the kingdom of God is at hand," etc., 451.

"The weak things of the earth confound the strong," 453.

"The wicked flees, when no one pursueth," 110.

"The word of God has been made of none effect by the traditions of men," 246.

Theism, 245, 433.
Theist: 85, 101, 103; no one is to be called a Theist, who does not believe in a Personal God, 124.
Theobald, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276.
Theocracy, 433.
Theodoret: quoted, 469.
Theological Opinion, — vide Opinion.
Theology: theology, as such, always is notional, as being scientific, 55, 140; vide God, and Dogmatic Theology.
Theophorus, 479.
Theorist: what is the meaning of the distrust, which is ordinarily felt, of speculators and theorists but
Theorist: continued.

this, that they are dead to the necessity of personal prudence and judgment to qualify and complete their logic? 278-9.

Theotocos, 245.

"There's a Divinity that shapes our ends," etc., 85.

"There's nae luck," 28.

Thessalian, 477.

Theudas, 450.

Thing: all things in the exterior world are unit and individual, and are nothing else, 9; vide Concrete.

"Thirty days has September," 337.

"Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent," etc., 467.

"Thou hast no speculation in those eyes," 73.

Thought: to meddle with the springs of thought and action is really to weaken them, 217 (vide Introspection); vide Mind.

Thoughts, Pascal's: quoted, 307-8, 310-11.

Tiberius, 27, 28, 469.

Tiburtius, St., 477.

Titus: 32; siege of Jerusalem by Titus, 435.

Toledo, Council of, 134.

Tory, 32, 85.

"Totus, teres, atque rotundus," 126.

Trade, 14.

Trajan: 470, 478; his words to St. Ignatius, the disciple of the Apostles, 479.

Translation: in literary examinations, it is a test of
Translation: continued.

good scholarship to be able to construe aright, without the aid of understanding the sentiment, action, or historical occurrence conveyed in the passage thus accurately rendered, let it be a battle in Livy, or some subtle train of thought in Virgil or Pindar, 22.

"Tres et Unus" is the key-note, as it may be called, of the Athanasian Creed, 125.

Trials, — vide Scripture.

Tridentine Canons: quoted, 146.

Trinity: the word "Trinity" belongs to those notions of the Supreme Being which are forced on us by the necessity of our finite conceptions, the real and immutable distinction which exists between Person and Person implying in itself no infringement of His real and numerical Unity, 50; vide Holy Trinity.

True and False, — vide Principles, First.

Trust in our powers of reasoning and memory,—vide Faculty, and Self.

Truth: what to one intellect is a proof is not so to another, and the certainty of a proposition does not properly consist in the certitude of the mind which contemplates it; and this of course may be said without prejudice to the objective truth or falsehood of propositions, since it does not follow that these propositions on the one hand are not true, and based on right reason, and those on the other not
false, and based on false reason, because not all men discriminate them in the same way, 293; the force of Pascal's argument depending upon the assumption that the facts of Christianity are beyond human nature, therefore, according as the powers of nature are placed at a high or low standard, that force will be greater or less; and that standard will vary according to the respective dispositions, opinions, and experiences of those to whom the argument is addressed; thus its value is a personal question; not as if there were not an objective truth and Christianity as a whole not supernatural, but that, when we come to consider where it is that the supernatural presence is found, there may be fair differences of opinion, both as to the fact and the proof of what is supernatural, 310; shall we say that there is no such thing as truth and error, but that anything is truth to a man which he troweth? and not rather, as the solution of a great mystery, that truth there is, and attainable it is, but that its rays stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual being; and that in consequence that perception of its first principles which is natural to us is enfeebled, obstructed, perverted, by allurements of sense and the supremacy of self, and, on the other hand, quickened by aspirations after the supernatural? 311; it does not prove that there is no objective truth, because not all men are in pos-
TRUTH: continued.

session of it; or that we are not responsible for the associations which we attach, and the relations which we assign, to the objects of the intellect; but this it does suggest to us, that there is something deeper in our differences than the accident of external circumstances; and that we need the interposition of a Power, greater than human teaching and human argument, to make our beliefs true and our minds one, 375 (vide Statement of the Case); truth certainly, as such, rests upon grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstractedly demonstrative, but it does not follow from this that the arguments producible in its favour are unanswerable and irresistible; these latter epithets are relative, and bear upon matters of fact; arguments in themselves ought to do what perhaps in the particular case they cannot do; the fact of revelation is in itself demonstrably true, but it is not therefore true irresistibly; else, how comes it to be resisted? there is a vast distance between what it is in itself, and what it is to us; light is a quality of matter, as truth is of Christianity; but light is not recognized by the blind, and there are those who do not recognize truth, from the fault, not of truth, but of themselves, 410; since a Good Providence watches over us, He blesses such means of argument as it has pleased Him to give us, in the nature of man and of the world, if we use them duly for those ends for which He has given
Truth: continued.

them; and, as in mathematics we are justified by the dictate of nature in withholding our assent from a conclusion of which we have not yet a strict logical demonstration, so by a like dictate we are not justified, in the case of concrete reasoning and especially of religious inquiry, in waiting till such logical demonstration is ours, but on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of proof, which, when reduced to the shape of formal propositions, fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science, 412 (vide Probabilities, and Mind); it is the way with some men to pronounce that there is no religious love of truth where there is fear of error; on the contrary, I would maintain that the fear of error is simply necessary to the genuine love of truth; no inquiry comes to good which is not conducted under a deep sense of responsibility, and of the issues depending upon its determination, 426; in considering Christianity, Newman starts with conditions different from Paley's; not as undervaluing the force and the serviceableness of his argument, but as preferring inquiry to disputation in a question about truth, 427 (vide Syllogism); vide Conscientiousness, Concrete, and Man; test of truth,—vide Criterion.

Truth-Like: the object of assent is a truth, the object of inference is the truth-like or a verisimilitude, 259.
Trypho: quoted, 468.
Turkey, 303, 304.

U
Uncertitude: instances of an adherence to propositions, which does not fulfil the conditions of certainty, 200–2; the various phenomena of mind referred to, though signs, are not infallible signs of uncertitude; they may proceed, in the particular case, from other circumstances; such anxieties and alarms may be merely emotional and from the imagination, not intellectual; a man's over-earnestness in argument may arise from zeal or charity; his impatience from loyalty to the truth; his extravagance from want of taste, from enthusiasm, or from youthful ardour; and his restless recurrence to argument, not from personal disquiet, but from a vivid appreciation of the controversial talent of an opponent, or of his own, or of the mere philosophical difficulties of the subject in dispute; but these points do not interfere with the broad principle, that to fear argument is to doubt the conclusion, and to be certain of a truth is to be careless of objections to it, 202–3.

Unconscious Assent: that mode of assent which is exercised unconsciously is simple assent, 189; in proportion to our ignorance of self, is our unconsciousness of those innumerable acts of assent, which we are incessantly making; and so again in
Unconscious Assent: continued.

what may be almost called the mechanical operation of our minds, in our continual acts of apprehension and inference, speculation, and resolve, propositions pass before us and receive our assent without our consciousness; hence it is that we are so apt to confuse together acts of assent and acts of inference, 188–9.

Understanding: the word understanding is of uncertain meaning, standing sometimes for the faculty or act of conceiving a proposition, sometimes for that of comprehending it; it is possible to apprehend without understanding, 19; vide Apprehension.

Uniformity of the laws of nature,—vide Laws of Nature.

Unitarian, 245, 250.

Unitarianism, 251.

Universal: what is not universal has no claim to be considered natural, right, or of divine origin; thus we may determine prayer to be part of Natural Religion, from such instances of the usage as are supplied by the priests of Baal and by dancing Dervishes, without therefore including in our notions of prayer the frantic excesses of the one, or the artistic spinning of the other, or sanctioning their respective objects of belief, Baal or Mahomet, 404; what is universal is natural, 405.

Universals: universals are ever at war with each other; what is called a universal is only a general;
Universals: continued.

what is only general does not lead to a necessary conclusion; "Latet dolus in generalibus"; they are arbitrary and fallacious, if we take them for more than broad views and aspects of things, serving as our notes and indications for judging of the particular, but not absolutely touching and determining facts, 279; let units come first, and (so-called) universals second; let universals minister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals; John, Richard, and Robert are individual things, independent, incommunicable; we may find some kind of common measure between them, and we may give it the name of man, man as such, the typical man, the auto-anthropos; we are justified in so doing, and in investing it with general attributes, and bestowing on it what we consider a definition; but we think we may go on to impose our definition on the whole race, and to every member of it; each of them is what he is, in spite of it; not any one of them is man, as such, or coincides with the auto-anthropos; another John is not necessarily rational, because "all men are rational," for he may be an idiot; since, as a rule, men are rational, progressive, and social, there is a high probability of this rule being true in the case of a particular person; but we must know him to be sure of it, 279–80 (vide Nature); this illustrated in the case of Elias, 280–1; vide Man; no real thing admits, by any calculus of logic, of
Universals: continued.

being dissected into all the possible general notions which it admits, nor, in consequence, of being re-composed out of them; though the attempt thus to treat it is more unpromising in proportion to the intricacy and completeness of its make; we cannot see through any one of the myriad beings which make up the universe, or give the full catalogue of its belongings; we are accustomed, indeed, and rightly, to speak of the Creator Himself as incomprehensible; and, indeed, He is so by an incommunicable attribute; but in a certain sense each of His creatures is incomprehensible to us also, in the sense that no one has a perfect understanding of them but He; we recognize and appropriate aspects of them, and logic is useful to us in registering these aspects and what they imply; but it does not give us to know even one individual being, 282–3 (vide Logic).

Universe: if we may justly regard the universe, according to the meaning of the word, as one whole, we may also believe justly that to know one part of it is necessarily to know much more than that one part, 260.

University Sermons, Newman's, 396 note.

“Unknown God,” 388.

“Unusquisque in suo sensu abundet,” 411.

“Urbem, quam dicunt Romam, Melibœæ, putavi,” etc., 26.
USEFUL ARTS: as regards the useful arts and personal accomplishments, we use the word "skill," but proficiency in engineering or in ship-building, or again in engraving, or again in singing, in playing instruments, in acting, or in gymnastic exercises, is as simply one with its particular subject-matter as the human soul with its particular body, and is, in its own department, a sort of instinct or inspiration, not an obedience to external rules of criticism or of science, 358.

"Usum non tollit abusus," 232.

"Ut pueris placeat et declamatio fiat," 490.

UTICA, 484.

V

VANDALS, 376.

"Varium et mutabile semper fœmina," 11, 64.

VENGEANCE: the doctrine of retributive punishment, or of divine vengeance, is not incompatible with the true religion, 419-20; it is even far from clear that an act of vengeance must, as such, be a sin in our own instance; but, first from the certainty that, if habitual, it will run into excess and become sin, and next because the office of punishment has not been committed to us, and further because it is a feeling unsuitable to those who are themselves so laden with imperfection and guilt, therefore vengeance, in itself allowable, is forbidden to us; these exceptions do not hold in the case of a perfect being, and
Vengeance: continued.
certainly not in the instance of the Supreme Judge; nor must it be forgotten, that retributive justice is the very attribute under which God is primarily brought before us in the teachings of our natural conscience, 420 (vide Conscience); and further, we cannot determine the character of particular actions, till we have the whole case before us out of which they arise; unless, indeed, they are in themselves distinctively vicious; it is difficult to trace the path and to determine the scope of Divine Providence; we read of a day when the Almighty will condescend to place His actions in their completeness before His creatures; if, till then, we feel it to be a duty to suspend our judgment concerning certain of His actions or precepts, we do no more than what we do every day in the case of an earthly friend or enemy, whose conduct in some point requires explanation, 420–1 (vide Providence).

Veni Creator, 133, 140.
Veni Sancte Spiritus, 140.
"Verily Thou art a hidden God," etc., 352.
Verisimilitude, — vide Truth-Like.
Vestal Virgins, 10.
Vettius Epagathus, 481.
Vice "from its hardness takes a polish too," 47.
Victoria, 225.
Vince on the proofs of the earth's rotatory motion, 318–19.
Virgil, 11, 22, 26, 29, 296, 297, 308.

Virtual Certitude, — vide Material Certitude.

Virtue: as we form our notion of whiteness from the actual sight of snow, milk, a lily, or a cloud, so, after experiencing the sentiment of approbation which arises in us on the sight of certain acts one by one, we go on to assign to that sentiment a cause, and to those acts a quality, and we give to this notional cause or quality the name of virtue, which is an abstraction, not a thing, 64; there are a hundred memories, as there are a hundred virtues; virtue is one indeed in the abstract; but, in fact, gentle and kind natures are not therefore heroic, and prudent and self-controlled minds need not be open-handed; at the utmost such virtue is one only in posse; as developed in the concrete, it takes the shape of species which in no sense imply each other, 341 (vide Ratiocinative Faculty, and Phronesis).

"Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied," 15–16.

"Vox et præterea nihil," 276.

Vulgate, 442.

W

Wallace, 10.

Warburton, 373.

Warton, 46.

Watchwords: as regards political and religious watchwords, first one man of name and then another adopts them, till their use becomes popular, and
Watchwords: continued.
then every one professes them, because every one else does; such words are "liberality," "progress," "private judgment," "Ultramontanism"—all of which, in the mouths of conscientious thinkers, have a definite meaning, but are used by the multitude as war-cries, nicknames, and shibboleths, with scarcely enough of the scantiest grammatical apprehension of them to allow of their being considered in truth more than assertions, 43–4 (vide MERE Assertion).
"We are reviled and bless," etc., 453.
"We hunger and thirst, and are naked," etc., 453.
"We preach Christ crucified," 466.
Weather-Wise Peasant, 332 (vide Peasant)
Wesley, 56.
Wesleyan, 32.
"What creature is that, which in the morning goes on four legs," etc., 48.
"When the Lord turned the captivity of Sion," etc., 219–20.
Whig, 32.
"Who is she that looketh forth at the dawn," etc., 378.
"Who knew many cities of men and many minds," 27.
Wilberforce, Mr., 77, 78.
"Will overcome when He is judged," 421.
"With eyes too tremulously awake," etc., 203.
"With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee," etc., 80.
"With the upright Thou shalt be upright," etc., 434.
"Woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel," 141.

Wonderful: wonderful events before now have apparently been nothing but coincidences, certainly; but they do not become less wonderful by cataloguing their constituent causes, unless we also show how these came to be constituent, 458 (vide Law).


Words: logical inference proposes to provide both a test and a common measure of reasoning; and I think it will be found partly to succeed and partly to fail; succeeding so far as words can in fact be found for representing the countless varieties and subtleties of human thought, failing on account of the fallacy of the original assumption, that whatever can be thought can be adequately expressed in words, 264; words, which denote things, have innumerable implications; but in inferential exercises it is the very triumph of that clearness and hardness of head, which is the characteristic talent for the art, to have stripped them of all these connatural senses, to have drained them of that depth and breadth of associations which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life, to have starved each term down till it has become the ghost of itself, and everywhere one and the same ghost, "omnibus umbra locis," so that it may stand for just one unreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs, for a relation, a generaliza-
INDEXED SYNOPSIS OF GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

Words: continued.

tion, or other abstraction, for a notion neatly turned out of the laboratory of the mind, and sufficiently tame and subdued, because existing only in a definition, 267 (vide Syllogism, and Language).

World, — vide External World.

Writing is a memoria technica, or logic of the memory, 337, 261.

Y — Z

"You shall be hated of all men for My name's sake," 452.

"Your life is hid with Christ in God," etc., 466.

Zoologist: the Proverb says, "Ex pede Herculem"; and we have actual experience how the practised zoologist can build up some intricate organization from the sight of its smallest bone, evoking the whole as if it were a remembrance, 260–1.